Political Opportunity Structure Moderates the Legacy of Political Violence

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March 29, 2018

Abstract

What is the legacy of political violence? Previous studies render the contradictory evidence of whether the victims of political violence and their predecessors would punish the former authoritarian party by voting after the democratization. This article suggests that the perceived political opportunity structure would moderate the effect of political violence on the vote choice and political participation after decades. The victims and their predecessors will punish the former authoritarian party only if their district is not dominated by it. If it is, they would instead vote for the former authoritarian party. This hypothesis is supported by a newly published Taiwan Holocaust Data that listed 13,206 victims of political violence during the martial law period in Taiwan (1949-1987). Whether the former authoritarian party KMT dominates in the county moderates the correlation between the percentage of victims before and KMT’s voteshare in the local elections after the democratization in 1987. Additional evidence is found on the reanalysis of a Crimea Tatars cross-generational survey. The result provides important implications for the social coordination, preference falsification, and transitional justice.

Keywords. Political Violence; Voting Behavior, Opportunity Structure, Democratization
Introduction

What is the legacy of political violence? If the violent repression during the authoritarian regime motivated citizens for seeking the democratization, how the citizens transferred and transmitted their previous experience into the current democratic era plays a vital role in the process of democratic consolidation. The citizens’ response to the previous political violence will decide how much the democracy could be self-enforcing (Przeworski, 2006; Fearon, 2011). The legacy of political violence will also foretell whether the ultimate goal of transitional justice – to prevent the political violence from happening again – could ever be achieved.¹

Given its importance, empirical analysis linking political violence and its long-term consequence on political participation after democratization do not draw too much attention to political scientists until recently (Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017). Studies of conflict and political participation mostly focus on the impact of the direct experience of conflict on vote choice and policy preference (e.g. Balcells, 2012; Blattman, 2009). The lack of study of this topic is understandable for several reasons by nature. First, it may be sensitive or may induce post-traumatic stress to discuss with victims on their previous experience of political violence. Second, the former dictator or his followers may still be active in the regime after democratization, which prevents the available records from being accessed. Meanwhile, such political context would also easily politicize the results of any academic findings related to this topic. Third, the records of political violence during the authoritarian regime is usually incomplete, if not destroyed.

Three recent studies start to estimate the long-term effect of political violence systematically. Unfortunately, the three analyses seem to reveal contradicting results. Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017) investigate Stalin and USSR’s deporting of 250,000 western Ukrainians to Siberia between 1943 and 1955. By mapping the declassified incident reports

¹For The definition and aim of transitional justice, see the official website of International Center of Transitional Justice, https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice. Access: March 19, 2018
from numerous institutions to the contemporary district boundaries, the author shows that
the WWII-era violence significantly lowers the district-level support of Pro-Russian candi-
dates in western Ukraine after 2004. Intuitively, citizens and their family members who had
ever suffered from the political violence in the former authoritarian regime would show less
support toward the parties or candidates who are associated with the former authority.

However, the other two studies render mixed results. Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) con-
ducted surveys to 2,000 Crimean Tatars who were deported to Central Asia by USSR between
1944 and 1989. They interviewed the first, second, and third generations with at least one
living survivor of the deportation. Even though the authors show that the third generation
of the victims is less supportive of unifying with Russia, these young people had a higher
turnout rate in the Russia-backed Crimean secession referendum on March 2014, in which
the "Join Russian Federation" option received 96.7% of total votes. The authors explain
the finding that "...this participation seems motivated by opposition to potential renewed
persecution, not by posttraumatic growth."

Meanwhile, Osorio, Schubiger and Weintraub (2018) estimate the impact of forced disap-
ppearance during the Mexico Dirty War in the 1970s and 1980s. Based on the archival work
of independent historians and scholars, the authors show that the 800 forced disappearance
caused by the PRI government is associated with lower social welfare and security capacity
in the municipality-level measured in 2012. "Contrary to the expectation," the authors also
found that forced disappearance positively correlates with municipal income derived from
local taxes, which is an essential indicator of citizen compliance. The authors did not explain
this result.

How do we reconcile these seemingly contradicting results? Why do victims and their
neighborhoods disapprove the Pro-Russian candidate in western Ukraine, while complying
with the Russia-backed referendum and PRI government which returned to power in 2012?
Political Opportunity and Legacy of Political Violence

In this article, I argue that the political opportunity structure in the local level moderates the legacy of the political violence on citizens’ political participation in the long run. People do remember their suffering experience and the repressed stories told by their ancestors. What did people learn from the stories? On the one hand, people may learn the importance of freedom and democracy, and defend the democratic regime by voting against the former dictator or the resurgence of authoritarianism. On the other hand, people may also perceive the importance of compliance – if there is no chance to win, it would be better to comply with the authority for survival.

In other words, citizens may reflect their experience of political violence on voting like the mechanism of preference falsification that Kuran (1997) described. In the literature of revolution and democratization, whether people would punish the wrongdoing government is usually formalized as a Prisoners’ Dilemma (Axelrod, 1981; Weingast, 1997; Ostrom, 1998; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001); how others behave matter. Empirical studies also evidence that the one’s social network plays an essential role in the decision to join the protest (e.g. Opp and Roehl, 1990). Even though a citizen living under the democratic regime, if the former authoritarian party has dominated his district since the democratization, such as PRI in Mexico or KMT in Taiwan (Magaloni, 2006), the citizen is reasonable to hide her suffering experience but support the former aggressor. In short, the political opportunity structure matters.

Among the three existing studies mentioned above, the political opportunity structure theory seems to reconcile the conflicting research findings. In the first case, western Ukraine has been dominated by the anti-Russian party since its independence in 1994. People who lived in west Ukraine were safe to share their story and express the hostile attitude toward Russia. Thus, the deportation is adversely associated with pro-Russian votes in those dis-
tricts. In contrast, the Crimea survey was conducted right after the 2014 referendum, in which the pro-Russian wave reached its maximum. In such scenario, it is useless and even dangerous to vote against joining Russian Federation. In the case of Mexico, the long-term dominated party PRI just won over the presidency and both chambers in 2012, in which the authors started the data collection. PRI also won the majority in many districts that forced disappearance happened.

Unfortunately, the unique setting of the previous studies prevented us to further investigate the interplay between political opportunity and the legacy of political violence in a systematic manner. The deportation happened in the western Ukraine that anti-Russian party already dominated, and the forced disappearance in Mexico was concentrated in few states (more than half were in Guerrero).

Indeed, the Crimea Tatars case could render some preliminary evidence by comparing respondents’ behavior in the referendum and the following parliament election. Since the opposition party was able to win 5 out of 75 seats in the 2014 election, Crimea Tatars may express their dissent through their vote choice rather than boycott. At the end of this article, I will exploit Lupu and Peisakhin (2017)’s valuable survey data to show how political opportunity structure moderates the vote choice of the third generation Crimea Tatars.

**White Terror in Taiwan, 1949 - 1987**

Before the revisit, this article will mainly focus on the case of Taiwan. To be specific, I will analyze how the White Terror during the martial law period (1949 - 1987) influenced the electoral outcomes after the democratization of this island in 1987.

White Terror was a series of violent repression after the KMT troops were defeated by CCP in the Chinese Civil War and retreated to Taiwan in 1949. On May 19, 1949, the KMT government announced martial law in Taiwan and passed Act for the Control and
Punishment of Rebellion one week later. During the martial law period, political dissidents were usually labeled as the CCP spy and were then detained, interrogated, or executed. Since the apparent goal of the leader Chiang Kai-shek at that time was to counterattack and recover the mainland China, any citizen in Taiwan who failed to express the "firm support" toward the counterattack would be arrested or killed by the Taiwan Garrison Command, a secret police body who was responsible to enforce the martial law. No opposition party can be formed in this period, and the assembly and association were outlawed. After several waves of protests led by the non-KMT activists (Dang-wai in Mandarin or Tong gon in Taiwanese) and critics from many countries, the martial law was lifted by the President Chiang Ching-Kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, on 15 July 1987. The non-KMT activists were called, since no opposition party can be formed during the martial law period.

(Un) Fortunately, there are four relative advantages to exploit the case of Taiwan on testing the legacy of political violence. First of all, the former ruling party KMT still exists and is one of the major party in the contemporary Taiwan politics. KMT even won in 1996, 2008, and 2012 Taiwanese presidential election. In comparison, the pro-Russian party in Ukraine was not those who conducted deportation under USSR. Second, the scale of the White Terror was far more extensive than the case of forced disappearance in Mexico. As will be further explained in the next section, the Taiwan Holocaust Dataset that this article will analyze includes 13,206 cases during the martial law period. As is shown in Figure 1, victims of the White Terror can be found in every county in Taiwan in almost every year during the martial law period.

Third, the opposition party has never won in some counties in Taiwan until now even after the democratization, such as Miaoli and Taitung, while it has dominated in several other counties at the same time. Hence, enough variation of political opportunity structure can be found in Taiwan politics. In the end, there was no mass election manipulation in
Figure 1: Number of White Terror victims across years and counties in Taiwan Holocaust Dataset

Taiwan after the democratization. According to the measure of Election Integrity Project, the level of election integrity ranked 24 globally between 2012 and 2016. Therefore, the published election results in Taiwan, such as vote share and turnout rate, were reliable for data analysis.

If the political opportunity structure moderates the long-term effect of political violence on citizens’ participation, we should expect that people who lived in the county with more White Terror victims were less supportive to KMT only if KMT did not dominate in the districts. If KMT still rules the county, people whose counties with more White Terror victims would instead support KMT more.

Data

IV: Percentage of victims in each district before 1987

The list of White Terror victims in the Taiwan Holocaust Dataset was coded by the New Taiwan Foundation. According to the volunteers who coded this dataset, the New Taiwan Foundation collected all available official records related to political victims and violence from all institutions in Taiwan. Some of the records are from the Compensation Foundation for Wrongful Trials on Charges of Sedition and Espionage during the Martial Law Period, while others were collected from the gradually declassified records in numerous police departments, military courts, and National Security Bureau. Overall, Taiwan Holocaust Dataset collected 13,206 cases, and each case includes (if available) the victim’s name, gender, date of birth, birthplace, level of education, an age when being arrested, employment, the reason for being arrested, sentences, and other accomplices in the same case. The dataset was uploaded and became publicly available in January 2016.  

Since the dataset was the collection of official records and was not designed for the research purpose, it still suffers from a certain level of missing data. In the theory of political opportunity structure, one must categorize all victims to a specific county in Taiwan. Here is the procedure for recoding. (1) 6,554 in 13,206 (50.4%) victims were coded by their birthplace in Taiwan if their county-level information is available. Even though many victims were not arrested in their birthplace, such as numerous students in the National Taiwan University in Taipei, it is reasonable to believe that their story would be told and spread by their family members and neighborhoods. In other words, all victims in this process were ethical Taiwanese. (2) If the county-level information is not available, the victims would be assigned to where he or she lived before the arrest. (3) If both were unavailable, the victim would

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3I appreciate Fang-Yu Chen at Michigan State University for the interview on the volunteers
be coded to live in the place that most of his accomplices were from or were living. Most of
the cases in the second and third process were Mainlander who was serving in the military
when being arrested. The last two procedures further categorized 1507 victims to a specific
county. Overall, 8161 in 13206 (61.8%) of records in the Taiwan Holocaust Dataset were
used for analysis in this article.

Most of the unidentifiable cases were owing to the missing data problem. Only the
victim’s name was listed in the dataset, so there is no way to identify the impact nor the
bias. Some other unidentifiable cases were foreigners who were arrested for ”helping CCP.”
They were from Hong Kong, mainland China, Japan, Malaysia, Philippine, France, and
Panama. The remains were the Mainlander victims who were serving in the military. They
did not participate in any association, nor did they have an accomplice. Since they were
not allowed to marry until 1959, and the marriage was restricted until 1974, the long-term
effect of these missing data may be limited. Since the troops stayed and rotated around all
counties in Taiwan, I did not perceive the reason if the missing data is geographically biased.

After cleaning the dataset, I created the key independent variable ”Percentage of victims
in the district,” which the total number of White Terror victims in each district is divided by
the population of the district in 1990. Taiwan government conducts the population census for
every ten years, so the 1990 data is close to the lift of martial law in 1987. The distribution
of the independent variable can be seen in Figure 2. In this figure, I dropped the small
islands including Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu; they had a different martial law period, and
the KMT government put a considerable number of troops on them for the national security
purpose.

In Figure 1, it is not surprising that most of the victims were from the major cities in
Taiwan, including the Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung. However, after the transformation,
Figure 2 reveals many interesting results. For example, the county with the highest percent-
age of White Terror victims was Miaoli which 0.065% and 0.060% of residents were sentenced
for political purpose. These two counties were also dominated by KMT in the elections for three decades after democratization. In contrast, Kaohsiung City and Chiayi County were ranked 3 and 4 (0.059% and 0.053%, respectively), but these two counties were occupied by the anti-KMT party right after 1987. I believe that the transformation can better capture the mechanism within the legacy of political violence. With the higher percentage of victims, citizens in the district were much likely to pass down the story of violence and were much likely to decide their response based on the political opportunity structure of that district.

**DV: County Election results and Turnouts after 1987**

The data of result and the turnout rate in the county and city mayor elections after 1987 are publicly accessible on the Taiwan Central Election Commission website.\(^5\) The


Apart from the vote share of KMT candidate in each district, turnout rate is another important measure for capturing citizens’ response to the legacy of political violence. Previous studies in the long-term impact of political violence show that the victims and their predecessors have a higher level of turnout rate. However, the higher level of political participation appears in both conditions that the victim’s preferred party can certainly win (Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017) and can certainly lose (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017). If the higher turnout rate in the districts that were not dominated by the former authoritarian party can be the sign of defensive democracy, then the higher turnout rate in the dominated districts may imply the sign of compliance and fear. The White Terror case in Taiwan can test if both were true, which could be reconciled into my political opportunity structure theory.

**Result**

**Vote Choice and the Legacy of Political Violence**

Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of the percentage of victims and mayor election results in all districts in Taiwan after 1987. In this Figure, X-axis is the percentage of the victim, and Y-axis is KMT’s voteshare, and the spot size was decided by the number of voters in the election. All spots are colored blue if KMT received more than 50% of votes in the election, and green if not. In the end, the two blue and green lines were the smooth line predicted by

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\(^6\)The 1989 and 1993 county mayor election results were generously provided by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, Taipei.
the ggplot function, shadowed with plus and minus 1.96 standard error.

Figure 3: Political Opportunity Structure moderates the effect of White Terror on Vote Choice

Figure 3 illustrates the pattern that previous research can only partially explain, but can be fully captured by the story of political opportunity structure. Among the KMT-dominated county, a higher percentage of victims associated with a higher KMT voteshare. Among the non-KMT county, the correlation is reversed. If all counties were grouped together, no significant correlation between political violence and party support could be found. Figure 3 provides the preliminary evidence of the moderation effect from the political opportunity structure.

To further estimate the moderation effect of political opportunity structure, Table 1 presents the results of six regression models on explaining KMT candidate’s vote share in the county and city election after democratization of Taiwan. In model (1) and (2), voters’ perception of the political opportunity structure is a binary variable that whether KMT
received 50% of the vote in that election. Since pre-election poll became popular in Taiwan since 1992, voters should expect whether KMT would dominate this time. In model (3) and (4), voters’ perception is captured by the binary variable that whether KMT got 50% last time or in the last two time, respectively. In the end, model (2), (4), and (6) includes the control variable of KMT’s performance last time as well as a dummy variable for DPP president Chen Shiu-Bian period from 2000 to 2008.

Table 1: Perceived Political Opportunity Structure and the Legacy of Political Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable:</th>
<th>KMT candidate’s vote share in county and city mayor election</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Victim</td>
<td>−143.4**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(69.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT&gt;50%</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Victim × KMT&gt;50%</td>
<td>262.2**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(114.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT&gt;50% last time</td>
<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Victim × last time</td>
<td>205.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(145.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT&gt;50% last two</td>
<td>−0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Victim × last two</td>
<td>344.9**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(192.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT% last time</td>
<td>0.177***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen 2000-2008</td>
<td>0.045***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Among the six models in Table 1, the percentage of victims during the martial law period
all negative correlates with KMT’s vote share in the elections after democratization. This result is consistent with Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov (2017)’s work in western Ukraine. However, the estimated coefficients of the interaction term between % of victims and the perceived political opportunity structure are positively different from zero in the model (1), (2), (5), and (6). If the coefficients of % of victims and the interaction term are summed up, it will still be positive in the model (1) and (2), and become zero in the model (3), (4), (5), and (6).

In other words, the six models in Table 1 reveal the moderation effect of the political opportunity structure between the legacy of political violence and vote choice. If voters perceived that KMT has no chance of winning in their district, more White Terror victims will further lower KMT’s already poor performance. However, if voters perceived that KMT could win this time, or KMT has been dominated in this district for a long time, their previous experience of political violence will not lower their support toward KMT; model (1) and (2) even suggest that voters in this KMT-dominated district will vote KMT more.

**Turnout and the Legacy of Political Violence**

Figure 4 shows the scatterplot between the percentage of White Terror victims and the turnout rate in the local elections. Consistent with the previous case in western Ukraine (Rozenas, Schutte and Zhukov, 2017), our data also reveal a positive correlation between political violence and a higher level of political participation in the long run after democratization.

To investigate the relationship between turnout and political violence, Table 2 shows the result of four regression models. Model (1) and (2) support the positive correlation between turnout rate and the percentage of victims. The result is robust even when a series of factors were controlled. However, model (3) and (4) show that such positive correlation only exists in the non-KMT-dominated districts. In comparison, among the KMT-dominated, a higher
percentage of White Terror victims is not related to the turnout rate.

Combining the results of the model (3), (4) and the moderation effect on vote choice would imply the full picture of the legacy of the political violence. After the democratization, if the party of the former aggressor still dominates the district, voters were not motivated to vote; but if they arrived the voting booth, they are much likely to support the former authoritarian party. However, in the district that the former dictator had ceded the domination, voters who experienced or acknowledged the political violence were motivated to get-out-and-vote and punished the former authoritarian party. The former scenario suggests a certain level of compliance, while the latter scenario indicates the behavior of defensive democracy. The theory of political opportunity structure can better explain this result.
Table 2: Turnout and the Legacy of Political Violence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) Full</th>
<th>(2) Full</th>
<th>(3) KMT &gt; 50%</th>
<th>(4) KMT &lt; 50%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Victims</td>
<td>69.865*</td>
<td>81.905**</td>
<td>−20.529</td>
<td>74.316**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40.555)</td>
<td>(37.608)</td>
<td>(104.195)</td>
<td>(37.167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen 2000-2008</td>
<td>−0.027***</td>
<td>−0.049**</td>
<td>−0.021**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Year</td>
<td>−0.002**</td>
<td>−0.007***</td>
<td>−0.0004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Candidate</td>
<td>−0.005</td>
<td>−0.009</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Electorates</td>
<td>0.00***</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td>0.00**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.230</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>0.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.190</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Additional Evidence: Re-analysis of Crimea Tatars

In Lupu and Peisakhin (2017)’s study, the third generation of Crimea Tatars has a higher level of turnout rate in the Russia-backed referendum if their grandmother or grandfather were tortured decades ago. The authors inferred that their higher turnout rate was for preventing the deportation from happening again, which is inconsistent with the political opportunity structure theory. Therefore, I re-analyze their dataset provided by the authors.7

In their dataset, the overall turnout rate in the secession referendum is 7.32%, and the turnout rate of the third generation is 7.75%. However, the third-generation respondents whose the number of ancestors died during deportation are zero, one, two, and three and above, had the level of turnout rate on 10.9%, 7.9%, 5.7%, and 6.2%, respectively. The chi-squared test shows no correlation between the ancestor’s level of victimization and turnout

7https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/VEPHLS Access: March 18, 2018
rate ($p = 0.114$). The result is inconsistent with the author’s claim in their Figure 2.\(^8\)

What is worse, showing up in the referendum is a strong predictor of supporting the secession. Among those who went to vote, 108 in 125 of Crimea Tatars voted yes (86.4%) in the referendum. Among the third generation, 63 in 68 voted yes (92.6%). Among that third generation whose at least three ancestors died during the deportation, 8 in 8 voted yes (100%). Therefore, participating in the referendum is not for preventing the deportation from happening again, as was claimed by the authors. Instead, it showed the loyalty to the authority which had brought the nightmare to their ancestors before. The result is consistent with the findings in the case of Taiwan, especially among those in the KMT-dominated counties.

Will Crimea Tatars expressed their disagreement toward Russia if possible? I found evidence in their vote choice in the 2014 parliament election, which was held six month after the secession referendum. The election adopted a mixed design, with 50 seats in Party-list proportional representation and 25 in majority constituencies. Before the election, it was clear that the ruling party United Russia would won in all single-member districts. However, the opposition party may won some seats through the PR design. In the end, the major opposition party LDPR won 5 seats in the PR election.

In the dataset, Crimea Tatars had a two times higher turnout rate in the parliament election (22.1%) compared with the secession referendum (7.32%), even though many Crimea Tatars called for boycott.\(^9\) Among those third generations whose ancestors did not die during the deportation before, 19.4% of them supported the ruling party United Russia. Among the third generations which one, two, and three of ancestors died, their support toward United Russia dropped to 12.6%, 8.8%, and 12.4%, respectively. The chi-square test shows that

\(^8\)I have notified the authors on this issue on March 21, 2018, and they said they would reply if they have time.

there is a significant difference between groups ($p < 0.01$).

Re-analysis of the Crimea Tatars support the political opportunity structure theory on the legacy of political violence. The tragedy of deportation indeed influenced their political participation and vote choice across the generations. However, whether they would punish the former authoritarian party (or its legacy) is contingent on the political opportunity structure. If there is no chance to win, Crimea Tatars may either be absent or even show their support, which is consistent with the patterns in the Taiwan White Terror case.

**Conclusion**

What is the legacy of political violence? This article provides a political opportunity structure theory, suggesting that people and their neighborhoods who suffered from the political violence would be much susceptible to the political environment they faced even after the democratization. They will punish the former authoritarian party more if it did not dominate in the district, but will instead support it if it is enjoying the majority. The theory is supported by the case of White Terror in Taiwan, and is compatible with all three previous studies on the legacy of political violence. Reanalysis of the Crimea Tatars survey provides additional evidence on the theory.

This result renders important implications to the study of political violence and democratization. First, the result implies that fear can help explain the persistence of the former authoritarian party after the democratization. If the victims found that the authoritarian party was still strong and may even win back the power again, they would instead vote for it.

Second, the result evidences the importance of signal and coordination. The victims and their predecessors may want to punish the authoritarian party, but they will do so only if the majority of people around them are also on the same direction. In the Crimea Tatars
dataset, 75.4% of the respondents said "they are willing" to join the protest, but only 6.7% have ever participated in any protest or demonstration. In the White Terror case, many citizens in Miaoli and Taitung knew clearly the history of political repression, but KMT still dominated the two counties since the democratization in 1987.

In the end, the results may help explain why the relationship between turnout rate and closeness in the district is not linear in many countries, especially for those who have ever suffered from the political violence or political repression before. For example, Kostadinova and Power (2007) show that election closeness is not predictive to turnout in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Shiao (2009) also find that the level of competitiveness cannot explain the turnout of Taiwanese voters. (Hung, 2014) even suggest that the relation between turnout rate and KMT’s voteshare in Taiwan follows a parabolic model. This article suggests that the victims of the political violence may motivate to either punish the former authoritarian party if it did not dominate or show their loyalty if they perceived the dominance of the former authoritarian party. In both scenarios, the victims, their neighborhoods, and their predecessors are motivated to vote because of the considerable margin.

Acknowledgment

This research project is sponsored $5000 by Chun and Jane Chiu Family Foundation at Oregon State University in 2017. The research fund was used by the author for traveling to Taiwan in summer 2017 for data collection. I really appreciate New Taiwan Foundation, National Chengchi University for the datasets, and thank Fang-Yu Chen, Billy Lin, Ching-Shan Su, Wei-Ting Yen, Yao-Yuan Yeh for the useful recommendations.
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