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BEHIND
INVENTING STUDENTS IN BEIJING

The GATE

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INTRODUCTION

There were 12 minutes and 28 seconds remaining.

I had never bid on eBay. It takes too much energy, too much attention to follow the vagaries of an online auction. And there never seems to be anything I want that badly. But I wanted that propaganda poster—a reproduction of an oil painting, mid-1970s—depicting, with the imagination and rhetorical power possible only in socialist realism, the May Fourth movement of 1919 (see fig. 0.1).

In the painting, the sky is clearing and clouds are dissipating behind the imposing presence of Tiananmen, which dominates the scene. The students, young men and women, are marching at the center, their facial expressions ranging from outrage to stern determination. They wear either the scholar's long gown or Western-style suits; both kinds of attire identify them as belonging to the social group of "modern" students. And the fact that they indeed embody the forces of modernity, of progress against an essentialized tradition, is made very evident by the painter. One of their signs reads, "Down with the store of Confucius and Co." while the notable presence of female

AN IMAGE

students marching prominently in the forefront epitomizes the stance on gender equality.

11 minutes 15 seconds. I wanted it. I repressed the creeping sense of unease, took out my credit card, and placed a bid.

19 minutes 20 seconds. “You have been outbid.” Somebody else wants it? But who? And why? Who could want that? I tried to resist the urge, tried not to get sucked into this perverse poker-like game of raising the stakes. I am an intellectual, a historian; I am above the petty antiquarian lust for ownership, for artifacts. I trace trends, ideas, and lives. Right.



FIGURE 0.1.

The May Fourth Movement, propaganda poster, 1976.

Source: Part of the IISH Stefan R. Landsberger Collection available at <http://chinese posters.net>.

8 minutes 35 seconds. All true. But I am specifically a cultural historian. I work with materiality, I study representation, I analyze images. Why shouldn't I own my subject matter?

I looked at the image again. Around the marching students, people converge toward the demonstration: they are workers, common citizens awakened by the words of students, words they literally clasp in their hands, in the forms of the leaflets students have distributed. The signs the protesters carry—“Give us back Qingdao,” “Abolish the unequal treaties”—alert the people of the imminent danger to the territorial integrity of China: the Treaty of Versailles had just assigned to Japan the German colonies in Shandong Province.¹ It was then the pull of nationalism

that drew the students out of their schools and connected them to the people.

7 minutes 22 seconds. “You are now the highest bidder.” My opponent seemed to have given up. Reassured, I started fantasizing, imagining the poster in my office, or better, in my living room. I had seen that image before, many times. I reached for a copy of Vera Schwarz’s *The Chinese Enlightenment*,² and there it was, on the cover. Schwarz never talks about that painting, and, for some reason, until this time I had never paid much attention to it either. But now, I was becoming obsessed with owning it.

4 minutes 10 seconds. Still the highest bidder.

It is a powerful image, and it synthesizes perfectly the multiple legacies of the May Fourth movement, a moment that, in different but converging histories, has been made to coincide with the birth of Chinese modernity, the emergence of a national consciousness, the birth cry of an infant class struggle. But the painting clearly suggests a precise historical interpretation; in the official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) mythology, the events of May Fourth mark the first encounter between the students and the people. Yet in the picture the students still march alone (and one wonders whether the promises of that encounter will ever be truly and completely fulfilled). They march under their own banners; they bring awareness to the people, thus making evident that their new political consciousness has matured apart from the people, inside a closed community, and implicitly because of that very isolation. The political awareness of the students is then almost a natural by-product of their status. But how can it be that this particular category is always assumed to be “naturally” political?

3 minutes 19 seconds. Still the highest bidder.

The monumental outline of Tiananmen (the Gate of Heavenly Peace) looms in the center of the scene. It marks more than a simple location; it is the central point in the map of student activism throughout the following century. Tiananmen stands as the symbol of continuity of the nation-state, the embodiment of power, authority, and national unity. Through the gate an uneasy suture is achieved between the public space of protest, the modern state, and an ahistorical national past (the cyclical recurring of China’s five thousand years). By implicitly linking May Fourth’s student nationalism to the imperial officers’ concern for the dynasty, the gate suggests a continuous reference to the long history of the relation between the state and intellectuals, for which “students” are the modern embodiment. Students are therefore *always already* political because they inherit a particular place in relationship with the state (imperial or national); they are always already standing in front of Tiananmen, waiting to be heard by (or curry the favor of) who is inside. Differences in time and space are erased in this

are people who go to (modern) schools. The long history of Chinese student activism, then, becomes just the continuous reemergence of an unwieldy sociological group, constantly reproduced in a set of particular institutions and made political precisely by an ahistorical tradition of activism.

There are, however, at least two major problems with this approach. First, there is something politically and historically incongruent in portraying categories (such as “students”), places (such as “university”), or even communities as *always already* established. While a sociological concept of “students” might come into existence as soon as people attending schools get to be counted and accounted for (that is, by virtue of a simple statistical operation), this cannot be true of “students” as a political category.⁶

Second, if these categories and institutions are understood as always already fixed, the political action that they can produce (in this case, student activism) is always limited to presenting their communitarian or institutional needs to the only authority that can guarantee their established position (or more fundamentally, their existence), which is to say, the state. Students, in this perspective, can only parade as “students” claiming to be better counted and recognized by the state. But politics, following Alain Badiou, can only come to existence by putting the state at a distance—that is, by making evident and challenging (in practice) the classificatory order of classes, groups, collective identities that the state imposes.⁷ No true politics can then rest on an established social category of “students.”

Thus, unless we want to dismiss student activism as always nonpolitical, we need to begin from a different set of assumptions. First, locations cannot be presumed in advance of activism and struggle. Politics is about making history but also changing space; therefore, political locations and political subjectivities are constituted through the struggles that are supposedly fixed in them.⁸ If we accept this premise, then—and this is my central argument—before the first instance of modern student activism on May 4, 1919, “students” did not come into being as a stable and circumscribed position to be occupied but were instead produced both because of and through the practices and the struggles of those years. Only after and as a consequence of the events of 1919 could “students” become fixed inside a (new) tradition and become connected to specific places (Beijing University, Tiananmen). To put it simply, while there had always been people who studied (sociological “students”), the political category of “students” emerged only as the result of a specific political struggle that was located precisely around the definition of “student.” Much like the working class for E. P. Thomson, Chinese students were present at their own making.⁹ The process of politicization of individual students around May 4, 1919, overlapped (but did not fully coincide) with the process that led to the invention of the political category that, since

perspective, and every instance of student activism becomes just the re-crafting of an old tradition.

1 minute and 20 seconds. “You have been outbid!”

Damn! Too late to place another bid, too late to recover the lost image. I am left with doubt (who stole it from me?), remorse (why didn’t I bid more?), and this digital reproduction.

Now that I had lost the chance of owning it, I looked at it again. Maybe, if we just shift our perspective a bit, the image lends itself to other readings, to completely different interpretations. Maybe Tiananmen is not as central and dominating as it looked at first glance. Rather, it might be seen as emerging among the dissipating clouds, suddenly revealed, its contours becoming more precise. It looks almost like a nascent symbol, summoned into life by what was happening in the streets. But if we can challenge the stability of the gate, then maybe none of the other elements in this picture will be fixed and determined either, including the “students” themselves. What will we find if we look behind the gate?

QUESTIONING A SIGNIFIER

Nowhere is the history of the modern nation-state as intimately connected with student politics as it is in China. From 1919 on, almost all the cardinal moments in the twentieth century have been signaled by an upsurge in student political activities: May 30, 1925; December 9, 1935; the crucial initial years of the Cultural Revolution (1966–68); and the beginning and ending stages of the Deng era (1979 and, of course, 1989). Despite the macroscopic disparities in historical circumstances and political meanings among these events, the list illustrates the lingering legacy of what Charles Tilly calls a “repertoire” of contention: a historically constituted array of gestures, places, and signs, prominently among them the signifier “student” itself.³

In no other case was this repertoire deployed more consciously than during the last instance of Chinese student political activism in spring 1989.⁴ On May 4, 1989, when students marched to Tiananmen Square and stood on top of the Monument to the People’s Heroes, where a relief depicts their predecessors from seventy years earlier, they literally posed on the background of their own mythology—never anticipating that, in a month, their movement would culminate in a much bloodier ending.⁵

While the influential presence of politically active students in China throughout the twentieth century has been widely studied, the confines and the very existence of the category of “students” have been largely taken for granted. Students, it has been assumed, simply materialize as soon as there

then, identified them and their brand of political action ("students" as a signifier). The study of the development of these two processes is the subject of this volume.

A SPACE FOR ACTIVISM

How do people, and in particular young people, become political? Or, in this case, what led those specific students (as individuals and as a group) to Tiananmen on May 4, 1919? As mentioned earlier, we cannot ascribe the politicization of those historical students to an "always already there" category of "students," because that would ultimately deny any independent political meaning to activism. This, however, is precisely the outcome of those analyses based on either "structure" or "position." The former explains student movements as an epiphenomenon of socioeconomic transformations or structural crises: students are constituted as a new social group (as soon as they can be counted), continuously reproduced in a succession of "generations," and spurred to action by the contradictions of the social structure.¹⁰ The explanations based on the power of position emphasize instead cultural and social continuities. Here, the assumption is that Chinese students—or at least certain students, in specific schools—are endowed with a status, a place in relation to the state, a place bequeathed to them by the historical precedents of scholar-officials, which has been reinterpreted in a modern context.¹¹ In both these perspectives, "students" come to be already "in place"; they exist politically because they exist sociologically.

Other analyses of the May Fourth case and of student protests in general have depicted politicization as a reflection of changes in the world of ideas, thus making activism directly dependent on large abstract categories such as "enlightenment," "nationalism," "revolution," or "liberalism." This approach has produced descriptions skewed in two different ways. It often resulted, especially in the May Fourth case, in a simplistic causal explanation: students read new books (in sheltered rooms, one guesses), became politically conscious, and took to the streets.¹² However, while the emergence of political subjectivities clearly implies the personal engagement with ideas, ideas (or ideologies) are never abstract, nor do they exist outside of practices, in which they are embodied and by which they are defined.

Ideas, considered apart from practices and abstracted from historical contingencies, might seem unchangeable over time; this has produced the view of one student identity continuously resurfacing throughout the century because of the persistent power of vague concepts such as "enlightenment." In this perspective, radically different instances (despite the formal continuity of the

repertoire), from 1919 to the Cultural Revolution, are connected and justified in the name of a consistent vision of the nation, an iconoclastic attitude allegedly connatural in "students," or an always incomplete "enlightenment."¹³

It is precisely with the intent of moving away from the assumption of any fixed location—be it the category of students, the power of place, the stability of certain ideal constructs—and of incorporating practices, that I have framed my analysis under the notion of space. This concept of space, largely derived from Henri Lefebvre's extensive corpus of writing, does not deny the overdetermination of fixed, planned space—architecture, monumentality, symbolic and ideological representations, the state, and the forces of capitalism and economic transformation—but considers that space is always also "lived" and therefore continuously transformed by the minute practices of the everyday. Space—be it the physical structure of classrooms and streets, the intellectual framework of curricula and courses, or the movement of students in the city—is never fixed, never stable, and always produced in the struggles of the quotidian. Politics is not a function of place, social categories, or abstract concepts, but it lies rather in the ability to produce a space in which a new everyday can be experienced, new relationships formed, and alternative lives can be lived. Space is not simply the stage of events but truly the stake of political struggles. Only by claiming a space of its own, only by producing a new everyday, can a group express and realize its politics.¹⁴ Only by looking at the production of space can we then analyze the political meanings of "students" and student activism.

Space, for Lefebvre, is also always produced within the irreducible tension that exists between, on the one hand, "capitalism's economic and political system—what might be called the 'monologue of the state'"—and, on the other, the lived practices of its subjects.¹⁵ I argue in this volume that student activism in the May Fourth era was predicated on the separation of politics from the state through an invention of new forms of lived practice. I see this separation as the necessary condition that allowed for the creation of truly political organizations and actions, but also one that was never final and had to be reaffirmed and reinvented as the state continuously attempted to reabsorb the challenge of "students." The relationship of activism with the state was therefore a problem always present, always to be solved, even more so when the students were shaping their new everyday inside a public (i.e., state) university. Student activism did not solve the contradictions and the tensions produced by postulating a space for politics at a distance from the state; rather, activism was expressed and realized within those tensions.

This relates to a second and more complex theoretical issue. The May Fourth movement has been considered for long time as constitutive of the modern nation-state, and student activism, as mentioned earlier, has seemed

were in the forefront of demonstrations from 1919 to 1989. Memoirs, exhibitions, university histories, and celebratory materials all agree in exalting Beida as *the* place, a light in dark times, never failing to endlessly produce scholarly talent *and* political consciousness among its students precisely as a result of its position—meaning its prominent place among state institutions, its connection with power and tradition, and even its physical location.¹⁹ Beida has been described as the hotbed of modern nationalism but also the direct descendent of the tradition of the literati's concern for the state, and both aspects are often depicted as being inscribed in the physical and institutional environment of the school. Beida students are purportedly always already political because of the magical power of the place they inhabit.

However, if we look at the founding moment of this Beida lore, the May Fourth years, contrary to the idea that the university was a settled reality—endowed with power and position, a rock of prestige to which any project could be anchored—what is striking is the very incoherence and fragility of Beida's setting, on various levels. In the years 1917 to 1923, Beida's position as a state institution, the unity of its physical setting, and the definition of its students were being heavily and continually challenged. The modern university stands in a particular relationship to the state, society, and the order of learning; Beida therefore lay institutionally at the intersection of these different realms and could not but be affected by their crises, which, in the first years of the Republic, had become painfully evident. About a decade had passed since the elimination of the imperial examination system (*keju*), but both an educational routine and an order of learning (what was to be studied, how, and why) appropriate for China were far from being established. Meanwhile, Beijing University stood as the symbol of this failure to identify a viable alternative to the *keju*. Even if Beida was China's first and only state university, the “highest school” in the country, its reputation was tarnished by past and present corruption, heavy bureaucratic involvement, careerism, and poor academic achievement. It was not a prestigious place; in many ways it was more infamous than famous.²⁰

Additionally, the economic and social transformations of the turn of the century were increasingly visible in Beijing. While newspapers and a flourishing publishing industry had opened possibilities for new kinds of intellectual engagement, the position of intellectuals, and consequently of students, had been irremediably shaken by the severing of learning from state service. The reasons one should study (career, profession, status) remained very much an open question.

In the first years of the Republic, the institutional coherence of Beijing University seemed to be guaranteed only by the disciplining mission entrusted to it by a weak state. However, in 1917, the reforms introduced under

to be intertwined with China's modern history. To argue, as I do, that the category of “students” was instead produced “at a distance” from the state implicitly requires at the minimum a delinking of the two constitutive elements of the nation-state and possibly a reassessment of the very meaning of nationalism. May Fourth student activists undoubtedly expressed a concern for the salvation of China (conceived as a people and a bounded territory) and yet were able to advance radical criticism to nationalism narrowly conceived. While an in-depth analysis of student nationalism exceeds the scope of this book, I strive to keep open the theoretical complexity of the students' multilayered concept of the “nation.” There seems to be a degree of intellectual dissonance between those students' activities that expressed a critique of cultural essentialism in the name of radical internationalism and their initiatives predicated under the more evident sign of patriotism, such as the campaign to promote national goods. Again, rather than attempting to reconcile this tension, I choose instead to stress the different ways in which May Fourth students negotiated and reinterpreted the nation in the effort to produce a space of politics whose potential horizon was not a state form and that was not foreclosed by Chinese boundaries.

This is another reason why it is crucial to put the everyday at the center of the study of May Fourth student activism. Henri Lefebvre saw the space of everydayness as central in his analysis of capitalist modernization: everydayness identifies “a specific experience lived and represented in industrializing cities” all over the world “but also a category of historical explanation that enlarged the perspective from which we can explore the contradictions of capitalist modernity.”¹⁶ The space of the everyday is where people negotiate “between the rhythms and routines reproduced everywhere capitalism spread and the lived or local and contingent experiences mediating them.”¹⁷ By locating their political struggles in the search for a different everyday (inside a modernizing city and around one of the quintessential global modern institutions, the research university), students in the May Fourth years were intervening within this tense articulation between the local (or the Chinese or national) and the global. They were therefore producing, from the specific condition of early-twentieth-century China, a critique of modernity that, however tentative and incomplete, necessarily exceeded the confines of a simplistic and univocal definition of the nation.

REDEFINING THE PLACE

In this volume, I examine the locus of student activism par excellence, Beijing University (Beida), the first public university in China,¹⁸ whose students

ventures, initiated pedagogical enterprises, and experimented with forms of communal life.

Juxtaposed to this organizational effort, the staunch, idiosyncratic refusal of communitarian rites by Beida students in their daily interaction assumes a clearer value; it can be seen as part of a larger attempt to redefine, through the refashioning of the everyday space of the school, the relations between studying and living, manual work and intellectual work, individual and authority. In this perspective, the case of Beida shows how transforming everyday life was the true goal of politics, and politics can thus be best viewed as displaced into seemingly minor aspects of the quotidian. Against the assumption that a well-defined community is necessarily the foundation of activism, this case illustrates instead how political militancy is possible only when the boundaries of identification become unsettled.

Finally, the challenge to the sociological definition of students and university was mirrored in the physical presence of Beida students and students in general in the city. In May 1919, students moved out of the school (May Fourth was a movement in that sense as well) and into the streets of Beijing in an organized way. They left both the place (the school) and the task (studying) allotted to them in order to appeal to the people of Beijing. Students, to paraphrase Kristin Ross, ceased to function as students and by doing so made any attempt at fixing the sociological distinction of “students” moot.²³ If classifications, following Bourdieu, are always a site of struggle,²⁴ students made this struggle spatially evident. By moving into areas of the cities where they were not supposed to be—the streets in general, but specifically neighborhoods farther away from the school—students were also dislocating politics. Government repression of student activism tried to negate this dislocation and put students back in their proper place by restating sociological and spatial classifications. This occurred physically, through the violent repression of the movement and the transformation of the school into a prison in early June 1919, but also with a series of government orders that tried to redefine the confines of the category “students” and its place inside the sociological order. In this effort, the concept of “youth” was deployed as a way to deny any political meaning to student actions, which were reduced to generational, adolescent effervescence.²⁵ The government repression showed that reducing political categories to their sociological determinants (youth, generation, and students) will always minimize or neutralize political meaning.²⁶

It was only after and as a consequence of the events of May and June 1919 that, through a process to which students took active part, a tradition of student activism was shaped and fixed in places, gestures, and symbols. Before 1919, not even Tiananmen, a symbol set in stone, conveyed meaning in the same way. The gate itself can be considered a modern invention, its association

Cai Yuanpei’s presidency were premised precisely on the subversion and the refusal of this very mission; Cai’s reforms outlined an idea of a university that abdicated any government-related functions and withdrew its activities from the scope of the state. This was the first step in a series of processes by which the institutional precariousness of the school was accepted and embraced; openness became the defining trait of May Fourth’s Beida.²¹

The university curriculum was reshaped by merging the borders of disciplines and allowing freedom of choice for research and teaching; a place of learning firmly inside the scope of the state apparatus was opened into a space of knowledge, theoretically infinite. The boundaries between the school and the city became increasingly porous, thanks also to the physical structure of the university, with buildings scattered around the Imperial City and without a central campus. And while students went out into the city, unofficial auditors—drop-ins who unlawfully used the resources of Beida—crowded into the school. They constituted the majority using the classrooms and shared dorms, athletic fields, and other resources of the university, making it extremely difficult to define who was a student and who was not. The lack of communal rituals, which became a defining trait of May Fourth’s Beida—there was no end-of-the-year ceremony, no flag raising, and no commencement—also stood in the way of the establishment of a closely knit community or a well-defined identity. Students extended this disdain for rites to their daily interactions, in classrooms and dorms, where rules of courtesy and esprit de corps were consciously shunned.²² After 1917, Beida, as an institution, placed itself in a precarious position: (ideally) separated from the state, its gates open, and its community fragmented and largely undefined.

If there was no settled “student” identity or “university community,” student politics in the years of May Fourth cannot be restricted to the realm of what we recognize as political movements, protests, and demonstrations—the simple representation of a group in public space. Rather, we can reconceptualize student activism by considering how it was precisely by challenging the distinctions between the cultural and the political, the intellectual and the quotidian, that student activists struggled over what a “student” and a “university” could be.

Student politics developed in the gap opened by separating the school from the state, which had left the definition of the university and the sociological status of its students open to contention. Students widened the gap by searching for and experimenting with alternative models of organizations, through which crucial issues could be questioned and solutions attempted. This led to an extraordinary flourishing of student associations that explored cultural and intellectual issues, created unconventional forms of commercial

to the nation-state largely contingent to the mass movement, not a condition preexisting and determining it.²⁷ Political events create their own mythology, but that mythology cannot be used to explain those very events.

NEW STUDENTS?

This volume argues that a political category of “students” was born out of the struggles of the May Fourth years, which obviously does not mean that there were no students before 1919 nor people who studied centuries before that time. And often, these people also staged protests and demonstrations and became involved in politics. Distinctions are therefore needed.

First, we can state a radical difference between “students” and people who studied before the wide diffusion of modern schools in China. Sang Bing, in his exhaustive study of the late Qing *xuetang* (schools),²⁸ argues precisely that students could emerge only when a large number of (young) people had access to modern schooling as the only path to achieve recognized educational credentials—in other words, when students became numerous enough to be apportioned in a sociological category. And that happened, in his analysis, not when modern schools were introduced in the late nineteenth century but only after the abolition of the civil examination system in 1905, which erased the identity of “exam candidate” and made “students” the only people who legitimately studied.²⁹ While cultural attitudes lingered, we cannot discount the radical change in institutional forms and practices. Although we can trace back some political practices and behaviors of “modern students” to people in the traditional academies (*shuyuan*), those practices assumed a very different meaning when placed outside of the context in which the imperial examination system was a viable and well-trodden path.

However, even if we focus only on the early twentieth century, students did make their existence visible in the public arena prior to the May Fourth movement. According to Sang Bing, between 1902 and 1911 there were 502 protest activities in schools in twenty provinces and the capital.³⁰ The May Fourth activists employed an array of means and tactics in their protests and thus provided the model for future student actions, but the 1919 demonstrators did not invent these tactics out of thin air. Strikes (*bake*) became common after 1905, replacing the practice of dropping out of school in mass (*zui-xue*), used in the previous years. The first political association of students was formed in 1903, while mass demonstrations and occupations of public space appeared in 1910 and 1911.³¹ Late Qing students organized boycotts of U.S. goods (because of anti-Chinese immigration laws), “wrote big-character

posters, spoke from street corners, and staged mass demonstration (sometimes including costumed characters) to dramatize their concern.”³²

In what sense, then, were the protests of May Fourth different and as such foundational for a new political category of students? At the level of means, tactics, and forms of protest, there is nothing unusual in the fact that people invent out of the set of models at hand. As the late Qing students borrowed models from other types of performances and from foreign examples, so did the May Fourth protestors shape a repertoire out of what was available to them. In this sense, the May Fourth years might be viewed as the intensification and conclusion of a process started probably around 1895, through which a student identity crystallized in the public arena and a repertoire of student actions coalesced. And it was in the forms inscribed in the model of “the May Fourth students” that this repertoire was bequeathed to, and employed in, later instances of activism.³³ In this sense, May Fourth works as a hinge between two phases: it is both the climax of a process of consolidation of tactics, practices, and ideas, and the beginning of a new history predicated under the political signifier “students.”

But the May Fourth activism—and the case of Beida specifically—were ordinary of a student identity in a more profound way. The late Qing students existed within a specific and bureaucratically defined relationship with the state, and it was in large part on this relationship that their protests were predicated. The 1905 abolition of the civil examination system led to a skyrocketing increase in the number of public schools at all levels precisely because these institutions came to represent the only avenue towards employment and status. The bureaucratic relationship sanctioned by the *keju* was transferred to the school system; significantly, exam degree titles were granted to those who completed different levels of schooling (and often passed a national examination).³⁴ Over time, without the seamless connection inscribed in the *keju*, the relationship between the schools and the state became looser and more contested, but the idea that the school system, and especially its higher level, the university, still had the bureaucratic function of producing talent for the nation-state lingered on until the first years of the Republic.³⁵ Up until the early 1920s, there still seemed to be a certain confidence in what the institutional, political, and social identity of the people who studied should be, an identity still largely defined by their connection with the state. Accordingly, late Qing student protests were state centered: they presented petitions to the state, dealt with issues of state rights, and, finally, as Sang Bing argues, were crucial in directly affecting the form of the state, as students contributed to the anti-Qing republican forces. Late Qing student politics was largely defined and consumed by its concern with the state.

Fourth repertoire of student activism has always had the potential to be not a replica but a reinvention.

ON LOCATION, TIME, AND SOURCES

LOCATION

Clearly, these two legacies of the May Fourth “students” are tightly entangled, as the analysis of Tiananmen in chapter 6 will show. But this is precisely one of the reasons why the case of Beijing University is particularly relevant, because probably in no other school in China is the mythology of student activism so closely interwoven with the minute practices of historical students. Beida is itself part of the symbolic repertoire that took shape in the May Fourth years,³⁸ and the place of the university in this legacy has been continuously celebrated to the point of being inscribed in city space: the avenue running past one of the main buildings of May Fourth’s Beida was renamed May Fourth Avenue (Wusi Dajie) during the Cultural Revolution.³⁹ Similarly, throughout the twentieth century, Beida students have been often considered to be metonymic of Chinese “students” tout court; this was particularly evident in the spring of 1989, when, thanks probably to students’ self-promotion and the observers’ need to identify a chain of leadership, Beijing University students were often and largely erroneously portrayed as directing the movement.⁴⁰

This case lies precisely at the intersection of the historical event of the first modern student demonstration in China and the mythology of the signifier “student.” It is therefore significant because it offers a glimpse of how people become political (the process of politicization), how they express and realize their politics, and how categories come to influence and reframe both later political movements and our historical understanding of them.

However, aside from its centrality in the mythology and the repertoire, Beijing University is crucial to the analysis of May Fourth politics because it illustrates how this politics was expressed in an (always problematic) disjuncture from the state. *National* Beijing University enjoyed physical, economic, and structural proximity to the state; yet it is precisely in this environment that through anticommunitarian practices, independent organizations, and curricular reform, students explored the possibility of experimenting with political identities and collective actions autonomously from the state. It is, as such, the place, real and perceived, of Beida inside the bureaucratic educational apparatus of the time that allows us to see more clearly what was at stake in May Fourth student politics.

Some of the practices and organizational forms that I describe in the following chapters were not exclusive to Beida, and with these in mind, we can

The almost immediate failure of the republican state and the miserable spectacle provided by state institutions after 1912 not only made state control more difficult to digest and to exercise³⁶ but also—in combination with social, cultural, and economic transformations—definitively shattered those identities, such as students, that still relied on a bureaucratic definition. In the specific case of Beijing University, it is only thanks to the opportunity presented by a weakening government in the second half of the 1920s that Beida had the freedom to seriously explore the contradictory possibilities that the model of the modern research university offered and to redefine its relationship with the state. And by doing so, the modern university stated it was radically different from the *xuetang*.

In the larger crisis of functionality that was part of the experience of Chinese modernity, the novelty for May Fourth students was the possibility to define what a student should be and especially to do so autonomously, at a distance from the state. As such, student politics did not rest on any stable definition of students, nor was it exhausted by state concerns. Rather, the students fought precisely over the ability to define what a student could be, and, particularly in 1919, they strove to stake the right to a kind of politics that could not be subsumed under the signifier “student,” nor any other sociological name.

The category of “students” was then invented in the May Fourth years in two different ways. First, as an identitarian sign, summarizing a repertoire of tactics, gestures, and places. And even if single traits of this repertoire can be traced back decades before, and its process of formation was more of accumulation than invention, it was on May Fourth that this repertoire was inscribed as the historical precedent of a tradition of activism. In that, May Fourth was indeed eventful. It was then by reemploying the repertoire established in 1919 that students could claim their legitimacy as political subjects throughout the twentieth century.

Second, and to me more significant, what was invented on May Fourth was the notion of students as a sign of radical unsettlement, the refusal of imposed definitions, and the disruption of communitarian boundaries. What was invented under the name of “students” was a new (and always renewed) political subjectivity of self-definition.³⁷ In that sense, in later instances of student activism in the May Fourth mold, “students” could signify a politics that exceeds and challenges the sociological order in the name of a potential equality in identifying political subjects. This was the case, for example, in the Cultural Revolution, when student organizations addressed the relationship between the party-state, class, and politics. In this view, then, “students” is not a closed category but an interpretational space, always polysemic, always problematic. And in that, every reutilization and replaying of the May

speak of a more general *May Fourth* mode of politics. But because *Beida* is a very unique position and this case should not be taken as representative of student activism in general or even of the “multiple *May Fourths*” all over China. I have tried to be careful when switching from “*Beida* students” to “students” in general, but a certain amount of overlap and confusion is unavoidable, especially when the two merged practically and symbolically, as in the actions of *May* and *June 1919*. In addition, both “students” and “*Beida* students” are already generalizations. “Students” subsumes a series of economic, geographic, and social realities to which I cannot here give justice; even in the case of *May Fourth Beijing*, there were major distinctions on the bases of school, gender, socioeconomic status, regional provenance, and so on. What this volume traces is the emergence of the political category under which these different realities came to be inscribed and were able to recognize themselves.

Similarly, I am aware of the overextension implicit in writing about the political activism of “*Beida* students.” It is extremely difficult—if not impossible—to ascertain how many students were directly engaged in organizational activism at *Beijing University*, especially before *May 4, 1919* (when a large number of *Beida* undergraduates did take to the streets). The politically active students were also those more likely to contribute essays to newspapers and magazines, to join associations, to have their names listed or remembered, and to write memoirs. There is obviously the danger of overestimating the feverish activism of a small minority vis-à-vis the day-to-day routine of a majority and assume the former as the defining trait of a whole group. But that is precisely what happened in this case: the process of politicization—with certain characteristics and specific forms—of a possibly limited but growing number of *Beida* students merged into the development of a political category of activism which came to be recognized precisely through those characteristics and forms. This multilayered meaning of “*Beida* students” then points to one of the central issues in this volume.

GENDER

As will become clear in the following pages (through my repeated use of the personal pronoun *he*), there are virtually no women in this story. While *Beida* is heralded as one of the pioneers of coeducation in China, there were no female students until *February 1920*, when three women were admitted as auditors. The numbers, however, remained small, and in *1923* there were just over thirty female students at *Beida*.⁴² Their stories do not figure prominently (or they do not figure at all) in the sources for the period and the topics I analyze. To write the story of *May Fourth* female activism, one should

I cannot provide here.⁴³ In this volume, I pay attention to issues of masculinity and femininity and gendered representations of students and try to highlight when female students appear in the sources. Yet I cannot but recognize the prevalence of male pronouns throughout the pages and the ghostly absence of female protagonists. I could have looked at different sources, materials, topics, but that would have meant a different book.

CHRONOLOGY

For a book framed around space, time here figures prominently: first and foremost, in the most canonical form of the chronological window stated in the title. The years *1917* and *1923* are not eventful dates; rather, they bracket the events of *1919*. In the history of *Beida*, the first date is connected with the beginning of *Cai Yuanpei*'s presidency, but also with a major increase in student admissions and the inclusion of leading members of the *New Culture* community in the faculty. While I don't subscribe to the view that sees *1917* as a radical rupture, by *1917* enough factors had coalesced at and around *Beida* to shape the physical, intellectual, and political environment associated with the *May Fourth* years. Nothing really “notable” happened in *1923*, but we can trace to that date both the definitive emergence of “students” as a particular signifier in the public opinion and the exhaustion of some student initiatives, such as the lecture groups, that had defined *May Fourth* student politics. While some of these activities continued in the following years, in general they became largely separated from “students.”⁴⁴

The choice of this chronological bracket suggests also a vision of *May Fourth* politicization—the emergence of the political subjectivities we identify as “students”—as a process that came to realization during those years, which does not mean that there was no event “*May Fourth*” but that we have to reframe its significance. The presence of students in the streets of *Beijing* and in front of *Tiananmen* on *May 4, 1919*, was eventful in so much as it brought to the fore new meanings, new strategies, and new symbols (among them “students”) and thus made evident the existence of new possibilities for the conduct of political activism.

SOURCES

To document the connections between activism, the everyday, and urban space, I use memoirs, biographical descriptions, university administration

The volume is organized in four parts, each investigating a different kind of space.

In part 1, "Lived Space," I describe everyday life within Beijing University's classrooms and dorms. During the May Fourth years, students challenged any kind of disciplining rituals or rules of interaction: they attacked exams, dorm regulations, and school hours and also willfully shunned elementary rites of courtesy. I show how this anticommunitarian attitude was a way to identify the space of everyday interactions as one of political struggle and to shape the quotidian practices into radical critiques of any imposed communitarian definition. Chapter 2 shifts the attention more closely to the bodily practices of Beida students, to their resistance to physical and martial training, to their bohemian choice of attire—students reveled in the shabbiness of their gowns—and to their devotion to frugality. All these seemingly unrelated practices prefigure a particular position *vis-à-vis* the impositions of a modernizing state and an integrated capitalist economy.

Part 2 focuses on "Intellectual Space." Beijing University, under Cai Yuanpei's presidency (1917–26), underwent radical reforms aimed at the abolition of any governmental function and the withdrawal of university activities from the scope of the state. This rather idealistic project had practical implications, first and foremost in the organization of the curriculum and the practice of teaching and learning. By making the pursuit of universal scientific truths the only goal of the university's mission, the academic reforms displaced the position of intellectuals and scholars, freeing them, at least in theory, from any national and state-based definition of knowledge. In short, the reforms configured a modern university that was not and could not be (expect geographically) a Chinese one.

In part 3, "Political Space," I examine the student demonstration of May and June 1919 as part of a struggle over political boundaries. The apolitical stance that had infused the university reform, far from being a retreat into the antipolitical, made it possible instead for students to formulate a redefinition of the political itself. Inside the university, the new administration system, and even admission exams configured different political experiences for students. The various study associations provided an experiment in alternative organizational practices, one based on self-discipline and subjective will, which theoretically and practically exceeded the boundaries of the university and of "students." Chapter 5 analyzes the repression of the 1919 movement as an attempt to enforce (physically and legally) a separation between school and society, students and people, political discussion and political practice.

archives, essays and short stories, photographs, newspapers, and city guides. In retracing the minute practices of the quotidian inside the school, memoirs are an indispensable yet extremely problematic source. Some of these recollections were written many years later, reminiscing and idealizing a youthful period in the midst of political crisis, war, or exile. Many, if not all, were used as weapons in the bitter power struggle to define the legacy of the May Fourth movement. As such, they present all the pitfalls (and some of the strengths) of oral history sources. First, they are "not fully reliable in point of fact."⁴⁵

In most cases, factual details provided in memoirs can be confirmed (or disproved) through other, usually less obviously biased sources—like school documents and newspaper reports. But in some cases and especially for those practices and details ignored in other, more institutional material but that are crucial for my analysis, there is little evidence outside memoirs and biographies. In some instances, comparing different memoirs against one another might be fruitful: this is the case, for example, of different versions of the events of May Fourth. But again, this tactic is limited usually to factual discrepancies and does not help much in ascertaining those details that are essential to this project: the everyday of Beida students, their choices of fashions, their habits, the general ethos of campus life.

Memoirs embody the entangled relationship between the historical activities and the mythology of May Fourth, between students' daily practices and their inscription in a repertoire of "students." Even when we have different authors all "remembering" a specific trait of May Fourth campus life or student activism, there remains the doubt that their agreement can be at least partially attributed to their participation in the construction of a collective memory, a shared mythology of Beida. In that, however, these sources have also a fundamental value, typical of oral history: they tell us less about events than about their meaning,⁴⁶ they allow to see which details are endowed with significance and which ones are set aside in the recollections. In the case of May Fourth "students," it is through memoirs that we can trace the process by which the category itself emerged with certain characteristics, a process located at the intersection of historical events, historiography, and myth. This clearly does not solve the issue of factual validation, and I have made efforts to be as careful as possible. When a specific habit of Beida students (their disregard for classroom attendance, for example) is reported in several memoirs, I take it not necessarily as a generalized description of all students but rather as part of a set of behaviors deployed by the activists among them to intervene in the daily life at their institution and that, in some cases, came to be constitutive of the May Fourth invention of the category of "students."

Part 4. Social space, uses the relationship between students and the social space of the capital. Chapter 6 reverses the view of the influence of abstract, monumental space on political actions by showing how students actively contributed to mapping out a new hierarchy of urban spaces, including the main symbol of student protest in the twentieth century, Tiananmen. Despite the unavoidable presence of imperial remains in the university area, the process of politicization for Beida students was more closely related to those urban transformations brought by capitalism and modernity. Chapter 7 follows the progressive expansion of student organized actions in the city: from the university, to the neighborhood, to the city, and, finally, outside the gates. The end of the May Fourth mode of activism is marked precisely by a retreat of students' organized activities back inside the university proper.

The conclusion looks at the double legacy inscribed in the category of "students" and its exhaustion at the end of the twentieth century.

BACK TO THE GATE

Months later I return to eBay. A quick search for "May Fourth movement" and there it is. The same poster, this time with an option "buy it now." Sixty dollars, plus shipping from Hong Kong. I get up and get my wallet. I hesitate, plastic in hand. I still want it. I have used that image for years without ever owning it in any form. I have unpacked, vivisected, and analyzed every aspect of that icon in classrooms and in talks. I put the card back in my wallet. Maybe it is time to move beyond this image and look behind the gate.

LIVED PART I SPACE

street level. The gate became uninteresting. The cult of personality provided Mao with an authority that was independent from the party-state and by moving down to the students' level, Mao transferred part of that authority to them, outside the state. What this gesture sanctioned was precisely the possibility for politics and political organization to subsist outside the state. Politics can exist only by leaving the gate behind.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. The painting is by Liang Yulong (Changsha, Hunan, 1922-), who is still an active painter. See www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/sheji/sj-yl.html.
2. Vera Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
3. Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978), and *The Contentious French* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986).
4. On the use of this repertoire in 1989, see Joseph W. Esherick and Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom, "Acting Out Democracy: Political Theater in Modern China," in *Popular Protest and Political Culture in Modern China*, ed. Jeffrey N. Wasserstrom and Elizabeth J. Perry, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 32-69. Jeffrey Wasserstrom provides a thorough analysis of the performative aspects of student protests through the twentieth century in his *Student Protests in Twentieth-Century China: The View from Shanghai* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997).
5. On May 4, 1989, a statement entitled "The New May Fourth Manifesto" was read publicly by Wang Dan, a Beijing University student. See Han Minzhu and

- Sheng Hua, eds., *Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 136. See also Craig C. Calhoun, "Science, Democracy, and the Politics of Identity," in Wasserstrom and Perry, *Popular Protest*, 93–124.
6. I borrow the distinction between "categories" and "concepts" from Sylvain Lazarus. See his *L'Anthropologie du nom* (Paris: Seuil, 1996). See also Alain Badiou's analysis of Lazarus's work in his *Metapolitics*, trans. Jason Barker (London: Verso, 2005), 26–57.
 7. Badiou, *Metapolitics*, 144–52. Here I make reference only to a small (albeit crucial) portion of Badiou's analysis of politics, i.e., its relations to the state and the state of the situation.
 8. Steve Pile, "Introduction: Opposition, Political Identities, and Spaces of Resistance," in *Geographies of Resistance*, ed. Steve Pile and Michael Keith (London: Routledge, 1997), 28.
 9. E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).
 10. This is, in part, the underlying assumption behind analyses focused on the emergence of "civil society," of which activism becomes an expression. This approach has been applied in particular to the case of 1989. See Lawrence R. Sullivan, "The Emergence of Civil Society in China, Spring 1989," in *China, the Crisis of 1989: Origins and Implications*, ed. Roger V. Des Forges, Luo Ning, and Wu Yen-bo (Buffalo: State University of New York at Buffalo, 1990), 285–300.
 11. See, for example, Timothy B. Weston, *The Power of Position: Beijing University, Intellectuals, and Chinese Political Culture, 1898–1929* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Weston pays attention to the everyday at Beida, but this aspect is not fully integrated in his argument, which is grounded precisely on the power of position. See also Craig J. Calhoun, *Neither Gods nor Emperors: Students and the Struggle for Democracy in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
 12. Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment*; Li Zehou, "Qimeng yu jiuwang de shuangchong bianzou" (The coupled variations of enlightenment and national salvation), in *Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun* (Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987), 7–49.
 13. Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Schwarcz, *The Chinese Enlightenment*; Li Zehou, *Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun*.
 14. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Lefebvre, *Critique of Everyday Life*, vol. 1, *Introduction*, trans. John Moore (London: Verso, 2000); Lefebvre, *Writings on Cities*, ed. Eleonore Kofman, and Elizabeth Lebas (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996).

15. Kristin Ross, "Streetwise: The French Invention of Everyday Life," *Parallax* 2 (1996): 73.
16. Harry Harootunian, *History's Disquiet: Modernity, Cultural Practice, and the Question of Everyday Life* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 5.
17. *Ibid.*, 56.
18. Founded in 1898 as the Jingshi Daxue (Imperial University), it was renamed Guoli Beijing Daxue (National Peking University) in 1912.
19. A visit to the Beijing University History Hall (Beijing Daxue Xiaoshi Guan) on the Haidian campus will show this vision of Beida. The new hall, officially inaugurated on September 1, 2001, was entirely financed by contributions of Japanese businessmen, for a total of 270 million Japanese yen (roughly equivalent, as of 1999, to 2.2 million USD). It hosts an exhibition hall that narrates, in glossy detail, the history of the university, from its founding in 1898 to the "successes" of the reform era and, on the ground floor, a shop that sells university paraphernalia. Obviously, the role of Beida students during the Cultural Revolution or the 1989 movement is not recorded. The whole period of 1966 through 1976 is almost completely omitted, leaving a curious and telling gap in this otherwise glorious narrative.
20. See chapter 3.
21. See chapter 1.
22. See chapter 1.
23. Kristin Ross, *May '68 and Its Afterlives* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 25.
24. Tim Cresswell, *In Place/Out of Place: Geography, Ideology, and Transgression* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 157.
25. See part 3.
26. In this sense, it is revealing that in the 1980s, the term *generation* resurfaced as part of a larger attempt to negate the validity and the importance of politics inside the May Fourth movement. See Li Zehou and Vera Schwarcz, "Six Generations of Modern Chinese Intellectuals," *Chinese Studies in History* 17, no. 2 (Winter 1983–1984): 42–56.
27. See chapter 6.
28. Sang Bing, *Wan Qing xuetang xuesheng yu shehui bianqian* (Students in late Qing *xuetang* and social change) (Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 1995).
29. The number of students in China grew from about one million in 1907 to thirty-one million in 1909. See Qian Manqing and Jin Linxiang, eds., *Zhongguo jindai xuezhi bijiao yanjiu* (Comparative studies on the modern Chinese school system) (Guangdong: Guangdong jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996), 125.
30. Sang, *Wan Qing xuetang*, 5.
31. *Ibid.*, 10.

- ing the May Fourth movement), in *Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuanhui wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui*, ed., *Wusi yundong qinini ji* (Personal memories of the May Fourth movement) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 1999), 124–29.
44. For the shift between student organizations and party-related activities, see Arif Dirlik, *The Origins of Chinese Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Hans J. Van de Ven, *From Friend to Comrade: The Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920–1927* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). I deal briefly with the waning of student activities at the end of chapter 7.
45. Alessandro Portelli, “The Death of Luigi Trastulli,” in *The Death of Luigi Trastulli, and Other Stories: Form and Meaning in Oral History* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2.
46. Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different,” in *The Death of Luigi Trastulli*, 67.

1. THROUGH THE WALLS: EVERYDAY LIFE IN THE UNIVERSITY

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1. Russell Baker, “Another Big Bluster,” *New York Times*, June 21, 1986, quoted in John Trumbour, ed., *How Harvard Rules: Reason in the Service of Empire* (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 3.
2. Meng Zhaoqiang, Lu Qing, Tang Han, eds., *Beida bu bai*, (Beida is invincible) (Haikou: Nanhai chubanshe, 1998), 1. The title of the volume makes direct reference to *Hafu bu bai* (Harvard is invincible), a book presenting the richest university in the world as a model of “success” for the new China. Yu Hong and Lu Yuan, *Hafu bu bai: Zai Hafu li nian de bi'an* (Harvard is invincible: The other shore seen from Harvard) (Beijing: Minzhu yu jianshe chubanshe, 1996).
3. See Guan Chenghua, ed., *Beijing Daxue xiaoyuan wenhua* (Beijing University campus culture), 2nd ed. (Beijing: Beijing Daxue chubanshe, 2004). Again, the often misty-eyed recollections of alumni celebrating the stones, the walls, and air of Harvard, Oxford, and Cambridge come to mind.
4. Wen-hsin Yeh, *The Alienated Academy: Culture and Politics in Republican China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 219.
5. John Israel, *Lianhua: A Chinese University in War and Revolution* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 120.
6. Wang Yiqiu, “Xianhua ‘Beida tese’” (Idle words on the characteristics of Beida), in *Beida gushi: Mingren yanzhong de lao Beida* (Old tales of Beida: Beida in the eyes of famous people), ed. Mu Zhou and Mu Xiao (Beijing: Zhongguo wujia

32. Wasserstrom and Esherick, “Acting Out Democracy,” 49. See also Edward J. M. Rhoads, *China’s Republican Revolution: The Case of Kwang-tung, 1895–1913* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 85–86 and 95–96.
33. The construction of this repertoire and its use of preexisting forms of activism are explored in detail in Wasserstrom, *Student Protests*, chap. 3.
34. Sang, *Wan Qing xuefang*, 144. Benjamin A. Elman, *A Cultural History of Civil Examinations in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 613. In 1911, the imperial government announced that university graduates (at the Imperial University) were no longer to receive government positions. They would still be awarded the title of *jinsbi*, however. Xiaoching Diana Lin, *Peking University: Chinese Scholarship and Intellectuals, 1898–1937* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 30.
35. Liang Qichao’s speech delivered at Beida in 1912 (discussed in chapter 3) is an example of this view of the university. See also Ma Xiangbo’s acceptance speech as acting president of the Beida in 1912, which echoes some of the themes Liang developed a week later (*BDSL II* 1:236).
36. See Lin, *Peking University*, 41.
37. I owe this phrasing to Robert Culp. Even in this second aspect, May Fourth students obviously benefited from the long process of detachment from the state and redefinition of school functions that took place in the preceding decades.
38. The only school banner clearly visible in Liang Yulong’s painting is the one bearing the name “Guoli Beijing Daxue.”
39. Several *hutong* were widened in preparation for the construction of the National Art Museum in December 1958 and given new names. During Beijing’s place-name rectification campaign (1965) the street was given a single name, Hanhuayuan Dajie. The name was then changed to Wusi Dajie during the Cultural Revolution. See Wang Bin and Xu Xiuli, eds., *Beijing diming dian* (Beijing place-name dictionary) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenlian chubanshe, 2001), 73–74; *Beijing Shi Dongchengqu diming zhi* (Place names of the Eastern District of Beijing) (Beijing: Beijing chubanshe, 1990), 186–87. I am thankful to Ed Franco and Andrew Field for the bibliographic help.
40. Zhao Dingxin, *The Power of Tiananmen: State-Society Relations and the 1989 Beijing Student Movement* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 251–52.
41. Ruth Hayhoe, “Towards the Forging of a Chinese University Ethos: Zhendan and Fudan, 1903–1919,” *China Quarterly*, no. 94 (June 1983): 323–41. Liu Liyan, “The Man Who Molded Mao: Yang Changji and the First Generation of Chinese Communists,” *Modern China* 32, no. 4 (October 2006): 483–512.
42. Weston, *The Power of Position*, 200.
43. For a vivid first-person description by a female student, see Lu Yunzhang, “Wusi yundong zhong de Beijing nüxuesheng” (A Beijing female student dur-