

Attila Ambrus

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Sex: Male

Citizenship: Hungary/USA (double)

Employment:

Professor, Duke University, July 2014-
Associate Professor, Duke University, Aug 2011-June 2014
National Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Sep 2009-June 2010
Research Economist, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Apr 2009-
Associate Professor, Harvard University, Department of Economics, Aug 2007- July 2011
Assistant Professor, Harvard University, Department of Economics, July 2003- July 2007
Member, Institute for Advanced Studies (Princeton), September 2006-May 2007
Postgraduate Associate, Yale University/Cowles foundation, July 2002-June 2003

Degrees:

Princeton University, PhD (Economics), 2003 June
Princeton University, M.A., 2000
Budapest University of Economic Sciences, B.A., M.A., 1994

School Experience:

Princeton University, PhD candidate, 1997-2002
SUNY at Stony Brook, PhD candidate, 1996-1997
Budapest University of Economic Sciences, 1989-1994
University College London, visiting student, 1993

PhD Thesis Title: Coalitional rationalizability

Fields of Interests:

Game Theory
Experimental Economics
Behavioral Economics
Microeconomic Theory
Industrial Organization
Political Economics
Development Economics
Economic History

Principal Thesis Advisor: Professor Dilip Abreu

Grants and Awards:

- Keynes Fund grant 2017 “Free riding and group cooperation” (with Arun Chandrasekhar and Matt Elliott)
- Excellence in Refereeing Award 2013, 2016, 2017 American Economic Review
- National Science Foundation (NSF) grant for “The economic benefits of investing into social relationships” (with Arun Chandrasekhar and Matt Elliott), 2014
- National Science Foundation (NSF) grant for “Continuous-time games with asynchronous moves: Theory and applications,” 2011
- W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National fellowship for 2009–2010 at the Hoover Institution
- National Science Foundation (NSF) grant for “Estimating compensated discount functions” (with Jawwad Noor), 2008
- National Science Foundation (NSF) grant for “Informal contract enforcement on social networks” (with Markus Mobius and Adam Szeidl), 2007
- Institute for Advanced Studies School of Social Science Fellowship, 2006-2007
- Warburg Prize recipient, Harvard University, 2007, 2008, 2010
- Clark Fund recipient, Harvard University, 2004, 2008
- Cowles Foundation postdoctoral fellowship, 2002-2003
- Princeton University Fellowship, 1997-2001
- Soros Foundation Travel Support, 1996-1997
- TEMPUS Mobility Grant, 1993

Editorial Responsibilities:

- Associate Editor, Review of Economic Design (2013-2014)
- Associate Editor, International Journal of Game Theory (2014-)
- Associate Editor, Economica (2014-)
- Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (2014-)

Teaching Experience:

- Advanced Microeconomic Theory PhD courses at Duke University (2012 Spring, 2012 Fall, 2013 Fall, 2014 Fall, 2015 Fall, 2016 Fall, 2017 Fall, 2018 Fall), Harvard University (2004 Spring, 2004 Fall, 2005 Spring, 2005 Fall, 2007 Fall, 2009 Fall), Yale University (2003 Spring) and at Central European University (2003 January)
- Political economy PhD courses at Harvard University (2011 Spring) and Central European University (2011 Spring)
- Undergraduate Introductory Game Theory course at Harvard University (2006 Spring, 2008 Spring, 2009 Spring, 2011 Spring)
- Master level Game Theory course at Duke University (2016 Spring, 2017 Spring, 2019 Spring)

Conference Presentations:

- Adansonia Conference, Bocconi University, May 2019
- ThReD Conference on Development Theory, Warwick University, June 2017

Social Networks and Information Conference, John Hopkins University, April 2017
North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, January 2017
Wallis Conference on Political Economy, October 2016
North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, Boston, January 2015
MKE (Hungarian Economists' Association) annual conference, plenary talk, CEU, Budapest, December 2014
CIREQ Montreal Economic Theory Conference, Montreal, November 2014
SITE Conference on Dynamics of Collective Decision Making, Stanford University, August 2014
North American Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, Philadelphia, January 2014
11th IO Theory Conference, Northwestern University, December 2012
Conference in Economic Theory in Honor of Jerry Green, Tel Aviv, June 2012
ThReD Conference on Development Theory, CEU, Budapest, June 2012
Conflict and Cooperation Conference, Northwestern University, May 2012
9th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston, April 2011
Wallis Conference on Political Economy, Rochester, Oct 2010
Calvo-Armengol Prize Workshop, Andorra, Jun 2010
AEA meetings, Atlanta, Jan 2010
North American Summer Meetings of the Econometric Society, Boston, Jun 2009
7th Annual International Industrial Organization Conference, Boston, Apr 2009
John Nash Conference, Princeton, June 2008
Society for Economic Design Conference, Ann Arbor, June 2008
AEA meetings, New Orleans, January 2008
The 4th Workshop on Media Economics, Washington DC, November 2006
European Meetings of the Econometric Society 2x (Vienna, Budapest) August 2006, August 2007
Cowles Foundation Workshop on Coordination Games, New Haven, September 2005
SITE conference, Experimental Economics session, Stanford University, August 2005
International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook 2x, July 2005, July 2009
International Industrial Organization Conference, Atlanta, April 2005
Kiel-Munich Workshop on Economics of Information and Network Economics, August 2004
Budapest Economics Institute Summer Workshop 2x, June 2004, June 2005
Radcliffe Seminar on Revealed and Latent Preferences, Cambridge, May 2004
Conference on Two sided markets, Toulouse, January 2004
Society for Economic Dynamics Annual Conference 3x (New York, Budapest, Prague), July 2002, June 2005, June 2007

Seminar Invitations: Harvard University, MIT, Yale University, Princeton University (2x), University of Chicago (2x in Economics Department, 1x in Booth School of Business), Northwestern University (2x), University of Michigan (2x), University Of Minnesota, New York University (4x), London School of Economics (2x), Brown University (3x), Boston University, University Pompeu Fabra, Washington University (3x), University of Pennsylvania, University College London (2x), University of Southampton, Central European University, Wesleyan College, Ruttgers University, UC Berkeley, Stanford University (2x), University of Montreal, Université du Québec à Montréal, Penn State (2x), University of Edinburgh, University of

Nottingham, University of Essex (2x), Columbia University, Duke University (2x), University of New South Wales, UCLA, CalTech, UC San Diego, UC Davis, University of Pittsburgh, University of Maryland, George Mason University, Bocconi University, McGill University, Georgetown University, Simon Fraser University, ITAM (2x), Barcelona Jocs/Autonomia Barcelona, Indiana University, Syracuse University, Ohio State University, Microsoft Research New England (3x), NC State University, Michigan State University, Corvinus University Budapest.

Refereed for:

Management Science, Journal of the European Economic Association, American Economic Review, American Economic Journal – Microeconomics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Theoretical Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Rand Journal Of Economics, Economic Theory, Economics Letters, Journal of Economics and Management, Review Of Economic Dynamics, International Economic Review, Economic Journal, Quantitative Economics, Economics Of Transition, National Science Foundation, VENI Innovational Research Incentive Scheme, Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research

Academic Publications:

- Coalitional rationalizability (2006), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(3), 903- 930.
- Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces, with Satoru Takahashi (2008), Theoretical Economics, 3(1), 1-27.
- Early marriage, age of menarche and female schooling attainment in Bangladesh, with Erica Field (2008), Journal of Political Economy, 116(5), 881-930.
- Price dispersion and loss leaders, with Jonathan Weinstein (2008), Theoretical Economics, 3(4), 525-537.
- Theories of coalitional rationality (2009), Journal of Economic Theory, 144(2), 676-695.
- Asymmetric networks in two-sided markets, with Rossella Argenziano (2009), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 1(1), 17-52.
- Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements, and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh, with Erica Field and Maximo Torrero (2010) Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 1349-1397.
- Cooperation over finite horizons: a theory and experiments, with Parag Pathak (2011), Journal of Public Economics, 95(1-2), 500-512.
- Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment - An experimental study, with Ben Greiner (2012), American Economic Review, 102 (7), 3317-3332.
- Hierarchical cheap talk, with Eduardo Azevedo and Yuichiro Kamada (2013), Theoretical Economics, 8, 233-261.
- A comment on commitment and flexibility, with Georgy Egorov (2013), Econometrica, 81 (5), 2113-2124.
- Legislative committees as information intermediaries: a unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules, with Eduardo Azevedo, Yuichiro Kamada and Yuki Takagi (2013), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 94, 103-115.
- Consumption risk-sharing in social networks, with Adam Szeidl and Markus Mobius (2014), American Economic Review, 104, 149-82.

- Almost fully-revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders, with Shih- En Lu (2014), *Games and Economic Behavior*, 88, 174-189.
- A continuous-time model of multilateral bargaining, with Shih En Lu (2015), *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 7, 208-249.
- Revealed conflicting preferences – rationalizing choice with multi-self models, with Kareen Rozen (2015), *Economic Journal*, 125, 1136-1156.
- How individual preferences get aggregated in groups – An experimental study, with Ben Greiner and Parag Pathak (2015), *Journal of Public Economics*, 129, 1-13.
- Either or both competition: A “two-sided” theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships, with Emilio Calvano and Markus Reisinger (2016), *American Economic Journal – Microeconomics*, 8, 189-222.
- Delegation and nonmonetary incentives, with Georgy Egorov (2017) *Journal of Economic Theory*, 171, 101-135.
- The case for nil votes: Voter behavior under asymmetric information in compulsory and voluntary voting systems, with Ben Greiner and Anne Sastro (2017) *Journal of Public Economics*, 154, 34-48.
- Pirates of the Mediterranean: An empirical investigation of bargaining with transaction costs, with Eric Chaney and Igor Salitskiyi (2018) *Quantitative Economics*, 9, 217-246.
- Loss in the time of cholera: Long-run impact of a disease epidemic on the urban landscape, with Erica Field and Robert Gonzalez (2019) conditionally accepted at the *American Economic Review*.
- Individual, dictatorial and democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability, with Ben Greiner, accepted by the *Journal of Public Economics*.

Working Papers:

- Gradual bidding in eBay-like auctions (with James Burns and Yuhta Ishii), r&r at *American Economic Journal – Microeconomics*
- Social investments, informal risk sharing and inequality (with Arun Chandrasekhar and Matt Elliott), r&r at the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*
- Informal risk sharing with local information (with Wayne Gao and Pau Milan), r&r at *Econometrica*
- A delegation-based theory of expertise (with Volodymyr Baranovskyi and Aaron Kolb)
- On asynchronicity of moves and coordination, with Yuhta Ishii
- Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability (with Ben Greiner)
- Compensated Discount Functions - An Experiment on Integrating Rewards with Expected Income (with Tinna Asgeirsdottir, Jawwad Noor and Laszlo Sandor)
- Commitment-flexibility trade-off and withdrawal penalties (with Georgy Egorov)
- Testing an informational theory of legislation: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives (with Laszlo Sandor and Hye Young You)

Older Outdated Working Papers

Exclusive vs overlapping viewers in media markets (with Markus Reisinger), 2006
Dynamic coalitional agreements in multi-stage games, 2003

Other Articles:

The New Immigration: A Border Policy That Can Improve Lives on Both Sides of the Fence
(joint with Michael Kremer), to appear as a chapter in the book “Big ideas”
The life and works of John C. Harsanyi (joint with Peter Eső), IN: “Nobel Prize winners in
Economics,” publisher: KJK, Budapest

Languages: English, Hungarian