The New Working Class Party?
The Impact of Radical Right Parties' Economic Position
on Working Class Support

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Prepared for the
Duke Conference on Radicalism & Realignment,
April 20-21 2018

Introduction

An unexpected switch in party allegiance by a crucial (though probably small) subsection of the working class vote catapulted Donald Trump into the White House. The resulting academic and journalistic interest in the alleged realignment of the working class is closely connected to a key European debate, which centres on the question whether populist radical right (PRR) parties are becoming the (main) political voice of the working class. Some authors have argued that these parties increasingly cater to the economically 'left-behinds' losing out from globalization, while others have raised doubt about the extent to which class plays a role in these parties' electorates; still others have argued that the specific attributes of 'class' that are relevant for explaining PRR support have changed (Burgoon 2009; Kriesi et al. 2012; Spies 2013; Ivaldi 2015; Inglehart & Norris 2016; Oesch & Rennwald 2017)

We argue that the electoral overrepresentation of voters from lower socio-economic strata – the so-called 'proletarianization' (Betz 1994) – of RRP parties is a moving target that follows different trajectories in different contexts depending on the supply side. The extent to which RRPs represent the working class electorate differs between countries (Van der Brug et al. 2013). Parties' success among voters less well-off citizens depends in part on macro-economic context (Rooduijn & Burgoon 2017). Still, there remains important unexplained variation in the extent of 'proletarianization' between and within parties.

In this study, we expect that parties' working class appeal *depends on their ideological positioning in the economic domain*. Indeed, there is evidence that the further left the parties position themselves regarding such issues, the more working class voters they attract (Harteveld 2016). By promising to soften both the (alleged) economic and cultural consequences of globalization to those perceiving a status loss on both fronts, such a left-ward move likely consolidates and expands PRR parties' appeal among the working class. Given the sizeable electoral potential of the 'left-nationalist' quadrant (Van der Brug & Van Spanje 2009; De Lange 2007; Spies 2013; Kriesi et al. 2012), this might even constitute a net beneficial strategy. At the same time, the dominating importance of cultural issues among the predictors of PRR support make it an open question how important parties' economic portfolio actually *is* in shaping their electoral appeal. We aim to shed more light on this question.

We do so by (1) *investigating the relation between party program and class appeal in a broader set of cases* and (2) *testing the mechanism on the individual level*. First, we conduct a longitudinal observational study combining CSES voter data with Comparative Manifesto Project data to investigate the relation between PRR parties' socio-economic platform and support patterns between countries and over time. Second, we conduct survey-embedded experiments in which we highlight a left-

or right-wing aspect of parties' socio-economic policy proposals. This second element of our design permits a much more stringent evaluation of the claim regarding the electoral effects of RRP's socio-economic policy than has previously been conducted.

Theory

The overrepresentation of lower socio-economic strata among the RRP electorate has been well-documented (Betz 1994; Van der Brug et al. 2000; Ivarsflaten 2005; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Lubbers and Scheepers 2007; Oesch 2012; Ford and Goodwin 2014). It remains an open question what the most relevant way is to operationalize class in 21st century post-industrial societies continues (see the various contributions in Rydgren 2013). Still, general agreement seems to exists that 'the working class' in a general sense is a prominent constituency of the RRP electorate. Moreover, this overrepresentation appears to be on the rise (Ivaldi 2015). Oesch and Rennwald (2017) show that RRPs increasingly compete with the Left over the vote of its traditional working-class support. In line with this literature we use the term 'working class' in rather broad sense.

The usual explanation for this overrepresentation stresses various grievances experienced by this group. Economic conflict theories suggest that workers support the radical right in an attempt to "protect their jobs and wages from competition from labor migration and international trade" (Oesch 2012: 305). Cultural explanations assume that the cultural challenge posed by immigration and cultural change is most strongly felt by the lower (and least educated) classes. Theories of political alienation, finally, explain workers' anti-establishment vote for the radical right by the dissatisfaction with traditional (chiefly Social-Democratic) parties, trade unions, or the political system as a whole, all of which have allegedly shown themselves to be incapable of defending their interests.

In a similar tradition, working class voters have been discussed as likely 'losers of (accelerating) globalization' (Kriesi et al., 2008; Bornschier and Kriesi, 2012). They lose out from an ever-growing social division that is the result of increasing international competition and cultural openness in globalizing, post-industrial societies. RRP parties are supported by the group that finds itself at the wrong side of this cleavage, consisting of those suffering decline in either absolute (non-skilled workers) or relative (skilled workers) status. As noted, this vulnerability to both economic and cultural change is further exacerbated by the generally lower levels of education found among the lower class (Stubager, 2010; Stubager and Ivarsflaten, 2012). All this makes for a plausible explanation of the overrepresentation of working class voters among RRPs, who have

to a certain extent become the core anti-globalization force in Western Europe (Azmanova 2011).

At the same time, the empirical picture is more complex. Not all parties are dominated by working class voters to the same extent. Van der Brug et al. (2012: 59) show that the variance in support for 19 RRPs that can be explained by a 'socio-structural model' ranges between 5% and 26%. The Scandinavian parties and the *Front National* (as well as RRP parties in Central and Eastern European countries, which are beyond the scope of this study) stand out as especially 'proletarianized'. Other parties remain more strongly focused on other, more middle class key constituencies of this party family, such as small business owners. All in all, the class background of the PRR party family is diverse and dynamic.

Enter the supply side

The key puzzle we aim to address is as follows. *While supply side literature stresses (a) the vast potential and (b) ongoing attempts by RRPs to cater to the working class, the extent to which RRPs have become 'working class parties' differs strikingly.*

Rooduijn and Burgoon (2017) show that the support of the least well-off depends on the macro-economic conditions in a country: counterintuitively, their support is especially evident during *good* times, when a vote for a radical party is less 'risky'. We propose another factor that is likely to explain variation: the supply side – or what parties *have on offer*. Despite their growing (academic and media) image as the protector of the working class, RRPs present a surprising array of positions on socio-economic issues "depending on the party studied, but also when this party was studied" (Ivarsflaten, 2005: 469). We hypothesize that parties will experience stronger 'proletarization' if they provide a more left-wing socio-economic programme. The reason is simple: while the overrepresentation of the working class certainly reflects a broader range of experiences than mere economic self-interest (Kitschelt 2012), a large group of working class voters *does* combine left-wing economic with nationalist-authoritarian cultural stances ('left-authoritarians', see Lefkofridi et al. 2014). A move by RRP parties to the economic center or even left reduces the trade-off these voters face in more unidimensional party systems in which this combination is not on offer (Spies 2013).

There is ample within- and between-party variation in this respect: the European RRP party family "spreads a significant part of the whole dimension between the two poles of laissez-faire and state economy" (Mudde 2007: 123). Some of these parties originally had – or were even uniquely founded for – a strong neoliberal position, in which anti-statist and populist arguments were used to criticize high taxes and large governments. Indeed, Kitschelt and McGann (1995;

2005) argued that a combination of nationalist-authoritarian and neoliberal policies reflected the electoral opportunities for RRP parties in the 1980s. During the nineties, some existing radical right parties moved towards the economic center as a result of increased competition with social-democratic parties (Ivaldi 2014), while new parties were founded with an economically more centrist or even left-wing ideology from the start (McGann and Kitschelt, 2005). Indeed, scholars agree that most radical right parties' economic stance can often be considered centrist or leftist not be described as classically right-wing (Mudde, 2007; Mughan et al., 2003; Rydgren, 2012; Ivaldi 2014). This is not without consequences: Röth et al. (forthcoming: 1) find that, once in office, RRP parties are likely to "refrain from welfare state retrenchment".

On the other hand, others found this move to be half-hearted or non-existent before the 2000s (Van der Brug and van Spanje, 2009). Moreover, parties' positions are not only volatile but sometimes outright vague (Rovny 2008). This likely reflects that RRP's socio-economic policy positions are instrumental to achieving other goals. For instance, foreign residents or immigrants are either to be excluded from such services, or to pay higher premiums (Betz and Meret, 2012: 120).

Given this diversity, differences in the ideological supply side provide a plausible reason for the heterogeneity in class background of RRPs. Indeed, Harteveld (2016) found that parties that are socio-economically more left-wing (according to Chapel Hill experts) have systemically more proletarianized electorates in the European Election Studies (measured using occupational categories). On the other hand, this correlation could be brought about by a reversed mechanism in which parties adjust their program to the alleged interest of their voters, or by historical-societal factors that shape both patterns of alignment and the ideological constraints of parties.

Despite the scattered evidence, the debate thus remains unresolved, and we aim to help fill these voids. Our most important contribution is to *test the individual-level mechanism*. Do voters actual *react* to PRRs parties' different and changing socio-economic platforms? We study this by performing experiments in which we isolate the effect of parties' policy proposals on voters from different classes. Before we do so, we *expand the empirical evidence* on the correlation between parties' programs and class background by looking at its correlation over a larger period in time and in a broader set of contexts than previous studies.

Design

As said, we first replicate and expand Harteveld (2016)'s observational study by gathering data from the Comparative Manifesto Project to investigate the class composition of RRP electorates

over time as the parties change and adapt their policy platforms. Second, we use survey embedded experiments in three countries to probe the causality of the link between RRPs' economic policy positions and the class basis of their support. The two elements of our design permit a much more stringent evaluation of the claim regarding the economic policy component of RRP electorates than has previously been conducted. Data collection and analysis for both studies are ongoing; we present the first findings below.

Study 1: longitudinal study of parties and voters

Data and operationalisation

The aim of the first study is to establish the correlation between parties' socio-economic stance and the class composition of its electorate. The individual-level data of this study is derived from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) data waves 1-4, a collection of harmonized national election studies.[1] The party-level data of this study is based on the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). This combination of sources ensures that the demand and supply measures cover the same moments – national elections.

Our operationalization is as follows. At the individual level, our most important measure of class is based the respondent's *occupation*. We coded the following occupations as *working class*: service workers and shop and market; skilled agricultural and fishery work; plant and machine operators; elementary occupations. Alternative operationalisations include income (in quintiles); education (primary, secondary, post-secondary), and income–education intersection (quadrants based on cut-off points at 4th quintile income and post-secondary education).

On the party level, a party's platform is derived from CMP's composite '*welfare'* indicator. This indicator is based on the data's subindicators on welfare state expansion and (mostly socio-economic) equality. Although termed 'welfare', the indicator thus covers a broader range of issues of inequality and the state's role in socio-economic outcomes. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that – especially in the American debate – working class voters are not necessarily universally in favour of, or feel they benefit at all from, the welfare state. However, in the European context this measure is likely to be capture parties' broader promise to bring 'protection' in the face of the forces of globalization (Ivaldi 2016), which is arguably the most relevant element of RRP parties' socio-economic policy. Following the CMP we call this *Attention to welfare*, with higher scores denoting a greater share of sentences devoted to economically left-wing statements.

[1] See CSES.org.

We are interested in two types of comparisons, and structure our analysis accordingly. First, we combine variation between and within parties, comparing the class background of parties at a particular election with both different elections in and different countries. In the regression model this takes the shape of a random effects (RE) model. Second, for a more stringent test of the causal role of parties' position, we compare parties' stances at different points in time (in the regression model using fixed effects, FE). This *within-party model* reduces susceptibility to potential confounding by (time-invariant) third factors.

Results

We first inspect a scatterplot to map the relation between party position and support among the working class. This data takes elections as its unit of analysis. Figure 1 shows the average PRR party support among working class respondents (red) and non-working class respondents (blue). The upper graph shows this for *Attention to welfare*. To grasp party platform change (within-party variation), the bottom graph plots each party's deviation *from its own mean*.

FIGURE 1 SCATTERPLOT OF (X) ATTENTION TO WELFARE (%) AND (Y) SUPPORT AMONG TWO GROUPS (FRACTION)

1A. Attention to welfare



1b. Relative attention to welfare (centered around party mean)



The top graph suggest that in, general, economically left-wing parties do somewhat worse among all voters, and especially non-working class voters. There is no increase in working class support for the most left-wing parties. At the same time, this pattern is heavily influenced by SVP (2011), which has 0,0 attention to socio-economic left-wing issues in its program according to CMP, while nonetheless being relatively popular among working class Swiss. It is relevant to note that when this particular case is left out, the trend *is* significantly positive among working class voters among the remaining parties. Nevertheless, the evidence remains somewhat inconclusive.

The bottom graph shows that a *relatively* left-wing position of a party is positively associated with average support among the working class ($r = .16$, $p < 0.001$) and negatively associated with average support among the non-working class ($r = -.20$, $p < 0.001$). At elections in which parties have a relatively left-wing position, they attract more working class and fewer non-working class voters. This is in line with our expectation.

We now move to a test of the cross-level interaction between party stance and individual class position in a regression with either random intercepts or fixed effects (and clustered stand-

ard errors) for parties. These analyses – of which the regression tables are presented in appendix A – show that no significant interaction exists between working class position and *Attention to welfare* in either in the RE or FE specification. This does not depend on the inclusion or exclusion of controls for age and gender. Neither is there a substantial or significant interaction with income, education, or the income by education quadrants (available on request).

In short, we find *some* aggregate-level evidence that on average parties have more working class support in those years in which they are relatively left-wing, although this is not replicated as a cross-level interaction. At any rate, the weaker *cross-sectional* effect shows that countries with a relatively left-wing parties do not consistently have more 'proletarianized' PRRs than countries with right-wing PRRs, suggesting that many third factors confound parties' composition of their electorate. Furthermore, any correlation we do find does not prove that policy positions have a causal effect on working class support. We therefore now turn to an experiment to gauge, with stronger internal validity, the effect of different policy proposals coming from the same party.

Study 2: experiments

Study 2 aims to isolate the role of parties' socio-economic platform. Do voters – and especially lower class voters – react to party's actual programs?

Data and design

The survey-embedded experiment was conducted in Denmark, Sweden and Norway. All countries are part of Scandinavia and share that region's particular welfare state history. Nevertheless, important differences exist in the history and extent of PRR mobilization.

TABLE 1 DATA SOURCES

Country	Data source	Period	# Respondents
Denmark	YouGov (standing panel)	Spring 2017	1269
Norway	Citizen Panel	Fall 2017	1549
Sweden	Citizen Panel	End of 2017	1457

The basic setup of the experiment is the same in all countries. Respondents are asked how they feel about the respective PRR party. This party sympathy measure is the main dependent variable in the study (see below for further details). Before being asked this question, the two experimental groups were provided with a statement about one of the PRR's socio-economic policies ("[Party name] has, besides other things, suggested to…"), which was taken from the latest election manifesto. One experimental group was presented with a *left-wing* policy proposal; the other

a *right-wing* policy proposal. The control group did not read a statement about policies. Table 2 lists the topics of these proposals. Crucially, we expect that stressing different elements of the PRR's program will affect respondents' support for this party in different ways *depending on their class position*.

At this point it is important to note that the nature of the socio-economic policies discussed in the statements differ between the cases, sometimes involving tax policies, sometimes benefits. While these concern quite different aspects from a policy point of view, we expect that in the respondents' minds they are used to update a general economic left-right schema informing their view of the political space (Dahlberg & Harteveld 2015).

TABLE 2 DESCRIPTION OF EXPERIMENT 1

Condition	**Denmark**		**Norway**	**Sweden**
	ND	*DPP*	*FrP*	*SD*
Left-wing cue		Extent duration of unemployment benefits	Increase state pension	Reduce taxes for the poor
Right-wing cue	Reducing tax on high incomes	Reduce taxes on high incomes	Lower taxes for the most wealthy	Reduce taxes for the rich
Control	*No cue*			

In Norway and Sweden, the experiment focused on the main PRR party: the *Progress Party* and *Sweden Democrats*, respectively.

The Danish context is unique because it currently provides *two* PRR parties with diverging socio-economic worldviews. The largest and oldest of the two, the *Danish People's Party* (DPP), has in recent decades developed a pro-welfare image in addition to its nativist platform. They are the main party in our analysis. The more recent *Nye Borgerlige* (The New Bourgeois, NB) was founded by former politicians from the mainstream right-wing *Conservative Party* and combines a nativist platform with a more right-wing economic outlook. We therefore conduct an additional Danish experiment to get further variation in PRR parties' actual stance.

Our cue thus exists of highlighting either a left-wing or (expect NB) a right-wing element (or none at all) in PRR's program. Although many respondents will have had some prior knowledge of their PRR's worldview, we expect that the different statements can still affect respondents' impression of PRR's socio-economic program, and thus potentially their support. At any rate, prior knowledge makes any effects we *do* find conservative.

The only exception to this design is that for *Nye Borgerlige* (NB) no left-wing policy condition is included because NB's outspokenly neoliberal position presents no such cue. Furthermore, because NB is relatively new and less known, the nativist aspect of NB's program is made explicit in both the control and experimental group by mentioning they want to ban the headscarf on schools.

Further operationalization

As mentioned, the dependent variable consist of party sympathy on a scale from 0 ('very badly') to 10 ('very highly'). Of course, party sympathy is not equal to vote choice. However, a vote intention measure would have been unlikely to pick up the nuanced differences in voters' evaluation of parties. Furthermore, party sympathy is closely related to vote choices: in the Danish waves of the CSES, each increase in party sympathy for the *Danish People's Party* is associated with a doubling of the probability to vote for it (see Appendix

Respondents' class was primarily measured using a subjective class indicator, and in Denmark also using an objective class indicator (see Table 3). [Note: in Sweden and Norway, an objective class indicator is available but not yet transferred from an earlier wave of the panel; this will be reported in a future version.] The following question introduced the *subjective class indicator*: 'There is sometimes talk about different social groups or classes. If you were to place yourself in such a class, which of the following would it then be: the lower class, the working class, the lower middle class, the middle class, the upper middle class, the upper class' (the item also included a "don't know" option that is not analysed). In the analysis, we collapse the two lower groups into one and the two upper groups into another (because very few respondents picked the extreme categories), thereby ending up with a measure consisting of four groups: lower & working class; lower middle class; middle class; and higher class. We expect the former group to be especially attracted to a PRR party when the left-wing aspect of its socio-economic policies are stressed, whereas the latter group is more likely to be attracted if the PRR party is depicted as economically right-wing.

The *objective class indicator* (currently available in Denmark only) was measured based on the occupation of the respondent. To this end, the various self-descriptions of jobs were recoded into four categories: *routine non-manual*; *manual* (semi-skilled manual, skilled manual, manual supervisor, or farm labor)*; controllers* (lower controllers or higher controllers) and *self-employed* (with employees or without employees; consisted of only 38 respondents). Obviously, different coding choices could have been made, but none of these alternative operationalisations yielded a different pattern.

TABLE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF CLASS MEASURES

Objective	*Denmark*	
	N	*%*
Manual	446	24,3%
Routine non-manual	388	21,2%
Self-employed	70	3,8%
Controller	928	50,7%

Subjective	*Denmark*		*Sweden*		*Norway*	
	N	*%*	*N*	*%*	*N*	*%*
Lower & working class	437	22,0%	219	15,6%	238	15,5%
Lower middle class	329	16,6%	183	13,0%	163	10,6%
Middle class	636	32,0%	735	52,3%	824	53,7%
Higher middle & upper class	584	29,4%	269	19,1%	309	20,1%

Manipulation check

In the Swedish and Norwegian version, we included a manipulation check by asking respondents to place the two parties on an economic left-right dimension. This took place *after* their evaluation of the party. Figure 3 shows that in both cases perceptions are on average more right-wing in the right-wing cue condition than in the left-wing cue condition. This difference is significant in Sweden ($p = 0.026$) but not in Norway ($p = 0.19$). The latter might partly reflect a ceiling effect: FrP is already perceived as very right-wing even in the control group condition (8.29 on a scale of 0 to 10).

FIGURE 3 PERCEIVED ECONOMIC LEFT-RIGHT POSITION

A Sweden



B Norway



Results

Figure 4 visualizes the average levels of support for PRR among the different subjective (and in Denmark also objective) classes under the different conditions. Stars in the class category titles denote whether the difference between the left- and the right-wing experimental conditions is significant. To assure readability, the control group average is presented by a line.

We find that *among the lowest class categories*, *depicting the party's ideology as socio-economically left-wing is associated with higher support for this party compared to a right-wing depiction*. This difference is significant in Denmark for both subjective and objective class measures ($p < 0.001$) and Norway ($p < 0.001$), but not in Sweden ($p = 0.27$). Furthermore, the interaction terms confirms that the effect of the cue among the lowest class differs significantly from all other classes in the same two countries ($p < 0.05$), showing this group is indeed deterred most by the cue.

The substantive size of this effect is noteworthy: among the lowest class group, mentioning either a left- or a right-wing aspect of the PRR party is associated with a full 1-point difference on the sympathy scale in Denmark and Norway. Given the subtle nature of the cue (a single sentence of information about long-existing and well-known parties), this strongly suggests that PRR parties' socio-economic policy positions are not without consequences for the nature of their support.

By contrast, among the highest class categories, the differences are mostly absent (or at any rate substantially much smaller and never significant) in all cases. Importantly, support among the highest classes is not significantly higher under the right-wing cue condition in any of the cases. Of course, this has to be understood in the Scandinavian context in which general support for welfare and redistribution is relatively high also among higher classes. Nevertheless, the fact that the policy framing mattered only among the lowest class has important implications for the role of PRR's socio-economic platform.

The patterns are mixed among the middle categories, which can be expected to be less homogeneous in their economic preferences. A left-wing message is associated with either no effect or somewhat greater support, but always to a lesser extent than among the working class. The significance partly reflects statistical power (as a result, a significant effect of the cue is visible among the large 'middle class' category in Norway), but the point estimate of the effect is always smaller than in the lowest class category.

FIGURE 4 MEAN PARTY SYMPATHY AMONG DIFFERENT CLASSES UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS: DPP, FRP AND SD



Sympathy for the PRR party. Red line is the average score in the control group.
*Note: stars indicate significance of the difference between the right-wing cue and the left-wing cue (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.10)*

The cue had no significant effect on the lowest class category in Sweden. Sympathy scores for *Sweden Democrats* are generally very low in this country regardless of class or cue. This might reflecting the ongoing relatively high stigma of this party compared to the more normalized DPP and FrP (both which have been included in or supported governments). At any rate, it might still be indicative that the contours of the general pattern are visible in this case, too: the differences between the groups appear to weaken for each higher class.

The differences with regard to the control group (the red line) are also informative. The control group captures support under un-altered notions of a parties' socio-economic policy. In that light it appears that the effect among the working class is more driven by altering the perception under the right-wing direction than under the left-wing direction.

FIGURE 4 MEAN SYMPATHY IN 4 CLASSES UNDER VARIOUS CONDITIONS: NB



*Note: stars indicate significance of the difference between the right-wing cue and the control group (*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.10)*

Finally, we turn to the new Danish PRR party *Nye Borgerlige* (Figure 4). Because no left-wing cue was available, we compare the effect of the left-wing cue to the control group. This time, the stars next to the class labels therefore reflect whether the right-wing condition differs significantly from the control group. Consistent with the findings above, an effect occurs only among the lowest subject and objective class. Among higher classes, no such deterring takes place; neither is the party sympathy higher in the control group among the highest classes.

To summarize, the way RRP parties' socio-economic policy is depicted affects patterns of support among the working class, but hardly among other classes. This suggests a left-wing position is a net winning strategy. Indeed, this is supported by the data. In all three countries, support for the PRR party across the whole sample is *highest under the left-wing condition*.

Preliminary conclusions

With their continuing rise, the class background of RRP parties has regained scholarly and societal interest. As RRP parties are often depicted as the 'new working class party', this study investigates whether parties' socio-economic ideology is related to their support among working class voters. While support for a party among a specific class does not have to reflect calculations of economic self-interest, and therefore might as well rely on other factors than economic policy, it is important to establish to what extent economic ideology can be a factor in PRR parties' 'new winning formula'. Our analysis suggest it might.

We show, first of all, that *RRP parties appear more successful in drawing working class voters in elections in which they pay a relatively lot of attention to welfare in the manifesto's*. While this pattern appeared at an aggregated level, we did not replicate this finding with cross-level interactions. The results thus point to a correlation between party platform change and success among the working class vote, but this was less robust than earlier studies using different data (Harteveld 2013). Possibly, manifesto's fail to capture parties' reputation among voters as well as experts surveys do.

At any rate, any aggregated correlation does not yet prove that working class voters more strongly support pro-welfare RRP parties *because* of this element of their party platform. We therefore conducted an experiment in three Scandinavian countries in which the socio-economic platform of two RRP parties' platform was exogenously highlighted. These experiments showed that (subjectively and objectively) lower class voters are less likely to support the *Danish People's Party* or the *Progress Party* if the party is depicted as a party that cuts taxes for the rich or extends benefits, compared to a right-wing policy statements.

This suggests that lower class voters indeed react to RRP parties' socio-economic program. This, in turn, is very likely to bring about the macro-level pattern noted in Harteveld (2013) and tentatively replicated above: stronger support among the working class for pro-welfare parties. While cultural considerations are obviously very important to understand RRP's success, voters' and parties' views of the economy (still) matter, too.

Importantly, higher class citizens were hardly affected by highlighting the socio-economic program of these parties. Perhaps they did not adjust their perception of the party, or economic policies are less salient for voters in non-precarious positions. In the latter case, moving to the economic left, which is sometimes called the 'new winning formula' (see De Lange 2007), could indeed likely to be a net beneficial strategy. Indeed, in our experimental data, all three parties attract more support *overall* when presented as socio-economically left-wing (or at least *not* right-wing). However, this might reflect the Scandinavian case with its particular relation to the welfare state; our macro analysis does not show that left-wing parties are structurally more successful than right-wing ones. The true winning formula thus remains contingent on parties' context and trajectory.

Nevertheless, research suggest that voters combining anti-immigrant with pro-welfare stances (or 'left-authoritarians') form a plurality in many countries (Van Spanje & Van der Brug 2009; Lefkofridi et al. 2014). If RRP parties increasingly pursue this particular group in the future, our evidence suggests that it will reshape their electorate – and possibly increase it.

Appendix A Macro level models

Table A.1 *Main regression*

	RE		FE	
	b	SE	b	SE
Working class	.638***	0.087	.642***	0.095
Attention to welfare	.029***	0.007	0.031	0.032
Working class X Welfare	0.000	0.008	0.000	0.009
Age	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.003
Male	.409***	0.039	.409***	0.056
			(country FE)	
Intercept	-3.120***	0.240	-2.551***	0.407
Variation level-2	.473*	0.218		
N	30169		30169	

Source: CSES

Appendix B Relation between party sympathy and vote for DPP