While states pay landowners in the big payment-for-ecosystem-services (PES) programs, PES can be locally organized. Downstream actors, e.g., may offer incentives to upstream. Even − or especially? − with local organization, though, there may be negative reactions to the increased monitoring and sanctioning of behavior required to increase PES impact. Mexico’s forest agency (CONAFOR) has had limited average impacts per PES contract in its direct state payments but also, since 2008, a novel policy to help create new local PES. The Fondos Concurrentes (Matching Funds) program solicits applications − initiated by varied partners − that must include agreement between upstream and downstream groups. We consider the creation of local PES programs, involving coordination by those groups to establish a new institution, and effects of permitting sanctions on upstream behaviors. We use PES framing (services go downstream, payment up) of the contributions in a new assurance game that, in real time, links the groups − each of which confronts free riding. After our field pilot, we recruited 240 downstream and 240 upstream Fondos participants from Xalapa (Veracruz State), Merida (Yucatan State) or Cancun (Quintana Roo State). Initial trust-game behaviors align with participant perceptions and predict baseline giving in assurance (which is significant, despite a zero equilibrium, perhaps due to our sample). For upstream providers, i.e., those who get sanctioned, the threat and the use of sanctions increase contributions. Any ‘motivation crowding’ is not dominant during these sanctions. Downstream users contribute less when offered the option to sanction − as if that option signals an uncooperative upstream − then contributions rise in line with complementarity.
You are browsing archives for