Opportunism as the Legacy of Political Violence

Austin Horng-En Wang

Department of Political Science, Duke University
http://sites.duke.edu/austinwang/

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Legacy of Political Violence

- What is the long-term impact of political violence in the previous authoritarian regime?
  1. Understand the politics after democratization
  2. Enhance democratic consolidation
  3. Realize transitional justice.
Rozenas et al (2017)
1. 250,000 deportations of Western Ukrainians by USSR, 1943-1955
2. Mapping victims to district. District-level analysis
3. More deportations, less support to Pro-Russian party after 2004

Lupu and Peisakhin (2017)
1. 2,000 deportations of Crimean Tatars by USSR, 1949-1989
2. Survey of the victims and their predecessors (three generations)
3. More victims, higher turnout/support in Russia-backed referendum

Sosio et al (2018)
2. Mapping victims to district, district-level analysis
3. More victims, more tax compliances in 2012
After democratization, victims would punish the former authoritarian party *only if* it is not the majority.

1. If the former authoritarian party did not dominate in the district, the victims and their predecessors felt safe to express their fear and anger through votes.
2. If the former authoritarian party still dominate in the district, the victims may feel unsafe and reminisce the past, which would instead show the loyalty to the former dictator.

⇒ Political opportunity structure moderates the long-term effect of political violence on political participation.
The Political Opportunity Structure Theory reconciles the long-term effect of political violence on political participation.

- Rozenas et al (2017)
  - Western Ukraine dominated by anti-Russian party → safe to anti-Russia → More deportations, less support to Pro-Russian party

- Lupu and Peisakhin (2017)
  - Crimea dominated by Russia → not safe to anti-Russia → More victims, higher turnout/support in Russia-backed referendum

- Sosio et al (2018)
  - PRI returned in 2012 → not safe to anti-PRI → More victims, more tax compliances
Political opportunity structure theory cannot be systematically examined in the previous studies

1. Rozenas et al (2017) → Western Ukraine already be dominated
2. Lupu and Peisakhin (2017) → Crimea already be dominated
4. Pro-Russian parties were not USSR itself.

The suitable case should be:

1. Many victims across the districts in the authoritarian regime.
2. The former authoritarian party still exist
3. The former authoritarian party still dominates somewhere
4. Free and fair elections after democratization (so the data is unbiased)
The White Terror in Taiwan

White Terror (1949-1987) in Taiwan as the suitable case:

1. Many victims across the districts ← Yes, in all districts
2. The former authoritarian party still exist ← Yes, KMT
3. The former authoritarian party still dominates somewhere ← Yes
4. Free and fair elections after democratization ← Yes
Data

The Taiwan Holocaust Dataset (1949-1987)
- 13206 reports of political victims by New Taiwan Foundation.
- Includes (if existed) victim’s name, gender, birth date, birthplace, education, age, job, cause, sentences, and other accomplices.
- After data cleaning, 8161 (61.8%) complete cases were used.
Independent Variable: % of Victims

(Number of victims before 1987)/(Population of district in 1990)

Miaoli 0.065%, Keelung 0.060%, Kaohsiung City 0.059%
Analysis

- DV: KMT’s voteshare in the county and city elections after 1987

- IV1: Proportion of Victims in 1990
- IV2: Political Opportunity Structure = Perceived chance of winning
  1. KMT>50% in this election
  2. KMT>50% in the last election
  3. KMT>50% in the last two election

- Interaction: IV1 × IV2

- Controls: Last election result, Chen’s Period 2000-2008
The moderation effect of Political Opportunity Structure

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### Table 1: Perceived Political Opportunity Structure and the Legacy of Political Violence

**Dependent variable:**
KMT candidate’s vote share in county and city mayor election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>(1)</th>
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<th>(4)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Victim</td>
<td>−143.4**</td>
<td>−147.9**</td>
<td>−195.3**</td>
<td>−177.8*</td>
<td>−298.9**</td>
<td>−272.5**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(69.5)</td>
<td>(64.3)</td>
<td>(93.3)</td>
<td>(88.1)</td>
<td>(120.8)</td>
<td>(112.7)</td>
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<td>KMT &gt; 50%</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0.054</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
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<tr>
<td>%Victim × KMT &gt; 50%</td>
<td>262.2**</td>
<td>244.6**</td>
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<td>(114.1)</td>
<td>(105.6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT &gt; 50% last time</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.046</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
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<tr>
<td>%Victim × last time</td>
<td></td>
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<td>205.7</td>
<td>174.2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(145.1)</td>
<td>(140.5)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT &gt; 50% last two</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>−0.045</td>
<td>−0.085</td>
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<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
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<tr>
<td>%Victim × last two</td>
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<td>344.9*</td>
<td>309.6*</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(192.0)</td>
<td>(177.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KMT% last time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.177***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.358***</td>
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<td>(0.051)</td>
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<td>(0.100)</td>
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<td>Chen 2000-2008</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.045***</td>
<td>0.060***</td>
<td>0.063**</td>
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<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>86</td>
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<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.551</td>
<td>0.608</td>
<td>0.195</td>
<td>0.298</td>
<td>0.186</td>
<td>0.328</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.540</td>
<td>0.592</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.286</td>
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</table>

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
DV2: Turnout in the county and city elections after 1987

→ If turnout is lower in the district with more victims, it is just a story of silent moderate voters.
→ If turnout is higher in the district with more victims, it is a story of victims’ punishment and compliance.
Conclusion

- Legacy of the political violence: Opportunism.
  1. The victims of and predecessors will punish the former authoritarian party only if it did not dominate the district.
  2. If it is, the districts with more victims will support the former authoritarian party more.
  3. The effect is not from the silent moderate voters.

- Political opportunity structure theory is compatible with the White Terror in Taiwan and all three recent (seemingly contradictory) studies in the western Ukraine, Crimea, and Mexico.
Implications:

1. The resilience/resurgence of the former authoritarian party.
2. Huge swings of the election result. ("Bu-Dau")
3. The importance of the transitional justice.

Future works

1. The remaining 5,000 cases? (imputation by name?)
2. More robust checks?
4. The interaction between political violence and elections before 1987?
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The Impact of Democratization

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The decline of KMT?

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