

Radio Waves and Ballot Boxes: How Conservative Broadcasting Influenced Southern Electoral Behavior

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Abstract

This study examines how conservative talk radio influenced electoral behavior in the American South during the postwar era. Focusing on Carl McIntire's "Twentieth Century Reformation Hour" program, I exploit exogenous variation in radio signal strength driven by topographical differences to identify causal effects on voting patterns. Using a novel dataset combining archival records with technical broadcasting data, I find that exposure to McIntire's broadcasts significantly reduced support for Democratic presidential candidate John F. Kennedy in the 1960 election by 1.4 percentage points while increasing Republican candidate Richard Nixon's vote share by 0.9 percentage points, with negligible effects on voter turnout. These effects were strongest in counties with the lowest proportions of Protestant residents, suggesting a ceiling effect in areas already predisposed toward conservatism. Furthermore, exposure to McIntire's program increased the probability Democratic congressmen would vote against Kennedy's 1962 Trade Expansion Act, demonstrating that partisan media influence extended beyond electoral outcomes to shape legislative behavior.

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I. Introduction

While the effect of biased media sources on political outcomes is a major source of contention in current political discourse and policy debates, these concerns are not unique to the present. This paper studies the political impact of conservative talk radio broadcasts in the American South during the postwar period. Following the end of the Second World War, regulatory changes by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) facilitated a rapid expansion in the number of AM radio stations. This growth altered the composition of programming available to listeners as the medium transitioned from predominantly moderate and centrist content to a broader spectrum that included conservative talk radio. The most prominent conservative broadcaster of the early 1960s was the fundamentalist preacher Carl McIntire, whose program, *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour*, began airing in 1953. At its apex, McIntire's program attained a listenership of approximately 20 million Americans, or about one-ninth of the national population. This program not only stoked Communist paranoia but also criticized desegregation, the expanding role of the federal government, and the internationalism favored by consensus liberalism. The FCC, however, maintained reservations about partisan media, and their enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine ultimately forced conservative talk shows, like McIntire's, to largely disappear from the airwaves by the mid-1970s (Matzko, 2020). Although these conservative broadcasts were relatively short-lived, their emergence coincided with the South's dramatic postwar partisan transformation from a solidly Democratic to a solidly Republican bloc. Recent literature has (1) explored the effects of partisan media on voter turnout, partisan identity, and political beliefs, and (2) sought to leverage novel data sources to better understand the mechanisms driving the South's partisan realignment. This research contributes to both areas of active work by estimating the effect McIntire's radio program had on voter turnout

and partisan vote share in the 1960 presidential election, the first national election where McIntire's had a sizable audience. Then, I consider McIntire's effect on voter turnout and partisan vote share during the down-ballot 1960 Congressional Elections. I also investigate heterogeneity in effects by religion. Finally, I explore whether McIntire's broadcast also affected the behavior of elected officials by considering votes in the House of Representatives on the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. To estimate these effects, I exploit exogenous variation in radio signal strength driven by local topography.

In addition to McIntire's prominence in conservative broadcasting during the early 1960s, this study considers the effect of the *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* because McIntire has the most complete surviving archives compared to any of his contemporary conservative broadcasters.¹ McIntire's broad media penetration, coupled with his extensive archives, enables a rigorous reconstruction of the conservative broadcasting expansion that characterized the late 1950s and 1960s. This is an interesting setting for studying the political impacts of media for two main reasons. First, by combining multiple archival sources into a novel dataset, I can contribute to the important but understudied effects of postwar conservative radio. Second, the identification of electoral effects can substantively contribute to contemporary academic and policy discourse regarding media influence and its effect on the political process.

A priori, it is not clear whether McIntire's program has political effects, as different theoretical models yield contrasting predictions about how slanted media sources affect voting patterns. According to the rational expectations hypothesis, voters optimally process information by filtering out systematic biases in media coverage (Bray & Kreps, 1987). Under this framework, exposure

1. The preservation of these archives is partially attributable to their seizure during a federal tax investigation in the 1990s.

to slanted news would not meaningfully alter voting behavior unless it delivered genuinely new information or resolved uncertainties aligned with voters' priors. Behavioral models, by contrast, emphasize various cognitive limitations and biases that make voters susceptible to media persuasion. DeMarzo et al. (2003), for example, develop a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to persuasion bias. This model suggests that voters' decisions are subject to media persuasion. Outside of economics, theories from cognitive linguistics suggest that voters interpret political information through metaphorical frameworks that can be activated and reinforced by partisan media framing (Lakoff, 1987).

The rapidly growing literature examining how different types of media – including newspapers, radio, and cable news – affect voting behavior and political attitudes has documented significant effects, although the effects vary between contexts and mediums. Gentzkow et al. (2011) found that newspapers increased voter turnout in the early 20th century, particularly after the first paper entered a market, but that partisan papers did not appear to shift party vote shares. Research into the effects of radio programming, by contrast, has shown effects on ideology and party vote share. Wang (2021) finds that exposure to the populist Father Coughlin's radio program in the 1930s reduced support for President Roosevelt in the 1936 presidential election but did not affect overall turnout. This suggests that his program primarily persuaded existing voters rather than mobilizing new ones. Evidence from 1930s Germany shows that pro-Weimar government radio decreased Nazi vote share, while later Nazi-controlled radio increased it. These results further demonstrate radio's potential to persuade existing voters (Adena et al., 2015). Specific to this paper's context, Engist et al. (2024) estimate that conservative talk radio increased GOP vote share by 1.8 percentage points during the postwar period. Finally, while the introduction of television in the 1940s appears to have decreased voter turnout (Gentzkow, 2006), more recent work has found that Fox News has

increased Republican vote share by both persuading existing voters and mobilizing new Republican voters (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Martin & Yurukoglu, 2017).

To address the empirical challenge of establishing causality with observational data, researchers studying media effects use two main identification strategies. The first approach leverages geographic or institutional conditions that affect signal availability. Enikolopov et al. (2011) use variation in signal reception of an independent TV station to study media influence on voting in Russia. DellaVigna et al. (2014) exploit signal spillover from Serbian radio to examine its effects in Croatia. Adena et al. (2015) use variation in radio signal reception to study radio's effect on the growth of the Nazi Party in Germany. In the US context, Martin and Yurukoglu (2017) use variation in cable channel positioning as an instrument for Fox News viewership. A second identification strategy exploits sharp changes in media markets, with Drago et al. (2014) and Gentzkow et al. (2011) studying the effects of newspaper entry and exit and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) considering the effects of the entry of Fox News. This thesis draws from the first methodological approach, using exogenous geographic variation in the signal strength of Carl McIntire's program *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* to estimate its political effects.

By focusing on McIntire, the content and historical setting of this study distinguish it from much of the existing literature on media effects. The differences between this paper and To estimate the effect of conservative talk radio, Engist et al. (2024) employ a county-level difference-in-differences framework. In their static specification, counties are defined as 'treated' during election cycles when a conservative talk show was actively broadcast by a local, low-power radio station within the county. Their dynamic specification then restricts attention to the first election cycle in which a county receives such treatment. By focusing exclusively on local stations, however, the analysis ignores the fact that residents in control counties and residents in treated counties during pre-treatment

periods could plausibly access the same programming broadcast from high-power regional stations. As a result, Engist et al. (2024) capture the impact of a conservative talk show’s entry into a local market, not the causal effect of listeners’ exposure to conservative talk radio itself. While Engist et al. (2024) identify a valuable parameter of interest, my approach allows for the estimation of the latter.

By using exogenous variation in signal strength from topographical features, I incorporate data from all stations broadcasting McIntire’s program, rather than just local ones. Moreover, this approach allows me to estimate the impact of conservative radio at a specific point in time — such as the 1960 election — rather than isolating only the effect of new entrants in that year. Despite our modeling differences, our results are directionally consistent and of a similar magnitude. In addition to lending support for Engist et al. (2024)’s findings, I compliment their work by exploring how religious heterogeneity moderates the effect of conservative radio, as well as the effect of conservative talk radio on congressional voting behavior.

In addition, by highlighting radio as a potential mechanism in the South’s partisan re-alignment, this paper also contributes to the growing literature seeking to understand the partisan transformation of the South in the postwar period. A detailed discussion of this literature can be found in Kuziemko and Washington (2015).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I provide historical background on Carl McIntire’s program and the rise of conservative talk radio in the postwar period. In Section 3, I describe the data that is used in the analysis. In Section 4, I describe my identification strategy and empirical methodology. Section 5.1 contains my baseline results exploring McIntire’s impact on voting patterns in the 1960 presidential and congressional elections. Section 5.2 then extends the baseline results from the presidential election to explore religious heterogeneity. Finally, 5.3 uses

congressional votes on the 1962 Trade Expansion Act to explore whether McIntire's program also affected the behavior of elected officials. Section 6 concludes.

II. Historical Background

The first radio stations in the United States began transmitting in 1920, and soon after radio became a popular form of household entertainment (Scott, 2019). While the earliest radio stations were independently owned, national broadcasting networks consolidated station ownership. By the early 1930s, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) and the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) held an approximately 70% combined market share (Sterling & Kittross, 2002).² The major national networks produced standardized content and distributed it to their affiliate stations to air in blocks. When local affiliate stations tried to substitute a program of their choice for the network's program, the network could threaten to reconsider the affiliate's contract (Matzko, 2020; Sterling & Kittross, 2002).³ Moreover, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB), an industry group that represented 428 member stations, issued explicit standards of "social responsibility" forbidding broadcasters from selling airtime for divisive religious or political commentary (Doherty, 2021).⁴ By the start of the 1940s, the standardized programs, industry regulations, and network influence over local programming ensured that America's radio market featured centrist content largely devoid of anything too politically controversial.

2. The market consolidation largely stemmed from the Radio Act of 1927, in which Congress attempted to regulate this newly emerging communication medium (Scott, 2019).

3. Legally, local stations had control over what they broadcasted, but because network affiliation was crucial to financial success, such threats were highly effective (Sterling & Kittross, 2002).

4. This standard was not frequently enforced, but it was salient to broadcasters, as the NAB did undertake high-profile enforcement action. Notably, the NAB decided that Father Coughlin – a radio personality who argued for monetary reforms and the nationalization of major industries while espousing anti-Semitic views – violated its standards and forbade broadcasters from selling him airtime unless he agreed to limit his sermons to "purely theological issues" (Bittle, 2020; Doherty, 2021).

The conclusion of the Second World War marked the beginning of a significant expansion for AM radio as the market was no longer constrained by the economic difficulties of the Great Depression and differing wartime priorities. After the FCC reversed its policy on the number and spacing of radio stations to allow more locations to qualify for AM station licenses, investors rapidly funded new stations in response both to strong consumer demand for more stations and to the availability of an experienced workforce of returning military personnel with wartime radio training (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). This rapid growth – from 900 AM radio stations in 1945 to 3,500 by 1960 – was largely driven by local, non-network affiliated stations that catered to suburbs and small towns.⁵ Consequently, the four major networks – NBC, CBS, the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), and the Mutual Broadcasting System (Mutual) – saw their control decline from 95% of stations in 1945 to less than 50% by 1952, with this percentage continuing to decrease throughout the 1950s (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). This decrease diminished the national networks' capacity to act as a moderating influence on radio content.

As the number of AM stations grew and national advertisers became more interested in television than radio, FCC reports suggested that stations would increasingly get smaller cuts of the local advertising pots and, resultantly, face uncertain financial outlooks. In fact, it's estimated that about one in three stations during this period lost money each year (Sterling & Kittross, 2002). To cope with the new financial pressures, stations increasingly turned to talk radio. These national talk radio shows, which proved popular among audiences, paid local stations for airtime and relied on donations from listeners to earn revenue. To maximize profit, the talk shows often claimed federal tax exemptions as educational groups (Matzko, 2020): this saved broadcasters the cost of paying

5. As television became more favored, popular programs and national advertising dollars moved to the new medium, giving stations less financial incentive to seek network affiliation. The networks were less interested in retaining control over the radio broadcasting market as they saw the future in television (Sterling & Kittross, 2002).

taxes and encouraged donations by allowing their supporters to write off their contributions on their taxes. Beyond paying for airtime, national talk radio shows also lowered the operating costs of local stations, as they reduced the amount of original content needed to be produced. While the partisan talk content that independent stations began to air didn't exclusively lean right, it skewed right, and the number of stations airing conservative programming increased rapidly. Given near-universal radio set ownership, there was no effective barrier to entry to consume this partisan content once the broadcasts reached your market (Appendix [A](#)).

The election of 1960 marked the first time conservative radio broadcasters had extended reach to cause political influence, as can be seen in Figure [A3](#). Carl McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* aired on more than 100 stations nationwide by 1960, a dramatic expansion from just a handful three years earlier. During the 1960 presidential campaign between John F. Kennedy and Richard Nixon, McIntire continuously voiced concerns about a Kennedy presidency on his program, insinuating that a Catholic president would undermine church-state separation and take cues from the Vatican on both domestic and foreign policy. Although Kennedy ultimately won the election, he had a narrow margin of victory. McIntire's program remained political after Kennedy's election as it continued to highlight his socially conservative and anti-Communism views and his suspicion of centralized government. Nationally, his audience grew to an estimated 20 million listeners, or roughly one in nine Americans (Matzko, [2020](#)). Despite McIntire's wide reach, conservative talk radio in the postwar period is a largely unstudied topic, and the effect McIntire, or conservative talk radio more broadly, had on the 1960 election is presently unknown.

III. Data

A. Radio Station Data

This study constructs a novel dataset to estimate the causal effect of conservative talk radio on voting patterns in the American South. The core dataset is based on Paul Matzko’s aggregation of archival records documenting the expansion of Carl McIntire’s Twentieth Century Reformation Hour. These records, housed in the Carl McIntire collection at the Princeton Theological Seminary Library, provide precise start dates for the program’s broadcast on local radio stations, as well as end dates for a substantial share of those stations.⁶ From this, I identify all radio stations that carried McIntire’s program.

However, Matzko’s archival data was incomplete in recording the technical specifications of each station, including its transmitter’s power and frequency, and was missing transmitter locations and heights, all of which are required to estimate the broadcast’s reach. To address these gaps, I first supplemented the dataset with technical details from the *Broadcasting Yearbook* (Broadcasting Publications, Inc., 1958, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1964, 1967). Since the *Broadcasting Yearbook* does not contain transmitter location data, I further enriched the dataset using records from the FCC’s digitized archives. Because radio stations can change their call signs over time, I used the FCC’s historical crosswalk to trace each station’s facility number and retrieve the relevant scanned FCC History Cards (FCC, 2024), which are the scanned files that radio stations filed with the FCC. These cards contain historical transmitter locations and technical specifics. Because I had to manually scrape data from these scans, I reviewed each card twice to ensure consistency.

Given this paper’s focus on the American South, the effect of McIntire’s program on voting

6. I am grateful to Paul Matzko for sharing the data.

patterns will only be considered in the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, Kentucky, Maryland, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia, following the definition of Clubb et al. (2006). However, I also included select radio transmitters in Missouri, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Delaware, and Illinois, as these were all capable of broadcasting to Southern states.

Together, these sources form a novel and comprehensive data set containing the technical details necessary to estimate the radio signal strength of each station that broadcast McIntire’s program.

B. Radio Signal Data

To measure radio exposure, I compute the received signal strength of McIntire’s broadcasts using two standard methods that model electromagnetic wave propagation. First, I consider signal strength under the idealized free-space conditions. Under this model, which assumes a smooth, unobstructed path, signal strength decays with the square of the distance from the transmitter (Olken, 2009). Prior work demonstrates that predicted signal strength is a reliable proxy for audience size in the absence of detailed listenership data (Adena et al., 2015; Olken, 2009). Here, exposure is calculated as the maximum received signal strength of McIntire’s broadcast, measured in decibel-milliwatts (dBm), in the county or Congressional District, depending on the specification. Following Durante et al. (2019) and Wang (2021), I treat continuous signal strength as the explanatory variable. For each county, I define exposure as the maximum predicted signal strength across all transmitters.

In practice, however, signal propagation is more complex than the free-space model suggests. Attenuation depends not only on distance but also on topographic obstacles, terrain irregularities, and atmospheric refraction. To account for these factors, I employ the Irregular Terrain Model (ITM), a professional-grade propagation algorithm originally developed by the US government

in the 1960s and still widely used by broadcast engineers. Following Olken (2009), I use the ITM to estimate transmission loss for each transmitter–county pair.⁷ The model requires detailed inputs: geographic coordinates and elevation for both transmitter and receiver, intervening terrain profiles, transmission frequency, and environmental parameters. By also controlling for predicted free-space signal strength, I can isolate variation due to topography and Earth curvature. I return to this identification strategy in Section 4.

To better integrate ITM calculations into my workflow, I convert Olken’s code to Python, and I integrate work from Markowski (2023) to speed up computation. To determine the latitude and longitude of the receiver, I calculate the centroid of each county and Congressional District based on shapefiles from Lewis et al. (2013) and Manson et al. (2024).

C. Voting Data and County Controls

The primary outcomes of interest in my baseline analysis are county-level vote shares (in percentage points) for Democratic candidates and total voter turnout in US Presidential and Congressional elections between 1944 and 1972. County-level election data for this period are obtained from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) dataset (Clubb et al., 2006). Because congressional elections are conducted at the House district level, county-level electoral outcomes do not necessarily align with congressional district-level results. However, for the purposes of this study, this distinction is of secondary importance, as the primary objective is to measure political allegiance rather than focus exclusively on federal election outcomes.

To incorporate a rich set of socioeconomic controls, I use microdata from the US Census

7. I am grateful to Benjamin Olken for providing access to the ITM software. The same model has been used in historical applications such as Adena et al. (2015) and Wang (2021).

IPUMS combined with data from “County and City Data Book [United States] Consolidated File: County Data, 1947-1977 (ICPSR 7736)” (1984), including educational attainment, population size, urbanization, racial composition, income, and population density (Manson et al., 2024). For specifications run at the Congressional district level, I instead draw my socioeconomic controls from Census’s Congressional District Data books. To account for geographic characteristics that may influence radio signal propagation and political behavior, I use Google Earth Engine to generate county-level measures of land area, average elevation, and terrain ruggedness.

IV. Empirical Methodology

My baseline empirical work examines the impact of Carl McIntire’s *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* on voting outcomes in the 1960 presidential election. Based on archival documentation, the stations that aired Carl McIntire’s show were a function of structural and market-level constraints – including station availability, contractual terms, and economic viability – rather than an intentional political strategy of opposition to the candidacy of John F. Kennedy.⁸

Nevertheless, reception of McIntire’s broadcast might have been correlated with other local characteristics, such as distance to the nearest city, that could have influenced voting behavior in 1960. To address this endogeneity concern, I employ an empirical strategy pioneered by Olken (2009) and exploit exogenous variation in the signal strength of McIntire’s broadcast driven by topological variation.⁹ Specifically, I compute both the actual signal strength (*Signal*) a listener would experience and the hypothetical signal strength in free space (*SignalFree*) where the Earth

8. Previous work on the expansion of Fox News and the broadcasts of Father Coughlin has similarly concluded that the locations of partisan media broadcasters in those settings was driven by market and infrastructure constraints and contract idiosyncrasies, not an intentional political strategy (DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007; Wang, 2021).

9. A similar empirical strategy has also been used by Wang (2021) and Adena et al. (2015), among others.




FIGURE 1. SIGNAL STRENGTH OF *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* BY COUNTY, 1960

Notes: Panel B shows the predicted actual signal strength of Carl McIntire’s radio program in 1960, as computed by the ITM. The dots are the location of radio stations broadcasting McIntire’s program. Panel A shows the signal strength in free space. While signal strength is measured in dBm, the heatmap uses z-scores for ease of interpretation. Some of the dots occur outside of the plot by design. Those are stations that transmit from states outside of those of interest for voting outcomes, but as their signal could potential reach the states of interest, their broadcasts were included for signal strength calculations.

is assumed to be free of topographical obstacles like hills. I then regress my outcomes of interest on *Signal* while controlling for *SignalFree*. Importantly, *SignalFree* controls for both the county’s distance from the radio transmitter and the transmitter’s power. Consequently, once controlling for *SignalFree*, the identification of the effect of *Signal* comes from variation in radio wave propagation caused by topographical obstacles along the signal’s transmission route. Figure 1 shows both the actual signal strength predicted by the ITM model and the hypothetical signal strength in free space in 1960. Since a county’s own topography has the potential to influence its political outcomes, I control for various local topographic characteristics, including surface area and elevation. Consequently, with the exception of counties that contain a station broadcasting McIntire’s show, I only exploit the residual variation in signal strength resulting from variation in the topography along the signal’s transmission path outside the county, which is arguably more exogenous. Finally, I utilize state fixed effects to compare counties within the same state for my analysis.

For my baseline analysis, I estimate the following model:

$$Y_c = \beta \text{Signal}_c + \gamma \text{SignalFree}_c + \delta' X_c + \eta_s + \epsilon_c \quad (1)$$

where Y_c is the outcome of interest: vote share (in percentage points) received by a party in county c and voter turnout (in percentage points) in county c during the 1960 presidential election. Signal_c is the actual signal strength of McIntire's radio program in county c during the 1960 presidential election, whereas SignalFree_c is the hypothetical signal strength of McIntire's radio program in county c in free space. X_c is a vector of county baseline controls for socioeconomic characteristics, geographic features, past voting outcomes, and the constant term. Specifically, I control for the proportion of the county who are male in 1960, the proportion aged 65 and older in 1960, the proportion who are white in 1960, the percent of the county covered in rural farmland in 1960, the percent of the county that is married in 1960, the proportion of the county in 1960 who moved there after 1958, county-level election outcomes between 1948 and 1958, the area of the county, the elevation of the county, and the terrain roughness of the county. η_s are state-level fixed effects, and ϵ_c is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. To improve the interpretation of the results, I follow Wang (2021) and standardize signal strength such that it has a mean zero and a standard deviation of one.

Under the identification assumption that *Signal* is uncorrelated with unobserved factors affecting voting outcomes, conditional on the covariates in Equation (1), β provides the reduced form estimate of the effect of exposure to McIntire's program. While this is untestable, I support this conditional exogeneity assumption through balance and placebo tests.

In Table 1, I consider the relationship between the signal strength of McIntire's program a

county experienced in 1960 and the county’s socioeconomic characteristics in 1950. As seen in the table, *Signal* balanced across pre-treatment socioeconomic characteristics when controlling for *SignalFree*, giving support to the identification assumption.

In Table 2, I perform a series of placebo tests by examining the relationship between *Signal* in 1960 and party vote shares and voter turnout in previous elections. The estimated effects are generally small, and conditional on *SignalFree*, none are significant. Columns (1) and (2) show that, conditional on *SignalFree*, *Signal* does not have a significant effect on county-level partisan vote share or voter turnout in the two presidential elections immediately preceding the FCC rule change. Columns (3) and (4) show that *Signal* does not have a significant effect on county-level partisan vote share or voter turnout in congressional elections either. This lack of effect is observed in both midterm and non-midterm congressional elections. These results suggest that exposure to McIntire’s program in 1960 was not systematically correlated with preexisting political preferences, providing further support to the identification assumption underlying Equation (1).

V. Results

A. Baseline Results

Table 3 shows the estimated effects of exposure to Carl McIntire’s program on voting in the 1960 presidential election. I find that exposure to McIntire’s radio program had a significant negative effect on the support for Kennedy and a significant positive effect on the support for Nixon in the 1960 presidential election. The results are robust and of similar magnitude when adding in different controls. Based on Column 2, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire’s program reduced Kennedy’s vote share by about 1.4 percentage points, which is about 2.7% relative to his

mean vote share.

Column 4 shows that most of the reduction in Kennedy's vote share as a result of exposure to McIntire went to Nixon and the Republican Party. A one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program increased Nixon's vote share by about 0.9 percentage points, which is about 2% relative to his mean. Moreover, Column 6 shows that exposure to McIntire's program had a small and insignificant effect on voter turnout. Taken together, Table 3 suggests that exposure to McIntire's program caused some small partisan re-alignment during the 1960 presidential election, reducing Kennedy's vote share and increasing Nixon's. Consistent with some existing literature on partisan media effects, these findings suggest that McIntire's program primarily operated through the persuasion of existing voters rather than the mobilization of new ones.

While McIntire was more vocal against Kennedy than any Democratic congressional candidates, the stances he espoused were generally at odds with Democratic candidates' platforms. To explore the effect of McIntire's program on down-ballot congressional races, I re-estimate Equation (1) using county-level data on 1960 congressional elections, with the estimated effects of exposure to McIntire's program shown in Table 4. Unlike the presidential results, I find no statistically significant effects on congressional vote shares or turnout. In counties with congressional elections, the Democratic vote share in the congressional elections was, on average, 26.69 percentage points higher than that county's Democratic vote share in the presidential election. This difference cannot be explained by differential turnout. While on average, each county had 1209 more voters in the presidential election than the congressional one, even if every voter who only voted in the presidential election had instead voted for the Republican congressional candidate too, the Democratic vote share would still be 16.78 percent points higher on average in the presidential than congressional elections. Thus, voters must have engaged in split-ticket voting. Table 4, combined

with the calculations in this paragraph, provides compelling evidence that partisan media can have targeted rather than universal effects, suggesting that the persuasive effects of McIntire’s anti-Kennedy and anti-Democrat rhetoric didn’t meaningfully spillover to local races.

B. Religion

Next, I examine the role religion played in the effectiveness of McIntire’s persuasion. Because McIntire was a Protestant minister and heavily covered religious themes in his broadcasts, it’s likely that listeners’ faith influenced how they responded to his broadcasts. To test this hypothesis, I extend my model in Equation (1) to include the following terms:

$$Y_c = \beta_1 Signal_c + \beta_2 Signal_c \times TQ_c + \beta_3 Signal_c \times BQ_c + \gamma SignalFree_c + \delta' X_c + \eta_s + \epsilon_c \quad (2)$$

where TQ_c is an indicator that equals one if the county’s Protestant population share is in the top quintile of the distribution of all counties and zero otherwise, BQ_c is an indicator that equals one if the county’s Protestant population share is in the bottom quintile and zero otherwise, and the vector of county -level controls X_c has been extended to include the indicators TQ_c and BQ_c as well as their interaction terms with $SignalFree_c$. Like Equation (1), this model is estimated using county-level data from the 1960 presidential election.

Table 5 reports the estimates of the regression, which support the hypothesis of heterogeneity in the treatment effect by listeners’ religious affiliation. Column 1 shows that for counties with a Protestant population between the 20th and 80th percentile, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire’s program reduced Kennedy’s vote share by about 1.19 percentage points. However, for counties in the top quintile, the treatment effect becomes statistically indistinguishable

from zero. Testing the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = 0$ yields a p-value of 0.718, so we fail to reject that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program is different from zero. By contrast, the effect increases in magnitude for counties with a Protestant population in the bottom quintile. For these counties, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program decreased Kennedy's vote share by 3.67 percentage points.

Column 2 in Table 5 shows a symmetric pattern occurs when considering Nixon's vote share. For counties in the top quintile, the effect of a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Testing the null hypothesis that $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = 0$ yields a p-value of 0.204, so we fail to reject that the effect of a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program is different from zero. For counties with a Protestant population in the bottom quintile, however, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program increased Nixon's vote share by 2.83 percentage points. Combining this with the estimates from Column 1 and the baseline model suggests that McIntire's effect on partisan re-alignment during the 1960 presidential election was mainly driven by less Protestant counties.

There are multiple potential mechanisms that could explain why McIntire's program had the largest effect in the counties with the smallest proportion of Protestants. As seen in Table A1, counties with higher proportions of Protestants had lower Democratic vote shares in the 1960 presidential election. So, in heavily Protestant counties, voters may have already been predisposed against Kennedy regardless of McIntire's broadcasts. In this case, McIntire's broadcasts would have had little additional persuasive effect. It's possible that there may have been some natural ceiling on anti-Kennedy sentiment in heavily Protestant areas that had already been reached through other channels. Moreover, in areas with fewer Protestants, McIntire's religious arguments against Kennedy might have provided new information or perspectives that weren't already circulating

in those communities. Thus, McIntire's broadcasts would have a larger effect in areas where the information it conveyed was more novel. Ultimately, future work is required to better understand the mechanism underlying why McIntire's program had a larger effect in less Protestant counties.

C. Legislative Impacts

Although exposure to McIntire's radio broadcast caused changes in voting patterns, it is presently unclear whether exposure also caused elected officials to change their behavior. This could occur either because McIntire directly influenced the beliefs and priorities of elected officials or because those officials, attentive to the shifting political behavior of their constituents, acted strategically to remain electorally viable. To answer whether it had an effect, I consider the case of the 1962 Polish Ham Boycott.

In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower administration attempted to use the prospect of free trade with the US to weaken the Soviet's Eastern Bloc. In 1958, President Eisenhower granted "Most Favored Nation" (MFN) trade status to Poland, followed by a similar designation for Yugoslavia in 1960. While MFN status was not overly exclusive (about eighty to ninety countries benefited from it), it did guarantee that any product exported from a recipient country would face the lowest tariff rate the United States had negotiated for that product with any other trading partner. To many conservative commentators and voters, however, granting preferential trade terms to Communist nations during the height of the Cold War appeared ideologically inconsistent, especially as US forces remained engaged in global anti-Communist conflicts (Matzko, [2020](#)).

Public frustration culminated in the Polish Ham Boycott of 1962. The movement was catalyzed by Jerome Harold, a Miami-based chiropractor who founded the grassroots organization "The Committee to Warn of the Arrival of Communist Merchandise on the Local Business Scene"

(TCTWOTAOCMOTLBS). The organization quickly scaled, claiming affiliate chapters in over 260 cities across the continental United States and helping start local boycotts of Polish Ham and other products imported from Communist nations. The boycotts gained further traction when Carl McIntire began using his radio program to promote the effort. The economic impact of this boycott was measurable, with the US Commerce Department, in conjunction with the Polish Embassy, estimating that Polish exports to the United States declined by approximately \$5 million in the months following the start of the boycotts (Matzko, 2020).

At the local level, the boycotts sparked political action, with at least 26 town and county councils passing ordinances aimed at discouraging the sale of Eastern European goods. The boycotts and their surrounding dialogue even influenced national politics. In the fall of 1962, Congress debated the Trade Expansion Act, which would authorize the executive branch to unilaterally reduce tariffs by up to 50%. Although the bill was expected to pass easily — Democrats held majorities in both chambers — the rising pressure made the bill's outcome increasingly uncertain. While the Trade Expansion Act ultimately passed, the final version included an amendment that revoked MFN status for both Poland and Yugoslavia (Matzko, 2020).

To understand whether McIntire's broadcast influenced the actions of Congressmen, I estimate the following linear probability model

$$Y_d = \beta Signal_d + \gamma SignalFree_d + \delta' X_d + \eta_s + \epsilon_d \quad (3)$$

where Y_c is the outcome of interest: either a "Yea" vote in favor of the Trade Expansion Act or "Nay" vote opposing it from the Congressman in District d . $Signal_d$ is the actual signal strength of McIntire's radio program in Congressman's district d in 1962, whereas $SignalFree_d$ is the

hypothetical signal strength of McIntire's radio program in district d in free space. X_d is a vector of district baseline controls. Specifically, it includes the percent of the district that is nonwhite, the number of households in the district, the female population of the district, the number of vacant housing units in the district, and a constant term. η_s are state-level fixed effects, and ϵ_d is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. As my radio data only spans the American South, I once again restrict my focus to the same set of southern states.

Table 6 reports the results of the regression. For Democratic Congressmen, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to McIntire's program results in a 25.7 percentage point increase in the probability of voting against Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act, which is significant at the 10% level. While the point estimates from the other regressions are consistent with the interpretation that an increase in exposure to McIntire's program caused an increase in the probability of voting "Nay" for Republican Congressmen and a decrease in the probability of voting "Yea" for both Democratic and Republican Congressmen, given the small sample size, these effects are not significant. Taken together, the results in Table 6 suggest that McIntire's radio show did not just affect voting behavior in elections, but also affected how politicians act in office.

VI. Conclusion

This thesis offers new empirical evidence on how conservative media influenced political behavior during a pivotal moment in American history. By exploiting exogenous variation in radio signal strength, I provide the first evidence that exposure to Carl McIntire's *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* significantly shifted vote shares during the 1960 presidential election – reducing support for Kennedy by 1.4 percentage points and increasing support for Nixon.

The heterogeneity in effects across the counties' religious composition is particularly noteworthy.

Counties with the lowest proportion of Protestants showed the strongest response to McIntire's broadcast. This potentially counterintuitive finding may reflect that in heavily Protestant counties, voters were already predisposed against Kennedy regardless of McIntire's influence, while in areas with fewer Protestants, McIntire's religious arguments against Kennedy provided novel information. However, future work is required to better understand this heterogeneity.

Additionally, this study shows that McIntire's influence extended beyond electoral outcomes to shape legislative behavior, with Democratic congressmen from districts with stronger signal exposure being significantly more likely to vote against Kennedy's 1962 Trade Expansion Act. This demonstrates how media can translate electoral influence into policy consequences.

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VII. Tables

TABLE 1. EXPOSURE TO CARL MCINTIRE AND
1950 COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS (BALANCE TEST)

	Mean	Coefficient	R^2
	(1)	(2)	(3)
<i>ln(Population)</i>	9.8639 (0.931)	0.0190 (0.016)	0.141
<i>Percent Non-White</i>	0.2111 (0.201)	0.0334 (0.044)	0.423
<i>Percent Age 75+</i>	0.0235 (0.008)	-0.0004 (0.000)	0.233

Notes: Column (1) of this table shows the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) of 1950 county characteristics. Column (2) reports the coefficient on *Signal* from the ordinary least squares regression of McIntire's signal strength in 1960 with controls for the hypothetical signal strength in free space (*SignalFree*) and state fixed effects, on each listed socioeconomic variable. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are corrected for clustering at the state level. Column (3) reports the R^2 of this regression.^a
*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

a. The balance exhibited holds for a larger set of socioeconomic factors, but not all are shown here due to time constraints in finalizing the thesis.

TABLE 2. EXPOSURE TO MCINTIRE AND BEHAVIOR VOTING
IN PAST ELECTIONS (PLACEBO TESTS)

	Presidential		Congressional	
	1944	1948	1944	1946
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Democrat Vote Shares				
<i>Signal</i>	0.8656 (2.437)	1.5433 (5.147)	3.9499 (2.814)	5.8202 (5.160)
Observations	1413	1413	1413	1413
R^2	0.060	0.135	0.075	0.058
Panel B: Republican Vote Shares				
<i>Signal</i>	-0.7447 (2.482)	1.7256 (5.382)	1.2155 (2.937)	1.3201 (5.448)
Observations	1413	1413	1413	1413
R^2	0.114	0.108	0.088	0.087
Panel C: Turnout				
<i>Signal</i>	-1.3427 (2.620)	0.5398 (5.451)	1.5347 (3.012)	2.4341 (5.497)
Observations	1413	1413	1413	1413
R^2	0.089	0.103	0.069	0.079

Notes: This table shows coefficients and standard errors (in parentheses) from regressions of county-level vote shares and turnout on McIntire's signal strength in 1960 (*Signal*). Each column corresponds to a different election and regression. All regressions include controls for *SignalFree* and state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

TABLE 3. EXPOSURE TO CARL MCINTIRE AND 1960 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING OUTCOMES

	Kennedy (Democrat)		Nixon (Republican)		Voter Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Signal</i>	-1.4482*** (0.364)	-1.4060*** (0.366)	0.9148*** (0.322)	0.9002*** (0.324)	0.5570 (0.371)	0.4674 (0.372)
Observations	1407	1407	1407	1407	1407	1407
Topographic Controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
R^2	0.788	0.788	0.837	0.837	0.801	0.802
Mean of dep. var.	52.71	52.71	42.95	42.95	47.13	47.13
Std. dev. of dep. var.	15.80	15.80	15.97	15.97	16.69	16.69

Notes: This table shows the estimated effects of exposure to Carl McIntire's radio program in 1960 on voting behaviors in the 1960 presidential election. Each column reports results from a separate OLS regression following Equation (1) using county-level observations. The outcome variables are vote share for Kennedy (Columns 1 and 2), vote share for Nixon (Columns 3 and 4), and voter turnout (Columns 5 and 6), all measured in percentage points. *Signal* is the estimated signal strength of McIntire's broadcast in 1960. Controls include the demographic, economic, and geographic county characteristics discussed in Section IV. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the state level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

TABLE 4. EXPOSURE TO CARL MCINTIRE AND 1960 CONGRESSIONAL VOTING OUTCOMES

	Democrat		Republican		Voter Turnout	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Signal</i>	0.9449 (0.789)	0.8118 (0.793)	-1.0529 (0.725)	-0.9589 (0.728)	0.6426 (0.435)	0.5637 (0.437)
Observations	1082	1082	1082	1082	1082	1082
Topographic Controls		Yes		Yes		Yes
R^2	0.647	0.648	0.690	0.690	0.799	0.799
Mean of dep. var.	79.72	79.72	18.87	18.87	42.80	42.80
Std. dev. of dep. var.	24.19	24.19	23.66	23.66	17.66	17.66

Notes: This table shows the estimated effects of exposure to Carl McIntire's radio program in 1960 on voting behaviors in 1960 congressional elections. Each column reports results from a separate OLS regression following Equation (1) using county-level observations. The outcome variables are vote share for the Democratic candidate (Columns 1 and 2), vote share for the Republican candidate (Columns 3 and 4), and voter turnout (Columns 5 and 6), all measured in percentage points. *Signal* is the estimated signal strength of McIntire's broadcast in 1960. Controls include the demographic, economic, and geographic county characteristics discussed in Section IV. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are clustered at the state level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

TABLE 5. BASELINE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS
WITH RELIGIOUS INTERACTIONS

	Kennedy (Democrat) (1)	Nixon (Republican) (2)	Voter Turnout (3)
$Signal \times Protestant_{TQ}$	1.4553* (0.816)	-1.4845** (0.756)	0.2280 (0.506)
$Signal \times Protestant_{BQ}$	-2.4812*** (0.812)	2.2183*** (0.753)	-0.9239* (0.506)
$Signal$	-1.1878*** (0.409)	0.6125 (0.379)	-0.0010 (0.253)
$Protestant_{TQ}$	-1.0645** (0.520)	0.2631 (0.482)	-0.1481 (0.324)
$Protestant_{BQ}$	2.8417*** (0.508)	-2.0473*** (0.471)	0.1686 (0.316)
Top Quintile			
F-statistic	F=0.13	F=1.62	F=0.25
p-value	0.718	0.204	0.620
Bottom Quintile			
F-statistic	F=24.13	F=16.74	F=3.93
p-value	0.000	0.000	0.048

Notes: The table shows additional baseline results, where the outcome variables are the vote shares for Kennedy (Column 1), vote shares for Nixon (Column 2), and voter turnout (Column 3) in the 1960 presidential election. $Protestant_{TQ}$ is an indicator variable that equals one if the county's Protestant population share is in the top quintile of the distribution if all counties and zero otherwise. $Protestant_{BQ}$ is an indicator variable that equals one if the county's Protestant population share is in the top quintile of the distribution if all counties and zero otherwise. Each column represents the results from a separate OLS regression at the county level. Here, I estimate an extended version of the model in Equation (1) that also includes the quintile indicator and interaction terms between $Signal$ and the quintile indicator and between $SignalFree$ and the quintile indicator. Standard errors, shown in parentheses, are corrected for clustering at the state level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

TABLE 6. EXPOSURE TO MCINTIRE AND TRADE
EXPANSION ACT VOTES BY PARTY

	Democrat		Republican	
	Yea (1)	Nay (2)	Yea (3)	Nay (4)
<i>Signal</i>	-0.2569 (0.179)	0.2577* (0.136)	-0.4844 (0.553)	0.3965 (0.215)
<i>Signal_Free</i>	0.7975** (0.335)	-0.5256** (0.255)	-0.0470 (0.538)	0.1350 (0.209)
State Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes		
Observations	80	80	11	11
R^2	0.267	0.317	0.598	0.896

Notes: This table reports the estimated effects of exposure to Carl McIntire's radio broadcast on the vote by party over the 1963 Trade Expansion Act. Each column is a linear probability model at the Congressional district regression, ran separately for Democratic and Republican Congressmen. The outcomes "Yea" and "Nay" are binary variables. A small number of Congressmen voted "Present" or did not vote at all. All specifications control for the percent of the district that is nonwhite, the number of households in the district, the female population of the district, the number of vacant housing units in the district. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Appendix

I. Supplemental Figures and Tables




FIGURE A1. PERCENT OF HOUSEHOLDS WITH WITH MEDIA ACCESS BY YEAR, 1949-1966

Notes: Radio ownership remained near-universal throughout the study period, with over 96% of households owning a radio set on average from 1949 to 1966. In contrast, television ownership increased rapidly during the late 1940s and early 1950s before plateauing in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Data on media ownership are drawn from Broadcasting Publications, Inc. (1967), while household counts are from U.S. Census Bureau (2025). Given the near-complete penetration of radio by the early 1950s, selection on media access is unlikely to bias estimates of radio exposure. While expanding television access could plausibly correlate with growing exposure to conservative broadcasting, Figure A3 shows that television ownership stabilized before Twentieth Century Reformation Hour gained widespread reach in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Importantly, the rise of television did not displace radio use: according to NBC’s Cumulative Radio Audience Method (CRAM) Study, 75.1% of adults listened to the radio daily and 90.5% weekly in 1965 (Broadcasting Publications, Inc., 1967). Thus, television’s emergence did not substantially diminish the audience for radio-based political programming. Later versions of *Broadcasting Yearbook* suggest radio ownership ownership remained similarly high after 1966, though changes in sampling complicate panel construction for later years.




FIGURE A2. NUMBER OF STATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH BROADCASTING *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour*, 1953 - 1973

Notes: This figure plots the number of active radio stations in the American South broadcasting *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* from 1953 to 1973. Station adoption increased rapidly during the early 1960s before steadily declining through the remainder of the decade.




FIGURE A3. STATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH BROADCASTING *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour*, 1953 - 1973

Notes: The map displays the geographic distribution of radio stations in the American South that aired *Twentieth Century Reformation Hour* between 1953 and 1973, marked by red dots at transmitter locations. The accompanying bar chart shows the total number of broadcasting stations by state. Texas and Florida hosted the largest number of stations, while Kentucky, West Virginia, and Maryland had the fewest.




FIGURE A4. CHANGE IN DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE, 1960–1972

Notes: Panel A shows the Democratic vote share by county in the 1960 Presidential election, which saw Democrat John F. Kennedy elected to office over Richard Nixon. Panel B shows the Democratic vote share by county in the 1972 Presidential election, which saw Republican Richard Nixon elected to office over the Democrat George McGovern. Data on vote shares are drawn from the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) 8611 dataset (Clubb et al., 2006).

TABLE A1. OLS REGRESSION: 1960 DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTIAL VOTE SHARE

	Coefficient	Std. Err.	t-stat
<i>Protestant Population (%)</i>	-0.1799	0.0321	-5.60
Constant	58.8324	1.1594	50.74
Observations			1,353
R-squared			0.0227
Adjusted R-squared			0.0220
Root MSE			15.728
F-statistic			31.38
<i>p</i> -value (F-test)			< 0.001

II. Background Summary Statistics

TABLE B1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR COUNTY-LEVEL SIGNAL STRENGTH, 1960

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
<i>Signal</i>	0	1	-7.336997	-0.592895	-0.054050	0.384620	2.034779
<i>SignalFree</i>	0	1	-1.344601	-0.717005	-0.231407	0.457363	6.740413

Notes: Table displays summary statistics for selected control variables used in the estimation of Equation (3). All values are at the congressional district level. Percent nonwhite refers to the percentage of the population that is nonwhite in 1960 (“United States Bureau of the Census: United States congressional district data books, 1961-1965”, 1984). Standard deviations are reported in the second column. Values are rounded to two decimal places or nearest whole unit as appropriate for readability.

TABLE B2. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR PRESIDENTIAL VOTE SHARES AND TURNOUT BY COUNTY

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
<i>Democrat Vote Share</i>							
1944	70.82	18.07	8.40	59.25	74.10	84.80	99.10
1948	54.47	21.49	1.50	42.35	56.20	70.90	96.50
1952	51.81	20.44	0.00	41.56	53.00	65.42	94.11
1956	48.86	20.74	0.00	36.88	48.91	62.80	96.07
1960	52.62	15.88	9.64	42.16	52.03	64.14	95.35
<i>Republican Vote Share</i>							
1944	26.64	19.14	0.00	11.40	22.50	39.60	91.60
1948	24.00	18.37	0.00	9.20	18.60	37.00	86.30
1952	40.39	19.93	0.00	28.24	42.50	54.59	92.96
1956	42.07	19.53	0.00	28.96	45.06	56.26	92.60
1960	42.92	16.04	4.64	30.85	43.69	54.32	90.35
<i>Turnout Percentage</i>							
1944	32.13	16.92	1.40	19.15	27.60	43.10	98.40
1948	33.42	15.70	1.70	21.25	29.10	43.80	81.60
1952	44.69	16.60	2.10	31.40	42.60	55.60	91.50
1956	43.52	16.83	1.80	31.10	40.40	54.00	95.50
1960	47.21	16.88	3.50	34.60	44.90	58.30	96.60

Notes: The data was compiled from Clubb et al. (2006).

TABLE B3. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR DEMOCRATIC VOTE SHARE IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
BY COUNTY

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
1944	61.50	21.38	0.00	49.80	61.40	75.90	97.90
1946	59.63	23.46	0.00	47.35	59.60	78.25	98.60
1948	64.07	22.24	0.00	52.65	63.90	81.95	98.60
1950	65.44	21.80	6.56	51.14	62.98	83.15	99.88
1952	62.82	22.12	13.67	46.96	59.74	81.45	99.79
1954	66.54	21.14	16.98	49.61	63.76	83.73	99.79
1956	61.34	22.98	0.00	47.58	58.93	77.86	99.79
1958	71.18	21.53	17.41	54.06	72.43	91.04	99.89
1960	60.27	23.94	0.00	48.40	59.55	75.24	99.83
1962	61.64	21.29	0.43	46.40	58.73	73.85	99.79

Notes: The data was compiled from Clubb et al. (2006).

TABLE B4. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR REPUBLICAN VOTE SHARE IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
BY COUNTY

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
1944	13.65	19.77	0.00	0.00	0.10	26.30	79.20
1946	14.16	20.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	27.25	84.90
1948	13.52	18.42	0.00	0.00	2.60	25.05	80.00
1950	11.67	18.91	0.00	0.00	0.00	19.03	79.12
1952	14.26	20.15	0.00	0.00	3.59	26.05	80.03
1954	12.40	19.09	0.00	0.00	0.57	20.64	76.61
1956	15.80	21.12	0.00	0.00	0.28	33.92	77.56
1958	8.59	16.99	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.69	77.75
1960	14.61	20.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	27.51	85.46
1962	20.78	21.35	0.00	0.00	17.95	38.25	72.40

Notes: The data was compiled from Clubb et al. (2006).

TABLE B5. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR VOTER TURNOUT IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS BY COUNTY

Year	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
1944	28.15	16.69	1.30	15.40	23.10	36.80	96.20
1946	16.45	15.44	0.70	6.00	10.20	21.00	91.30
1948	28.92	16.27	1.60	17.30	24.40	36.90	82.60
1950	20.09	17.22	0.00	8.40	13.10	25.60	86.30
1952	37.73	18.69	0.00	23.20	34.30	47.90	92.50
1954	22.47	15.86	1.40	11.50	16.60	27.40	89.00
1956	36.25	17.30	1.10	24.60	32.50	44.10	92.10
1958	20.28	16.18	0.60	8.50	15.20	26.50	95.70
1960	38.91	17.80	3.60	26.10	34.60	48.60	93.30
1962	27.83	16.57	0.00	14.80	24.80	36.60	92.70

Notes: The data was compiled from Clubb et al. (2006).

TABLE B6. DISTRIBUTION OF VOTES ON TRADE EXPANSION ACT
BY PARTY AND BY STATE

Panel A: By Party				
	Yea	Nay	Present	No Vote
Democrat	70	24	11	7
Republican	6	2	0	2
Panel B: By State				
State	Yea	Nay	Present	No Vote
Alabama	6	1	1	1
Arkansas	6	0	0	0
Florida	5	2	0	1
Georgia	7	1	2	0
Kentucky	5	0	1	2
Louisiana	3	2	1	2
Maryland	7	0	0	0
Mississippi	1	4	0	1
North Carolina	1	0	0	0
Oklahoma	3	2	0	1
South Carolina	2	4	0	0
Tennessee	7	0	1	1
Texas	13	7	2	0
Virginia	7	2	1	0
West Virginia	3	1	2	0

Notes: Panel A reports the number of each vote type by party affiliation. Panel B reports the same breakdown by state. The vote outcomes include “Yea,” “Nay,” “Present,” and “No Vote.” These refer to votes on the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. The data was compiled from “H.R. 11970. TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962. ADOPTION OF THE CONFERENCE REPORT.” (1962).

TABLE B7. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR KEY DISTRICT-LEVEL COVARIATES, 1962

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
<i>Percent Nonwhite</i>	11.73	14.28	0.10	2.10	5.40	16.18	92.10
<i>Number of Households</i>	121,426	40,069	50,545	94,654	114,423	138,623	322,069
<i>Female Population</i>	208,723	69,940	85,965	160,668	195,234	237,682	502,105
<i>Vacant Units</i>	4,532	3,124	992	2,759	3,609	5,253	26,797

Notes: Table displays summary statistics for selected control variables used in the estimation of Equation (3). All values are at the congressional district level. Percent nonwhite refers to the percentage of the population that is nonwhite in 1960, and data is “United States Bureau of the Census: United States congressional district data books, 1961-1965” (1984). Standard deviations are reported in the second column. Values are rounded to two decimal places or nearest whole unit as appropriate for readability.

TABLE B8. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR KEY DISTRICT-LEVEL SIGNAL STRENGTH, 1962

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
<i>Signal</i>	0	1	-0.592895	-0.054050	0.384620	2.034779	
<i>SignalFree</i>	0	1	-1.344601	-0.717005	-0.231407	0.457363	6.740413

Notes: Table displays summary statistics for selected control variables used in the estimation of Equation (3). All values are at the congressional district level. Percent nonwhite refers to the percentage of the population that is nonwhite in 1960 (“United States Bureau of the Census: United States congressional district data books, 1961-1965”, 1984). Standard deviations are reported in the second column.

TABLE B9. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR COUNTY CONTROLS, 1960

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	25th %	Median	75th %	Max
<i>prop_65_plus</i>	0.098	0.032	0.010	0.076	0.094	0.116	0.249
<i>prop_male</i>	0.496	0.018	0.412	0.488	0.494	0.501	0.780
<i>prop_white</i>	0.796	0.194	0.165	0.665	0.856	0.962	1.000
<i>pct_rural_nonfarm</i>	48.350	22.511	0.000	32.300	47.800	65.600	99.300
<i>pct_moved_after_1958</i>	25.829	6.601	11.000	21.400	24.900	29.100	71.000

Notes: Table reports summary statistics for selected demographic controls at the county level in 1960.