The key textual point of departure for my contribution to our discussion is found in a volume of the collected works of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938): *Husserliana XXVII - Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922-1937).*\(^1\) Five essays within this volume deal with the topic of "Erneuerung" - "Renewal". In these essays, Husserl called for a renewal, reformation, or rehabilitation of the European spirit; indeed, and somewhat disturbingly, he seeks a rehabilitation of the whole world based upon a renewed Europe. In a certain sense, he advocates a "salvific" role for Europe as a cultural enterprise; but this role can only be fulfilled if Europe first "saves" itself from a ruinous situation. The purpose of this discussion paper is simply to outline Husserl’s appeal for renewal based on texts from this tumultuous period of German history, to open some new perspectives on Husserl’s philosophy and its many links to a theological discourse, and, perhaps, to open the way for discussion about what his view on renewal/reformation might offer to a philosophical comprehension of present day "crises" – of which there seem to be no lack. First, I will briefly sketch the genesis of these essays and the context within which they were written, and seek a definition of what Husserl means by “renewal.” In the second section, I will focus on some of the communal and political aspects of Husserl’s call for renewal. Finally, my brief conclusion will be that while Husserl’s view of European renewal displays some

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shortcomings, it nonetheless offers on many points an enlightening and surprisingly relevant perspective upon some aspects of the historic period in which we find ourselves today – a period not dissimilar in many traits from those of Weimar Germany.

Husserl's Definition of Renewal

The five essays on "renewal" were written in the years 1922/23 for the Japanese journal Kaizo; the title itself apparently meaning something like renewal, reform, or reconstruction. The audience for this journal consisted of young Japanese intellectuals who had their eyes on the West, those possessing the same mind-set as the numerous Japanese students of philosophy who attended Husserl's (and later Heidegger's) seminars in Freiburg. The first essay, "Renewal - Its Problem and its Method," sets forth Husserl's general assessment of the situation immediately following World War I and the framework of a methodology for achieving the renewal which Husserl felt to be necessary. This essay was published in 1923 in Kaizo and appeared in both Japanese and German. The next two essays, "Die Methode der Wesensforschung" ("The Method of the Investigation of Essence") and "Erneuerung als individualethisches Problem" ("Renewal as Individual-ethical Problem"), the themes of which are the proper method of renewal and the role of the individual, were printed only in their Japanese translation. Two earlier essays intended for Kaizo, "Erneuerung und Wissenschaft" ("Renewal and Science"), which deals with the universal aspect

2. This point is made by Husserl himself; see editor's introduction, Hua XXVII, p. xi.

of renewal, and "Formale Typen der Kultur in der Menschheitsentwicklung" ("Formal Types of Culture in the Development of Humanity"), were never published. This last essay in particular places the problem of renewal within the context of world history. A sixth essay which displays connected to the Kaizo writings due to its thematic similarity, time of composition and intended audience was "The Idea of a Philosophical Culture: Its First Dawn in Greek Philosophy," published in 1923 in another journal with a connection to Japan, the Japanisch-deutsche Zeitschrift für Wissenschaft und Technik. As with the "Kaizo" pieces, it was meant as a general introduction for an audience unfamiliar with Husserl's thought. Husserl later used sections of this essay in the first part of his lecture course from 1923-1924 entitled "First Philosophy." In the critical edition of that lecture course, the essay appears only partially in the body of the main lecture course, with the remainder reproduced among the appendices. Along with these six essays, the various texts which have been provided as appendices to the "Kaizo" essays in the critical edition of Husserliana XXVII are extremely interesting, as they often expand upon or clarify what is said in the essays themselves.

As texts aimed at an audience which lacked any advanced knowledge of his phenomenology, these essays are devoid of some of the difficulties a reader might encounter in first approaching the philosophy of Husserl. Hence, they form an accessible introduction to the tenor of Husserl's thought, if not the specifics of his phenomenological method. Nevertheless, given the fact that these texts either had a rather limited circulation or remained unpublished until 1987, they do call for some preliminary remarks. This introduction aims to provide an acquaintance with the context within which these texts were conceived, as well as pointing out some of the major themes which combine here to present a somewhat "different" picture of Husserl and

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5 Hua XXVII, pp. 96-124.
the development of his thought than is often present in the literature.\textsuperscript{6}

When considering these articles, it is clear that they arise within the historical context within which Husserl himself was writing, namely, the "deplorable situation,"\textsuperscript{7} as he calls it in Kaizo, of a Weimar Germany in "political, national, religious, artistic, and philosophical chaos."\textsuperscript{8} We are generally familiar with the situation: failed constitutional efforts which never enjoyed enough popular support to fill the political vacuum left by the fall of the Kaiserreich;\textsuperscript{9} traditional German regionalism, and Allied control in some sectors which led to a diffusion of political power; lack of consensus at the regional level – and indeed, radical disagreement on the very form of political life.


\textsuperscript{7} \textit{Hua XXVII}, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Hua XXVII}, p. 95. For background on the turmoil of Weimar Germany, an excellent source is Hagen Schulze, \textit{Weimar Deutschland: 1917-1933} (Berlin: Severin und Siedler, 1982). An old, but standard work on political decay in Weimar is K.D. Bracher, \textit{Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik. Eine Studie zum Problem des Machtverfalls in der Demokratie} (Villingen: Ring Verlag, 1964).

\textsuperscript{9} From the election of June 6, 1920 to the fall of Weimar, the Reichstag never had a pro-republican majority. For the lack of political consensus, see Ullrich Scheuner, "Grundrechte und Verfassungskonsens als Stützen der Verfassungsordnung" in \textit{Weimar als Erfahrung und Argument} (Bonn: n.p., 1977).
Economically, there was the two-edged sword of the war and its aftermath: namely, the depletion of resources which had occurred and, at the same time, the collapse of the false economic rise which the war had brought to at least certain sectors of the economy. Added to this was the war debt imposed by the treaty of Versailles.\textsuperscript{10} The economic hardships of the period are conveyed by Husserl himself in a letter to the Canadian Winthrop Bell from 1922, wherein he complains that, due to inflation, his pay raise actually works out to be one-tenth of his old salary; he adds that, because he needed the money, he could not refuse the offer to write some articles for the Japanese journal \textit{Kaizo}.\textsuperscript{11} Given such a situation, combined with the personal suffering and loss which the war had brought,\textsuperscript{12} one can empathize with the depression and confusion, as well as the resentment, felt in Germany at the time. It is this resentment that Husserl is voicing when he says that the war, in a certain sense, had continued past 1918, to be waged with psychological torture, moral deprivation, and economic need.\textsuperscript{13}

It would seem, therefore, that the First World War may well be viewed as the external event pivotal to the production of these \textit{Kaizo} articles. Pierre Trotignon claims that it was the First World War which formed a radical break with the cultural and rational heritage of Europe that had existed for twenty-five centuries. The war was a true “crisis,” separating Europe from the rational ideal that had

\textsuperscript{10} See Schulze, \textit{Weimar Deutschland 1917-1933}, pp. 31-47.

\textsuperscript{11} Husserl-Archive signature R.I.Bell 13.XII.1922. I am grateful to the Director of the Husserl-Archive, for permission to cite this letter and other material from Husserl's unpublished Nachlass.

\textsuperscript{12} Husserl's youngest son, Wolfgang, was killed in action at Verdun, France on March 8, 1916. Another son, Gerhart, later a Professor of Law at Harvard, was badly wounded.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Hua XXVII}, p. 3.
There can be little doubt of the tragic role which the First World War played in Husserl's consciousness of a crisis. It would be misleading, however, to consider this monumental event as the "efficient" cause of Husserl's crisis-philosophy first expressed in these Kaizo articles. The war and its aftermath, just as the later rise of Nazism, were for Husserl signs of something fundamentally amiss in European civilization, signs of a sickness with roots reaching well beyond the immediate circumstances of these terrible events.

One is reminded of Spengler's contention, expressed in the preface to Der Untergang des Abendlandes, that his work had basically taken shape before the war, and that he had even chosen his title by 1912. So the war was not the cause of decay, but a reflection of it. As Spengler says, "events have justified my theory and refuted nothing." One should add immediately that while Spengler and Husserl agree that the present situation is a "sign" of something, they disagree radically about the underlying cause of this degeneration and about the nature of possible solutions. Untergang, says


Husserl, is our fate only if we passively accept it as such.\textsuperscript{16} It is to Husserl's credit that he gave in neither to the superficial pessimism which repeats itself in every age, but which grew to a crescendo in the 1920's, nor to an external analysis of the crisis which would perhaps yield easy answers. As Franco Volpi has pointed out in an excellent article entitled "Aux racines du malaise contemporain: Husserl et la responsabilité du philosophe," Husserl's account deserves special attention because it attempts to discover the \textit{primordial} roots of the contemporary malaise.\textsuperscript{17} It is this depth which gives Husserl's analysis its lasting value.

The fundamental crisis that Husserl describes in the \textit{Kaizo} articles is a loss of \textit{faith}. Renewal is thus the renewal of faith, a re-establishment or rekindling of faith. The faith that has been lost is that faith which has sustained Europe since its "foundation" or origin, that is, since the Greeks.\textsuperscript{18} This faith can be described in the first place as a belief in the possibility of rational existence. It is a sense that human life \textit{can be} rational, a belief that all human activity can be guided by rationally established means. For Husserl, this faith also has what might be called a "moral dimension". It is not just a belief that human life \textit{can be} rational, but rather a belief that human life \textit{ought} to be rational. This faith proclaims that for human life to be truly human, it must be rational. According to this faith, truly human existence is a rational existence. Thus, this faith not only proclaims that rational existence is possible, but that such an existence constitutes a goal for authentic humanity. It is a faith in the moral and normative sense of human culture.

\textsuperscript{16} Hua XXVII, p. 4.


\textsuperscript{18} Hua XXVII, see especially pages 79-89.
that is, of rationally determining values within a culture. It is thus a rational faith in morality, and a moral faith in rationality.

What is this rationality and how has the West come to lose faith in it? For Husserl, not surprisingly, true rationality ultimately takes the form of philosophy. The trade-marks of this philosophical rationality which continually appear in his thought are well-known: critique, theory, ideality, omni-temporality, infinitude, method, and universality. The belief that true human life is a rational life is a belief that this life must be imbued with a sense of critique and a desire to see for oneself. It maintains that one should accept nothing simply on the basis of the tradition and that one must be willing to critique oneself and one's actions. Rationality also implies a certain attitude that is not dominated by immediate, pressing concerns, and that is not interested solely in functioning, but in truly comprehending and knowing why the world and its inhabitants function as they do.

When Husserl this describes in the Kaizo articles the "sorrowful age" in which he lives and the loss of faith in this ideal of rationality, while the shadow of the First World War seems omnipresent, the war was itself only a sign for Husserl of the abandonment of the struggle for rational existence. In the articles for Kaizo, Husserl attributes the primary cause for the loss of faith in the possibility of ordering life in a rational way to the lack of a science that can act as an aid in this task. It is not that science is completely absent; indeed, there exist numerous natural sciences that seem to function well and to produce results. But the science required for the direction of human life is different because the "subject matter" of such a science is different. Values belong to the realm of "Spirit," and a proper scientific approach to this realm is lacking. Again, it is not as if "human sciences," the "sciences of spirit," are nowhere to be found. Rather, they have shown themselves to be inadequate to the task of providing a proper, a priori, scientific approach to the realm of subjective, human life. Renewal of the sagging faith in the possibility of meaningful human existence is thus based on the establishment of an a priori, normative
science of human subjectivity. Only by this means can the traditional faith of the West in rational, meaningful human existence be regenerated.

In *Kaizo*, the emphasis is thus not so much on the threat to the proper approach to spirit that arises from the tendency of the natural sciences to view everything as a fact, rather, it is on the inability of the human sciences to develop and to found themselves properly. That is, Husserl does not stress the *hubris* and self-forgetfulness of the natural sciences so much as the poor performance of the human sciences. This stands somewhat in contrast to the view in the *Crisis*. In that text, the natural sciences share the culpability for the decay. Indeed, there the self-forgetfulness of the natural sciences of their ground in human subjectivity is clearly a fundamental cause of the crisis.\(^{19}\) In the *Crisis*, the source of existential alienation and discontent is said to be the inability of all the sciences to deliver on their promises. In *Kaizo*, the view is much more that the natural sciences are doing precisely what they must, that even the negative aspects of the technological developments within the natural sciences are over-emphasized. Disappointment is felt primarily in the human sciences. As Husserl mentions in an earlier version of the first *Kaizo* article, there even existed deep-seated mistrust of philosophy due to its service of war-propaganda. Still, the returning soldiers had a spiritual need. For Husserl, their numbers at philosophy lectures showed that they sought the fulfilment of this need in the true philosophy of "eternal ideas, which carry in themselves the sense of the world and human life."\(^{20}\) The terrible situation is,


\(^{20}\) Hua XXVII, p. 94.
therefore, not entirely without hope. The dire nature of the times made the need for philosophy apparent. As long as things were "going-well," the question of the proper scientific approach to humanity could be overlooked. But in view of the destruction of the war and its aftermath, questioning about the nature of human life, its meaning, and its rationality becomes so acute as to be unavoidable. Thus there is what Husserl describes as the "universal call"\(^{21}\) for renewal, a renewal which is led by the re-establishment of faith in the project of rational, human existence.

This brief summary of Husserl's assessment of the situation and his description of the proper method to approach the lack of faith is drawn mainly from \textit{Kaizo I} and \textit{II}. It also gives rise to numerous questions. For example, his approach to the lamentable situation seems ruled by what might be called the "logic of the felix culpa."\(^{22}\) That is, faith in rationality actually had to be lost before it could be restored by the salvific act of transcendental phenomenology. Husserl seems to imply a cycle of decay and re-birth in his view of the history of Western rationality. In short, Husserl suggests in these essays that there is also a historical or genetic element to understanding his call for shoring up the foundations of European culture. The fundamental crisis is described as a loss of faith in reason and renewal is the re-establishment or rekindling of faith in reason. For something to be renewed, it must have once been new and become old. Herein lies the introduction to a historical turn in Husserl's thought; a turn that is both important for phenomenology, intriguing, and also contains numerous perplexing elements.

It was perhaps due to Husserl's early emphasis on the Cartesian way to transcendental phenomenology, combined with the fact that the \textit{Crisis}-text as we know it was not widely available until

\(^{21}\) Hua XXVII, p. 3.

\(^{22}\) See my more extensive treatment of this problem in P. Buckley, \textit{Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility} (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1992), chapter five, section 2.
the publication of the critical edition in 1954, that a tendency developed to regard Husserl's thought as primarily un-historical or even anti-historical. The publication of the critical edition of the Crisis and the subsequent study of its emphasis on history then led some to believe that this "late discovery" of history (often attributed to the influence of Heidegger) constituted a break with Husserl's early phenomenology.

Other commentators see a definite continuity in Husserl's thought, a continuity which is not broken by the thorough reflection on history in the Crisis. With the publication of these "Kaizo"-essays along with the essay which was woven into the lecture course "First Philosophy" from 1923-1924 as an introduction to

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24 A well-known exponent of the opinion that the Crisis marks a radical change in Husserl's philosophy is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), p. 61. Even circumspect and insightful commentators as Carr tend to stress the novelty of this infusion of history into Husserl's thought; see David Carr, "Husserl's Crisis and the Problem of History," in Interpreting Husserl (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 71-73. Elsewhere, Carr does emphasize the continuity of Husserl's thought vis-à-vis history; see his Phenomenology and the Problem of History (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), pp. 66-67. Some treat this "novelty" as a reaction to the historical crisis of the 1930's, and also imply that the proximity and popularity of Heidegger should not be ignored; see Paul Ricoeur, "Husserl and the Sense of History" in Ricoeur, Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern, 1967), p. 144.

the lengthy "Critical History of Ideas," we can now see clearly the slow germination of Husserl's full understanding of history as expressed in the Crisis.

Two related concepts which stand central in Husserl's grasp of the dynamic of history are worked out for the first time in these essays: primal establishment (Urstiftung) and re-establishment (Nachstiftung). Two further concepts are often used in relation to the main two: namely, new establishment (Neustiftung) and final establishment (Endstiftung). In the following discussion, the focus is on the first two concepts, though reference to the second two is unavoidable at points. It must be admitted that Husserl does not always maintain a precise technical usage of these terms. This not only has to do with the fact that there is a degree of interchangeability among them, but also with certain ambiguities in Husserl's view of the moments in history which concretize these concepts.

Primal establishment might best be called a moment of original authenticity. It occurs when, through a deliberate act of self-reflection and direction of will, a new type of consciousness directed at a new type of intentional object is formed. In this sense, the primal establishment is truly a new establishment, it constitutes a break with the past and the establishment of a novel form of thinking and being. This primal establishment is perhaps best grasped as an individual moment, for it involves in the first place the struggle of the individual to become disengaged from traditional ways of thinking, the individual struggle to gain truth for oneself. It is a moment of self-responsibility in the strongest sense of the word: answering to oneself for what one believes. Still, it carries with it the possibility not only to influence others present, but in opening up a new type of consciousness, of functioning as a model for future generations. In no way does this imply an absolute or necessary determination of the future, rather, the primal establishment is the creating of a new possibility for the future.

Therefore each future generation has the possibility of freely choosing to re-establish the new form

\[26\] The "Kritische Ideengeschichte" occupies pp. 3-191 of Husserliana VII.
of consciousness, of joining in the tasks and goals of the new way of thinking. This re-establishment of what was given in the primal establishment is a true "renewal," a making new again what was given before. Therefore, Husserl speaks of every re-establishment as a new primal establishment. In this sense, every re-establishment is also a new establishment. This newness makes it clear that the re-establishment is no mere repetition of the past, no mindless "going through the motions" without insight or decisiveness. To the contrary, the re-establishment can never take place without a deliberate act of will, a solemn decision to make one's own the possibility which has been handed down. The dominant quality of both primal establishment and re-establishment is, therefore, freedom. This freedom is a breaking away from the past. Thus, in the case of re-establishment, it is a paradoxical freedom. It is a freedom from the past which allows one to gain for oneself the insight of the past.

In the fifth "Kaizo"-essay, Husserl uses the history of religion as a surprising model to illustrate his notion of history. The first type or stage of religious culture which Husserl describes is called "natural" religion. In this form of religious culture, absolute norms put forth by the gods or God govern everything, and the social will is organized around these norms. There is no freedom to choose how to comport oneself, for all is set forth according to pre-given determinations. It is for the individual an unreflective, passive life, lived in the acceptance of religious law and priestly dictates. It is essentially a life governed by the tradition. Husserl also calls this type of religion naive, for individuals live in blindness to the "why" of the norms and laws which govern their existence. As concrete examples of this stage of religious culture, Husserl cites Babylonian religion and Judaism.

At a particular point, there can arise the individual who assumes a critical posture regarding the tradition. Through a voluntary act of self-reflection, this individual seeks to legitimize for himself the convictions held naively and passively in the tradition. This individual forges an original relationship to

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27 Hua VI, p. 72; Crisis, p. 73.
God, seeks to discover the intuitive meaning which has been covered up by the thoughtless, unreflective acceptance of divine norms. This is a new type of religious consciousness, one that is rational, critical, active and, essentially, free. This individual can be said to be the founder (Urstifter) of a free, intuitive, religious consciousness that is rooted in self-responsibility and reflection. This type of authentic religious individual occurred for Husserl in the person of Christ. The form of this religious consciousness is now available to future generations, the attitude contained therein can be freely and deliberately assumed.

The assumption, or re-establishment of this original insight by those wishing to imitate Christ means nothing less than finding for oneself the meaning of religious experience. To emphasize once again: it can have nothing to do with mere repetition or simple external adoption of a particular posture taken by Christ. What is to be re-established is precisely the critical attitude, the questioning in freedom, the seeking for oneself that was exemplified in the Urstifter. There is for Husserl no absolute assurance that this will be the case. There is always the danger of a "slide-back" into traditionalism, into a passive acceptance of a form which is no longer understood, of taking to be "mine" that which has not been truly appropriated by the self. Husserl takes this to be what occurred in the Middle Ages. A hierarchical, imperialistic form of religious culture emerged, the very form of which negated the religious posture it claimed to preserve. Husserl does not call it this, but one might name it an inauthentic "re-establishment", though in fact it is no re-establishment at all but a moment of loss of what is claimed to be re-established. However, even in these periods of "sliding-back" and loss, something of the primal establishment is maintained. There can come a moment of authentic re-establishment, of true reawakening of the religious culture, of a making new again the form of the primal establishment. A period of such re-establishment in the history of religion is, according to Husserl, the Reformation.
It would lead far afield to raise some obvious difficulties with certain details of Husserl's history of religion (for example, his stereotypical grasp of the Middle Ages, or his surprisingly naive understanding of Judaism - given his background). The purpose here has been simply to illuminate Husserl's view of the shape of history as consisting in a movement from a primal establishment to the attempt by succeeding generations to re-establish this primal establishment. In doing so, we see in a formal way what a crisis situation is for Husserl. It is very simply a distancing from the origin, an inauthentic repetition of the primal establishment, a separation from the meaning of the primal establishment, or perhaps most accurately, a "forgetting" of the primal establishment. This definition, in turn, makes eminently clear why an historical investigation is necessary in order to fully grasp the crisis in all of its manifold forms of separation from an original truth. Only by a "questioning-back" (Rückfrage) into the process of separation and alienation from the primal establishment can the possibility of an authentic re-establishment be obtained. Moreover, since the overcoming of the crisis is precisely a re-establishment of the original moment of authenticity, it can only be obtained by a grasp of that origin. Thus, both the understanding of the crisis and the overcoming of the crisis demand historical reflection. It is a "questioning-back" through the crisis to the origin. But what exactly is recovered at the "origin" or "foundation"? In fact, it is a “faith” in reason”. As we know from Kierkegaard, “faith” is a difficult notion for philosophy. Faith “in” rationality is even more difficult. A rational faith in rationality begins to sound circular, and the restoration of a rational faith in rationality by means of science strikes one indeed as a peculiar project. Of course, everything hinges on what one means by faith, and this is no easy question in Husserl. In the fifth Kaizo piece, I have suggested that a clue is yielded in the discussion of religious faith by the identification of authentic religious faith with the critical aspect of the phenomenological attitude. What is it precisely that makes Jesus, or Luther, or Husserl a “faithful” guide to the renewal of faith in reason itself? In the next section, I will try to approach this question obliquely by asking about the social and political aspects of this call for renewal. How does it come about in a large-scale, communal sense?
What is the philosopher's role in this over-all renewal? Possible answers to these and other "political" questions can be sought in *Kaizo* III and IV, in which Husserl considers in turn the role of the individual in renewal, and the universal nature of "scientific" renewal.

**Renewal: An Individual or a Societal Task?**

My intention is not to suggest that one finds in these *Kaizo* articles a concise and clearly expressed political philosophy. Nowhere in Husserl's work does one find such a philosophy. Nevertheless, it would be a false understanding of phenomenological reduction to think that phenomenologists, and more specifically, Husserl, have nothing to say about social phenomena. For Husserl, the crisis has a societal dimension, and nowhere is this more evident than in the *Kaizo* articles. The difficulty which Husserl recognizes is that part of the crisis consists in being "lost" in the political and social world, that is, in accepting what has been given as self-evident, and thereby formulating solutions to the crisis in the same worn out and sedimented concepts and language that are in fact part of the problem. Phenomenological reduction is required, not because of a lack of interest in the social and political world, but rather because Husserl wants to approach these phenomena in a new, unhindered way.

Without reduction, one runs the risk of joining the political sophists, who use "socioethical argumentation as a disguise for the egoistical goals of a completely degenerate nationalism." For Husserl,

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28. As Karl Schuhmann has pointed out, the word *Politik* appears fewer than ten times in the first twenty volumes of Husserliana. See K. Schuhmann, *Husserls Staatsphilosophie* (Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber, 1988), p. 18.

29. Hua XXVII, p. 5.
it makes no sense to talk about the re-establishment of rationality in political life if we have lost faith in rationality überhaupt. Before we can talk about acting rationally in the political and social realm, we must re-establish the belief that humanity itself is rational. Politics are by no means excluded from the project of renewal; to the contrary, the spiritual renewal which Husserl seeks may have far-reaching political consequences. Husserl says that the establishment of a science of humanity and the human community would in turn "establish a rationality in social and political activity and a national, political technique." How might this be the case?

Any discussion of the social and the political involves two distinct but connected relationships: the relationship of subject to subject (the "I" to other individual instances of "I") and the relationship of the individual subject to the community of subjects (the "I" to the "we"). Neither of these relationships is without difficulty in Husserl. Regarding the first, it is well known that if one focuses on Husserl's "egology," that is, on his emphasis on the singularity of subjectivity and on such statements as "the monads have no windows," then one is confronted, to some degree, with the possibility of solipsism in his thought. The subject can be seen as a completely self-sufficient, self-actualizing, and self-subsisting entity. Husserl sometimes uses the image of a circle to describe the life of this individual "monad," because a circle safely contains everything within its boundaries, or conversely, excludes everything from its own interiority. On the

30. Hua XXVII, p. 6, "... welche <die rationale Wissenschaft> eine Rationalität im sozialen, im politischen Handeln und eine rationale politische Technik begründen würde ..."


32. Hua XIV, p. 359.
other hand, Husserl also stresses relations of *Einfühlung* (empathy). Through such relations the monads do indeed seem to have windows! To be sure, the subject never has access to the subjective life of other monads in the same way that it has access to its own inner life. There is, nevertheless, an awareness of other subjects within one's own subjectivity. This inter-subjectivity forms the basis for the second relationship, namely, between the "I" and the "we," for it is only through a type of "sharing" between individual subjects that anything like an authentic "we" can emerge. Before suggesting how renewal takes place in the framework of this relationship, let me characterize this "we" more closely; for it turns out that this "we" is not merely a consequence of a plurality of "I's".

The shortest definition which Husserl gives of different sorts of communities, different sorts of "we's" (e.g. family, clubs, and somewhat more problematic, the state) is that they are "personalities of a higher-order."33 This formulation already implies the similarity and the difference between the "I" and the "we." The similarity is that the community too is a "personality," that is, it can somehow be viewed as a subject writ large. Husserl says at the outset of *Kaizo* III that the community "is a personal, one might say, many-headed and yet connected subjectivity."34 So tight is the analogy between the individual and the community that he describes the individual and the community as an "inseparable pair of ideas."35 In various texts, Husserl ascribes to the "personality of higher-order" all sorts of characteristics which are normally

33. This notion of a "personality of higher order" is found already in *Ideen II* (Hua IV, section 51) and is worked out more fully in manuscripts dating from the same period as *Kaizo*; see, for example, Hua XIV, texts 9 and 10. It is not surprising that it plays a central role in *Kaizo* as well; see Hua XXVII, p. 22.

34. Hua XXVII, p. 22.

35. Hua XXVII, p. 6.
associated with an individual's personality, such as memory and even a form of corporeity. Just as individuals have a will, so too is there a community-will.

It is crucial to remember, however, that to speak of the community as a subjectivity is indeed to speak analogously. The personality of higher order is founded in the individuals who also form the basis for the analogy. Higher-order does not mean better, or first, but founded. Thus, the community is something different from the individuals who make it up, it is more than the mere sum of the individuals who make it up, it is in fact something new, but it cannot exist without the individual. An authentic community will, for example, cannot exist without the willing of the individuals who make up the community. One is reminded of the nature of categorial acts which, on the one hand, are something truly new, but which are founded and only exist on the basis of individual acts of perception. The founded nature of the community is important to stress, for it goes against any notion of pre-existent communal structures wherein the individual is viewed as a mere part or where the individual finds his true being. James Hart, in an article describing the elements of Husserl's theory of community, summarizes this point well:

Husserl's discussion of the ontological features of the community as a personality of a higher order (or an analogous founded "I" of "I's") make it clear that the "we" emergent out of being-in-one-another of wills in community is not absolutist in the sense of a prior existing founding principle which is the efficient cause of its moments/members and for which the moments/members are accidental ... This emergent high-order substrate, "we," as the analogous "I" of "I's", is constituted from out of a manifold of "I's".37

36. Hua XXVII, p.49.

It is noteworthy that what might be called that Husserl's communitarian position goes against a common trend that developed in some anti-liberal circles in Weimar Germany, namely, to treat the state as the highest ontological order and to see individuals as secondary.\(^\text{38}\) Within these circles, renewal was said to begin with the renewal of the state, the individual being "renewed" through the renewal of the state. For Husserl, to the contrary, the fact that the true community is ontologically founded on individuals precludes any such view of renewal "from above."

Husserl does understand, however, that communities can diverge into an inauthentic form. This happens precisely when there is a loss of the radical independence, self-responsibility, and willingness to be critical on the part of the individual member. In Kaizo, Husserl names such an inauthentic form of community "an imperialist organization of will, a central will in which all single wills are focused and to which all must subordinate themselves."\(^\text{39}\) Such an inauthentic "we" is possible only on the un-phenomenological attitude of power over others. In the fifth Kaizo article, in which Husserl compares and contrasts religious and scientific culture, he gives as the prime example of such an imperialist unity the mediaeval Church. Power over others is fundamentally irrational for Husserl, because it takes away the very basis of true rationality: self-determination, self-judgement, autonomy, and seeing for oneself. One should add here that there is another un-phenomenological attitude which is implicated in this inauthentic "we," namely, laziness. The mere acceptance of the insights of others, the mindless taking over of the tradition or the dictates of the

\(^{38}\) See, for example, the sarcastic treatment of the "liberale Einzelmenschenbewusstsein" in C. Schmitt, \emph{Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität}, 2. Ausgabe (München und Leipzig, 1934), p.74.

\(^{39}\) \textit{Hua XXVII}, p. 53.
community, this attitude makes possible an imperialistic community. Such laziness, or as Husserl calls it in the "Vienna Lecture," fatigue (Müdigkeit), is one of the major symptoms of the degeneration which he hopes to reverse.  

The authentic community, therefore, does not consist of either an overwhelming central will, or of a group of lazy individuals. Rather, it consists of what Husserl calls surprisingly a "communistic unity of wills," wherein there is a "consciousness of the communal goal of the common good to be pursued, of an encompassing will of which all know themselves to be functionaries, but as free, and not even a freedom which must practice renunciation, and also not subordinated functionaries."  

The unity of will (Willenseinheit) which makes up the authentic community is not derived from above, but is arrived at from below. This arriving takes place through the process of sharing insights, insights that are valid and obtainable (at least, in principle) for everyone, but that are first won by the hard, phenomenological work of the individual. James Hart points out both the role played by Husserl's intuitionism and the inter-subjective nature of true phenomenological activity when he says:

although phenomenology is negated when regarded as solipsism, i.e. where what it uncovers holds only for me and not for us, and therefore although phenomenology can exist only as an ongoing building of a common good and common life, no "we" can stand for me; I cannot delegate to anyone my seeing and marshalling of evidence - an evidence whose sense is "for us all", but an "us" which is co-founded on my seeing and in no way substitutes for my seeing or asks me to trust someone else's seeing. The ideals of the

40. Hua VI, p. 348; Crisis, p. 299. See also Husserl's attack on "lazy reason," in Hua VI, p. 14, Crisis, 16.

41. Hua XXVII, p. 53.
institutionalization of a phenomenological culture and radical democracy draw near to one another.\textsuperscript{42}

This citation brings us back directly to our question of communal renewal, for what Husserl intends by renewal is nothing less than phenomenological culture. Who is responsible for renewal? Those who have not yet lost sight of the goal of rational life, of philosophy as a rigorous science, namely, phenomenologists. In the first place, individual phenomenologists undertaking their own struggle for insight. Husserl clearly recognizes, however, that while such individual efforts may bring personal satisfaction, they are insufficient to renew culture.\textsuperscript{43} An important stage of general cultural renewal is, therefore, for phenomenological philosophers themselves to form an authentic community. There are, however, several difficulties with this movement from individual renewal to large-scale renewal.

First, and rather obviously for those of us who belong to a department of philosophy, there is the difficulty of philosophers themselves forming what Husserl calls an authentic community. Husserl gives no account of the possibility of the authentic conflict that does indeed seem to mark philosophical activity. Husserl certainly has a theory of inter-subjective correction. Through the comparison of believed insights the possibility of illusion is ruled out and the proper justification of true insights is discovered. It is these insights, shared by individuals and justified in common, that form the very basis for the unity of will that is essential to authentic community. While it is true that this process of inter-subjective correction plays a crucial role in communal philosophical life, it is also obvious that there can exist a plurality of well-justified insights that do not coincide in a common will. Husserl's view of the unicity of universal reason precludes the possibility of unsolvable rational conflict. The existence of two (or three ...) distinct but equally well-justified insights

\textsuperscript{42} Hart, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{43} Hua XXVII, pp. 28, 107.
forms of rationality is also an impossibility for Husserl. The struggle that seems to characterize philosophical engagement can only be viewed as authentic by Husserl if it is interpreted as part of the process of inter-subjective correction within the already established framework of the scientific rationality founded by the Greeks. Any suggestion that true philosophy might diverge from, perhaps even negate, this fundamental form of scientific rationality could only be seen as a deepening of the crisis by Husserl.

Yet it could be asserted that the admission that there might be totally different and still valid views on a question is the Stellungnahme that perhaps best prevents the philosopher from becoming a tyrant. Such an admission of "difference" could itself be understood not as a denial of authentic, communal, philosophical life but, rather, as the affirmation of such a life and as a pre-condition for true, philosophical existence. In this case, of all possible communities, philosophers seem to be the group least likely to fulfil Husserl's view of an authentic community.

Let us assume for a moment, however, that philosophers do in fact constitute an authentic "we" as set forth by Husserl. The next question is how the renewed faith in rationality possessed in common by this group is to be passed on to the larger community. A possible answer, not unknown to the tradition of philosophy, is to speak of the authority of philosophy. In the tradition, this authority was usually based on philosophers having insights that the majority was deemed to lack. While Husserl does sometimes speak of the authority of philosophers, he certainly cannot mean it in this traditional sense. For the rest of the world simply to accept the insights and attitudes of philosophers clearly goes against Husserl's emphasis on personal freedom and his view that insights must always be gained for oneself. Indeed, it would be rather surprising for Husserl to suggest that a type of argumentation that is based on power and authority, a type of argumentation excluded from philosophy, could then be applied by philosophers to the world at large.

44. Hua XXVII, p.53.
A further possible account of how the life of rationality lived by philosophers contributes to a rational culture is found in the functionalism that can be detected at various places in Husserl's thought. This functionalism is particularly evident in the Kaizo articles. Here, the cause of the crisis is described as a loss of faith in rationality that is precipitated primarily by the lack of a proper science of human rationality. This faith will be restored when the scientists of rationality (philosophers) re-establish their own method and principles. If philosophers were to fulfil their function properly, then the entire network of sciences and scientific culture in general would operate in a manner more in keeping with the scientific character that they claim. Husserl had a great deal of affinity for the functionalist approach, even within philosophy itself. It is worthwhile to recall that within his scheme for phenomenology, Husserl sees phenomenologists as being occupied with a particular region of being. Hence, each phenomenologist is to direct his or her efforts towards one specific realm of phenomena, be it towards religion, history, art, or other realms. Husserl is a great promoter of division of labour within philosophy. Such an approach seems also to be suggested when discussing large-scale renewal.

Still, the mechanics of how a well-functioning philosophy actually entails well-functioning sciences and a well-functioning culture remain unclear. Indeed, Husserl realizes that the natural sciences "function" rather well, at least qua technique. The difficulty is that the meaning of these sciences has been lost; their ultimate rationality is no longer evident. This ultimate rational sense is to be recovered by re-discovering in a rigourously scientific way the origin of all science in human subjectivity. Yet it is not altogether evident how the re-discovery of the meaning of scientific activity by philosophy will actually restore the meaning within the sciences themselves, let alone within the entire culture affected by those sciences. The meaning re-discovered by philosophy must somehow be conveyed; Husserl, however, never gives a complete account of how this "conveying" might take place. It is possible to imagine that the insights of phenomenology would at least have some impact on the human sciences since both phenomenology and the human
sciences are concerned with subjectivity. But the ultimate effect of phenomenology on the natural sciences remains difficult to fore spell. Simply to inform biologists, physicists, chemists, or even mathematicians that philosophers have re-discovered the original and ultimate meaning of their tasks does not seem to achieve the profound renewal that Husserl seeks.

The functionalist approach appears even less palatable when the crisis of culture is considered. A group of philosophers living in perfect rationality does not make a philosophical culture. Indeed, the functionalist interpretation of the mechanics of overcoming the crisis, just as the authoritarian interpretation, seems to go against Husserl's radical individualism and the requirement of seeing for oneself. Philosophers can only "propagate" the spirit of reason among the "laypeople"\textsuperscript{45} by bringing them to see, not by seeing for them. Thus, an even more radical view is required to account for large-scale renewal. In short, everyone must become a phenomenologist.

It does seem to be the case that if everyone were to become a phenomenologist, a phenomenological culture would arise. This culture would be truly philosophical, and, therefore, the true re-establishment of the Greek-origin. The suggestion that everyone become a phenomenologist can be understood in at least two ways. A rather extreme understanding would posit that everyone must actually engage in philosophical activity, each person inquiring back into the origin of all knowledge and truth in subjectivity. Everyone would have to conduct the type of constitutive analyses of consciousness that led Husserl to produce such an extensive \textit{Nachlass}. As unlikely as this universal phenomenological existence might be, it also is not what Husserl expects. In the first place, Husserl believes that to be a philosopher is

\begin{quote}
45. "Die Philosophen sind die berufenen Repräsentanten des Geistes der Vernunft, das geistige Organ, in dem die Gemeinschaft ursprünglich und fortdauernd zum Bewusstsein ihrer wahren Bestimmung (ihres wahren Selbst) kommt, und das berufene Organ für die Fortpflanzung dieses Bewusstseins in die Kreise der 'Laien'." Hua XXVII, p. 54.
\end{quote}
a highly personal vocation to which only a few are called. He is also very well aware that a certain forgetfulness is necessary within the sciences. In order to function well as a physicist, one cannot continually be focusing on the constituting origin of the world that one studies. The physicist must have a certain blindness and must maintain a certain naive accepting of the objective world in order to make any progress at all.

Yet, in a certain sense, it is this blindness that Husserl hopes to overcome, since it is this blindness that lies at the root of the crisis. In a remarkable passage located in an early manuscript from 1887, we find Husserl's assessment of the narrowness that allows the mathematician in particular, and the scientist in general, to pursue interests without paying attention to questions of foundation and meaning:

This limitation to ever more specialized fields [that is characteristic of modern science in general] is nothing that constitutes value or worth. It is only a necessary evil. The complete researcher who strives to be a complete human being as well should never lose sight of the relation of his science to the more general and higher epistemic goals of humanity. Professional restriction to a single field is necessary; but it is reproachable to become fully absorbed in such a field. And [the researcher] must appear even more reproachable, who is indifferent even to the more general questions which concern the foundation of his science, as well as its value and place in the realm of human knowledge in general.  

The ambiguity of Husserl's approach to the scientist is clearly felt here. Is there a way for scientists to "become" phenomenologists and yet continue to work in their specialized domains? This is perhaps possible if everyone becoming a phenomenologist is interpreted slightly differently: it is not as if everyone must do phenomenology, but rather, everyone must proceed as a phenomenologist does.

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46 Husserl-Archive manuscript K I 28/25a. Sections of this manuscript are published in *Husserliana* XXI. This citation is found on *Hua* XXI, p. 231.
This narrower understanding of what it means for individuals to form a philosophical culture can be viewed as a fourth understanding of the mechanics of renewal. It is thus not a question of philosophy giving authoritarian instruction, nor of philosophy functioning well on its own, nor of the entire population of the world undertaking a purely philosophical existence. It is rather that phenomenological philosophers can be seen as exemplars of how life is to be lived rationally; they are the models that show how one strives for a rational existence. A rational life involves having insight into what one is doing; it means determining for oneself a life on the basis of reason. A rational life requires the justification of each and every "position-taking" (Stellungnahme), it demands taking responsibility for oneself on the basis of autonomous reason.

For Husserl, the philosopher must be the example of such rational living, of such responsible behaviour. The philosopher is thus a model to be emulated, by the natural scientist, by the politician, by the banker, by the baker, by the sociologist and by the lawyer. Philosophers as a group must be an example of rationally-determined communal life to the society at large. In their common endeavour of working towards the establishment of the goal of rational existence, philosophers are to be the example of what a community, united in the task of determining a rational societal existence, could achieve.

While it remains dubious whether philosophers, both individually and through their work in common, have lived up to their vocation as role-model, it is also dubious whether such responsible behaviour on the part of philosophers would be noticed; if noticed, whether it could be widely implemented; and if implemented on a large-scale, whether this would be sufficient to cure the crisis that Husserl has depicted with such accuracy. In the first place, it must be admitted that philosophy occupies, at least formally, a more marginal position than it did in the past. Perhaps it is a sign of the gravity of the crisis that the "moral preaching"47

47. Hua XXVII, p. 52.
which philosophy is called upon by Husserl to undertake in order to overcome the crisis falls mostly on deaf ears. It is a crisis that, by its very nature, is not so noticeable. Things are, after all, functioning rather well; and when they do not function well, the tendency is to attribute mal-functioning to a temporary and reparable deviation rather than to something being fundamentally amiss. It is a crisis of forgetting, and forgetting implies that one is not bothered by what is forgotten, due to the very fact that it is forgotten.

Some may argue that philosophy is not so marginal, that philosophers are being noticed, and that the need for philosophy is being recognized. Most university presidents would not deny the importance of philosophy, although their actions often do, and even the business-world seems interested in "getting" some ethics. The language of the expressed need for philosophy, however, often betrays the very type of thinking that Husserl feels is part of the crisis. If one of the dangers of the crisis is that it can pass unnoticed, an equally great danger is that it can be noticed in a superficial way. By the rapid formation of centres for bio-ethics and for business-ethics, philosophy may feel liberated from a marginal position. But philosophy may also slip into a type of thinking that is itself part of the crisis.

Perhaps being marginal in a culture in crisis is the best indication that philosophy is somehow being true to itself. Philosophy is "slow," and may even stand in the way of the breath-taking and blind progress that is so idolized by the sciences. Philosophy may thus be marginalized, but perhaps it should not fear this marginal position. After all, history is full of the stories of marginal movements which have had enormous social impact. Husserl himself never feared such marginality. To the contrary, one sometimes is under the impression that, for Husserl, the worse the crisis, the greater the need for philosophy to assume its self-responsibility. The more destitute the situation, the greater the need for philosophy to assert its truth; the more the world drifts away from philosophy, the more Husserl feels obligated to carry on the struggle. The hope issuing from Husserl's thinking about the crisis distinguishes him from the average thinker of doom.
Husserl's philosophy of cultural renewal is a philosophy of a recaptured faith in reason, a faith which then can hope, against all odds, for a rational future.

**A concluding comment on Husserl's "Renewal" and Eurocentrism**

Despite the inadequacies of Husserl's account of the mechanics of renewal, his position has much to offer. I would like to conclude by mentioning three areas where Husserl's thought offers a positive criticism of certain popular conceptions of renewal in our “Weimar-like” present age, and also to address a commonly pointed out negative aspect in Husserl's call for. The positive aspects are: “renewal” as pushing against the call for ever-greater “technization”; the radical individual responsibility required for renewal within a communitarian perspective; and the criticism of the "statist" mentality. The negative aspect of Husserl's discussion of renewal is his "Eurocentrism."

Certainly, here there is much talk always and everywhere about political freedom. But this occurs most frequently within the context of discussions about economics. Political freedom is viewed either as the prerequisite or the result of the introduction of a market economy. The primary goal is revealed as economic renewal. Husserl would probably have nothing against such economic renewal, unless it were to be taken by people (as it has been in some circles) as authentic renewal, that is, as the renewal of human culture as such. To view economic renewal as authentic renewal would be to place the mundane over the transcendental, to remain trapped in a naturalistic attitude. It would, therefore, constitute for Husserl a deepening of the crisis. Husserl would most likely be in favour of material improvement. Such improvement, however, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the "bliss" (Glückseligkeit) that is the result of authentic renewal.\(^48\) This bliss arises from leading one's life rationally, from living autonomously, regardless

\(^{48}\) *Hua XXVII*, pp. 28-33, 98.
of, even in spite of, the material and factual circumstances in which one finds oneself. *Wirtschaftswunder* (in Germany, in China, etc.) would probably not be a bad thing in Husserl’s eyes, but it is nothing compared to the "wonder of wonders," the human subject, living in personal freedom, exercising its possibilities of rational self-judgement and self-critique. It may be true that Husserl’s philosophy can be seen as too spiritual and idealistic, but it certainly offers a different view of authentic human life than that of big cars, GDP growth, internet connections, and Hollywood lifestyle.

It has also already been pointed out that the movement of renewal in Husserl can be described as being from "bottom to top.". One should keep in mind, however, that this "bottom" or basis of renewal was for Husserl the individual. The pre-condition for authentic renewal could be described as the critical "position-taking" by the individual. That is, the individual must have the willingness to supply justification for each of one’s beliefs, and such justification can only come from radically autonomous reason. The next stage of renewal was the formation by a group of such truly autonomous individuals into a community, a "we," wherein each "I" can see and justify its own position within that "we" and to that “we.” Given this view of self-responsibility, I believe Husserl would be somewhat perplexed by contemporary politics. Husserl is a communitarian, but not a collectivist – and I think he would be suspicious of the way collective or group identities are claimed, expressed, and then used themselves as "reasons" for advancing a particular position. Some forms of collective identification do not seem to originate in the radical, rational self-responsibility of individuals, nor do the individual members of such collectives always seem to possess a clear-sighted, rational justification for what they are doing ‘as’ members of that collective. As we shall see, it is highly plausible that Husserl would have preferred an inauthentic "'we' of below’ to an inauthentic "'we' of above’ (authoritarianism) against which it has struggled. Still, Husserl’s view does remind us that there is a threat

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to individual responsibility in mass-movements, and that freedom of expression, movement, and communication does not yield, a priori, an authentic community.

While it is true that Husserl at times views the state as a necessary constraint upon the irrational drives and tendencies of humans, that is, as a protection against disharmony within the practical realm when active autonomous reason is absent, ultimately he might also classify the state as an inauthentic "we." Any state seems to be a pre-given body that in some ways claims to speak for the individual and to express the individual's interests, even though the individual had nothing to do with the constitution of this entity. Thus, it is not too surprising that Husserl hints rather clearly in Kaizo that, with the advent of large-scale authentic communal life, there would result an Abbau (deconstruction) of the state power organizations. This de-construction of the state concerns nor ONLY totalitarian structures, but applies equally well to the liberal-democratic conception of state now being imported or resurrected in Eastern Europe. James Hart has shown that even liberal-democratic institutions do not correspond to Husserl's idea of a radically democratic society, for within the state the common good is always constituted from above, even if at least part of the above are my representatives. In true community, nobody can represent me and nobody can speak for me. There can be no delegation to elected officials of my responsibility to make decisions, and no submission to the whims of a technocratic bureaucracy. The state, says Husserl, "is a unity by power, by domination." This domination has a different, less harsh, and more hidden form in the institutions of a liberal democracy. Husserl's view of authentic communal life as the Liebesgemeinschaft offers the image of

49. Hua XXVII, p. 58.


communal unity without such domination. To be sure, this is a distant, perhaps impossible, goal. What I have already indicated for philosophers may hold true for society as a whole: there could be such a thing as unsolvable rational conflict. In such instances, there may be need of arbitration from above. This arbitration, while hopefully somewhat rational, may indeed be truly arbitrary. Still, Husserl's view offers both a challenge and a warning: it challenges the individual to radical responsibility for self and for one's place in the community, and it warns against placing all our hopes for authentic self-expression and authentic "being-with-one-another" in the hands of the state.

While Husserl's approach to renewal may challenge us to do some fundamental rethinking about the rational nature of our individual and communal life, his thought itself displays a certain close-mindedness. I think this lack of openness can best be displayed by outlining his "Eurocentrism." For Husserl, the idea of a philosophical culture is a peculiarly Western idea, founded in the Greeks and nurtured in European civilization. By philosophical culture, Husserl understands a culture guided by a proper, scientific form of rationality. The type of rational knowledge that existed in cultures such as the Babylonian, Egyptian, Chinese, and Indian can only be classified as a lower form of knowledge by Husserl, as "pre- or unscientific." The scientific rationality that lies at the basis of a philosophical culture developed exclusively in Europe. It is itself, however, not exclusive. As the ultimate form of rationality, it is universal, open to all who wish to partake in it. In Husserl's view, this is precisely what the Japanese had done. In Kaizo he describes Japan as a "young, fresh, green branch of 'European' culture." Having joined the project of European culture, they are also affected by the loss of faith in the rationality that is the basis of that project. But a rather obvious question comes to mind: did there not exist in a culture such as the Japanese a faith in

52. Hua XXVII, pp. 73-74.

53. Hua XXVII, p. 95.
a truly "rational" system of values long before it turned Westward? Husserl's suggestion that only the revival of true, Western-scientific rationality can stand at the basis of a philosophical and hence genuine culture is highly questionable. Could it not be that other forms of rationality have something to offer to the task of a genuinely renewed world? Might not the renewal of Western rationality and the overcoming of the one-sided, narrow concepts of rationality that Husserl recognizes have dominated our culture since the Renaissance, be aided by interchange with such otherness, with other cultures not as potential branches but as rational foundations in their own right? Indeed, within our own tradition there are many other forms of rationality that might serve the task of renewal. The loss of faith in the deficient scientific form of rationality could perhaps be seen not simply as a call for more complete and fully grounded scientific rationality, but rather as giving other forms of “rationality” a chance. In these Kaizo articles, we catch glimpses that Husserl is aware that poetic, narrative, and religious forms of “rationality” may have much to contribute to human renewal and can complement transcendental phenomenology, but he struggles to articulate them except as precursors to a genuinely phenomenological attitude. That task, would seem, to belong to us.