Gendering Differences in Party Preferences: Gender Ideologies and the Radical Right
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Abstract: This paper demonstrates that gender ideologies are an important predictor of preferences for radical TAN parties, and the differences in gender attitudes help explain the gender gap. Previous work on the gender gap has shown that men and women hold different attitudes, personality traits, and socio-economic positions that reflect differences in voting patterns (Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2016, Harteveld et al. 2015) I argue that a previously unconsidered determinant of party preferences is gender ideologies, which are individuals' beliefs in gendered and separate spheres for men and women. Using Swiss Household Panel from 2000-2014, I show that gender ideologies help explain the gender gap in all waves of the survey. Furthermore, I demonstrate the effect of gender ideologies varies over time. Finally, this article shows how the relationship between gender and immigration issues may be changing and is perhaps the result of tactical shifts by these parties towards using an immigration frame to discuss gender issues.

INTRODUCTION

Scholarship on the radical right has long identified a gender gap in support for these parties. This gender gap persists over time and across all countries with radical right parties, though there is variation in the size of this gap. Understanding the reasons for this gap has been the subject of considerable inquiry, and the literature has come to several conclusions with mixed evidence. First, the attitudinal model suggests the gender gap is the result of attitudinal differences among men and women on key issues like immigration and the European Union. However, in many cases there is not a discernible difference in attitudes on many of these issues.[1] Furthermore, socio-structural differences between men and women have also been shown to predict the gender gap. Men and women occupy different positions in the class structure. Men are far more likely to belong a class of production workers that have become source of the proletaritization of these parties. Women are much more likely to be located in the public sector, insulating them from the perception of competition for work. The psychological models argue, among other things, that men and women experience different childhood socializations that leads them to have different levels of empathy, authoritarian personality traits, and adherence to social norms (Coffe 2018, Harteveld and Ivarsflaten 2016, Immerzeel et al 2015, Iversen and Blinder 2010, Spierings and Zaslove 2015). Men in particular are potentially greater affected by the status loss of the post-materialist revolution (Gidengil et al. 2005, Immerzeel et al 2015).

This paper, like several others, attempts to unpack gender differences and how they are (potentially differentially) important for politics. In particular, I follow on Harteveld et al.'s (2015) work that unpacks how gender is politically relevant for support for radical TAN parties. They argue mediation (women and men have different attitudes and experience gender socialization differently) and moderation (women and men vote for different reasons) are both important determinants of the gender gap in voting patterns. I examine gender role ideologies because they are a clear source of attitudinal differences between men and women that are likely to influence issue positions and vote choices. Gender role ideologies are individuals beliefs in separate and gendered spheres for men and women (Davis and Greenstein 2009). They therefore are deeper-seated than political attitudes, as they in part reflect the ways in which individuals were socialized and perform gender in their daily interactions.

I first show that gender attitudes remain important for predicting attitudes towards radical right parties across time and for both men and women. I also examine the effect gender ideologies have on patterns of radical right voting from 2000-2014. I find that differences in the predictive power of gender ideologies among men and women emerge with time. Consensus on gender egalitarianism means parties are no longer able to compete directly on gender issues but subsume it within an immigration frame. Therefore, I examine the link between gender attitudes and attitudes on immigration, and find that that in more recent years, immigration

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[1] Arzheimer and Carter 2009, Betz 1994, Coffe 2012, Givens 2005, Harteveld et al 2015, Lubbers et al. 2002, Norris 2005, Rydgren 2012, Spierings and Zaslove 2015b

issues have become linked with gender issues in a gendered manner that points at recent work finding that the views of radical right voters are more heterogeneous than previously thought.[2]

The gender gap in support for European radical right parties is well documented, and the Switzerland is no exception. Figure 1 shows calculations based on the Swiss Household Panel data from 1999-2014, which demonstrates a substantively significant and persistent gender gap in support for the party.


Figure 1: Gender Gap in Support for Radical TAN in Switzerland

Radical TAN parties are known to vacillate on non-core issues.[3] And while they (especially in recent years) have an almost singular focus on immigration, gender remains a defining feature of these parties (Akkermann 2015). They employ 'masculine' rhetoric and historically have had male leadership and representatives (Mudde 2007). This is reflected in their positions and statements on gender; radical TAN parties have historically expressed traditionalist views on gender and morality. DeLange and Muegge (2015) argue parties with a neoliberal profile tend to take more 'modern' stances, while nationalist parties take neo-traditional or mixed modern and traditional stances on gender. The Swiss SVP comprises nearly all of the votes for radical TAN parties in the Swiss data, which has held more moderate stances on gender issues because of its neoliberal profile. However, in 2003 it campaigned against a proposal to extend public daycare provisions.

Given radical right parties' positioning on family and gender policies and considerable attention has been paid to discussing what it is *about* gender that might explain the gender gap in radical right voting, it seems natural to turn to gender attitudes. Spierings and Zaslove (2015) use data that contains a question about gender equality in the labor market from the ESS, but

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[2] Lancaster (this conference), Spierings and Zaslove 2017
[3] Rovny 2013

this perhaps is a weak proxy for gender role ideologies. Other work has used LGBT attitudes, which are related to gender attitudes. I use two variables measuring different dimensions of gender ideologies that provide more valid measurement. Furthermore, gender role ideologies fundamentally differ from political attitudes in that they are deeper-seated and more durable. Given the long history of radical right parties' promotion of relatively traditional positions on family and gender issues, they should be less likely to attract individuals with very progressive attitudes on gender issues, all else equal. This becomes my first hypothesis:

H1: Gender egalitarian attitudes will be associated with a decreased likelihood of preferring the radical right.

While trends over time point towards the diffusion of egalitarian attitudes, there is still a persistent gender gap, with women holding more progressive attitudes. These differences in gender attitudes may have differential importance for vote preference. Men's position in society is not directly affected by appeals by the radical right for traditional families, but reinforced. Very traditional men may therefore be attracted to the radical right, especially if gendered social policies have made advances and led to norm changes.[4] Furthermore, gender attitudes may become activated by campaigns. Valentino et al. (2018) in new work suggest a combination of anger and sexist attitudes contributed to the victory of Donald Trump in 2016, and that this effect was particularly important for white men. These traditional men are likely also those holding fears about status loss that has come with the decline of traditional values and employment.

The direction of this relationship is potentially complex for women. Women are more likely to hold beliefs in gender egalitarianism. Those very progressive beliefs, such as identification with feminism, have previously been shown to explain the gender gap in attitudes (Conover 1988). Furthermore, gender politics directly affects women's lives, expectations about their roles, and their ability to form independent households. Therefore, more egalitarian women are more likely to reject these parties. Gender traditional women may be more attracted to these parties because they resist sexually modern values. However, these women are likely religious and constituents of center-right parties (Shorrocks 2018, Norris and Inglehart 2000). Finally, the diffusion of more gender egalitarian attitudes and development of policies supporting gender equality may have a counter-reaction. Women may perceive that the gender equality movement has made enough advances, and so gender issues may be less politically relevant.

It is theoretically unclear, therefore, if gender attitudes should have a stronger effect for men or women. It is possible that different levels of gender attitudes may have differential effects. I argue that there is likely to be a gap in the effect of gender ideologies, but I make no predictions as to whether or not the effect will be greater or smaller for men and women.

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[4] Iversen and Rosenbluth 2010

H2: Gender egalitarian attitudes will have differential predictive power for women and men.

Compared to many countries, Switzerland might be expected to have relatively more conservative gender attitudes. Switzerland belongs to the continental European welfare regime in which male breadwinning households and traditional norms are more prevalent. Furthermore, Switzerland is unique in that women were granted suffrage only in 1970. However, there is also significant change in gender attitudes in Switzerland over the two decades since the Swiss Household Panel began in 1999. I construct a measure of gender attitudes using two questions in the survey and use a second question as a separate measure.[5] These questions likely tap into different dimensions of gender ideologies. The first deals with the promotion of women and the belief that women face difficulties (in general) as compared to men, with higher values corresponding to more progressive positions. This is likely a contextually-dependent political attitude about feminism and the role of the state in reducing inequalities between men and women. The second question about children and working mothers taps into a specific dimension of gender ideologies that deals with a belief in separate spheres and primacy of male breadwinning. For this question lower values indicate more egalitarian positions. Figures 2 and 3 shows the differences between genders and over time.

There is still a substantial gender gap in gender role ideologies on both questions. Men express less egalitarian attitudes over all waves, with little sign that the overall gender gap is narrowing. There are surprising differences in the data; the question asking if a child suffers when the mother works shows a clear downward trend, meaning attitudes as a whole have trended towards more progressive stances. On the other hand, the constructed gender scale shows a gender gap, variation over time, but no clear trends. Attitudes on these questions are no more progressive in 2014 than they were in 2000. There is an interesting dip in the data that may be the result of the financial crisis, which may be politically important.


Figures 2 and 3: Gender Attitudes (both indicators) over time

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[5] "Do you think women are in general penalized compared to men?" and "Do you think measures should be taken to promote women?" Both are on 1-10 scales, with higher values corresponding to more progressive attitudes. The alpha in each wave for the measures is between 0.66 and 0.74. Including the child question in the same scale yields an alpha of around 0.15. The child question is only asked beginning in 2002.

Transformations of the post-industrial age have meant that gender norms and ideologies have changed. Because gender attitudes are thought to be relatively stable over an individuals' lifespan, generational replacement is a likely explanation for changing gender attitudes. Figures 4 and 5 plot the two gender attitudes questions by birth cohort. Figure 4 shows means by birth decade on the question "Does a child suffer if the mother works?" Older women are more religious and therefore also hold more traditional beliefs, but this clearly changes rapidly over time. Older men are also more traditional, but the change across birth cohorts is less dramatic than for women.

Figure 5, on the other hand, is the mean response to two questions about gender equality. Here, responses show surprising differences across birth cohorts. Women in mid-range birth cohorts have significantly different attitudes and do believe women face challenges (in general, compared to men) and that measures should be taken to promote equality. Much older and much younger men and women are less likely to think women are penalized and that affirmative action policies are necessary, but likely for different reasons. Older individuals were socialized before gender issues became politically relevant and feminist movements made advances. For younger birth cohorts progress made towards gender equality may mean that gender is depoliticized, lowering the perception that women face difficulties compared to men. It could also reflect recent findings suggesting there is a widespread belief among some parties and the public that gender equality is something that has already been achieved.[6]

Figures 4 and 5: Gender Attitudes by birth cohort (L – Child Question, R – Gender scale)

Under conditions of consensus on gender issues, politicians may less able to effectively campaign on issues of gender and family. These changes likely mean that all politicians, but especially those that advocate traditional messages about families, must alter their messages in order to not alienate voters. Akkerman (2015) argues that the salience of gender for radical TAN parties may wane with time. And radical TAN parties have changed; many no longer

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[6] Tuori 2007

advocate for traditional roles, even if morality remains important.[7] They differentiate themselves still by resisting the left's positions on equality and gender mainstreaming (examining all policies and processes through the lens of gender in search of equality).[8]

Changing gender attitudes (and beliefs that equality has been achieved) and the salience of immigration has prompted new frames for gender and social issues. Many parties have sought a 'defense of the Enlightenment' position, which has sought to highlight the difference between 'European' and 'Muslim' values and gender norms.[9] In relatively more progressive countries like the Netherlands, radical right parties have a history of discussing gay and lesbian rights (and the threat immigration presents to them) beginning with Pim Fortyn's party, though this has also been picked up by the PVV under Wilders.[10] The German AfD, to cite another example, rejects gender 'mainstreaming' and single parent families. At the same time, it has also capitalized on events such as the sexual assaults on New Years Eve in Cologne to argue it is a defender of liberal values against the supposed conservatism of Islam.

Spierings et al. (2017) find that approximately 2-3 percent of the Swiss electorate hold so-called 'liberal nativist' attitudes. This means these individuals hold combinations of liberal attitudes towards LGBT rights but restrictive attitudes on immigration. These individuals are more likely to support the radical TAN party family. I seek to confirm this using gender attitudes and also ask if this is subject to gender differences.

H3: The effect of gender attitudes will be mediated by attitudes towards immigration.

DATA AND METHODS

The SHP was selected in part because it contains (with some irregularities in question availability) three primary questions that tap into gender attitudes. Each wave from 1999-2014 contains anywhere from four to ten thousand respondents. Individuals who did not answer the full questionnaire and only responded to the 'grid' survey are removed from the sample because they do not answer any political questions. I also remove children in the household (over ninety percent under 18) and individuals without Swiss nationality. Missingness, especially on political attitudes or the dependent variable, vote choice, is a significant problem.[11]

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[7] Erzeel and Rashkova (2017)

[8] Mayer (2015) documents the shifting position of the FN under Marine Le Penn on gender and sexuality politics and the potential for the closing of the gender gap among voters of the FN.

[9] Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) argue this is a defining feature of the conflict over values between immigrants and Europeans. Fekete (2006) argues this discussion over supposedly 'backwards' and 'modern' values also treats both cultures as monoliths, when segments of European societies remain conservative on some social questions.

[10] Akkerman 2005

[11] Missingness on vote choice is significant (respondents who answered they would 'vote for a candidate, not a party' are coded as missing). Missingness on key independent variables (political attitudes and gender attitudes) ranges from 6-10 % in the combined sample. Multiple imputation was used to fill in missing values; this does not substantively change the results.

I use two of them to construct a scale (alpha between .65 and .69 across all waves) of gender attitudes.[12] A third question in the survey asks, "Do you think a child suffers if the mother works when the child is young," but the inclusion of this question in the scale makes the alpha plummet to 0.15. I therefore use it as a separate validating measure.

My dependent variable is vote choice. I recode vote choice into party family blocks, radical right, center-right, and center-left, and don't know/abstain.[13]

One of the hypothesized explanations for the gender gap and for radical right voting are gender differences in political attitudes.[14] The SHP also contains questions about attitudes towards the EU, Swiss military, and immigration, all of which have been shown to be important in attitudinal models of radical right voting.[15] Finally, I include a measure for political interest, which should help control for the relatively large number of respondents who answered they did not know or abstained from voting.

Other work has highlighted the specific socio-structural bases of radical right voters.[16] Older and more religious voters are less likely to vote for the SVP, and I include these measures in my models. Socio-structural models of voting have used Oesch's (2006, 2013) measure of post-industrial class structure, and so I apply his code to the SHP data to obtain an 8-class measure that I include in each model as indicator variables. Because I am particularly interested in preferences and the relationship between gender attitudes, economic positions, and voting, I include a dummy variable of whether or not the respondent is in the work force. These are overwhelmingly women. I also include whether or not individuals are in public or private sector work, as public sector workers are less likely to support the radical right. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of each of the independent and dependent variables.

	Count	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Age	72417	50.57478	15.13192	18	99
Years of Education	72418	13.44303	2.969745	0	21
Sex	72420	0.5667357	0.4955298	0	1
Partner	72357	0.7499482	0.4330456	0	1
Employment Sector	68924	1.171232	1.303507	0	3
Oesch Classification	71337	5.978819	2.721893	1	9
Income (Deciles)	66374	5.525266	2.899008	1	10
Immigration (Pos-Neg)	66007	1.660218	0.9005091	1	3

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[12] The questions are "Do you think women are in general penalized compared to men?" and "Do you think measures should be taken to promote women?" Both are on 1-10 scales.

[13] The parties were coded into these blocks according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey categorization of party families. Liberals were collapsed into the Center-Right and Greens into the Center-Left for modelling simplicity.

[14] Harteveld et al. 2015, Immerzeel et al. 2015

[15] These questions on EU, immigration, military, and social spending come with three response categories. The immigration question asks, "Do you favor better chances for immigrants, neither, or Swiss citizens?"

[16] In particular Rydgren (2012) but also Harteveld (this conference)

EU (Pos-Neg)	64340	2.111797	0.9681578	1	3
Social Expenditures (dec-inc)	64672	2.21057	0.756436	1	3
Military (dec-inc)*	60462	1.953276	0.8345055	1	3
Interest in Politics	72334	5.682169	2.761866	0	10
Religious Attendance**	55864	4.104128	2.16526	1	9
Vote Choice Family	51546	2.560819	0.9460552	1	4
Gender Attitudes Scale	67904	5.573729	2.507787	0	10
Gender Attitudes (Child Suffers)***	55307	5.706637	3.258084	0	10
* Not available in 2009					
** Not available in 2011, 2014					
*** Not available in 2000, 2001					

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

I estimate my models using multinomial logistic regressions with the four categories of the dependent variable. I begin by estimating models for each wave of the survey. I apply cross-sectional survey weights stratified by the seven regions of Switzerland, following procedures laid out in the SHP documentation. The sample sizes range from 3,500 to 10,000 because of attrition from the panel with two additional recruitment samples. I have additionally pooled the waves of the data into one dataset that allows me to examine trends over time. Pooling the data is potentially problematic because while each wave is a representative cross-section, individuals show up in each wave. After pooling, I have re-estimated survey weights using each wave's cross-sectional weight. I also estimated models using fixed effects for years.

RESULTS

I begin by estimating models of radical right voting as they typically are done. I first include all of the socio-structural characteristics like age, gender, partner status, occupation, and sector of employment. The results are shown in model 1. As is expected, gender (1 coded for women) is negatively associated with a preference for radical right parties. Furthermore, the other covariates like public sector work, age, and occupation in professions like socio-cultural professionals are negatively associated with the radical right. Model 2 includes other previously known attitudinal measures that are associated with preferences for the radical right, including a desire to restrict immigration (higher values are more restrictive responses) and a desire to stay out of the European Union. It is associated with a desire to decrease spending on social programs, reflecting perhaps the SVP's historical neoliberal position.

Model 3 includes my first measure of gender attitudes, a scale constructed from two questions. This variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant, signaling some association between gender egalitarian attitudes and a rejection of radical right parties. Model 4 includes an alternate variable for gender attitudes that asks if respondents think the child will suffer if the mother works when the child is young. This variable is positively signed and statistically significant, meaning that individuals who think children suffer when mothers work

are more likely to prefer the radical right. In both cases, the gender variable became statistically insignificant, suggesting gender attitudes explain a good portion of the gender gap.[17]

The effect of gender attitudes on voting for the radical right is both substantively and statistically significant across all waves of the survey. Because the results from logistic regressions are not immediately interpretable, I plot the marginal effects of gender attitudes. They are shown in Figures 4 and 5. Greater gender traditionalism is associated with much higher propensity to prefer the radical right, while on average gender egalitarian attitudes are associated with rejection of these parties.

Figures 6 and 7: Marginal Effects of Gender Attitudes on Vote Preference in 2014

I now turn to the proposition that gender ideologies may have different predictive power for radical right party preference for men and women. I first examine this potential in each wave of the survey by interacting each of the gender ideology variables with the gender variable and then moving to a pooled analysis for simplicity. The interaction term (or the marginal effects plots) show no difference in effect between men and women in each of the years leading up to the mid-2000s.[18] After 2005, in each wave the interaction term becomes statistically significant (though the effect size does not change).[19] Figure 8 visualizes the interaction term. This shows that gender ideologies are, perhaps surprisingly, better predictors of radical right voting for men rather than women. Lower values indicate more egalitarian positions, and these individuals are less likely to prefer the radical right. Among egalitarian individuals, there is no difference in the effect between men and women. However, there is a growing difference in the effect between men and women as one moves towards more

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[17] The gender dummy variable is statistically insignificant when the models are estimated separately for each year. When the analysis is pooled, the gender variable returns to statistical significance, presumably in part because of the greater statistical power of the combined sample.

[18] I ran all models separately for each year before pooling them for simplicity.

[19] However, interactions between gender and the constructed gender scale show the opposite relationship over time; the interaction terms in models before 2005 is statistically significant, whereas the interaction after 2005 is not. The figures are shown in the appendix.

traditional positions. Traditional views on family are much stronger predictors of radical right voting for men, while traditional views on gender issues were less associated with a preference for the radical right among women.


Figure 8: Interactions between gender ideology and gender

The difference in statistical significance across time potentially reflects the changes within the SVP that Akkerman (2015) documents. In the early 2000s the leadership actively sought to recruit new voters and tacked to the hard right. Therefore, more traditional men became more attracted to the party in more recent years. The difference between men and women is intriguing because one might think that gender ideologies, in particular egalitarian ideologies would strongly turn women away from the party. This did not seem to be the case; gender ideologies for women do not seem to have (as strong an) association between party preference as compared to men.

Finally, I explore the possibility that the relationship between gender ideologies, immigration issues and vote choice differ for men and women. This hypothesis reflects other work suggesting combinations of egalitarian attitudes on gender issues but conservative immigration attitudes are associated with a preference for the radical right. This may be the case because of the increased use of the immigration frame by radical right parties when discussing gender issues. But it also reflects the consensus forming in European societies around greater gender egalitarianism, pushing direct conflict over gender issues off the political table. What is theoretically unclear is why this relationship should be different for men and women. I have shown that where a gender gap has existed, gender issues (holding immigration views constant) have been more important for men than women. Men and women do not have

significantly different views on immigration.[20] But it is possible then that the immigration issue is bound up with gender politics for women to a greater degree than for men.[21]

This interaction is statistically significant in the pooled analysis with the gender ideology question on children. The following figures from the final wave of the survey visualize the relationship between gender attitudes (scale of two questions) and attitudes on immigration. I use three levels of immigration attitudes from the survey (using the first as a baseline that is not shown). For men, gender attitudes are seemingly unrelated to their immigration attitudes insofar as it explains men's propensity to vote for the radical right. Gender traditional men who hold restrictive views on immigration are not more or less likely to prefer the radical right than their progressive counterparts. The same is true for those holding moderate views on immigration. However, for women the results are slightly different. While women who are relatively more gender traditional and hold restrictive views on immigration are not statistically more likely to vote for the radical right, those who hold increasingly progressive views on gender issues are, in fact, more likely to prefer the radical right. The opposite holds true for those with more moderate immigration views. While traditional women are less likely to prefer the radical right, the confidence intervals for those with more progressive gender attitudes crosses zero, suggesting they are not more or less likely to support the SVP.

Figures 9 and 10: Interactions between gender and immigration attitudes, 2014[22]

Women are likely to hold more gender egalitarian attitudes than men, but coupled with restrictive attitudes on immigration, they become likely voters of the radical right. This demonstrates first and foremost the power of immigration attitudes and the salience of the immigration issue for those who support radical right parties. Second, this may reflect the ways in which parties have shifted on questions of gender. Whereas in the past radical right parties

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[20] Norris 2005, Harteveld et al 2015, Spierings and Zaslove 2015b
[21] Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007) suggest that gender issues are the point of greatest conflict over differences between immigrant and native cultures. This conflict almost always revolves around women's position in society.
[22] These results are substantively the same for both gender attitude questions. The results above are from the gender scale question.

have held traditional or 'modern-traditional' views on gender issues,[23] parties have attempted to address gender issues by shifting their rhetoric on social questions in order to attract more votes.[24] These results are preliminary evidence that such a shift in rhetoric has worked – even very gender progressive women may vote for the radical right if they hold restrictive views on immigration. The immigration framing of gender issues may be a successful strategy for these parties.

Voters in the sample holding 'liberal nativists' attitudes in are nearly two-thirds women and three-quarters of them are married, and slightly younger than the full sample. Furthermore, women with these beliefs are less likely to be in the workforce than women overall; roughly forty percent are not in the workforce. Where they do work, they are in relatively lower skilled occupations (based on Oesch's classification) working as clerks or in the service sector. This leaves several open questions about the relationship between gender attitudes, households, and political behavior. It is possible, for example, that certain events have increased the salience of immigration for them. An area for further investigation could also be the interpersonal influence; these results suggest that Becker's family model – in which male preferences become those of the entire family – could apply.

DISCUSSION and CONCLUSION


Figure 11: Gender Gap in Support for Radical TAN by Cohort

As a modern gender gap was emerging, Inghelart and Norris (2000) argued the gender gap was developmental. As more women entered the workforce and became economically active and independent, they predicted that the gender gap would grow. Women became more

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[23] Akkerman 2015, deLange and Muegge 2015
[24] Mayer 2015

likely to support left wing parties, while men were increasingly likely to support parties of the right. However, aggregate differences can be misleading; Shorrocks (2018) finds that aggregate gaps actually underestimate the gender gap because it has expanded in younger cohorts.

My findings, as well as those of others examining the potential closing of the gender gap in radical right voting have interesting, but potentially contradictory implications. Gender attitudes have altered significantly since the early 2000s, as documented in this survey. However, while older cohorts of women became more progressive at an increasing rate for several decades, this seems to have slowed (or even partially reversed) in recent cohorts (Figure 4). Figure 5 shows the gender scale by cohort, suggesting that younger cohorts perceive little discrimination and do not think policies should promote women's advancement. The question is how this maps onto Figure 11, which shows the gender gap in support for radical TAN parties by birth cohort. This figure shows an expanding divide in older cohorts that has begun to shrink in the youngest ones.

There are several potential explanations. Increasingly progressive attitudes on the child question, coupled with a decreasing perception among younger cohorts that discrimination exists could suggest that the sharpness of political conflict over gender issues is decreasing. This, however, seems to contradict work suggesting gender has been a point of conflict over immigration. It could also suggest that men and women think equality has been 'achieved.' This could particularly be the case in Switzerland where women were granted the vote in the 1970s. The lack of political conflict on gender politics would mean that parties are no longer able to compete on this issue, and therefore cease to be a predictive measure of preference for the radical right. This turned out to definitively not be the case. A comparison of marginal effects plots over all waves shows that there is almost no change in the predictive power of gender ideologies on voting over the range of both variables. The interaction term using both measures of gender ideologies was positive, suggesting that gender ideologies become *more* important over time.

Perhaps more cynically, it may also reflect people who think feminism has gone too far. This would suggest that those who perceive conflict over gender is over are potential constituents of the radical right, especially among men. Yet, the 'liberal nativists' seem to be women who believe women are relatively more penalized or those who believe a child does not suffer if a mother works. This makes sense, given parties' rhetoric on gender within an immigration frame. This may be also a more likely support base of the radical right given that most of these women are married and not in the workforce and perhaps obtain some of their conservative attitudes on immigration from their partners. In either case, it points to the potential heterogeneity of support for these parties.

At the same time, it seems unlikely that the most gender progressive individuals would also hold conservative attitudes on immigration. It is possible, for example, that individuals could respond that women are not penalized or do not need affirmative action policies because they genuinely believe gender equality has been achieved. It is equally possible that individuals who score low on this scale are also those with anti-feminist attitudes; they may believe

feminism has gone too far. These people are potential constituents of the radical right, who also reject gender mainstreaming and feminist political movements. These attitudes may vary by cohort because gender issues have held differential importance for women of different generations. A cohort analysis of the effect of gender attitudes could demonstrate the changing relationship between cohorts, gender attitudes and preferences for radical TAN parties.

This paper so far has suggested that previous work addressing the gender gap in radical right voting has neglected to address the potential for gender differences in gender ideologies and the ways in which they are important predictors of vote preference. I have shown that these have different importance for men and women. Gender ideologies differ from political attitudes on issues like LGBT rights and feminism in that it is a deeper-seated ideology that is a reflection of how individuals see themselves and participate in society. Of course, gender ideologies may simply have predictive power but no real bite. One possible explanation for these findings is that the salience of immigration in recent years has carried outsized weight when it comes to the ballot box. Gender attitudes may simply be background considerations that have little effect on vote choice.

APPENDIX

VARIABLES	Socio-Struc	Attitudes	Child Suffers	Gender Scale
Child Question			0.0963***	
			(0.0100)	
Gender Scale				-0.153***
				(0.0102)
Gender	-0.402***	-0.317***	-0.197***	-0.252***
	(0.0423)	(0.0576)	(0.0677)	(0.0582)
Age	0.00513***	-0.00145	-0.00245	-0.000945
	(0.00157)	(0.00210)	(0.00244)	(0.00212)
partner	0.0381	0.117**	0.126*	0.134**
	(0.0439)	(0.0573)	(0.0653)	(0.0576)
Education (Yrs)	-0.139***	-0.0816***	-0.0610***	-0.0786***
	(0.00741)	(0.0102)	(0.0118)	(0.0103)
Religiosity	0.0784***	0.0321***	0.0242*	0.0244**
	(0.00889)	(0.0117)	(0.0135)	(0.0118)
Small Business	0.479***	0.198*	0.126	0.222*
	(0.0913)	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.119)
Associate Managers	0.159*	-0.00823	-0.0537	0.0344
	(0.0905)	(0.114)	(0.129)	(0.115)
Office Clerks	-0.0876	-0.139	-0.190	-0.0835
	(0.106)	(0.133)	(0.150)	(0.134)
Technical Prof	-0.454***	-0.412***	-0.559***	-0.376***
	(0.106)	(0.132)	(0.152)	(0.133)
Production	0.0994	-0.0303	-0.0746	0.00795
	(0.0987)	(0.127)	(0.143)	(0.128)
Socio-Cultural Prof	-1.350***	-0.869***	-0.911***	-0.825***
	(0.116)	(0.141)	(0.158)	(0.142)
Service	0.00137	-0.211	-0.243	-0.165
	(0.109)	(0.147)	(0.167)	(0.148)
Not in WF	-0.117	-0.252**	-0.361***	-0.259**
	(0.0855)	(0.108)	(0.123)	(0.110)
Public/Private	-0.288***	-0.329***	-0.294***	-0.322***
	(0.0596)	(0.0767)	(0.0872)	(0.0769)
Political Interest		-0.0305**	-0.0288**	-0.0307**
		(0.0119)	(0.0140)	(0.0120)
EU		1.077***	0.998***	1.034***
		(0.0325)	(0.0374)	(0.0327)
Immigration		0.603***	0.599***	0.587***
		(0.0290)	(0.0335)	(0.0292)
Military		-1.070***	-1.040***	-1.048***
		(0.0359)	(0.0406)	(0.0362)
Social Expenditure		-0.922***	-0.913***	-0.838***
		(0.0358)	(0.0403)	(0.0363)
Year Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	0.610***	1.504***	0.549	2.122***
	(0.169)	(0.283)	(0.344)	(0.286)
Observations	36,517	28,844	22,217	28,790

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1: Base Model

VARIABLES	Pre-2005	Post-2005	Pre-2005	Post-2005
		Vote Preference for Radical TAN		
Gender Scale	-0.136***	-0.129***		
	(0.0171)	(0.0198)		
Gender * Gender Scale	-0.0481**	-0.0168		
	(0.0241)	(0.0284)		
Child Suffers			0.0979***	0.143***
			(0.0188)	(0.0167)
Gender * Child Suffers			-0.0225	-0.0511**
			(0.0249)	(0.0228)
Gender	0.0618	-0.194	-0.0195	0.114
	(0.144)	(0.166)	(0.188)	(0.154)
Political Interest	-0.00788	-0.0760***	-0.00708	-0.0589***
	(0.0145)	(0.0147)	(0.0185)	(0.0148)
EU	1.100***	0.907***	1.064***	0.918***
	(0.0387)	(0.0533)	(0.0477)	(0.0534)
Immigration	0.554***	0.656***	0.588***	0.630***
	(0.0355)	(0.0363)	(0.0437)	(0.0368)
Military	-1.056***	-1.115***	-1.052***	-1.113***
	(0.0450)	(0.0455)	(0.0546)	(0.0456)
Social Expenditures	-0.839***	-0.853***	-0.916***	-0.920***
	(0.0455)	(0.0460)	(0.0541)	(0.0457)
Age	-0.00173	-0.00192	-0.00278	-0.00431
	(0.00253)	(0.00297)	(0.00313)	(0.00299)
Partner	0.0628	0.103	0.0462	0.0731
	(0.0708)	(0.0731)	(0.0863)	(0.0730)
Education (Yrs)	-0.0777***	-0.0883***	-0.0590***	-0.0711***
	(0.0127)	(0.0130)	(0.0160)	(0.0133)
Religiosity	0.0325**		0.0440**	
	(0.0143)		(0.0176)	
Public/Private Sector	-0.430***	-0.232**	-0.412***	-0.217**
	(0.0950)	(0.0944)	(0.118)	(0.0953)
Oesch Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Year Dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓
Constant	1.896***	2.547***	0.342	0.950**
	(0.347)	(0.416)	(0.464)	(0.428)
Observations	18,485	18,574	12,079	18,301

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 2: Time Interactions. Models were run separately for each year and later pooled for simplicity.

VARIABLES	Women	Men
	Vote Preference for Radical TAN	
Gender Scale	-0.377***	-0.0994
	(0.122)	(0.0975)
Immigration	0.187	0.662**
	(0.276)	(0.263)
Gender Scale * Immigration	0.108**	-0.0266
	(0.0522)	(0.0470)
Religiosity	0.181	-0.178
	(0.177)	(0.178)
Partner	0.132	0.0209
	(0.278)	(0.274)
Public/Private	-0.783**	-0.224
	(0.318)	(0.276)
Age	-0.0107	-0.000888
	(0.0109)	(0.00902)
EU	0.955***	1.485***
	(0.270)	(0.291)
Military	-1.101***	-1.194***
	(0.147)	(0.153)
Social Expenditure	-0.924***	-0.860***
	(0.152)	(0.150)
Education (Years)	-0.0954*	-0.125***
	(0.0503)	(0.0389)
Household Income	0.00331	0.0123
	(0.0445)	(0.0468)
Political Interest	-0.0697*	-0.103**
	(0.0418)	(0.0459)
Oesch Dummies	✓	✓
Constant	3.495**	0.490
	(1.474)	(1.447)
Observations	2,924	3,052
Standard errors in parentheses		
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Table 3: Gender Scale - Immigration Interactions (2014)

VARIABLES	Women Rad_TAN	Men Rad_TAN
Child Suffers	0.165***	0.130***
	(0.0285)	(0.0275)
Immigration	0.898***	0.600***
	(0.0846)	(0.0999)
Child Suffers*Immigration	-0.0439***	-0.00122
	(0.0128)	(0.0136)
Political Interest	-0.0323**	-0.0459***
	(0.0156)	(0.0170)
EU	0.986***	0.971***
	(0.0531)	(0.0487)
Military	-1.057***	-1.103***
	(0.0499)	(0.0491)
Social Expenditures	-0.870***	-0.931***
	(0.0491)	(0.0497)
Age	-0.00187	-0.00332
	(0.00309)	(0.00337)
Partner	0.281***	-0.144*
	(0.0795)	(0.0852)
Education (Years)	-0.0957***	-0.0389***
	(0.0177)	(0.0132)
Religious Attendance	0.0495***	-0.0125
	(0.0164)	(0.0162)
Public/Private Sector	-0.511***	-0.142
	(0.108)	(0.101)
Constant	-0.0217	0.639
	(0.524)	(0.459)
Oesch Dummies	✓	✓
Year Dummies	✓	✓
Observations	15,637	14,433
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1		

Table 4: Gender Ideology – Immigration Interactions (All Waves)

Figure 12: Gender Ideology Interaction with Gender, Pre-2005

Figure 13: Gender Scale Interaction with Gender Post-2005

Figures 14: Gender Scale Interaction with Gender Pre-2005

Figures 15-16: Relationship between Gender Attitudes and Immigration Attitudes by Birth Cohort


Figure 17: Immigration Attitudes by Birth Cohort

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