

Waning Effect of China's Carrot and Stick Policies toward Taiwanese People: Clamping down on Growing National Identity?

Austin Horng-En Wang¹

Abstract

To repress the growing regional/national identity, the motherland country applies Rationalism strategies including economic incentive and military threat. Analysis of Taiwan National Security Survey in 2003-2015 shows that China's carrot and stick policies negatively correlates with exclusive Taiwanese identity, but the effects, not perceptions, decline among the young generations.

Keywords: National Identity, Identity Change, Rationalism, Taiwan, Cross-strait

¹ Austin Horng-En Wang is Ph.D. Candidate of Political Science at Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. He wishes to thank Emerson M. Niou, Fang-yu Chen, Herbert Kitschelt, and Michael Ward, and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful comments to this article. Email: <austin.wang@duke.edu>. [[8,008 words with notes, 3 table, 7 figures]]

Introduction

Group identification is defined as an individual's psychological attachment to a particular group based on shared beliefs, interest, and living experience.² The strongest identities are national and regional ones, originated from common living experience in specific time and place. These territorial identifications are especially powerful in shaping political attitudes and mobilizing political participation. It defines the boundary that one (can) imagine whose he or she will live together, interact with, and share the linked fate in the past, now, and future.

Under the trend of global democratization and economic integration, the role, change, and the consequence of the *exclusive regional/national identity* attracts more attention. Exclusive identity, suggested by Carey and Hooghe and Marks³ in the scenario of European Union, is that an individual conceives of their identity as exclusive of other territorial identities or identities from higher levels. For example, people who exclusively identifies themselves as Québécois and Catalans, compared with those who also identify themselves as French-Canadian and Spanish, are much likely to support the independence movement.⁴ In the study of European integration, parties

² Jackman, Mary R. and Robert W. Jackman, "An Interpretation of the Relation Between Objective and Subjective Social Status," *American Sociological Review* 38:5 (October 1973), pp. 569 - 582.

³ Carey, Sean, "Undivided Loyalties: Is National Identity an Obstacle to European Integration?" *European Union Politics* 3:4 (December 2002), pp. 387 - 413. And see Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks, "Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?" *Political Science and Politics* 37:3 (July 2004), pp. 415 - 420.

⁴ Serrano, Ivan, "Just a Matter of Identity? Support for Independence in Catalonia", *Regional & Federal Studies* 23:5 (April 2013), pp. 523-545. Also see Mendelsohn, Matthew, "Rational Choice

such as Vlaams Blok in Belgium and the French Front National propagated the idea of exclusive national identity by slogans such as “Boss in Our Own Country.” Such sentiments reinforce Euroskepticism and oppose European integration.

For the activists of independence or secession movement, the construction and establishment of exclusive regional/national identity is the crucial part in the long-term “stateless” nation-building process.⁵ As is suggested by Benedict Anderson: “... *I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.*”⁶ The exclusive identity fortifies the boundary of imagination. Unsurprisingly, the motherland authority would be unpleasant to see the growth of exclusive identity and the secession movement followed. To repress the growth, motherland country may apply economic incentives, military threat, or both, toward the separatists. For instance, Catalans are warned to be ousted by the European Union and trade will be reduced, Québécois are told that its economy will be shaken after the independence, Scots are alerted their social welfare and retirement pension will shrink, and Taiwanese are threatened to be attacked and invaded.

and Socio-Psychological Explanation for Opinion on Quebec Sovereignty,” *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36:3 (July 2003), pp. 511-537.

⁵ Keating, Michael, “Stateless Nation-building: Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland in the Changing State System,” *Nations and Nationalism* 3:4 (December 1997), pp. 689-717. Also see Serrano, “Matter of Identity.”

⁶ Anderson, Benedict, “Imagined Communities,” in *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso Books, 2006), pp. 49.

The logic behind the two strategies is based on the economical or functional foundation of group identity. People's choice of self-identification is partially based on cost-benefit calculation. One may reduce or even discard the chosen identity which brings negative utility to them. Previous studies in Quebec and Taiwan shows that economic benefit and military threat both reduce the possibility of citizens seeking for exclusive identity.⁷

If these strategies work, however, why do more and more people in these areas still switch to have an exclusive identity? Are these strategies from motherland effective forever? When will the lucrative trade and pressure of military attack no longer work?

In this article, I argue that the effect of economic benefit and military threat to exclusive regional/national identity is decided by the life experience of the targeted people. In the calculation of identity change, the military threat can be effective on the generation who had experienced wartime. Similarly, the economic benefit is only attractive to those who had lived in poverty before. For the (new) generation who have never suffered from war and poverty, they tend to take survival and material life as granted and therefore emphasize more on post-materialistic value such as freedom and self-expression.⁸ In other words, for the people who live under peacetime and had stable economic growth in their childhood, when they start seeking exclusive identity, the motherland's carrot and stick strategies will be less and less effective with generation replacement.

⁷ For the Quebec, see Mendelsohn, "Rational Choice." For Taiwan, see Wu, Naitheh, "Romance and Bread: A Preliminary Study of the Identity Change in Taiwan," *Taiwan Political Science Review* 9:2 (December 2005), pp. 5-39.

⁸ For details, see Inglehart, Ronald, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, May 1997), p.43.

Compared to previous studies, this article tries to combine the time dimension with the rational choice factors in explaining the growth and repression on identity change.

This article focuses on the case of Taiwan, an autonomy that has been claimed as a long-lost province of China. With the demise of the former authoritarian government which claimed the representativeness of the whole China, Taiwan began its democratization and quest for the Taiwanese identity rather than the Chinese one since 1987.⁹ To squash the emergence of Taiwanese identity, the PRC government implemented both carrot and stick policies, which is also called *liangshou celue*.¹⁰ The stick is the military threat, which includes the 2005 Martial Anti-Secession Law, and the carrot is the favor-granting economic policies, which reached the highest point when China and Taiwan signed the 2010 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Do the benefits from economic cooperation or the military-backed threat successfully prevent or slow down Taiwanese people from developing exclusive Taiwanese identity (ETI hereafter)? Moreover, are the effects of economic benefit and military threat on ETI declining across time owing to the generation replacement in Taiwan? I will use eight cross-sectional waves

⁹ Chu, Yun-han, and Lin, Jih-wen, "Political Development in 20th-Century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity", *The China Quarterly* 165 (March 2001), pp. 102-129. Also see Dittmer, Lowell, "Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity," *Asian Survey* 44:4 (July/August 2004), pp. 475-483.

¹⁰ Niou, Emerson M., "The China factor in Taiwan's Domestic Politics," in *Democratization in Taiwan: Challenges in Transformation* ed. by Philip Paolino and James Meernik (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, June 2008), pp. 167-182.

of Taiwanese National Security Study Survey datasets (TNSS hereafter), conducted by Duke Program in Asian Security Studies from 2003 to 2015 (n = 9347), to address these questions.¹¹

Study on the change of Taiwan identity and its relation to China's rationalism strategies may make contributions in several domains. First, although many studies focus on identity change and stability, few had ever explored the national one. As is discussed in the next chapter, the distribution of Taiwanese identity changed dramatically in the last twenty years, which implies that the national identity itself should be treated as dependent variable waited to be explained under certain contexts. Second, around the world, there are at least 80 ongoing independence/secession movements. The study of the construction and repression of the exclusive national identity may help explain and predict the future of these stateless nation-building processes. The scenario of ETI is different from the construction of European identity, which the former is constructing from a larger existence, while the latter is built upon existing nations.¹² Third, previous studies on national identity change relies heavily on single-shot cross-sectional data, which fails to distinguish between cohort and life-cycle effect. This study takes advantage of the eight waves of

¹¹ All datasets are available at the Duke Program in Asian Security Studies website, <http://sites.duke.edu/pass/> Access: April 1, 2016.

¹² For example, see Risse, Thomas, "European Institutions and Identity Change: What Have We Learned?" In *Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU* ed. by Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse, and Marilyn B. Brewer (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, May 2004), pp. 247-271.

representative surveys across 13 years in Taiwan. In the end, empirical studies on Taiwan identity rely on surveys conducted before 2008,¹³ so this study can re-examine and extend their findings.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will further discuss the theory behind identity and identity change, and its implication to the study of Taiwan studies. Section 3 discusses the theoretical linkages between generation, life experience, and the growth of ETI: the replacing young generation which lacks the life experience of poverty and war undermines the strength of China's *liangshou celue* gradually. Section 4 examines the hypotheses through logit model and the eight waves of TNSS. I show that the effect of perceived economic benefit and military threat from China are significantly negative to exclusive Taiwanese identity, but the effect is smaller among the young generations. Besides, the effect on each generation is quite constant across the 13 years, in which Taiwan had undergone second presidential turnover in 2008, the rise of China, and almost the certain third presidential turnover in 2016. I would further show that the perception of the two factors is not significantly different from generations. In the end, Section 5 concludes the findings and discusses its implication on identity change study and the future interaction between China and Taiwan.

¹³ Two recent examples include Chen, Lu-huei, Shu Keng, and Te-Yu Wang, "Taiwan's 2008 presidential election and its Implications on cross-strait relations: The effects of Taiwanese identity, Trade interests and Military threats" (in Chinese) *Journal of Electoral Studies* 16:2 (November 2009), pp. 1-22, and Chen, Rou-Lan, "Reconstructed nationalism in Taiwan: a politicised and economically driven identity," *Nations and Nationalism* 20:3 (June 2014), pp. 523-545.

Identity, Change, and Exclusiveness

The first generation of group identity studies evidences the profound influence of group identity on individual and group behaviors. Group identity is treated as the *unmoved mover*: identification is regarded as a long-term psychological attachment to a specific group, which will bias the cognitive information processing and related behaviors.¹⁴

However, the unmoved mover assumption does not apply to the people during the nation-building process. Figure 1 illustrates the dramatic change in the distribution of national identity among Taiwanese people. Within a quarter-century, the percentage of Taiwanese people having the exclusive Taiwanese identity - who exclusively identifies herself as Taiwanese - soared from 17.6% to 60.6%. With such change, it would be reckless to treat the national identity as an unmoved mover; in contrast, the change and continuity of national identity itself in Taiwan are worthy exploring.

[Figure 1 is here]

¹⁴ For the classic example, see Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, September 1964). Recent experimental approach can see Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber, "The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis," *Political Psychology* 26:3 (June 2005), 455-482.

The second generation of group identity study focuses on the origin and change of group identity. Indeed, group identity can be formed as easily as by a random team assignment in the laboratory or a summer camp.¹⁵ Once the identity is psychologically established, it requires extra effort to uproot. There are two approaches to explaining identity change: *Constructivism* and *Rationalism*. Constructivism suggests that group identity can be modified through social learning and socialization, while rationalism emphasizes the importance of individual's cost-benefit calculation on the choice of identification.¹⁶ Examples of the former one include the assimilation policies through education conducted by the motherland authority,¹⁷ and the region-centered history and storytelling propaganda pushed by separatists and political elites. In an aspect of rationalism, Tajfel and Turner argue that¹⁸ the need for positive distinctiveness drive group identity. When the chosen group identity brings the stereotype of the lower-status or negative image or even

¹⁵ Sherif, Muzafer, O. J. Harvey, B. Jack White, William R. Hood, and Carolyn W. Sherif, *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment* (Norman, Okla: University Book Exchange, 1961), pp. 63-117. Also see And Tajfel, Henri, "Experiments in Intergroup Discrimination", *Scientific American* 223:5 (May 1970), pp. 96-102.

¹⁶ Checkel, Jeffery T., "Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change", *International Organization* 55:3 (July 2001), pp. 553-588. Also Risse, "What have we Learned?"

¹⁷ Mylonas, Harris, *The Politics of Nation-building: Making Co-nationals, Refugees, and Minorities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, February 2013), pp.17-49.

¹⁸ Tajfel, Henri, and Turner, John, "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict," in *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* ed. by William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1979), pp. 33-48.

monetary loss, individuals may reduce, or even abandon their initial identification. Some may even turn to identify themselves as a member of the dominant or major group.¹⁹ For example, Ethier and Deaux showed that²⁰ Hispanic students in Ivy League college would lower their racial identity when it is threatened by the race-unfriendly environment.

Undoubtedly, the motherland authority would apply both constructivism and rationalism strategies trying to repress the growth of national/regional identity, especially the *exclusive* one. Why is exclusive regional/national identity special? Following previous works, group identity defines the boundary of an individual's imagination on the group of people he/she emotionally attached and self-emerged. *The major difference between exclusive identity and dual identity is the two provides distinct boundaries in an individual's mind.* Thus, people with exclusive regional/national identity behave entirely different from those who identify himself to both the motherland and the region. For example, people in the Europe who has exclusive national identity would strongly oppose European integration, while those with dual identity support it; Flemish people who have exclusive Flemish identity rather than dual identity tend to oppose multi-level

¹⁹ Huddy, Leonie, "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory," *Political Psychology* 22:1 (March 2001), pp. 127-156. Also McClain, Paula D., Jessica D. Johnson Carew, Eugene Walton, and Candis S. Watts, "Group Membership, Group Identity, and Group Consciousness: Measures of Racial Identity in American Politics?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:1 (June 2009), pp. 471-485.

²⁰ Ethier, Kathleen A., and Kay Deaux, "Negotiating social identity when contexts change: Maintaining identification and responding to threat," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 67:2 (August 1994), pp. 243-251.

governance in Belgian; Catalan people with exclusive Catalan identity tend to support independence, while those with dual identity or less do not.²¹

In the case of Taiwan, Lin and Liao²² analyze five representative datasets from 2001 to 2008 and found out that there is no statistical difference on vote choice between those who identified as “both” and “Chinese” in most of the models, but strong difference between them and those identified as “Taiwanese.” Chen and Wang²³ analyze a representative survey in 2012 and reveal that “Chinese” and “both” identifiers are not different on evaluating the President Ma, which is distinct from the exclusive “Taiwanese” identifiers.

These evidences from Taiwan, European, Belgium, and Spanish suggest that the exclusive regional/national identity function differently than dual or motherland identity; people with dual or motherland identity may have similarly imagined boundaries of the state and the members in it, while those with exclusive identity only focus on a narrower region and smaller group of people.

Time plays a key role in the establishing and growth of exclusive regional/national identity. Why do people identify themselves as a member of the specific group rather than the broader one?

²¹ EU case can be found on Hooghe and Marks, “Economic Rationality.” Case of Catalan is in Serrano, “Matter of Identity.”

²² Lin, Chung-Chu, and Liao I-Shing, “Questionnaire Design and Measure of National Identity: The comparison of TEDS and TSCS Datasets,” in *TEDS: Review and Perspective on Methodology* ed. by Chi Huang et al. (Taipei: Wunan Press. September 2013), pp. 391-430.

²³ Chen, Lu-Huei, and Wang Hung-Chung, “Questionnaire Design and Measure of Political Trust,” in *TEDS: Review and Perspective on Methodology* ed. by Chi Huang et al. (Taipei: Wunan Press. September 2013), pp. 135-166.

Because the group of people shares similar life experience, belief, and interaction. The shared life experience helps form the boundary of imagination in people's mind defining "who are we." In Taiwan, the beginnings of ETI construction came with Sino-American detente and Taiwan's eviction from the United Nations in 1971. Under the martial law ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT hereafter) government, the anti-KMT dissidents started establishing the narrative and foundation of ETI.²⁴ The nativism and localization movement led by political elites, scholars and politicians help establish the "Taiwanese subjectivity" (*Taiwan zhutixing*) during this period. Yet, the geographic segmentation caused by Taiwan Strait, regular election, and distinct life experience make Taiwanese people tend not to imagine beyond the scope of Taiwan and nearby islands; like the evolution of endemic species, the growth of ETI may happen naturally with time under the specific political context in Cross-strait. Studies of exclusive national identity in Cyprus and South Korea²⁵ show that not only the young generation tends to identify themselves exclusively rather

²⁴ Hsiau, A-Chin, "Identity, narrative, and action: Anti-KMT dissident construction of history in 1970s Taiwan", *Taiwanese Sociology* 5 (June 2003), pp. 195-250. Also see Dittmer, "Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity."

²⁵ For Cyprus case, see Webster, Craig, "Division or unification in Cyprus? The role of demographics, attitudes and party inclination on Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution to the Cyprus problem", *Ethnopolitics* 4:3 (August 2006), pp. 299-309. For South Korea, see Shin, Gi-Wook, and Joon-Nak Chou "Paradox or paradigm: Making Sense of Korean Globalization", in *Korea Confronts Globalization* ed. by Yunshik Chang, Hyun-ho Seok, and Donald Baker (New York, NY: Routledge, March 2008), pp. 250-272.

than inclusively, the percentage of people in all generation seeking unification is decreasing across time.

Therefore, the operationalization of ETI is defined as people who identify themselves as Taiwanese only when choosing between the Taiwanese, Chinese, or Both. As can be found in Figure 1, after the beginning of democratization and the lift of martial law in 1987, the percentage of Taiwanese with ETI are only 17.6% - the majority of Taiwanese people still believe they are Chinese, or both Chinese and Taiwanese. In 2014, however, around 60% of Taiwanese people owned ETI, and the trend is still going up.

Rationalism, China Factors, and Cohort Effects

No motherland would easily let go of the region seeking secession or independence. China has been trying to influence Taiwan's politics by both the military threat and economic benefit, both categorized as the rationalism strategy. According to Qian Qichen, former foreign minister, Beijing's strategy has been “to blockade Taiwan diplomatically, to check Taiwan militarily, and to drag along Taiwan economically.” The carrot and stick strategy imply the neo-functionalism assumption that people would rationally maximize its (economic) utility and reduce potential loss.

26

²⁶ See Niou, “The China factor,” and Dittmer, “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity.”

Indeed, China government would have applied both constructivism and rationalism strategies toward ETI, but owing to resource and time limitation, in this study I would only stick to the rationalism part first, and will extend my research to the constructivism in the future.

Since Figure 1 shows the tremendous growth of ETI, one may question if the two strategies have ever worked. In Figure 2, I use the eight TNSS datasets, which will also be discussed and used in detail analysis later, to firstly illustrate the trend of ETI, perceived economic benefit, and perceived military threat from China among Taiwanese respondents. Among the datasets, respondents are binary coded as 1 who gave a positive answer to the question “Economic cooperation between China and Taiwan should be strengthened because the cooperation benefits Taiwan’s economy,” and to the question “If Taiwan declares independence, do you think the Mainland will attack Taiwan?” In the previous 13 years, people with ETI increased 23% - from 32% to 55%. Meanwhile, people who perceived an economic benefit and military threat changed over time and decreased slightly since 2003. In the aggregate level, there is no clear evidence that the two rationalism strategies from China can effectively repress the growth of ETI. By combining aggregate-level data on economic dependency and individual-level survey from 1992 to 2004, Chen²⁷ also suggest that the economic dependency between the cross-strait plays a minor role on the (re)construction of nationalism in Taiwan.

[Figure 2 is here]

To avoid the potential problem of ecological fallacy, researchers usually turn to analysis in individual level. Some studies show that perceived economic benefit may indeed undermine the possibility for Taiwanese people to choose ETI. Based on the representative panel survey data in 1998 and 2000, Wu suggests that economic benefit from China indeed dragged people from having

²⁷ See Chen, “Reconstructed nationalism in Taiwan.”

Taiwanese identity. However, the effect of economic benefit is much smaller than the influence from ethnic-cultural identity. The following study also suggests something similar: representative surveys in 2009 and 2010 shows that economic interest significantly decreases the probability of choosing Taiwanese identity, but the weight of the effect is much smaller than the symbolic political issue.²⁸

Few study on cross-strait relationship focuses on how military threat from China would influence the ETI among Taiwanese people. However, studies of group identity and social identity suggest two groups of theory which render opposite predictions. Rationalism suggests that since people are motivated to gain positive distinctiveness from the group identity, people who identify themselves in the group under military threat or being dominated would lower the strength of attachment, or even abandon the original identity. The logic is similar to the economic benefit. The second camp is the in-group-out-group salience. Military threat from the motherland needs to define friend and enemy, so the line between in-group and out-group is made clear by the threat. For example, Kelman points out the interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian national identities: when the out-group military threat is salient, so does the national identity.²⁹

²⁸ See Wu, "Romance and Bread." And Chen, Lu-Huei, Ying-Nan Chen, and Hsin-Hsien Wang, "Economic interest and symbolic attitudes: Analyzing the dynamics of Taiwan identity," *Soochow Journal of Political Science* 30:3 (September 2012), pp. 1-51.

²⁹ Kelman, Herbert C., "The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts," *Journal of Social Issues* 55:3 (September 1999), pp. 581-600.

Based on the discussion above, I first suggest two hypothesis for testing the influence of China's rationalism strategies on ETI:

H₁: *Perceived economic benefit from China (ECO) negatively correlates with ETI*

H₂: *Perceived military threat from China (ATT) negatively correlates with ETI*

One of the implicit assumptions behind H₁ and H₂ is that Taiwanese people rationally put these two factors into the calculation of choosing a national identity. Indeed, this assumption should usually hold. However, the effectiveness of these two factors would be heterogeneous on different generations owing to their various life experience. Based on Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs theory, Inglehart reveals the intergenerational change on the distribution of materialism-post materialism axis.³⁰ He argues that an individual's belief in materialism and post-materialism be formed and consolidated during the childhood experience. Following the same logic, the military threat can be effective on the generation who had suffered from or experienced wartime, while economic benefit can only distract those who lived in poverty before. For the new and young generation who has never suffered from war and poverty, they tend to take survival and physical life as granted and therefore emphasize more on post-materialistic value including freedom and self-expression. The self-expression characteristic in the post-materialism would further push individuals to identify themselves exclusively.

In the context of Cross-strait, the last direct military conflict between PRC and ROC is the 823 Artillery Bombardment in 1958. For Taiwanese people who had experienced the bombardment, Chinese civil war (1927-1950), and World War II (1939-1945), the life experience

³⁰ Inglehart, "Modernization and Postmodernization"

would make them susceptible to the current military threat from the China, and lower their ETI owing to fear. It does not mean that military threat has no effect on those who has never been suffered from the war - the life experience can be transmitted through education, mass media, and through family members. However, the effect would be smaller based on the second-hand experience. For example, in 2008 Taiwan Presidential election, the China's military threat did not significantly influence people's vote choice between KMT and Democratic Progressive Party, the pro-independence and second largest party in Taiwan (DPP hereafter).³¹

When it comes to economic development, Taiwan went through accelerated industrialization during 1950 to 1980 and entered into the post-industrial period in early 1990, based on the structure of employment and gross national product. The average income in Taiwan increased a lot during this time, and the majority of Taiwanese people successfully escaped from the poverty line. Even though economic performance is still one of the most important factors influencing vote choice in Taiwan election, the existing economic development would push more people, especially the young generation, to take the level of national economy for granted and prefer post-materialistic belief when they grew up, as is suggested by Inglehart. Thus, the lucrative profit through cross-strait economic tie would be less influential among the young Taiwanese - they prefer to identify themselves as Taiwanese only, regardless of materialistic distraction.

H₃: Negative effect of ECO on ETI is smaller among young generation

H₄: Negative effect of ATT on ETI is smaller among young generation.

³¹ See Chen, Keng, and Wang, "Taiwan's 2008 presidential election and its Implications."

If the effect of ECO and ATT is smaller among the young Taiwanese, with time goes by, more and more Taiwanese people would be indifferent to the effect of economic benefit and military threat. In this scenario, the effect of the two China factors would decline over time. Previous studies on identity change or Taiwanese identity neglect the possibility of heterogeneous influence from motherland's rationalism strategies on different generations. The theory, data, and analysis provided in this study may help bridge the gap.

Empirical Evidence

Data, measures, and model

Eight TNS datasets conducted in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012, 2014, and 2015 are used in this study.³² In each independent wave, more than 1000 respondents were reached through stratified sampling in county level with random digit dialing in the last two digits. Once the phone call is answered, the members within the household are then sampled by the interviewer. After the data collection, the sample is weighted by gender, age, and level of education to fit the distribution of the population in the Taiwan official record. The total number of sample in eight waves is 9347.

Following the previous discussion on the definition of exclusive identity, the dependent variable in this study, the Exclusive Taiwanese Identity (ETI), is coded 1 if the respondent answered “Taiwanese” in national identity item “In our society, some people consider themselves as Taiwanese, and others view themselves as Chinese, while still others see themselves as both

³² The analysis is done by R 3.1.3. All data and code for analysis and replication are available on author's personal website.

Taiwanese and Chinese. What is your view on this matter?”, and 0 if he or she answered “Chinese,” “both,” or “none.”

I deliberately coded this item as binary for the following reasons. In the theoretical aspect, the exclusive national/regional identity is special because it contours a clear line between in-group and out-group. For those who answered both or Chinese, the boundary in their mind is much closer to each other. In the technical aspect, since the number of respondents categorizing themselves in other category is relatively smaller, multinomial regression may be biased owing to the skewed distribution in recent year. Especially, less than 5% of the respondents identify themselves as Chinese after 2008, which might not be proper to serve as an independent category in multinomial regression analysis. In the empirical aspect, previous studies in Taiwan and Europe also suggest that those with dual and motherland identity tends to behave similarly.

Exploratory variable includes Taiwanese people's perception of the two most important cross-strait policies implemented by China. In economic aspect, perceived economic benefit from China (ECO) is coded 1 if respondent agreed the argument that “Economic cooperation between China and Taiwan should be strengthened because the cooperation benefits Taiwan’s economy,” -1 if the respondent disagree, and 0 otherwise. In military aspect, perceived military threat (ATT) is coded 1 if respondent agreed on the argument that “China will attack Taiwan once Taiwan claimed independence,” -1 if the respondent does not believe the attack will happen, and 0 otherwise. Similar items can be found in all of the eight surveys used in this study. If the data supports H₁ and H₂, we would expect to find that the partial coefficients of ECO and ATT on explaining ETI would be significantly negative. The simple logit regression model is shown below.

$$\widehat{ETI} = \text{Logit}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 ECO + \beta_2 ATT + \text{controls} + \varepsilon)$$

To examine the cohort effect suggested in H₃ and H₄, the number of cohorts and their duration are needed. Among the eight waves, respondents are asked to report their birth year, which makes cross-wave analysis comparable. To be specific, the eight waves of the survey across 13 years can help us distinguish the cohort effect from the life cycle explanation. Previous studies on distinguishing cohort effect and life cycle effect on repeated cross-sectional surveys tend to apply Mixed Effect Model or pseudo panel data analysis.³³ However, the research topic and data structure fail to meet the criteria of these two methods. First of all, interaction terms are required to test H₃ and H₄, which is not yet supported by existing mixed effect models. Moreover, since there only eight waves of TNS dataset, the number of waves is not enough for panel data analysis.

Therefore, I run eight logit regression models separately including the interaction term between the two China factors and cohort dummies; after that, simulation is used to calculate the net effect of the two China factors on influencing each cohort's ETI decision. The logic is similar to Inglehart's seminal works on analyzing the cohort and life-cycle effect on post-materialistic attitude. If the intergenerational difference on the effect of the two China factors is from life-cycle, the lines of the net effect in each cohort would gradually move downward. If cohort effects are

³³ Mixed effect model see Yang, Yang, and Kenneth C. Land, "A Mixed Models Approach to the Age-Period-Cohort Analysis of Repeated Cross-Section Surveys, with an Application to Data on Trends in Verbal Test Scores." *Sociological Methodology* 36:1 (August 2006), pp. 75-97. Pseudo panel analysis see Deaton, Angus "Panel data from time series of cross-sections." *Journal of econometrics* 30:1-2 (October 1985), pp. 109-126.

present, the pattern will not be diagonal but horizontal, with the net effect of the two China factors in each cohort remaining about the same at the end of the time series as it was at the start.

However, previous studies on the cohort effect in Taiwan do not have a consensus of how (many) cohorts should be decided. To strike a balance between sample size in each subgroup in each wave of the survey as well as the clarity of analysis, I simply pool all eight waves together and use quartiles based on respondents' birth year to separate all respondents into four cohorts evenly. The first generation (G1) includes those who were born before 1957 (27.96% of total sample; 30.69% in the first wave in 2003, and 22.88% in the last wave in 2015), which experienced the direct cross-strait conflict, Chinese civil war, World War II, Korea War, and severe inflation and poverty. The second generation (G2) was born between 1958 and 1965 (22.95% of total sample), which was influenced directly by the emerging economic development and indirectly by the Cold War and Vietnam War. The third generation (G3) was born between 1966 and 1975 (25.41% of total sample), which experienced Taiwan economic miracle, the break of US-Taiwan diplomat relation, eviction of United Nations, democratization movements and repression. In the end, the fourth generation (G4) was born after 1976 (23.68% of the total sample; 17.22% in 2003 and 30.44% in 2015), which went through democratization and the slowdown of the economic development. Since the cohorts are arbitrarily defined, at the end of analysis alternative definitions of the cohort will be used to test the robustness of the conclusion in this article.

To test H₃ and H₄, I set G1 as the base and put G2, G3, and G4 into the model and is interacting with ECO and ATT. To support H₃ and H₄, the partial coefficient of the interaction term, should both be *positive*. For example, when β_1 is negative while β_8 is positive, it implies that the negative effect of ECO on ETI is smaller among the younger respondents who were born after 1976.

$$\widehat{ETI} = \text{Logit}(\beta_0 + \beta_1 ECO + \beta_2 ATT + \beta_3 G2 + \beta_4 G3 + \beta_5 G4 + \beta_6 ECO * G2 + \beta_7 ECO * G3 + \beta_8 ECO * G4 + \beta_9 ATT * G2 + \beta_{10} ATT * G3 + \beta_{11} ATT * G4 + \text{controls} + \varepsilon)$$

One above alternative explanation linking China factors and ETI is that young people would be less influenced by economic benefit and military threat, but things may change when they got older. The most straightforward way to test the cohort effect is to trace the influence of the two factors on the same group of people born in the same year across the eight surveys. If an individual who was born in 1984 has not been influenced by the two rationalism strategies from 2003 to 2015, while during the same period another elder respondent who were born in 1974 was systematically undermined his ETI owing to the two factors, we would be much confident that the two factors are influential because of the cohort rather than life-cycle.

Apart from the main explanatory variables, numerous relevant control variables are also included in the models. Control variables include respondent's level of education EDU (1-6), Gender male (0-1), party identification Blue (KMT and Pan-blue camp=1, else=0) and Green (DPP and Pan-green camp=1, else=0), and ethnicity SGI (mainlander=1, defined as the origin of respondent's father origin.). In an earlier study based on representative surveys from 1994 to 1998, Liu and Ho³⁴ suggested that partisanship, the level of education, and ethnicity can help explain the choice of national identity. Moreover, the partisanship and education variable can contribute to capturing the potential effect from the *Constructivism*, since promoting and attacking the emerging

³⁴ Liu, I-Chou, and Ho Szu-Yin, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People," *Issues & Studies* 35:3 (May 1999): pp. 1-34.

of ETI is one of the polarized issues between the two largest parties in Taiwan. In the end, I did not include household or personal monthly income because the item did not exist in all waves.

Exclusive Taiwanese Identity and China Factors

First of all, individual's perceived economic benefit and perceived military threat are used to explain individual's tendency to have exclusive Taiwanese identity. Among the eight simple logit models in Table 1 (all tables are shown in Appendix), the partial coefficients of ECO and ATT are both significantly negative. It reaffirms that rationalism is one of the important considerations for Taiwanese people in choosing a national identity. The result is also consistent with previous cross-sectional studies,³⁵ implying that the effect of economic benefit and military threat indeed lowered Taiwanese people's choice of identifying themselves as Taiwanese exclusively. After control variables are added (table is omitted), the coefficients of ECO are still significantly negative in all eight models, while the coefficients of ATT are significant in seven of the eight models (except 2011). In short, H₁ and H₂ are supported by the empirical data.

Interaction between Generations and China Factors

In Table 2, the interaction terms between the four cohorts and perceived China factors are both put into the logit regression models. Across all eight models, the interactions between one of the cohort and one of the China factors are at least positively significant once. The interactions between cohorts and ECO are significant across all eight models, while the interactions between cohorts and ATT are significantly positive in five.

³⁵ such as Checkel, "Why Comply?" and Wu, "Romance and Bread"

Table 3 presents the result of logit regression analysis with both interaction terms and controls. After controlling for relevant covariates including partisanship and education, the interaction between cohorts and the two China factors are still significantly positive at least once in five of the eight models, in particular among the youngest cohort who was born after 1975. Besides, the separationplot of the eight models with interaction terms is also presented in the Appendix, which indicates that the eight models provide the acceptable goodness of fit on explaining the ETI.³⁶

Results are, generally speaking, consistent with the theory of life experience and post-materialism under the special political and historical context of Taiwan: the older generation were suffered from both the wartime and poverty before, so the recent China threat reminds them of their childhood nightmare; they would rather follow the will of the China government to avoid the worse outcome. For the middle generations, they also experienced poverty when they are young, but their feeling toward the war is indirect. In the end, the young generation who has never experienced poverty and wartime are the least susceptible to the carrot and stick strategies from China on the road to seek exclusive Taiwanese identity. H₃ and H₄ are supported by empirical data.

To explore whether the intergenerational difference comes from cohort or life-cycle, I use the following steps to estimate the net effect of the two China factors in each cohort by each wave: for each logit regression model in Table 3, I first randomly generated 300 sets of regression coefficient from the variance-covariance matrix estimated by each survey. The sampled coefficient

³⁶ Greenhill, Brian, Michael D. Ward, and Audrey Sacks, "The Separation Plot: A New Visual Method for Evaluating the Fit of Binary Models," *American Journal of Political Science* 55:4 (June 2011), pp. 991-1002.

sets then product with the matrix including the mean value of all control variables, the maximum and minimum value of ETO and ATT, and the dummies for each cohort. The log odd ratios were then transformed to be the predicted probability for an average Taiwanese individual in each cohort to choose ETI when she has either highest or lowest level of the two perceived China factors. By subtracting the two simulated probabilities, the distribution of the net effect of ETI and ATT on each cohort in each survey can then be estimated.

Figure 3 and 4 show the simulated maximum effect of ECO and ATT on ETI in each cohort. The large points are the mean of simulation, and the errorbars illustrate the 95% of distributions. In the both figures, the horizontal pattern implies the cohort effect of the two China factors. The youngest generation is the least susceptible to economic benefit or military threat when they are choosing the exclusive national/regional identity. In contrast, the two factors, especially the perceived military threat, firmly drew the oldest generation from choosing ETI.

[Figure 3 is here]

[Figure 4 is here]

Meanwhile, there is no clear diagonal pattern in both Figure 3 and 4, suggesting that the intergenerational heterogeneity does not come from life-cycle. The net effects of the two China factors in each cohort are almost the same in 2015 as in 2003. Even though the young generation experienced 13 years of adult life, when choosing between being Taiwanese and being Chinese, they are still insusceptible to the economic benefit and military threat from China, compared to the elder generation who were at the same age 13 years ago.

Theoretically, when it comes to war and economic growth, young people should be influenced the most - they will be recruited with the highest priority once the war is declared, and they just begin their career in business. In comparison, middle-aged and older groups face relatively short lifespan, so they can reasonably discount the future outcome and pursue their dream.³⁷ Therefore, the result should be reversed if life cycle is the main explanation of the heterogeneous effect of China factors - rational young people should be *much* susceptible to the two China factors. Combining the discussion above, I suggest that the effect of the two rationalism strategies applied by China on the Taiwan identity issue is cohort one rather than life cycle. With generation replacement over time, utility loss from the two strategies would not be considered seriously in Taiwanese people's mind.

Among the control variables, partisanship and respondent's father's birthplace both significantly influence one's choice of ETI. The result is not surprising: the construction and propagation of the emerging exclusive identity is a top-down trend driven by political elites. Therefore, people in the pan-green camp are much likely to own the exclusive Taiwan identity, compared to those in the pan-blue camp. Meanwhile, when respondent's father is from Mainland China, it can be expected that the respondent is less likely to own exclusive Taiwanese identity since his or her father serves as a heuristic cue of the image of a Chinese. He or she can better

³⁷ On the discussion of individual discounting, see Frederick, Shane, "Valuing future life and future lives: A framework for understanding discounting," *Journal of Economic Psychology* 27:5 (October 2006), pp. 667-680. Empirical work can be found on Harrison, Glenn W., Morten I. Lau and Melonie B. Williams, "Estimating Individual Discount Rates in Denmark: A Field Experiment," *American Economic Review* 92:5 (December 2002), pp. 1606-1617.

imagine what a Chinese would like and behave when retrieving of his or her father. These results speak to the previous study on ethnicity and long-term social learning process on the establishment and change of exclusive regional/national identity. However, even when these two powerful constructivism variables are included in regression models, estimated influence from the two China factors remains strong, supporting the first two hypotheses H₁ and H₂ in this study. In comparison, the influence of the level of education is uncertain, which may be correlated with cohorts. In the end, there is a negative correlation between male and ETI in most of the models, which is consistent with Liu and Ho's study based on 1994 to 1998 datasets.³⁸

Waning Effect, not (just) waning Perception

Another possible explanation is that the strength, rather than the effect, of economic cooperation and military threat from China toward Taiwan, is declining over time. Objectively, it cannot be true, since the amount of cross-strait trade and economic dependency keeps increasing, and the military budget of China also soars in recent decades.

Subjectively, Figure 5 and 6 show the percentage of Taiwanese people in different cohorts perceive the economic benefit and military threat from China (the coding is the same as in Figure 2). The mean value of both measures slightly declines over time, contrary to the trend of economic dependency or military spending. Generally speaking, however, it is clear that the perception of the two China factors is not different from the four generations. Moreover, the slight decline during the 13 years is not compatible with the results in Table 1 to 3 for two reasons. First, juxtaposing Figure 3, 4, 5 and 6, *young generation (G3 and G4) perceived an economic benefit and military threat the most*, but the perception does not translate into the pressure on seeking exclusive

³⁸ Liu and Ho, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People."

Taiwanese identity. Therefore, the result suggests here is that the effect of the China effect become smaller in young generations owing not to the perceived strength, but how the young generation puts them into the calculation. Second, if the subjective strength of the China factors decreases, and people resort their identity through the perception, we would observe the effect of China factors on explaining ETI would *increase over time* - who are not influenced by the China factors are much likely to have ETI. It is not the case in Table 3 and Figure 3-4.

[Figure 5 is here]

[Figure 6 is here]

Robustness checks

The result of the cohort effect still holds under several different robustness checks. One of the weaknesses in my analysis is the arbitrary definition of cohorts. When respondents in all waves are evenly separated into three or five cohorts, the regression result in Table 2 and 3 and the pattern in Figure 3 and 4 are mostly the same. Another way to separate the cohorts is through important events in Taiwan. I tried to separate the cohorts by the 1949 Retreatment, 1959 last military conflict, and 1986 the removal of martial law. Nevertheless, the result is generally held. I also try to replace the four cohorts with respondent's birth year and interact it with the two China factors. Across the eight waves of survey, the interactions between respondent's birth year and ETO positively influence the choice of ETI in six models (with controls), and interactions between birth year and ATT are significantly positive in two.

Besides, propensity score matching is used as an alternative to testing the effect of ECO and ATT. I use the MatchIt package in R, and treat the perceived economic benefit and military attack as binary treatment variable, respectively. The propensity score is calculated by logit model regressing the two treatments with individual's education, father's origin, gender, and party identification. Unfortunately, individual's partisanship cannot be balanced after matching using nearest method. Under this incomplete matching dataset, I still find the declining effect of ECO and ATT in the young generation. The distribution is similar to Figure 3 and 4.

Conclusion, limitation, and future work

In the halfway between province and independence, developing and developed the economy, war and peace, democratization and consolidated democracy, Taiwan serves as a wonderful case on exploring the construction and change of national identity. Based on the analysis of the eight waves of representative survey, I argue that the two China factors derived from rationalism indeed work on repressing the pursuit of exclusive Taiwanese identity, but the effect is declining gradually owing to generation replacement. The individual-level mechanism behind the generation replacement is life experience combining with the peacetime, economic development, and post-materialism. Compared with the previous study on identity change or national identity in Taiwan, this article emphasizes the importance of time dimension on estimating the effect of rationalism factors.

When the strategies of economic rationality become less efficient, the strategy of the motherland itself should change accordingly. For example, Lai (2014) conducted a series of survey experiment and found that Taiwanese subjects who received the message of China's economic growth would instead identify themselves as Taiwanese more; in contrast, subjects who received

the content related to China's progress on democracy and human right protection would increase the level of dual identification.

In the last ten years, there is at least 16 independence referendum around the world. Six of them happened in 2014, including Donetsk, Lugansk, Veneto, Scotland, Catalonia, and Sint Eustatius. We can expect more independence movement and independence referendum will appear, such as Chuuk, New Caledonia, Quebec, and Iraqi Kurdistan. The result of this study provides insight into other dividing countries

Future work of this project may be three-folds. First, the mechanism in individual level between rationalism factor and identity should be further explored. In this article, I argue that the post-materialism and life experience influence the change and continuity of ETI, but evidence in individual level is not enough to support the argument since the dataset lacks measure related to life experience and post-materialism. I only use cohorts as instruments, which is methodologically indirect. If it is possible, the experimental design would be used to test whether an individual who switches the identity given the treatment including the military threat or economic benefit. Second, the backdoor behind Inglehart's theory is that the percentage of post-materialism would decrease if the country encounters dramatic economic decline or wartime. Therefore, the trend provides in this article might be reversed once Taiwan experienced such tragedy again. Third, one of the major social problem in Taiwan is the increasing level of inequality and expensive property (especially house price). The first step of redistribution is to clarify who are we and who will we. Future research can focuses on the interaction between redistribution and Taiwanese identity, given the fact that the first step on discussing redistribution is to clarify who are the in-group members and who are not.

Appendix

Table 1: Simple Logit Model of China factors on ETI

	2003	2004	2005	2008	2011	2012	2014	2015
ECO	-0.64*	-0.55*	-0.85*	-0.81*	-0.85*	-0.70*	-0.76*	-0.69*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
ATT	-0.30*	-0.41*	-0.28*	-0.18*	-0.12*	-0.19*	-0.31*	-0.18*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
(Intercept)	-0.52*	-0.17*	-0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.21	0.47	0.40*
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
<i>N</i>	1225	1484	1221	1076	1104	1075	1091	1071
AIC	1416.85	1771.24	1446.06	1320.36	1367.20	1381.28	1350.94	1377.66
BIC	1478.17	1834.87	1507.35	1380.13	1427.28	1441.04	1410.88	1437.38
logL	-696.42	-873.62	-711.03	-648.18	-671.60	-678.64	-663.47	-676.83

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 2: Logit Model interacting China factors and Cohorts on explaining ETI

	2003	2004	2005	2008	2011	2012	2014	2015
ECO	-0.80***	-0.73***	-1.16***	-0.97***	-1.06***	-1.00***	-0.99***	-1.33***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.19)
ATT	-0.48***	-0.50***	-0.35***	-0.30**	-0.20 ⁺	-0.26*	-0.30**	-0.34**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Born during 1957-1965	-0.03	-0.30 ⁺	0.24	-0.16	-0.36 ⁺	-0.11	0.12	-0.29
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Born during 1966-1975	-0.38 ⁺	-0.40*	-0.16	-0.17	-0.35 ⁺	-0.36 ⁺	0.07	-0.23
	(0.21)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.22)
Born after 1976	-0.12	-0.25	0.14	-0.06	-0.04	0.40*	0.38	0.30
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.21)
ECO × B57_65	0.02	0.00	0.23	0.13	-0.07	0.08	0.18	0.64*
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.26)
ECO × B66_75	0.14	0.28	0.11	-0.02	0.33	0.39 ⁺	0.24	0.71**
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.24)
ECO × B76	0.58**	0.57**	1.01***	0.58*	0.37 ⁺	0.57**	0.46*	0.91***
	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)
ATT × B57_65	0.18	0.14	-0.04	0.03	0.12	-0.11	-0.14	0.16
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.16)
ATT × B66_75	0.32*	0.05	0.22	0.20	0.09	0.07	0.03	0.11
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.15)
ATT × B76	0.42**	0.29*	0.17	0.29*	0.14	0.31*	0.11	0.39**
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
(Intercept)	-0.45***	0.01	-0.17	0.05	0.25 ⁺	0.22	0.33*	0.43**
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.16)
<i>N</i>	1225	1484	1221	1076	1104	1075	1091	1071
AIC	1412.73	1763.78	1426.42	1315.96	1370.09	1350.55	1353.90	1344.34
BIC	1658.05	2018.30	1671.58	1555.05	1610.41	1589.60	1593.65	1583.20
logL	-658.37	-833.89	-655.21	-609.98	-637.04	-627.28	-628.95	-624.17

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

Table 3: Logit Model interacting China factors and Cohorts on explaining ETI, with controls

	2003	2004	2005	2008	2011	2012	2014	2015
ECO	-0.57*** (0.16)	-0.46*** (0.14)	-0.86*** (0.18)	-0.65*** (0.18)	-0.74*** (0.18)	-0.97*** (0.17)	-0.76*** (0.18)	-0.97*** (0.20)
ATT	-0.35*** (0.10)	-0.32*** (0.09)	-0.30** (0.11)	-0.20 ⁺ (0.11)	-0.15 (0.12)	-0.25* (0.11)	-0.23* (0.11)	-0.30* (0.12)
Born during 1957-1965	-0.01 (0.21)	-0.08 (0.19)	0.26 (0.22)	-0.24 (0.23)	-0.36 (0.23)	-0.14 (0.22)	0.06 (0.23)	-0.21 (0.23)
Born during 1966-1975	-0.31 (0.23)	-0.26 (0.19)	-0.10 (0.24)	-0.30 (0.24)	-0.28 (0.22)	-0.41 ⁺ (0.21)	-0.04 (0.21)	-0.21 (0.24)
Born after 1976	-0.04 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.22)	0.09 (0.24)	-0.26 (0.25)	0.04 (0.22)	0.27 (0.22)	0.23 (0.22)	0.32 (0.24)
ECO × B57_65	-0.02 (0.22)	-0.14 (0.20)	0.06 (0.24)	0.14 (0.26)	-0.05 (0.25)	0.05 (0.24)	0.19 (0.27)	0.49 ⁺ (0.27)
ECO × B66_75	0.03 (0.23)	0.22 (0.20)	0.00 (0.24)	-0.14 (0.26)	0.26 (0.22)	0.40 ⁺ (0.22)	0.19 (0.24)	0.59* (0.25)
ECO × B76	0.39 (0.24)	0.34 (0.22)	0.82*** (0.25)	0.51* (0.25)	0.26 (0.22)	0.57** (0.22)	0.37 (0.24)	0.70*** (0.25)
ATT × B57_65	0.18 (0.14)	0.06 (0.14)	0.01 (0.16)	0.07 (0.16)	0.17 (0.16)	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.11 (0.16)	0.17 (0.17)
ATT × B66_75	0.26 ⁺ (0.15)	0.10 (0.14)	0.22 (0.16)	0.13 (0.16)	0.08 (0.15)	0.06 (0.14)	0.06 (0.15)	0.10 (0.16)
ATT × B76	0.32* (0.15)	0.23 (0.15)	0.16 (0.16)	0.26 ⁺ (0.15)	0.17 (0.15)	0.30* (0.14)	0.02 (0.15)	0.34* (0.15)
Level of Education	-0.13* (0.06)	-0.16** (0.05)	0.02 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.06)	-0.17** (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.07 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.06)
Male	-0.45** (0.14)	-0.09 (0.13)	-0.35* (0.14)	-0.02 (0.15)	-0.07 (0.14)	-0.19 (0.14)	-0.54*** (0.14)	-0.48*** (0.14)
SGI	1.08*** (0.23)	-0.85*** (0.22)	-1.21*** (0.25)	-0.35 (0.23)	-0.46* (0.23)	-0.93*** (0.23)	-1.16*** (0.23)	-0.83** (0.22)
Pan-blue	-0.40* (0.17)	-0.31 ⁺ (0.16)	-0.61* (0.31)	-0.56*** (0.17)	-0.33* (0.16)	0.32 ⁺ (0.19)	-0.12 (0.17)	-0.39* (0.17)
Pan-green	1.26*** (0.17)	1.43*** (0.15)	0.77* (0.33)	1.37*** (0.20)	1.02*** (0.19)	0.26 (0.15)	1.14*** (0.18)	0.90*** (0.17)
(Intercept)	-0.90** (0.32)	0.26 (0.22)	0.21 (0.35)	0.02 (0.28)	0.93*** (0.29)	-0.02 (0.26)	0.13 (0.26)	0.62* (0.25)
<i>N</i>	1224	1470	1213	1068	1098	1070	1088	1071
AIC	1282.75	1585.13	1313.59	1202.18	1297.76	1331.79	1261.81	1274.67
BIC	1630.22	1945.06	1660.44	1540.38	1637.85	1670.12	1601.27	1613.06
log <i>L</i>	-573.37	-724.57	-588.79	-533.09	-580.88	-597.89	-562.90	-569.34

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ significant at $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$;




Figure 1. Percentage of Taiwan’s population that identify with Taiwanese and/or Chinese.

Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University <

<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166>>




Figure 2. Trend of ETI, Perceived Economic Benefit, and Perceived Military Threat from China, 2003-2015




Figure 3. Simulated effect of ECO on ETI across generations over time (2003-2015)




Figure 4. Simulated effect of ATT on ETI across generations over time (2003-2015)




Figure 5. Perceived Economic Benefit from China in different generations




Figure 6. Perceived Military Threat from China in different generations




Figure 7. Separationplot of the eight logit models with interaction term