

## Online Appendix for “Linkage Strategies of Authoritarian Successor Parties”

In: James Loxton and Scott Mainwaring. *Authoritarian Successor Parties* (2018)

### Web Appendix 1: Measures and Index of Parties’ Clientelistic Effort

The DALP dataset uses a 5 question battery to measure the scope of clientelist appeals. Here we describe that battery which forms the dependent variable in many of the analyses in this chapter. The battery, which is the second one in the survey, begins with a discussion of what is meant by these various forms of exchange and how respondents should interpret the questions’ response options:

INTERPRETATION OF THE SCALE	
<b>No effort at all</b>	No one receives targeted benefits based on how they vote.
<b>Only a mild effort</b>	A small core of party activists and party supporters receive targeted benefits.
<b>A moderate effort</b>	Not only core supporters but also some less strongly affiliated voters receive targeted benefits.
<b>A major effort</b>	<i>Even some of those who are only mild sympathizers of a party receive targeted benefits. Please note that in reality it may still be a rather small proportion of voters who in fact get such benefits.</i>

Respondents were then asked five questions about different kinds of targeted, material exchange that we believe constitute the major forms of clientelist exchange, with the emphasis in the original.

B1 - Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens **consumer goods** (e.g., food or liquor, clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building materials etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods?

B2 - Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens preferential access to **material advantages in public social policy schemes** (e.g., preferential access to subsidized prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?

B3-Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens preferential access to **employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector**

(e.g., post office, janitorial services, maintenance work, jobs at various skill levels in state owned enterprises or in large private enterprises with government contracts and subsidies, etc.) as inducement to obtain their vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities?

B4 - Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens and businesses **preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities** (e.g., public works/construction projects, military procurement projects without competitive bidding to companies whose employees support the awarding party) as inducement to gain their and their employees' votes. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities?

B5. Consider whether candidates or parties influence or promise to influence the **application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies** (e.g., more lenient tax assessments and audits, more favorable interpretation of import and export regulation, less strict interpretation of fire and escape facilities in buildings, etc.) in order to favor individual citizens or specific businesses as inducement to gain their and their employees' vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favor?

We then formed an additive scale of clientelist effort for each party. A more detailed analysis of the notion of clientelism and the individual questionnaire items, as well as the construction of the summary index of clientelism is available in Kitschelt (2011), downloadable from the DALP website. We display here a correlation matrix for the five variables for the full set of 88 countries in the dataset.

pwcorr b1 b2 b3 b4 b5

	b1	b2	b3	b4	b5
b1	1.0000				
b2	0.8192	1.0000			
b3	0.7722	0.8267	1.0000		
b4	0.7965	0.8137	0.9023	1.0000	
b5	0.7537	0.7926	0.8037	0.8924	1.0000

The correlations are extremely high, but this feature is driven by the presence of a substantial number of parties in Western advanced postindustrial democracies that have virtually no clientelism. As shown in Kitschelt (2011), the correlation is substantially lower between some of the five indicators, when affluent countries are excluded. Especially the correlation between providing gifts/vote buying (b1) as spot-market, individually targeted clientelistic technique and the relational clientelistic techniques (whether targeted at individuals as patronage b3 or procurement b4 at business firms and non-profit associations) as well as the spot-market “wholesale” technology of regulatory favors account for only 40-45% of the variance. Nevertheless, in spite of the diversity of clientelistic linkage profiles across parties and countries,

even then a principal components analysis generates just one very strong underlying latent variable that captures the variance of most of the scores on all five clientelism indicators (Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.955$ ).

## **Web Appendix 2: The Index of Parties' Programmatic Appeal or "Crystallization" (adapted from the appendix to Kitschelt and Kselman (2013))**

In the paper we use a measure of programmatic competition that has been developed from the DALP survey (and is part of the DALP dataset that is available for download) to test whether Authoritarian Legacy Parties are better positioned to make programmatic appeals than other parties are. Here we briefly describe that measure for the ease of the reader; a more detailed development of the operationalization of these attributes and of the overall measure of programmatic appeals can be found in Kitschelt and Freeze (2010), available on the DALP website.

The survey's fourth module asked experts to identify parties' precise *policy positions* on a series of issue dimensions.<sup>1</sup> In addition to these standardized policy questions asked in each country, the questionnaire also included questions on nationally idiosyncratic issues and issue dimensions that could not be scored across the entire data set of 88 countries.<sup>2</sup> Experts were also given the options 'Don't Know' and 'Party has no Clear Position'. The DALP team (which we are both part of) make use of this policy placement data to identify whether or not a party meets three criteria Downs (1957) outlined to enable voters to choose among parties based on their programmatic commitments: The party must issue appeals that are (1) distinct from the appeals of other parties, (2) internally shared (coherent) by the relevant party operatives and (3) salient for the parties' activities.

First, to measure the *distinctiveness* of a party's position on any issue dimension, we compute the average distance between a party  $j$ 's mean position (across experts) on issue  $k$  and the mean positions of all other parties (across experts) on the same issue  $k$ . The resulting indicator represents the average differentiation of a party  $j$ 's position on issue  $k$  from that of all other parties in the system.

Second, we operationalize the parties' internal programmatic coherence by the consistency of the experts' policy placements. Parties characterized by internal dissension and temporal inconsistency are more likely to generate inconsistent expert policy placements. We adopt the conventional approach and operationalize a party  $j$ 's *cohesion* on any single issue  $k$  as the standard deviation of expert judgments for  $j$  on issue  $k$ .<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Each was measured on a 10-point scale.

<sup>2</sup> The five core policy issues cover (1) the defense of national identity, (2) moral-cultural governance (tradition versus individual choice) and (3) various aspects of economic governance and distribution (redistributive spending on the poor; state role in the economy; universalistic social insurance). Precise question wordings can be found on the DALP website.

<sup>3</sup> To take out an individual expert's idiosyncratic anchor, however, we have transformed expert  $i$ 's party positions  $jk$  into differences from the mean position  $k$ -bar she assigns to all parties  $j$  on issue  $k$ , by subtracting a party  $j$ 's position from that mean  $k$ -bar.

Third, as a second measure of programmatic variance, but also of the salience of the issue dimension for the political pursuits of a party, we use the share of experts who *do not attribute a position* to  $j$  on dimension  $k$  (i.e. the share of experts who chose ‘Don’t Know’, ‘Party has no clear Position’, or left the question blank). To the extent that experts fail to score parties on a particular issue dimension, this is also a sign that said parties do not meet the minimal level of cohesion and consistency required for responsible and reliable programmatic choice.

For each party  $j$  on issue dimension  $k$ , this leaves us with three distinct indicators: differentiation, cohesion, and non-attribution. As a first step towards an integrated measure, we normalize each of these three measures to  $[0,1]$  such that each is increasing in the extent to which it satisfies the relevant programmatic criterion (i.e. higher scores indicate more distinctiveness, greater cohesion, and lower levels of expert non-attribution). The absence of any one of these properties is sufficient to undermine a party’s programmatic capacity: parties which do not differentiate from their competitors will generate a ‘rationality crisis’, regardless of whether or not their platform is unified and consistent (thus satisfying the responsibility/reliability criterion); parties which generate extremely low response rates are unlikely to satisfy the responsibility/reliability criterion, even if the small number of experts that judge place them consistently and distinctly from other parties; and so on. To create a single, integrated index operationalizing party  $j$ ’s programmatic capacity on issue dimension  $k$ , we thus calculate the product {distinctiveness X cohesion X non-attribution}, which yields a *programmatisms score* in the range  $[0,1]$  for  $j$  on  $k$ .

One approach to measuring a party’s aggregate programmatic capacity would be to average their programmatisms scores across all of a country’s issue dimensions. However, different parties may give different emphases to different issues in campaigns and governance, and we may not want to classify a party as ‘non-programmatic’ for failing to generate high programmatisms on all conceivable issues. For the aggregate index of programmatic partisan effort, we therefore select the *four* issue dimensions on which party  $j$  has the highest programmatisms scores, and takes the average of  $j$ ’s scores on these four dimensions. Label this indicator PROGRAM. A range of different indices employing fewer or more items were constructed and compared (Kitschelt and Freeze 2010). The PROGRAM index turns out to provide scores that are highly correlated with the range of alternative indices explored. The index can numerically vary from 0 to 1; among the 506 parties in our data set it empirically varies from .012 to .780, with a mean (standard deviation) of .276 (.154).

Operationalizing the Downsian criteria for rational programmatic choice is, as can be seen, no simple task. The PROGRAM indicator is a composite of three distinct measures, each of which is likely subject to measurement error arising from the methodological pitfalls of expert surveys. Before proceeding, it is thus essential to establish a minimum of construct validity. Kitschelt and Kselman show that it is strongly correlated with economic development (Natural Log of GDP) and the level of democracy (Average Polity Score 2003-2007). Past research suggests that policy-based accountability should be associated with both higher levels of economic development and higher levels of democratization (Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Stokes et. al 2013; Kselman and Kitschelt 2013). In both cases the association is strong and in the expected direction (correlations of  $r=.62$  and  $r=.33$ ). The indicator of programmatic competition also varies inversely with other linkage strategies in predictable ways. The survey’s

second module asks experts to score parties' efforts to secure electoral support using five different *clientelistic* mechanisms: the distribution of material gifts, patronage jobs in the public sector, social policy benefits, procurement contracts and awards, and regulatory discretionary favors. One of the core indicators emerging from the DALP data collection effort is an index of *clientelistic effort*, the sum of averaged party scores on all five types of clientelistic benefits (Kitschelt and Kselman 2013). The same papers cited above regarding development and democracy, as well as a host of other research (Kitschelt and Stevensen 2007; Magaloni et. al 2007; Weitz-Shapiro 2013), suggest that there should exist clear and tangible tradeoffs between the extent to which parties rely on programmatic as opposed to clientelistic linkage strategies with voters. This tradeoff emerges quite clearly, with a strong negative correlation between programmatism and clientelism ( $r=-.52$ ). Finally, the DALP also asks experts to provide a 'round-about' assessment of the extent to which parties pursue votes based on their programmatic policy promises. Although this item is noisy, and measures programmatic 'effort' rather than programmatic coherence and distinctiveness, the positive correlation ( $r=.40$ ) again suggests that our more detailed measure of programmatism varies in ways which satisfy at some basic level the criteria for construct validity.

Despite the challenges associated with measuring the concept of 'programmatic capacity', the PROGRAM indicator thus meets quite robustly the expectations of past research. That said there is one noticeable and unexpected finding: a pronounced medium low-to-intermediate PROGRAM score for most parties in several Northern European countries, where we might have expected greater programmatic clarity and differentiation (Finland, Norway, Sweden). Even extensive diagnostics, in consultation with country anchors of this project, shed no light on this unexpected pattern.<sup>4</sup> The domestic experts in these countries currently attribute to their parties less programmatic coherence than the cumulative historical body of research would have led us to expect. We have run the analyses in our paper with a Scandinavia dummy variable but that variable does not change our assessments of the (non)effect of having an authoritarian legacy.

### **Web Appendix 3: Testing for How Reactive Authoritarian Successor Parties Build Networks and Engage in Clientelism**

In the text we discuss how we explicitly exclude reactive authoritarian successor parties from our concept of authoritarian legacy parties and discuss robustness checks that show that these parties do not differ from other parties with regards to network building or overall clientelist efforts. The analyses are below in Table A1 and Table A2. The reactive authoritarian successor parties are coded based on Loxon's specifications.

The results in Table A1 models 1, 2, and 4 suggest that both authoritarian legacy and reactive authoritarian successor parties have significantly larger networks than parties without authoritarian ties. Yet in examining the data, we grew concerned that the latter finding was driven largely by El Salvador's ARENA. While ARENA does not have ties to a preexisting party that competed under authoritarianism, it was able to capture the networks of pre-existing militia

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<sup>4</sup> It is not entirely implausible that, indeed, our data accurately reflect a sharp depolarization of Scandinavian politics in the new millennium that signals a rapid erosion of strong socio-economic distributive cleavage structures so dominant in twentieth century Northern party systems.

organizations and we believe this partially explains its particularly large network density. When controls for this one case are added in models 5-8, there is no longer a significant difference between reactive authoritarian successor parties and other parties in an average country.<sup>5</sup> Then the results in Table A2 confirm that only authoritarian legacy parties have a significantly higher clientelist effort scores, even if the distinction between ARENA and other parties is not controlled for (models 1-3). The implication is that ARENA was not able to turn its substantial militia network into an electoral machine as efficiently as did authoritarian legacy parties whose networks were used for electoral mobilization in the authoritarian period, reminding us that it is not just the size of the pre-existing network but their quality that matters. But the general message of these models is that while authoritarian legacy parties are significantly different from other parties in an average country, reactive authoritarian successor parties are less distinctive.

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<sup>5</sup> While the ARENA dummy is not significant, it is as large as the reactive authoritarian successor party coefficient, suggesting that it is twice as large as the average reactive authoritarian successor party.

**Table A1: Network Size by Type of Authoritarian Party**

	Extensiveness of Local Offices (a1)	Ties to local Notables (a3)	Ties to Civil Society Organizations (a8s)	Overall Network Size (Latent Variable)	Extensiveness of Local Offices (a1)	Ties to local Notables (a3)	Ties to Civil Society Organizations (a8s)	Overall Network Size (Latent Variable)
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
ARENA	0.558*** (0.120)	0.389*** (0.090)	0.359* (0.150)	0.792*** (0.171)	0.560*** (0.120)	0.390*** (0.090)	0.360* (0.150)	0.795*** (0.171)
Log(GDP)	0.523* (0.266)	0.435* (0.196)	0.096 (0.336)	0.683° (0.375)	0.435 (0.297)	0.339 (0.219)	0.082 (0.375)	0.532 (0.419)
Democracy Stock					0.436 (0.659)	0.473 (0.485)	0.068 (0.833)	0.747 (0.928)
Polity Democracy Score	0.356** (0.130)	-0.049 (0.070)	-0.623*** (0.189)	0.140 (0.146)	0.356** (0.130)	-0.049 (0.070)	-0.623*** (0.189)	0.140 (0.146)
Latin American Country	-0.001** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Constant	0.008 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.021 (0.031)	-0.008 (0.024)	0.008 (0.021)	-0.015 (0.012)	0.022 (0.031)	-0.007 (0.024)
			-1.474*** (0.154)				-1.474*** (0.154)	
	0.588 (0.455)	1.510*** (0.248)	4.541*** (0.667)	-0.530 (0.515)	0.586 (0.455)	1.508*** (0.248)	4.541*** (0.667)	-0.534 (0.515)
Variance Components								
Country-Level	0.099 (0.024)	0.013 (0.007)	0.234 (0.052)	0.081 (0.031)	0.099 (0.024)	0.013 (0.007)	0.234 (0.052)	0.081 (0.031)
Party-Level	0.297 (0.021)	0.177 (0.013)	0.460 (0.033)	0.628 (0.044)	0.297 (0.021)	0.176 (0.012)	0.460 (0.033)	0.627 (0.044)
N Parties	478	478	476	476	478	478	476	476
N Countries	81	81	81	81	81	81	81	81
Wald $\chi^2$	40.23***	28.71***	102.62***	28.05***	40.69***	29.72***	102.62***	28.74***
Hierarchical Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses; ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001								

**Table A2: Clientelist Effort by Type of Authoritarian Party**

	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]
Authoritarian Legacy Party	2.043*** (0.494)	1.953*** (0.488)	0.885* (0.420)	2.069*** (0.494)	1.969*** (0.488)	0.901* (0.420)
Reactive Authoritarian Successor	1.471 (1.111)	1.051 (1.084)	0.819 (0.933)	0.851 (1.237)	0.437 (1.210)	0.415 (1.038)
ARENA				3.153 (2.786)	3.046 (2.685)	2.025 (2.293)
Log(Party Size)			2.369*** (0.251)			2.364*** (0.251)
Government Status			0.827*** (0.203)			0.825*** (0.203)
Log(GDP)		32.351*** (7.017)	33.976*** (7.415)		32.254*** (7.004)	33.898*** (7.407)
Log(GDP) <sup>2</sup>		-4.650*** (0.927)	-4.853*** (0.980)		-4.637*** (0.925)	-4.843*** (0.979)
Democracy Stock		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Democracy Stock <sup>2</sup>		-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)		-0.001*** (0.001)	-0.001*** (0.001)
Polity Democracy Score		0.116 (0.088)	0.094 (0.094)		0.118 (0.088)	0.095 (0.094)
Constant	12.128*** (0.346)	-41.946*** (13.143)	-45.291*** (13.878)	12.123*** (0.345)	-41.784*** (13.119)	-45.158*** (13.864)
Variance Components						
Country-Level	8.627 (1.504)	1.708 (0.440)	2.353 (0.486)	8.597 (1.499)	1.700 (0.438)	2.348 (0.485)
Party-Level	4.865 (0.345)	4.919 (0.352)	3.428 (0.244)	4.852 (0.344)	4.907 (0.351)	3.423 (0.244)
N Parties	478	478	478	478	478	478
N Individuals	81	81	81	81	81	81
Wald $\chi^2$	18.50***	238.69***	376.19***	19.830***	240.91***	377.67***
Hierarchical Linear Models, Standard Errors in Parentheses; N Countries=82, N Parties= 478; <sup>o</sup> p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001						

