

Programmatic Party System Structuration: Developing and Comparing Cross-National and Cross-Party Measures with a New Global Data Set

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Abstract: In recent years, there has been an increased interest in theorizing and empirical research concerning democratic accountability mechanisms such as programmatic appeals and clientelism, but a relative lack of readily comparable cross-national data. This paper addresses this empirical gap by first developing party and system-level indices of programmatic structuration based on a new global expert survey encompassing 88 polities. These indices are based on the cohesion, polarization and salience of positions taken by parties on different issues in each country. Second, the programmatic measures developed are subjected to various tests of construct validity through comparing the relationship with alternative programmatic measures from the survey, as well as exploring their relationship with economic development. Finally, the paper compares politicians' efforts to project programmatic appeals with other appeals politicians may deploy to attract voters and establish relations of accountability, and suggests future avenues for the refinement of these measures.

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As their foremost objective, politicians in democratic polities strive to acquire and maintain electoral office. In order to achieve this, the competitive electoral process forces them to at least partially deploy the leverage of office to support a loyal constituency. Impressed by the experience of democracy in contemporary affluent OECD democracies, most substantive empirical research and most formal theory of democratic competition assumes that politicians pursue electoral constituencies by offering and delivering “policies” to voters. Politicians are responsive to electorates by advertising and enacting principles and policies sufficiently in line with a stock of constituents to get them reelected, when voters compare the (credible) commitments and perceived achievements of rival candidates. Periodic elections make politicians accountable to their voters and enforce a modicum of responsiveness to their demands. This is the essence of what political science has called the “responsible party governance” model since the 1960s.

But is all of democratic accountability based on citizens’ demand for and politicians’ articulation of programs and delivery of policies? If not, what are alternative accountability mechanisms politicians might deploy with the prospect of winning a critical electoral constituency? And how do politicians decide on the effort they make to develop programmatic appeals and policies, compared to alternative ways to promote their reelection? Will they try to bundle accountability mechanisms that show their responsiveness to voters or choose between them? More specifically, are there complementarities or trade-offs between the deployment of “programmatic” accountability strategies and “clientelistic” strategies that rely on the provision of material goods and services targeted to particular voters or small groups of voters contingent upon their delivery of the vote to the candidate (“clientelism”)?

There is a fair amount of theorizing about choice of effort politicians make to pursue and implement different accountability mechanisms, particularly programmatic and clientelistic politics (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007), albeit less so about the intensity of programmatic effort made by political parties. But there is a general paucity of data reporting how parties actually make such choices in democracies around the world and how much effort occurs to deploy various democratic linkage mechanisms. There is a substantial amount of research on the *substantive positions* parties take on policies and the *relative emphasis* they put on specific policies, but not on their overall programmatic effort, when compared to other efforts parties can make to mobilize voters.

Based on an expert survey in 88 democracies implemented in 2008 and 2009,¹ this paper has a primarily empirical, descriptive purpose. It develops measures of the programmatic effort parties are making around the world and compares these measures among each other as well as to the efforts politicians are making to deploy non-programmatic democratic accountability mechanisms. Let us introduce a somewhat awkward neologism here to denote the object of our empirical analysis, the programmatic effort of political parties. We call it the “**programmaticism**” of parties and of party systems.

¹ Financial support for the data collection came from the Chilean National Research Foundation, the World Bank, and Duke University.

The objective of the paper is not, however, to offer an exhaustive theoretical and empirical *explanation* of such choices, nor to analyze the *consequences* of the application of different profiles of accountability mechanisms by political parties. Of course, ultimate success in establishing that different profiles of linkage mechanisms in the accountability strategies of parties have important consequences will motivate the disciplinary relevance of the collection of data on this subject. We envision such investigations to show three types of consequences:

- **Process consequences:** Parties that emphasize programmatic efforts have different organizational structures and financial arrangements than parties that do not. It may be cheaper to run programmatic parties than clientelistic parties. Also patterns of inter-party competition are different contingent upon prevailing linkage strategies.
- **Political output consequences:** Politics in which parties that emphasize programmatic linkages dominate provide more public goods and different distributive allocations than party (systems) that do not.
- **Political outcomes:** Economic growth rates and more substantive welfare measures (human development indicators; subjective well-being), but also support for democratic governance may be associated with the politicians' choices among linkage strategies.

As this introduction indicates, we use the concepts of “linkage,” “accountability” and “responsiveness” to depict relations between voters and politicians. A “linkage” exists, if politicians successfully demonstrate that they act on (are responsive to) the demands of the constituency supporting them in elections. If they become agents aligning their actions to their principals' interests, they reckon to be more likely to survive the accountability test of the subsequent election and get reelected. Linkage or accountability *strategies* are the efforts politicians undertake to gain the electoral support that awards them survival and advancement in office, individually or collectively as parties. Programmatic appeals and policies are just one technique to meet the accountability test, and it may work in some instances, but not others.

The first section of the paper introduces a simple distinction among linkage mechanisms politicians deploy to show themselves accountable to voters. The second section will relate our notion of programmaticism to the existing literature on parties and party systems. The third section addresses the potential relationship among different linkage mechanisms, particularly reasons to believe there are reinforcing or trade-off relations among clientelism and programmaticism. In the fourth section, we then operationalize different measures of programmaticism, followed by a comparison among them in the fifth section. The sixth section examines the relationship between programmaticism and other linkage mechanisms. The seventh section engages in a brief exercise of construct validation by relating programmaticism to other phenomena with which it should or should not correlate. In the conclusion, we offer some prospects for future research.

1. Types of Linkage Mechanisms in Democracy

Voters validate the accountability of politicians by reelecting them. Repeated endorsement of politicians (parties) by electoral constituencies creates a political “alignment.” What induces voters to participate in a partisan alignment in competitive electoral democracies? One reason may be that voters want certain collective goods or large-scale club goods that help large social strata, sectors or regions to improve their welfare to be delivered by government “policies.”

These voters are looking for a party whose positions on the provision of a basket of collective and club goods is close to their own. In order to predict that parties will actually pursue these goods, if elected to office, voters demand from parties a certain ideological coherence, stability and immobility (Downs 1957: 109-10) to make the politicians' post-electoral actions at least somewhat predictable.

Parties are rationally immobile (ibid) in order to attract these instrumental voters. The intrinsic ideological cohesiveness of parties, not just its legislative discipline, are one yardstick to assess the calculability of a party's future actions, and therefore its attractiveness for rational instrumental voters a critical proportion of whom belong to the often small pool of voters up for grabs in legislative campaigns and thus the object of intense inter-party competition. Programmatic cohesiveness of a party is a *sufficient* condition for legislative discipline, but *not a necessary* one: There may be instances of legislative discipline even in the absence of programmatic cohesiveness, because the compliance of legislators with partisan unity is enforced by external institutional incentives and punishments (e.g., side-payments for electoral supporters in a legislator's district).

But is the presence of legislative partisan discipline all that rational instrumental voters need to know in order to reduce their uncertainty about a party's future course of action? That depends. If a party is programmatically highly heterogeneous, chances are that the programmatic point around which the party coordinates is highly volatile, as the dominant coalitions that govern parties may dramatically change. Indeed, once a newly elected powerful leader or an all-decisive party congress have made up their mind, legislative caucuses move in a uniform trajectory. But what direction that trajectory takes is highly uncertain before dominant coalitions emerge, as intra-party heterogeneity opens up many options.² Party discipline and programmatic cohesiveness are therefore not identical, and from the perspective of rational-instrumental voters and parties which respond to such voters, the programmatic cohesiveness of a parties' activists and leaders may be just as important as the institutional mechanisms put in place to enforce legislative discipline of party caucus members.

Competent programmatic politics is only one way to create alignments between voters and politicians and their parties. Even if we think of accountability as an instrumental relationship in which voters try to obtain a tangible benefit, there is another possibility, whenever politicians cannot credibly commit to deliver policy benefits: clientelism. In this case, rather than providing collective or club goods to large groups, without checks on whether individual members or groups of members did or did not vote for the party allocating goods, politicians offer private, targeted benefits to individual citizens or small groups (families, street neighborhoods) in exchange for citizens' partisan support (votes, participation in rallies, campaign work, etc.). What is different from programmatic politics is not only the *scale* of goods delivered (small, targeted), but also the *contingency of the exchange*. Benefits ideally accrue only to those who stick to the (implicit) contract: targeted benefits, if votes are delivered. Such contracts are comparatively easy to enforce, as long as open ballots prevail. Under rules of secret balloting,

² As Kitschelt and Kselman (2010 APSA paper) argue, party organization also contributes to or subtracts from the predictability of a programmatic party. Optimal for programmatic stability is a party with many veto players. Authority to make strategic decisions is neither concentrated in a narrow clique of leaders, let alone a single personality, nor left to "grassroots" democratic input at national conventions.

however, a myriad of formal and informal indirect techniques have been invented to enable politicians to find out whether voters comply with the contract, involving agents such as party brokers and local notables, indirect supervision, or more generally informal networks that allow politicians to monitor voters' conduct (cf. Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). As a simple first check, politicians may engage in turnout policing of likely party stalwarts (e.g. Nichter 2008).

Clientelism involves direct or indirect vote buying, an activity often enough **expected** by voters, even though it may not be legally permitted, but only tolerated. Whereas in the general sociological literature the notion of clientelism is often used to denote long-standing relationships of entrapment in which a monopoly patron (usually a landowner) deals with impoverished clients (peasants), electoral clientelism may or may not involve the asymmetry of monopolistic supply by a hegemonic ruling party and the dispersed demand by a disorganized electorate. In contemporary electoral democracies, citizens may be dealing with situations of competitive clientelism that pit rival parties and their candidates against each other, each trying to attract clients with various targeted inducements, presented in a more or less credible fashion.

A further instrumental accountability strategy involves valence competition. On valence issues, public opinion clusters on one side of the issue (motherhood and apple pie), while no one takes the opposite position (e.g. on economic growth, national defense). Politicians compete by advertising their personal and/or party's competence in realizing policies delivering universally valued benefits.

But fewer issues may be valence issues than appears at first sight: Everyone might want economic growth, but for some this calls for fiscal and monetary austerity with the possible consequence of higher unemployment while for others it requires fiscal deficit spending with potential inflationary consequences. In a similar vein, defense, environmental protection, and law and order cease to be valence issues, when we consider budgetary costs, losses in industrial employment, and erosion of civil liberties as consequences of the vigorous pursuit of what are seemingly consensual issues.

Politician-voter alignments of accountability are, of course, not limited to *instrumental-material relations* of clientelism or programmatic policy production. In electoral choice, it is known that *affective bonds* come into play as well, and politicians may systematically nurture such bonds and play on them to solidify their grip on electorates. Physical and cultural *trait-based "descriptive" representation* invoking the likeness of language, race, ethnicity, region or gender between voters and candidates is one such affective mechanism. Politicians' calculation is that even net of voters' instrumental expectations that a "like" politician may deliver more instrumental benefits (policy, clientelistic goods), sameness may breed sympathy and allegiance.

As another psychological mechanism, voters may also be enchanted by the *unique personal qualities of a politician* to arouse affection, faith or loyalty in her leadership (*linkage through "charismatic" authority*), or by the affective significance of a party's history and capacities for social integration that may be highlighted by campaigning politicians featuring parties' symbols, rituals, and legends of struggle (*linkage through party identification*). Of course, to some extent party identification, descriptive representation or even charismatic authority of a politician may be nothing but tracers of "running tallies" (Fiorina 1981) that track agents' past instrumental achievements (program/policy or clientelistic service) for their

constituencies and enable them to form expectations about future benefits accruing to them, if reelecting their agents. But at the same time emotional allegiance to politicians and parties may involve a kernel of irrational, spontaneous identification that does not dissolve into instrumental calculation.

In the global comparison of democracies, we might want to describe and compare *distinct profiles of instrumental and affective accountability as linkage mechanisms politicians create in their relations to citizens*. How do such linkage profiles vary across parties and across polities? What role does programmaticism play relative to other linkage efforts? Generating a stock of descriptive information on linkage mechanisms constitutes a prelude to a more profound investigation into the differential “qualities” of democracy that have emerged across the globe. Such analysis, in turn, would enable scholars to probe into the origins of linkage profiles as well as the consequences of such profiles for the fortunes of democratic governance.

2. Linkage Mechanisms and Programmaticism of Parties

Max Weber, in (1919; English 1946) “Politics as a Vocation”, was one of the first to note how parties used different means to link to the electorate. First, he noted, there are parties that rely on the charismatic authority of great personalities, supplemented by a subordinate army of faceless legislators and party administrators under conditions of universal suffrage and mass campaigning. Second, there are programmatic “world view” parties, such as the Social Democrats and the Catholic Center Party in the early 20th century in Germany. These parties maintain “principled political views who have maintained that their members, at least subjectively, represented bona-fide *Weltanschauungen*.” (Weber 1919: 111). Weber thought that there was a trade-off between such programmatic parties and high-quality leadership: Abstract program parties attract mediocre personalities, compared to entrepreneurial parties centered on the personality of a party founder or leader.³ Both personality-centered and programmatic parties, in turn, are set apart from patronage-based parties that are configured around a boss interested in nothing but “power alone, power as a source of money, but also power for power’s sake” (Weber 1919: 109). Bosses build organizations of “unprincipled parties,” adjusting their platforms to the whims of the electorates, but most of all compensating their followers with the power of patronage, the spoils system. Weber (1919: 108) invoked the historically implausible number that the U.S. Presidency alone commanded 300,000 to 400,000 official appointments, or well over 1% of the total U.S. labor force at the beginning of the twentieth century!

Already in Weber, programmaticism emerges as the effort politicians make to attract voters based on commitments to general policies, delivering public goods or large-scale club goods that benefit classes and social strata. Alternatively, politicians can feature personal charismatic qualities of leadership or provide targeted inducements to individual followers. Programmaticism involves “*Weltanschauung*,” which may be loosely translated as ideology, a system of interlocking beliefs about how the world works, what social order is preferable, and how to reach that order by political means.

³ “Ideally, one of their [i.e., the personality based parties’] mainsprings is the satisfaction of working with loyal personal devotion for a man, and not merely for an abstract program of a party consisting of mediocrities.” (Weber 1919: 103)

Weber's student Robert Michels and one of his intellectual heirs in the study of political parties, Otto Kirchheimer, were much less interested in varieties of linkage mechanisms—programmatically and its alternatives—than in the actual positions politicians and parties take on programs. Michels' (1911) famous book on oligarchy outlines intra-party organizational mechanisms as the cause that is said to make party leaders abandon the programmatic radicalism of principled parties and opt for acquiescence to the status quo. For Kirchheimer (1966), it is more a logic of electoral competition for uncommitted voters in the race to maximize seats that causally induces party strategists to abandon the sharp representation of societal groups and classes in their programs in favor of an opportunistic "catch-all" strategy that seeks votes by the rapid adjustment of policy appeals to short-term policy agendas and more generally by moving into a centrist programmatic position. Kirchheimer did expect, however, that with more centrist positions parties also adopt a programmatic vagueness we might conceive as a waning commitment to programmaticism.

The choice among alternative linkage strategies peripherally reappears with Duverger's (1954) distinction between "internally" and "externally" created parties. "Internal" parties already present in legislatures still elected under census restrictions were more able to rely on patronage, whereas "external" parties supported by the disenfranchised invoke policy principles and programs. Duverger clearly expected programmaticness to be higher in external than internal parties, but also diagnosed a gradual diffusion of programmaticness from socialist, workerist parties of the left across the whole of the party system, together with an adoption of the left's mass party organizational form ("contagion from the left").

In the most influential text on party competition in the post-World War II decades, Anthony Downs' (1957) *Economic Theory of Democracy*, at first sight appears to be primarily concerned with parties' positions, *assuming* that they can be conceived programmatically. What became the standard formulation of his famous median voter theorem in subsequent formal theory does not concern parties' intensity of programmatic efforts, or their efforts to supplement or supplant programmatic appeals with other linkage mechanisms. But Downs himself offers at least two other variants (competing or complementary with the standard version?) of the median voter argument that postulate a weakening of parties' programmaticness in two party systems with rational voters, rather than merely a centrist positioning:

(1) **The standard formulation: Convergence of parties to the median voter.** In two party systems with no new party entry that compete in a single left-right positional (not valence) ideological policy dimension with compulsory voting and voters rationally supporting the party closest to them, to list only some of the theorem's critical premises,⁴ parties locate their programmatic appeals near the median voter (Downs 1957: 118). Moreover, rational voters who wish to minimize the distance between their personal ideological ideal points and that of the party coming to office insist that parties maintain programmatic commitments intertemporally in responsible ways and act reliably on pre-election commitments, once elected to office (p. 105). For rational voters to support any party it must show programmatic coherence and "rational immobility" (Downs 1957: 110) of ideological position.

⁴ For a detailed analysis of premises, see Grofman (2004) and Adams et al. (2005).

(2) First alternative formulation of the median voter theorem: In two-party systems, parties rationally create *ambiguity about their policy positions* and create uncertainty and overlaps among them so as to capture the maximum range of political preferences (Downs 1957: 135-6). Parties try to be as “equivocal as possible about their stands on each controversial issue. And since both parties find it rational to be ambiguous, neither is forced by the other’s clarity to take a more precise stand.” The “fog of ambiguity” over party programs becomes an equilibrium in two party systems, although this obscurity is limited by the threat that rational voters will abstain, if they cannot discern any programmatic commitment (p. 107 and 136). This gives rise to a rationality crisis (see below). While the first formulation of the median voter theorem builds on a unitary actor conceptualization of political parties forcefully asserted early in Downs’s study (pp. 25-6), the alternative formulation of the median voter theorem would be compatible with a view of parties as loose coalitions of politicians with rather disparate views.

(3) Second alternative formulation of the median voter theorem: Only in multi-party systems are voters “likely to be swayed by doctrinal considerations—matters of ideology and policy,” but not in two-party systems. First of all, somehow two party systems instill in voters a massing in the “moderate range where both ideologies lie.” (Downs 1957: 127) But this surprising turn toward endogenizing voter preferences is not the key point to which we want to draw attention. It is rather that voters then give parties incentives to *compete on non-positional or even non-programmatic accountability mechanisms* altogether—valence, charismatic authority or party identification, as discussed above. Duverger expresses this by focusing on the electoral demand side of the competitive situation, asserting that in two-party systems voters “are likely to view personality, or technical competence, or some other nonideological factor [here we could bring in party ID or descriptive representation!] as decisive.” (Downs 1957: 127) In multi-party systems, rational voters not only can find a closer approximation between their ideal points and the parties’ ideological appeals. Here the competitive complexity in fact makes ideology “a decisive factor in one’s voting decision” and thus motivates parties to emphasize programmatic appeals more in their linkage strategies.

Maybe Downs should have devoted more space to alternative democratic accountability linkage strategies in his book, because he ultimately saw programmatic party competition as an impossible, contradictory ideal. He diagnoses a “rationality crisis” of democracy (Downs 1957: 139) in both two-party and multi-party systems. In the former, rational voters have no reason to turn out, because parties either converge on policy or obscure their positions and/or compete non-programmatically. In the latter, voters can rationally support a party close to their ideal point in the act of voting, but since parties most likely must enter government coalitions, these programmatic principal-agent linkages will be compromised and rendered irrelevant at the level of government formation and policy (Downs 1957: chapter 9).

After Downs, a few contributions to the formal literature on party competition have incorporated variability of programmaticism along these two lines of reasoning already anticipated in the classic treatment, but next to no systematic empirical work has complemented these efforts. First, a few formal models have explored conditions under which parties embrace

ambiguous policy appeals and the consequences of ambiguity for voter choices.⁵ Second, there is a small literature that considers supplements or alternatives to programmatic appeals, for example of how parties choose between “policy” and “pork” appeals to attract votes, or between “policy” and “clientelistic” voter inducements.⁶

The main comparative parties and party system literature, however, always remained more interested in the substance of programmatic appeals and the position of parties on programmatic dimensions, *presupposing* that parties voice unambiguously programmatic stances as a critical linkage strategy to mobilize vote support. This applies to the early literature about cleavages in party systems (most prominently Lipset and Rokkan 1967) which primarily investigated how socio-demographic groups aligned with parties, invoking specific programmatic appeals geared to the demands of their target constituencies. But it also characterizes more recent theories of selective issue competition (Budge and Farlie 1983) that gave rise to the most comprehensive comparative empirical effort to record programmatic party appeals around the world, the Comparative Party Manifestoes Project (CMP). The CMP data set counts the proportion of pre-election party manifestoes devoted to specific programmatic bits, namely issue positions. The data set can therefore be employed to compare the parties’ *relative emphasis* on *different programmatic issues* and more arguably the parties’ overall issue positions, for example on a generalized left-right dimension, in as much as parties’ salience scores on issues can be recoded as positional signals to the electorate.⁷ What the CMP certainly cannot do, however, is speak to the relative effort parties make in their programmatic appeals. Who would accept the gross word length of a manifesto, or the proportion of the total manifesto devoted to indicating policy positions, as a valid measure of a party’s programmatic effort? Nor does the CMP dataset speak to complementary or alternative linkage strategies parties may employ to attract voters.

More in the spirit of the question of linkage mechanisms is the literature on legislative roll-call votes, party discipline, and defection from party caucuses. Much of this literature originates in studies of the U.S. Congress that employ roll-calls to uncover both the substance (number and content of issue dimensions) of policy alignments among members of Congress as well as the degree to which policy alignments coincide with partisanship over time.⁸ It has recently exploded due to the unquestionable intensification of conditional partisanship in the American legislature combined with a polarization of policy positions at least at the elite politicians’ level, if not the electoral level of mass constituencies itself.⁹

⁵ See especially Snyder and Ting (2002) who generate one equilibrium in two-party systems in which parties, lacking powers to restrict candidate entry or to screen candidates choose extreme platforms under conditions of high candidate heterogeneity of positions in order to remain informative to voters and instigate greater ideological purity.

⁶ As recent reviews and elaborations of these contributions, see especially Stokes (2005), Nichter (2008), Dunning and Stokes (2010) and especially Kselman and Rozenas (2009).

⁷ For recent efforts to use the CMP to map parties’ left-right positions over time and across space, see Klingemann et al. (2006).

⁸ The literature is vast and deep and obviously does not need to be reviewed here. Prominent theoretical and historical treatments include Aldrich (1995), Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and Aldrich and Rohde (2001).

⁹ Also this literature is vast, deep and full of controversy. As useful entries conveying the positions of the antagonists, see Herrington (2009), Layman et al. (2006) and Nivola and Brady (2006).

At the elite level, however, the literature on legislative policy alignments leaves an important ambiguity by focusing on the *output* of the legislative process, roll-calls. If the partisanship of votes is high, is it due to *external “incentives”* (institutional rewards and punishments) that makes candidates and legislators comply with partisanship or is it due to *the actors’ internalized convictions*, and more specifically programmatic convictions (rather than, for example, descriptive group affiliations or affective party identification) that makes parties cohesive?¹⁰ Cross-sectional and inter-temporal comparison lets us identify quite well the share of legislative roll-call unity that may be accounted for by external institutional incentives. In fact, a great deal of the literature on legislative party cohesion in comparative politics is inspired by institutionalist theoretical arguments.¹¹

But it is much harder to determine the variance in parties’ legislative discipline that is unaccounted for by institutional constraints, and that appears to often be the larger share, particularly once we take the endogeneity of institutional arrangements into account. Moreover, as argued above, *knowing the underlying heterogeneity of programmatic positions* among the relevant actors that may contribute to the formation of a dominant coalition inside a party *may help rational voters to determine how volatile the legislative position of a party may be*, even if leaders exercise discipline over its caucus members.

As an important step in the analysis, therefore, it would be useful to have an *independent measure of the heterogeneity of relevant partisan actors’ programmatic issue positions inside parties*, whether at the level of party activists (e.g. party conventions) or at that of party leaders (legislators and executives), as a baseline estimate to work from in comparative analysis. For the U.S., some of this evidence might be gleaned from party convention surveys, but to our knowledge the variability of ideological policy and programmatic cohesiveness in party conventions has never been systematically employed to account for variability in “conditional party government” at the legislative level in subsequent terms, as measured by roll-call votes. Beyond the United States, we have only rather limited fragmentary coverage of information about the policy or programmatic cohesiveness of parties.¹² Moreover, in comparative research, of course, there are even stringent limits to data collection on roll-calls, as many legislatures do not report them and as the significance and procedural status of roll-call votes varies across legislatures, even where they are reported.

The two most influential texts signaling a renewed interest in the question of programmaticism of political parties in a comparative context were probably by Shefter (1978) and Cox (1987). The former compares the extent to which patronage politics is displaced by programmatic competition, building on Duverger’s (1954) distinction between internal and

¹⁰ On the distinctions, see Morgenstern (2004), chapter 4. There is also a potential institutional endogeneity problem in that (un)cohesiveness of beliefs induces the choice of institutions exercising lesser or greater discipline.

¹¹ An early example is Katz (1980) about the lack of cohesiveness in ballot systems with personal preference votes. More generally see Carey and Shugart (1995), Ames (2001), or Morgenstern (2004) who explicitly examines non-institutional sources of party cohesiveness as well.

¹² One of the paper author’s own collaborative work on postcommunist democracies involved data on the programmatic cohesiveness of party legislators and functionaries in five countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia in the first half of the 1990s) (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Kitschelt and Smyth 2002), as well as the Salamanca dataset of Latin American legislators with usable information on twelve legislatures (Kitschelt et al. 2010, especially chapter 5).

external parties, but critically adding the degree to which government bureaucracies operated according to formal-bureaucratic professionalism or patronage penetration. For Shefter, it is the interaction of “internal” party status with availability of public office to clientelistic politics due to the lack of a formal-bureaucratic state apparatus that undercuts programmaticism, whereas formal-bureaucracy and then even more so the growth and ultimately success of “external” parties to capture executive power undercuts patronage regimes.

Shefter had to finesse the problem that Britain had no professional civil career bureaucracy until the mid-19th century, yet its “internal” parties began to reject patronage politics and clientelism just at the time when his explanation would call for them—with the enfranchisement of formerly “external” parties with a radical challenger programmatic agenda the incumbents could most expediently fight off by intensifying their clientelistic constituency linkages. This is where Cox’s (1987) explanation for Britain comes in. The combination of electoral enfranchisement and mass politics that made patronage or vote buying expensive and difficult with intensifying media attention to the legislature and legislators animated members of the House of Commons to focus increasingly on policy programs. This effect was amplified by redistricting within Britain’s single or low member district voting system. Since the legislature could not cope with individual MPs flooding it with a torrent of proposals for constituency service, legislators had incentives to pool their resources at the national level under party labels and seek the support of cabinet members, with the winning party then being able to control the government implementation of policies that might deliver collective or club goods across the United Kingdom. Cox’s explanation of partisan and legislative change in Britain from patronage to policy is enlightening. But obviously his historical materials did not allow him to probe into the programmatic coherence of political parties. He had to build his case empirically on legislative proposals and decisions, not the intra-party process of opinion formation and preference coordination.

An implicit proposition to be taken from both Shefter’s and Cox’s work is that parties may face a trade-off between clientelistic, patronage and vote-buying based linkage strategies and programmatic appeals. We will test here whether our measures of clientelism and programmaticism deliver a relationship of trade-off, independence, or mutual reinforcement between the two accountability strategies. Given the overwhelming support in the literature for the trade-off hypothesis, not finding a trade-off between measures of clientelism and programmaticism might indicate not the provocative rejection of common wisdom, but signal problems of construct validity of one or both operational measures of the linkage mechanisms.

One final literature that may feed into contemporary work on programmaticism originates with Samuel Huntington’s (1968) proposition that institutionalizing political participation is a key ingredient contributing to the stability of modern mass democracies. With regard to parties, at a minimum this means longevity of organization over a long run of electoral terms and separation of the personality of founders/leaders from the organizational identity through procedures of regularized leadership turnover. In a rightly famous article, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) have taken up this proposition and operationalized criteria of party (system) institutionalization for Latin America that have been widely adopted or modified in subsequent studies. We wish to emphasize here, however, that institutionalization is not another term for programmaticism, but a clearly distinct theoretical concept. Institutionalization denotes

organizational procedures separating parties from political personalities. This may be a necessary, but insufficient condition for programmatic parties: Because it is not easy to craft a collective preference function (“program”), it may take an extended, temporally drawn-out process of deliberation to arrive at it and then to revise it as conditions (voter demands) change. But also clientelistic parties may have reasons to invest in a large and stable party organization (“machine”), even though it may not necessarily depersonalize organizational control as much as parties emphasizing programmatic linkage mechanisms.¹³

Against the backdrop of this sketchy literature review and our intermittent reflections, let us now formulate three benchmarks for parties “effort” to build programmatic accountability linkages.

(1) First of all, a range of a party’s key personnel *must explicitly and repeatedly take positions on issues*, or at least *on underlying principles* (e.g. about equality, individual autonomy) that allow them to generate positions on a range of operational policy issues (e.g. social policy), and highlight the *salience* of such principles/policies for the party. Whether and how these salient positions are communicated orally (through the media, the legislature) or in written declarations (such as pre-election party manifestoes) may be highly idiosyncratic to national or even local particularities.

(2) Second, the range of a party’s key personnel that does take stances on issues and principles should do so not in contradiction to each other. In other words, the *issue proclamations voters obtain from parties* through various channels of communication should be characterized by a fair amount of *coherence or cohesiveness*. Cohesiveness reduces the uncertainty rational policy-motivated voters may have over the future actions of a party and thus make its pronouncements more *credible*. Because observed roll-call unity in legislatures may or may not reflect programmatic cohesiveness of parties, it constitutes an unsatisfactory substitute for a direct measure of parties’ programmatic efforts.

(3) Third, examining a field of parties, and reverting back to Downs (1957), programmatic politics requires *distinctiveness of each party’s appeals to policy or principle* to permit the construction of a programmatic citizen-politician linkage in which rational policy-motivated voters can meaningfully distinguish among parties. Only when parties actually take different positions is programmatic democratic competition possible. Otherwise, a rationality crisis ensues. Of course, this does not require a linear relationship between programmaticism and party system polarization: The most extremely polarized party system is not necessarily the most programmatic, or more programmatic than a less polarized system. But within reasonable bounds, to be possibly determined empirically, more distinctiveness of parties—spreading out of positions in the issue space—does facilitate programmaticism, i.e. the ability of politicians to communicate party positions and that of voters to receive and understand them.

¹³ See on this question the paper by Kitschelt and Kselman for the same 2010 APSA panel.

3. The Question of “Reinforcement” and/or “Trade-Offs” Between Linkage Mechanisms of Accountability, Particularly Clientelism and Programmatic Linkage Strategies

As a final point before starting the empirical analysis, let us briefly examine the question of trade-offs, independence, or mutual reinforcement of linkage mechanisms, particularly of clientelism and programmaticism. On the face of it, if there is a large variety of instrumental and affective linkage mechanisms in the toolkit of democratic politics that may attract voters to a party, why do politicians not use all of them in an maximizing “catch-all” effort? Some voters may support a party because of its policy positions. But those who are indifferent or averse to them may be wooed with targeted material benefits (gifts, public sector jobs, preferential treatment in social transfers and access to medical services, etc.). If that fails, voters may support your party if you organize it as a social community affair (party ID), nominate candidates that are descriptively like voters you cannot get by other means (in terms of gender, ethnicity, race, religion...), or make sure your candidates are particularly entertaining, socially likable, morally sincere, rhetorically persuasive in their verbal and non-verbal communication, or testimony to the human capacity to overcome great adversities and succeed (all potential aspects of “charisma”).

We see at least three reasons behind the intuition that the two rational-instrumental linkage strategies are often, but not always in a relationship of trade-off. First, politicians operate under a *budget constraint*. As much as they may want to avoid it, at the margin they have to choose among alternative courses of action in light of scarce financial means, but also attention of their electoral constituencies and intermediaries that may prime and direct such constituencies (mass media, interest organizations, public intellectuals...).

Second, *electoral constituencies* may welcome some linkage mechanisms, but intensely dislike others. A party that wishes to pursue such constituencies is compelled to stay away from some strategies. For example, in most times and places, the social spearheads of anti-clientelistic drives have been better educated, urban voters in private sector jobs, such as financial, legal, or medical professionals. For them, clientelistic offers have no incentive effect. But they may see the downside for the economy of proliferating state expenses on private goods to partisan supporters rather than public or large scale club goods, or no public expenditures at all. Clientelism is a form of rent-seeking that undercuts efficient market allocation of resources.

Third, there is an *ideational argument*. Clientelism practices a particularistic distribution of benefits that flies in the face of universalistic postulates about equality of citizens and equality under the law. In public policy, the two principles may clash head-on so that politicians cannot have it both ways for different constituencies. For example, social policy benefits (pensions, health care, access to education) may be supplied based on general criteria of entitlement that apply to all citizens, or based on political discretion and favoritism that are likely to be associated with clientelistic linkages in electoral democracies..

Notwithstanding this general theoretical plausibility of the trade-off thesis, there may be instances where parties can sufficiently geographically and politically segment their supporters to combine clientelistic and programmatic politics up to a point. Moreover, large governing

parties may use public financial coffers to shell out clientelistic inducements and thus alleviate the trade-off (cf. Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007).

More generally, we imagine (and may test) the presence of a scenario where “external” parties of the politically and economically repressed mobilize as programmatic parties, without access to clientelistic resources. But eventually they reach sufficient popular strength or electoral success to capture government office and remold the economy in a redistributive state-interventionist fashion (e.g. along the lines of the model of import-substituting industrialization). While coming to office with a programmatic redistributive agenda and implementing some of it, they also create a mixed public-private economy with new opportunities for clientelism that predominantly gives opportunities to its own politicians and followers to practice clientelistic linkages. Sooner rather than later, such large, if not temporarily hegemonic ruling parties combine a profile of programmatic and clientelistic appeals.¹⁴

Beyond the relationship between clientelism and programmaticism, the literature offers weak theoretical priors for the likely association among these and other linkage mechanisms. There is some plausibility that clientelistic parties rely more on charismatic appeals: Charismatic authority of a party founder can be routinized more easily through clientelistic practices, as they advantage centralization and require less bargaining of the leader with his followers than the transition from personalist authority to a programmatic party.

We have few priors about the relationship between invoking party identification or a party’s competence to govern and any of the other linkage mechanisms. Deploying party ID as a linkage mechanism is available primarily to older, and typically larger parties that often have had opportunities to serve in government and may therefore also promote their capacity to govern. But both more programmatic and more clientelistic parties may have the qualities of institutionalization that enables them to draw on party ID and (valence) claims to governing competence.

4. Operationalizing the Programmaticism of Political Parties and Alternative Linkage Mechanisms

Hitherto a growing number of expert surveys has collected data on parties’ policy positions that could, in principle, be employed to create measures of programmaticism (for example Laver and Hunt 1992; Benoit and Laver 2006; Marks et al. 2002; 2006; most recently Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2009; and Wiesehomeier and Benoit 2009). But these data sets have several limitations. Numbers of respondents for the smaller countries tend to be too low to analyze variance among expert judgments of the same party as measure of uncertainty over a party’s programmatic stances. The surveys do not explore other linkage strategies than parties’ programmatic appeals. And competitive party systems in many areas of the globe are not covered, most notably all of Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and the few countries of the Middle East that would qualify for inclusion in the pool of at least semi-competitive party systems. Studies of

¹⁴ It is quite patent that we write this scenario with the experience of a number of Latin American countries in mind, where parties of urban wage earners came to political power with a reformist economic policy agenda, but, once in government office, began to practice clientelistic linkage building as well.

clientelistic linkage are typically confined to localized ethnographic field research, surveys in individual countries or small sets of countries, and qualitative comparative case studies. Most of the time, research tries to pick up clientelism indirectly, e.g. by tracking the variance in public employment levels. We are lacking a broader comparative grasp of the distribution of such accountability practices. In a similar vein, work on politicians' deployment of charismatic leadership, party symbols and identification, or descriptive identification is rare, particularly in a comparative framework.

Programmaticism indicators developed here derive from a study that makes a step to filling this void by gathering quite detailed data primarily on two mechanisms of accountability, policy/program and clientelism. This focus is supplemented by a minimum of information on other linkage practices involving politicians' appeals to voters by invoking valence/competence of electoral contestants, the identification with their parties, or the recognition and admiration of their leader(s) charismatic authority.¹⁵ The study, conducted in 2008 and 2009, is an expert survey in which 1,374 respondents, primarily political scientists and political sociologists with a specialization in their own country's parties, elections, and campaigns, as well as small panels of political journalists for national newspapers covering electoral campaigns, rated a total of 506 parties. The study covers 88 countries around the world that had at least a modicum of open party competition in the five years running up to 2008 and a minimum of two million inhabitants. The rules were bent a bit to include a few hegemonic party systems to achieve at least some coverage of the Middle East and extend coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Experts were asked to characterize attributes of partisan activities in their countries from the vantage point of politicians in a total of four subject areas:¹⁶

- *How parties are organized*: the party organizations' extensiveness, centralization, external associational and informal linkages to notables, and financial transparency.
- *How politicians provide targeted benefits to voters*: the effort made to provide targeted benefits, the kinds of benefits offered and the perceived effectiveness of such efforts to generate votes for a party.
- *How politicians can police the contingency of the clientelistic exchange*: Can parties monitor voters and, if so, can they punish defectors? Are clientelistic targeting efforts at all electorally effective for parties as a way of increasing their electorate?
- *How politicians appeal on programmatic issues*: Do parties take distinct stances on issues and, if so, on which ones? How are policies "bundled" and signaled through left-right placements?
- *An overall assessment of linkage effort*: In a brief final section, experts scored each party's efforts to mobilize electoral support along five different linkages: leader's charismatic personality, the attractiveness of a party's positions on policy issues, the emphasis on the delivery of targeted material benefits to electoral constituencies, a party's historical

¹⁵ On descriptive representation as linkage mechanism, we will rely on objective measures, such as the parties'

¹⁶ In many countries, experts completed the survey online. In about a third of the total, however, the survey was administered through paper questionnaires, often in fieldwork with project affiliated researchers visiting the experts and conducting the survey in face-to-face interaction. This applies especially to Sub-Saharan Africa, but also to some countries in South Asia and the post-communist region.

achievements and collective identity, and a party's competence to govern and bring or maintain economic, social, and political stability.

Expert surveys of party behavior certainly generate large measurement errors, but there may be no clearly superior research tool, particularly for broad cross-national research.¹⁷ At least four kinds of threats to the validity of the data collected in expert surveys stand out:

- *The **expertise** of the experts themselves may be limited, and differentially so.*
- *Familiarity with parties in specific national settings provides experts with divergent “**anchors**” to score party behavior in different countries, interpret the meaning of the scales on which they are rating parties. Contingent upon that anchor, similar scores on the same scale mean different things for different experts, particularly when their anchor points vary across countries.*
- *Experts may have trouble passing **aggregate judgments** about the conduct of parties across their polities, as they recognize the localized diversity of party practices. Measurement error creeps in through **data aggregation**.*
- *The selection process of experts is non-random and experts may be **politically biased** for or against a party and for this reason they may strategically distort their favored and their most disliked parties' scores.*

The survey built in a variety of safeguards to limit these distortions or at least to detect them, such as questions about the experts' personal closeness to each party's position and her confidence in her own judgment of a party's affairs on different thematic baskets of the survey. Nevertheless, the considerable “noisiness” and measurement error of a global cross-national data set of expert judgments commands certain precautions in the use of and inferences drawn from the data. Broad global comparisons may be more adequate given the coarseness of the expert scores than fine-grained comparisons of otherwise similar parties and countries, particularly in the same region. Small differences between party and polity on linkage scores may result from measurement error more than substantively interpretable political phenomena.

For the development of programmaticism measures, the experts' scores of parties' policy positions are of critical relevance. All experts in all countries had the opportunity to rate their parties on five 10-point scales, three relating to different aspects of economic distributive issues, and two to questions of socio-political governance. The economic questions covered the intent of parties to engage in income redistribution (D1), state intervention in the governance of the economy (D2), and support of universal social insurance spending (D3). The two questions of socio-political governance concern the parties' propensity to insist on and defend national identity against multiculturalism (D4) and the role of compliance with traditional moral authorities and values (D5). At the end of the survey module, we asked experts to score parties on a 1-10 left-right scale (DW).

While the five issue questions are likely to cover a rather extensive range of potential policy issues, it is possible, however, that a country's national context features different specific issues that may relate to the big underlying issue dimensions tapped by the five standard issues,

¹⁷ For a representative overview of the issues, read the special issue of *Electoral Studies*, Volume 26, 2007, Number 1.

but that really capture local inter-party debates in much sharper terms. So as not to understate programmatic competition between parties, we asked “country anchors” in each country to help us customize the policy module of the questionnaire to local conditions and add issues that are instantly recognizable to local experts. For example, no survey on policy divides in party competition in Taiwan would be plausible that leaves out the issue of Taiwanese relations to mainland China. Asking experts to rate their parties on this issue in Japan, South Korea, or the Philippines, however, makes little sense. Country anchors therefore generated up to 14 additional policy scales in just about all countries covered in the survey.

The analysis of programmaticness, however, is not interested per se in the content of the policies on which parties take programmatic positions, but simply in the extent to which parties have identifiable policy positions. There is also no need that parties enable experts to identify distinct positions on ALL of the issues they score in their respective country. It is critical, however, to establish that on at least some issues parties make the effort to produce crisp policy appeals to attribute a measure of programmaticness to them. We also use the general round-about measure in which experts indicated how much each party makes an effort to compete for votes by programmatic appeals (E2) toward that objective.

While we cover here the construction of our measures of programmaticness in detail, we will use in the empirical analysis also measures of other linkage mechanisms, particularly of clientelism, that we introduce here only briefly. On clientelism, we employ three different measures at the level of individual parties. The first is the roundabout judgment in the summary part of the survey how much effort experts believe parties are making to reach out to voters with clientelistic targeted benefits (E3). For a more detailed and operational measure, we asked experts to assess how much effort parties are making in their country to provide five different classes of contingent goods and services to their electoral target constituencies. These included outright gifts of consumer goods (B1), preferential access to social policy entitlements (B2), public sector employment, or employment in government regulated private sector jobs (B3), government contracts or procurement opportunities for business (B4) and client influence over regulatory procedures (B5). Since experts’ party scores on the 1-5 scales of these five variables correlate highly, we created a single additive index (B15) running from virtually no clientelistic targeting (=5) to extremely high targeting efforts (=15). A third indicator of clientelism is a question about outcomes, namely the extent to which experts believe that parties’ clientelistic efforts produce actual votes (B11). We also have questions about parties’ efforts, techniques and success to monitor voting conduct of clients and to punish them, if they defect (section C of the survey). We will bracket these efforts for the purposes of the current analysis.

On three other linkage mechanisms, the survey includes the roundabout questions of part E only, asking experts to score the parties’ deployment of leadership charisma (E1), affective party identification (E4) and the valence issue of government competence (E5). We have no question in the survey about descriptive representation of parties, but we intend to cover this with “objective evidence,” for example about the share of women or ethnic minorities in parties’ legislative delegations. An itemization of the survey sections and questions in the survey can be found in table 1. Questions used for the current analysis are shaded.

Table 1 about here

Regarding parties' programmatic linkage effort, there are, of course, some simple, quick short-cuts to generate a first set of measures without complications. These are (1) the use of the roundabout programmatic effort attribution in the final survey section (E2) and (2) the standard deviations of experts' ratings of each party on the left-right scale (DWsd). We also (3) calculated the percentage of experts who declined to rate a party on the left-right scale as a tracer of lack of programmaticism ("no data" = DWnd). This measure is, in fact, moderately correlated with both DWsd and E2, but we will make no use of it here.

Let us now turn to the construction of a set of more sophisticated measures of programmaticism that takes advantage of the issue scores expert panels assign to parties on the globally common issues (D1-D5) as well as the nationally distinctive issues (D7+). As indicated above, programmaticism needs to measure the *cohesion* of parties' appeals on an issue position, the *salience* of the issue position, and the degree of *spatial distinctiveness* or polarization of parties on issue positions. Whereas the roundabout question about parties' effort to feature programmatic issues (E2) only scores the "enthusiasm" party activists and leaders display in emphasizing issues, this more sophisticated measure of programmaticism actually tries to determine the degree to which parties operationally accomplish some measure of cohesion and distinctiveness around salient issues that actually enables to rational-instrumental voters to make intelligent choices.

As a preparatory step for the construction of our programmatic party structuration (PPS) variables, we partially corrected for the experts' personal anchor points by removing the mean party judgment of each expert from each issue score in section D of the survey. To illustrate this, consider the following hypothetical experts P, Q, and R rating political parties A, B, and C on a 1-10 scale in Table 2 below.

Table 2 about here

Experts P and R give parties the same rank order in the policy dimension, but have different anchor points where they see the mean of the scale. Variance in the rating of the same party is here generated entirely by the anchor points. If we calculate each party's position as the difference from the mean position these politicians attribute to the parties, both P and R rate A at -2, B at 0, and C at +2.

Since we are not interested in the difference in respondents' anchor points, we first removed that source of variance and transform all judgments into relative scores by calculating each judge's mean score over all parties rated. The score for an individual party was then calculated by subtracting the original score given to that party by the judge from the mean score she gives to all parties. In contrast with P and R, judge Q sees much greater variance between the party positions, although her anchor point (mean over all values) is the same as that of judge P's. Q's relative scores would be -4, 0, +4. We are inclined to see this not as an anchoring problem, but a meaningful disagreement about the relative radicalism of parties, in this instance A and C.

After the correction for personal anchor points, we develop measures of programmatic party competition based primarily on three different attributes of programmatic politics: cohesion, polarization, and salience.

1. Cohesion – Parties employing programmatic linkages with the electorate will tend to have clear and cohesive policy positions. As a result, when experts are asked to judge the policy position of a party, they will be more likely to agree on that position if the party employs programmatic linkages on that issue. The measure we develop is based on the standard deviation of expert judgments for each party on each issue. A larger standard deviation indicates less cohesion of expert judgments for a particular issue. In order to make the score more comparable to the polarization and salience scores, we first standardized the standard deviation between zero and one¹⁸, and then subtracting this figure from one, making larger values indicative of more cohesive (and programmatic) linkages. To calculate national-level scores, we took the mean of the party-scores, weighted by party size¹⁹.

Admittedly, the cohesiveness measure we calculate from the survey is not ideal. It would be better if the (in)cohesiveness could be reconstructed from the politicians' own personal policy preferences rather than the summary judgments of external expert observers. Since the latter were asked to assign a single specific score to parties, as a whole, they are likely to weigh different factions and influential opinions inside a party against each other and then report the resulting tendency of a party's policy preference. This is likely to understate the true incohesiveness of issue positions inside a party leadership. Surveys among legislators and party executives themselves, by contrast, can capture this raw heterogeneity in a much more direct fashion.²⁰ Nevertheless, since the bias against finding policy incoherence in an expert survey is the same across all countries, the variance remaining among experts' judgments of party positions may still be a meaningful gauge to assess differentials of partisan programmatic appeals across parties and countries.

2. Salience – Other experts may form cohesive judgments of party positions, this does not mean the issue is necessarily an important issue on which parties link with voters. There may be some issues which experts are asked to evaluate on which parties may not take strong stances. As a rough measure of issue salience, we use the proportion of valid expert responses out of all responses, with a potential range from zero (many nonresponses) to one (no nonresponses).²¹ When large numbers of experts fail to provide a judgment on a party position for a particular issue, it is likely that this issue is not a relevant political issue. However, the converse is less likely to be true – there may be issues which have a high number of valid responses from experts, but are not necessarily salient. The party-level values are scaled to the national level by using the mean score of the parties, weighted by party size.

¹⁸ All figures have been standardized between zero and one. Unless otherwise indicated, standardizations are calculated as follows: first, the mean cohesion (or other) score of all issues for a party (or country at the country-level) on a particular measure is calculated. Any score which falls below the lowest mean cohesion score of any party (or country) is coded as a zero. Any score above the highest mean cohesion score of any party (or country) is coded as a one. All other scores are divided by the highest mean score, resulting in an overall distribution between one and zero.

¹⁹ Throughout this paper, party size is operationalized by the mean electoral support in the previous two elections.

²⁰ This was done in surveys of five East European countries as well as the Salamanca surveys of Latin American party legislators. See Kitschelt et al. (1999); Kitschelt and Smyth (2002); Kitschelt et al. (2010).

²¹ This measure is standardized by making all values less than 0.4 equal to zero and all other values having 0.4 subtracted from them, and divided by 0.6, maintaining a possible range from zero to one, but giving a larger penalty to nonresponses.

The main reason the survey did not include any independent expert scores on the salience of each issue for each party, such as do Benoit and Laver (2006), has to do with the economy of the survey. It is already very long, requiring on average over 250 judgments (provided experts scored the average of close to 6 parties/country for each question) and up to over 400 judgments by experts in countries with very fragmented party systems (10 parties).

But there may be also a substantive reason that deserves further probing why at least for our purpose a direct salience measure could be sacrificed.²² On some issues, particularly of economic distribution and social policy, it is the rare party for which experts do not score the issue as salient. On other issues, particularly those of socio-political governance (individual autonomy or collective compliance versus hierarchy and subordination; exclusive or inclusive conceptualization of citizenship and collective identities, multicultural tolerance) and the idiosyncratic country-specific issues covered in our survey, an issue is likely to be more salient for parties that take extreme positions on it. Thus the rights of immigrants to practice cultural tradition at variance with the host country's cultural habits may be most salient for parties that are most intensely for or most intensely against multiculturalism. Environmental issues are most salient to parties that demand more environmental regulation of business and consumers and parties that strictly reject them in favor of a free-market regime with little attention to externalities of production and consumption. Questions of women's rights to terminate a pregnancy resonate most with parties that are strictly in favor or opposed to individual choice. In other words, the spatial issue positions of parties are already likely to incorporate information about the salience of this issue for political parties. By examining the "issue extremism" of parties with our next and last measuring component, we thus pick up salience as well²³.

3. Issue distinctiveness or Polarization – The final attribute we quantify is the ability of parties to highlight a distinctive stance on issues. One may also call this a measure of issue polarization. Going back to Downs (1957), rational voters can link up programmatically to voters only if they can perceive meaningful differences in parties' issue positions. This is likely to require not just cohesiveness of messages and salience of the issues, but also an unambiguous distinctiveness of a party's message, when compared to that of its competitors on the same issue. Absent party polarization, voters are left with very similar party choices, creating incentives for parties to attempt to compete on alternative linkage mechanisms, as Downs submits as well.

At the party level, we measure this distinctiveness by calculating the mean distance of a focal party's position on the issue from the positions of each of the other parties in the system, with each dyad's distance weighted by the relative size of the two parties whose distance is being compared. We were a bit worried that this measure might discriminate against countries with high party system fragmentation, as the average distances between all neighboring parties are

²² There may, however, be purposes where an independent measure of issue salience is a clear advantage, as Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009) cogently argue.

²³ To confirm the relationship between polarization and salience, we calculated measures from the Benoit and Laver data set, which does include questions on issue salience. The average correlation between issue salience and system-level polarization came to be about 0.4. The correlation between issue salience and polarization for social issues (abortion, homosexuality, euthanasia) was even higher, at 0.76.

likely to be smaller than in a system with few parties. But this is counterweighed by large distances between the extreme parties in a multi-party system where parties may “fan out” over issue dimensions.

At the national level, however, we use a more common measure, the standard deviation of the parties’ mean positions on an issue, also weighted by party size. These measures are then standardized on a 0-1 scale in a manner similar to those employed to generate parties’ issue scores on cohesion and salience.

For each issue and party, we then create two types of programmatic scores. Given that programmatic structuration means a combination of parties’ issue cohesion, salience, and distinctiveness, we multiply cohesion (Co), salience (Sal) and polarization (Po) to generate a *CoSalPo score* for each issue/party. Given that all three components range from zero to one, so will their product.

Based on the classical formulation of Downs’ median voter theorem in two-party systems, however, programmatic competition should be possible among rival parties also with a minimum of distance and polarization between them. While full convergence takes away the capacity of rational voters to make an intelligent choice, minimal differentiations between the parties may sustain programmatic competition. To capture this idea, we also calculate an index of programmaticism that does not incorporate the polarization measure, but only cohesion and salience (CoSal). As we show later in the paper, generally measures which include polarization tend to be more powerful, effective indicators of programmatic politics in the sense that they yield sharper contrasts to other linkage mechanisms and may even suggest crisper explanatory accounts, something to be explored in other papers. The CoSalPo and CoSal scores form the core of our programmatic measures. Table 3 summarizes the definition of components and multiplicative indices.

Table 3 about here

The creation of multiplicative indices is worthwhile to achieve two things. First, in as much as the components are supposed to measure the same or related objects and processes, the use of multiple variables might reduce measurement error. Second, insofar as the measures actually capture different aspects of a programmatic linkage relationship, the multiplication of their components in the index construction delivers a representation of the theoretical construct that the index supposed to be measured. In our case, the salience of a policy for a party would be clearly insufficient for it to produce a programmatic party effort, provided the party has no cohesive stand on the issue *and* the central tendency of intra-party stances is not different from those of other parties (polarization). It is really the multiplication of the three terms that makes our empirical index a valid measure of the theoretical concept, not each component taken separately.

Thus, while we do not mind some correlation between our measures, and even suggested that salience may in fact also be scored to a certain extent by our measure of polarization, we are content to report that the components of our programmaticism index CoSalPo indeed appear to pick up different aspects of our theoretical object. Figures one and two display simple

scattergrams showing the relationship between the cohesion, polarization and salience measures in the survey at the national level of aggregation of party scores by polity only. The overall correlation between the three measures ranges from 0.25 to 0.30, which is positive, but not particularly strong.

Figures 1 and 2 about here

Examining figure 1 more closely, we can see that there are no countries where some experts refuse to score parties on issues (thus signaling that these issues must have low salience for those parties), while others who do score them see high polarization between parties. The reverse, however, does not pertain: The willingness of experts to assign a score to a party does not imply that there is a great deal of polarization. On some issues, salience may generate centripetal competition. But it is also possible that our measure of salience is imperfect. While low expert response rates most likely suggest low salience of an issue for a party's positions, the inverse may not always hold, however. Experts may rate parties on issues they do not deem salient for them.

Figure 2 shows a positive relationship between the cohesion and polarization scores, although there are a few countries off the diagonal axis, exhibiting low polarization and high cohesion. By mathematical necessity, where experts' scores of a party are highly dispersed (low cohesion), the mean party score must gravitate toward the mid-point of the scoring scale. Empirically, however, the scattergram shows that the relationship between the two measures is quite noisy. Chilean parties, for example, are quite polarized, yet also only moderately cohesive.

The next challenge in our quest for a parsimonious measure of programmaticism is to aggregate our issue-based measures of programmaticism for each party/country to the level of whole party program appeals. For a party (or a whole party system) to be engaged in a meaningful programmatic competition, it does NOT require that parties stake out crisp issue positions on **all** issues, or even all underlying policy dimensions or principles on which issues might map. It may be sufficient, if only a limited range of prominent issues generate programmatic alternatives and signal party principles to rational-instrumental voters. How do we aggregate the issues that enter this more holistic summary score of a party's programmatic appeal? Moreover, how can we ensure comparability of such an index, given that there are customized national issue questions included in the survey beyond our five core items (D1-D5) and the number of such customized issues varies across countries?

Because there are many plausible ways to answer these questions, we developed a whole host of measures four of which we describe here and two of which we will employ in the rest of the paper: We create aggregate CoSalPo and CoSal measures by selecting those issues for which each party (or party system/country) exhibit the highest scores and meet certain distribution requirements. Then we calculated the average CoSal or CoSalPo scores from the selected issues:

1. CoSal(Po)_econ: the three highest scoring economics issues (from D1-D3 and/or custom country questions clearly loading on economic distribution) . Party positions and CoSalPo scores on these three issues are anyway highly correlated (around .90).

2. CoSal(Po)_same: This measure calculates each party's average CoSalPo score on D1 (on economic distribution), D4 (on multiculturalism and national integrity), and D5 (on collectivism/traditionalism and individual autonomy), arguably representing three fundamental dimensions of modern politics, namely greed (political rules over the acquisition of resources), group (drawing boundaries between collective membership identity and outsiders) and grid (promoting or setting limits on individual autonomy and participation) (cf. Kitschelt and Rehm 2008).

3. CoSal(Po)_4: From the entire universe of issues on which experts rate a party (system), select three of the five common issue scales (D1-D5) that have the highest CoSalPo scores, but no more than two of them may be economic. Then add the highest scoring country-specific issue, or one of the remaining D1-D5 issue scores, provided the latter trumps the CoSalPo score of the available customized national questions.

4. CoSal(Po)_8: From the entire universe of issues on which experts rate a party (system), select the eight issues that have the highest CoSalPo scores.

There are, of course, a myriad of different possibilities for aggregating CoSalPo scores into a single programmatic index. We also calculated several other indices covering three, eight and all possible issue positions, and covering different categories of issues. We found that these other programmatic variables were generally similar to the four indices just described. Correlations among the various aggregate CoSalPo scores typically are in the 0.7-0.8 range, i.e. leave little meaningful variance that might substantively distinguish party (system) scores.

5. Comparing Measures of Programmaticism and other Linkage Mechanisms

Before actually comparing scores, let us step back and consider the operational content of our measures of programmaticism in the context of what constitutes a linkage mechanism as a whole, whether it is a programmatic or a clientelistic linkage mechanism. At a very general level, parties may make a very general linkage commitment (for programmaticism, for example: "We want to talk about the issues, not about personalities;" or, for clientelism: "Whether crooked or not, we'll put a chicken in every pot."). This linkage commitment has a highly symbolic charge. It is like an explicit or implicit "statement of intent" of how parties attempt to achieve accountability in citizen-politician accountability relations. With regard to programmaticism, we are even inclined to characterize it as a sense of parties' "enthusiasm" for debating policy issues. In our survey, it is most likely that we pick up this symbolic linkage commitment in the scores experts attribute to the parties in our concluding "round-about" survey section. Consider the phrasing of these questions:

"E2: Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party's positions on policy issues."

“E3: Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the capacity of the party to deliver targeted material benefits to its electoral supporters.”

Each of these questions ask experts to attribute intent to political parties, not performance in actually targeting resources (clientelism) or coordinating politicians’ issue appeals around a common party preference function or program. It is on these scores of parties’ symbolic intent, where experts’ scores may be most easily influenced by their own personal political biases. We pick them up in a question (DY) in which our respondents are invited to indicate how close their own personal policy views are to those of each rated party (1-10 scale for proximity, 1 indicating identity of personal and party position). Given the probability that our highly educated respondents do not see much value in clientelistic linkages (or have contempt for it), it is possible that for parties that are strongly clientelistic, but to which our respondents feel close, their score given in the assessment of the party’s symbolic programmatic intent and enthusiasm (E2) exceeds the score given in their assessment of the party’s operational capacity to coordinate its programmatic appeals (CoSalPo).

When parties make a symbolic commitment to particular linkage mechanisms, the proof of the pudding, however, is whether they can back it up by operational action. Our CoSalPo indicators come closer to tracking the operational efforts parties make in realizing their programmatic strategies in electoral campaigns.²⁴ Our B15 summary of goods and services targeted to party supporters performs the equivalent role for clientelism.

A bit trickier is to assess where another measure of programmaticism may fit in that we include in this paper only in passing. It is the standard deviation of experts’ left-right party placements. On the one hand, left-right semantics has a strongly symbolic whiff and lays out relations of conflict, competition, and collaboration among politicians that could be programmatic, clientelistic, personality or party-identification based. On the other, in many parties and party systems left-right placements more or less also reflect the operational programmatic commitments to which parties subscribe. By regressing issue positions on parties’ left-right scores we could explore the extent to which our left-right programmaticism measure belongs more on the symbolic or the operational side, but that could be the task of a different paper. Nevertheless, we report here standard deviations for experts’ placements of parties’ left-right positions and triangulate them with other measures of programmatic linkage.

Another aspect of the operational sincerity of a party in implementing programmatic or other linkage mechanisms has to do with the *organizational form* it chooses. To modify Marshall McLuhan, the organizational medium of the party is also a message. A party with a primarily programmatic issue appeal may opt for somewhat different organizational forms than a party with a more clientelistic attraction.

²⁴ As indicated earlier, we acknowledge, but for now ignore the criticisms that have been made of expert judgments as a technique to assess parties’ programmatic appeals in the methodological literature. Our survey also includes questions about the level of confidence experts have in their party judgments in different modules of the survey (see table 1). In a separate paper, we will analyze responses to this question to determine how (self-reported) knowledge affects expert judgments.

Citizen-politician linkages, of course, do not exhaust themselves in politicians' talk and posturing, but necessitate implementation through binding authoritative decisions and resource flows that relate to the symbolic and operational commitments parties make. And ultimately for politicians the key is whether talk and action translate into votes at subsequent elections. Measuring these aspects of democratic linkage mechanisms is obviously an agenda way beyond the confines of the survey instrument employed in this project. On the programmatic linkage side, it requires data on legislative activities, where roll-calls would come in handily, but also a coding of legislation and budgetary allocations to measure the extent to which partisanship translates into policy (e.g. Castles 1982; Klingemann et al. 1994). Both parties' programmatic rhetoric and operational policy measures may then be employed together as predictors of subsequent electoral payoffs, requiring a research design and a scope of data with an extraordinary scale and complexity. To our knowledge, realizing this agenda has been tried with some measure of success only once in a longitudinal study of U.S. politics (Ericksen et al. 2002).

Distinguishing symbolic, operational, output and outcome aspects of a linkage relationship is not unique to programmatic politics, but can also be applied to other linkage mechanisms, and for our purposes particularly clientelism. As with regard to programmaticism, our different measures of clientelism reflect different aspects of the overall arch of linkage building and maintenance. We even include a subjective measure of the electoral effectiveness of operational clientelistic efforts, something for which we do not have a corresponding equivalent in programmatic politics. Table 4 summarizes for programmaticism and clientelism how different measures derived from the democratic accountability survey relate to aspects of the whole linkage process.

Table 4 about here

Relationship Among Different Measures of Programmatic Party (System) Structuration

In light of these considerations, let us examine the correlations among different measures of programmatic politics both at the level of individual parties (N=506) as well as that of entire countries (N=88) (see Table 5). The full measures of operational programmatic appeal—CoSalPo_Econ and CoSalPo_4 described above—are very strongly related to each other as well as moderately strongly to the corresponding CoSal measures of programmatic appeals that leave out the polarization of party positions as an element of programmatic structuration in the competition among parties. Also the measure of programmatic structuration that may combine operational and symbolic charges—the standard deviation of experts' left-right placements of parties in a polity—is moderately strongly associated with the operational measures of programmatic party structuration both at the level of individual parties (between $r = -.36$ and $r = -.57$) as well as whole party systems (between $r = -.50$ and $r = -.68$). The sign of the correlations is negative, as a higher standard deviation of left-right self-placements means less, not more, programmatic structuring.

Table 5 about here

The correlations between the operational and the mixed-operational/symbolic measures of programmatic structuring, on the one hand, and the more symbolic-declaratory

round-about judgment of parties' programmatic enthusiasms in the summary part of table 5, however, is rather weak, ranging from only .27 (.28) to .40 (.41) at the party (systemic) level. Rescaling E2 to the same 0-1 range as CoSalPo_4, figure 3 shows the national-level aggregate figures of the parties' scores, weighted for electoral size, on both measures. There is a general tendency that CoSalPo scores are lower than E2 scores. In other words, experts have a propensity to score parties higher in their overall assessment of programmatic enthusiasm than is warranted by the CoSalPo_4 analysis of their scores on actual capacity to coordinate programmatic issue positions.²⁵

Figure 3 about here

This tendency is not randomly distributed, when we make some atheoretical geographical divisions that may have nevertheless heuristic value to generate hypotheses. Table 6 shows average differences in the parties' standardized symbolic and operational scores of party system structuration for different regions of the world. A positive score means that, on average, experts rate parties in a country as programmatically more enthusiastic (E2) than is validated by the operational measure of programmatic coordination (CoSalPo_4). The slope of the regression line in figure 3 suggests that, overall, experts are much more exuberant in attributing programmatic enthusiasms to parties than is borne out by our actual index of programmatic coordination. But this gap between programmatic intent and performance varies across countries and parties. It is particularly pronounced in Sub-Saharan Africa, but also in some affluent established democracies, most notably Norway and Sweden.

Table 6 about here

Why are symbolic and operational measures so weakly correlated? Fairly extensive analysis yields an answer that comes in three parts. They are detailed in table 7 which estimates a hierarchical linear model (mixed effects REML regression) with the difference between parties' standardized symbolic and operational scores of programmatic effort as dependent variable.

Table 7 about here

First, rather substantial effects occur at the level of individual parties and result from the interaction of parties' size and operational clientelistic effort (B15, see above table 4). Experts appear to attribute a "halo" of programmatic enthusiasm to large clientelistic parties that are actually not operationally coordinated around programmatic appeals. In our HLM regression, these relations show up in the combination of direct and interactive effects of party size and clientelistic operational effort on the (over)estimation of symbolic relative to operational programmatic efforts, with the interaction term having a positive sign and the direct effects of both variables a negative sign.

²⁵ On the standardized 0-1 scale the average difference between the two scores is a very substantial 0.3. Of course, what the figure glosses over is the fact that even in polities where on average experts give parties higher E2 than CoSalPo scores, there may be some parties, where the operational score of programmatic appeals is actually higher than the symbolic score.

More concretely, for powerful, often hegemonic parties that rely primarily on clientelistic efforts our operational measure of programmatic effort generates a very low score. But experts still tend to rate their symbolic commitment to programmatic linkage mechanisms (E2) as rather strong. To revert to the geographical breakdown in table 6, such large, clientelistic parties can be found most frequently on the African continent. Of course, the programmatic halo of hegemonic clientelistic parties is unlikely to explain why the discrepancy between programmatic enthusiasm and performance is so strong in Norwegian, Swedish or Hungarian parties, most of which are small and generally making preciously little clientelistic effort.²⁶

Second, the discrepancy between symbolic and operational scores of parties' programmaticism may be a result of *expert bias*. Our survey asks experts to indicate how close their own policy opinions are to those of each party they rate (variable DY). A low score means agreement, a high score disagreement with a party. Our regression shows that the more an expert tends to agree with a party, the more she is willing to score that party higher on programmatic enthusiasm than performance. We also found an additional example of expert bias. We asked experts in each module of the survey to indicate their degree of confidence in their judgment of the various parties (variable DX, with a high value indicating high confidence). Interestingly, the more confident experts are, the more they are inclined to (over)estimate parties' programmatic enthusiasms relative to their actual performance of programmatic coordination. Perhaps further analysis will reveal that this assertion of competence is politically motivated and consciously or not is intended to further assert the programmatic character of a (subjectively favored) party in the presence of evidence to the contrary (low CoSalPo scores, high B15 operational clientelism scores). But once again, this may only provide a partial explanation for the difference in experts' scores on our two measures. Also personal bias or motivated assertion of competence in rating parties are unlikely to explain why experts consider so many Scandinavian or Hungarian parties to be programmatically enthusiastic without attesting them programmatic performance.

Third, we also examined several party systemic features that may affect the CoSalPo scores without actually indicating weak programmatic performance. Maybe parties in more polarized and less fragmented party systems have an easier time reaching a high CoSalPo score, if distinctiveness of party positions—measured as polarization—is an ingredient of our measure. The estimation we display here, however as well as many other specifications we ran, never yielded significant coefficients for the two systemic variables. At least when we measure systemic polarization by the standard deviation of the mean left-right positions experts attribute to each of them, the sign of the coefficient is correct, but never reaches conventional statistical significance.²⁷ The outlier status of parties in Scandinavia and some other Northern European countries in displaying a rather large difference between programmatic enthusiasm and actual performance of coordination thus remains a mystery. The companion paper by Kitschelt and Kselman (2010) suggests yet another avenue of investigation, namely the role that party organization may play in undercutting actual programmatic coordination in certain parties with

²⁶ At the same time, we checked that it is not a context of lower competitive democratic quality, as measured by the Polity IV scores, that accounts for the propensity of experts to score parties' symbolic programmaticism higher than operational programmatic effort.

²⁷ And Norway, Sweden, and Hungary have neither particularly high nor particularly low left-right polarization scores. So we are hesitant to see this mechanism as an explanation for the particularly large gaps between programmatic enthusiasm and performance of programmatic coordination in these countries.

strong programmatic enthusiasms. But also this explanation, applicable only to a small set of parties, cannot be confirmed in a large-N statistical estimation.

Finally, ethnic divisions may lead to an overstatement of symbolic programmaticism. As Kolev and Wang (2011) show in their paper, where polities display substantial between-ethnic group differences in average incomes (BGI), and where hence also ethnic political mobilization around parties is high, such parties tend to make substantial operational clientelistic efforts. At the symbolic level of programmatic enthusiasms, but not the operational level of CoSalPo coordination scores, experts may (mis)interpret—with or without political motivation—such clientelistic practices of ethnocultural favoritism as programmatic commitments. Our statistical analysis does not support this hypothesis consistently, and also not quite in the specification displayed. It may be the case, however, that the interaction between party size and clientelistic effort (P31xB15) that unambiguously contributes to the disparate estimation of symbolic and operational programmaticism soaks up some of the variance that otherwise would be available for the ethnic BGI index to explain the same phenomenon.

The purpose of our close, quasi-forensic investigation into the difference between measures of programmatic politics is not to offer an exhaustive substantive analysis of levels and disparities in the parties' programmatic enthusiasms and actual performance of coordination. It is motivated by the methodological concern with the validity of our measures. It seeks to establish that the difference between our concepts is not simply measurement error, but driven by political logics that make each of the measures meaningful in their own way.

Programmatic Party Structuration and Other Democratic Linkage Mechanisms

As a further step examining the construct validity of these measures, we turn to their association with other linkage mechanisms. Table 8 offers simple correlations between the symbolic and operational measures of clientelism and programmaticism, as well as with the three other linkage mechanisms on which at least one general score was collected in the expert survey—leadership charisma, party identification, and competence to govern.

Table 8 about here

The most prominent question concerns the relationship between clientelistic and programmatic linkages. The table displays rather weak negative correlations between the symbolic measures of both linkage mechanisms at the party or the aggregate country level (-.30/- .41), but much stronger negative relations when we focus on the operational measures of both concepts, when experts' wishful thinking or the parties' halos becomes less intrusive (-.51/- .65). This negative association of operational linkage practices reveals a highly robust, albeit not all-encompassing trade-off between the two linkage mechanisms: Our measures thus confirm the common wisdom that most of the time, parties that engage in more clientelistic effort actually display less capacity for programmatic coordination.

But this relationship still leaves room for parties that combine clientelistic with programmatic linkages. What the conditions are under which strong operational efforts with both

linkage mechanisms can be combined is the topic of a future paper. Our hunch, indicated above, is that all-round linkage builders are large hegemonic parties that were originally founded as external parties challenging an established order with a strong program of social reform, but that got caught up in clientelistic practices, as they acquired political power and control over the economy. Conversely, we may also investigate which parties manage to build neither clientelistic nor programmatic linkages. Pending further investigation, we suspect that these are recently founded, smallish parties with strong charismatic appeals by an individual founder.

Had we included also our diluted measures of operational programmaticism that leave out the distinctiveness/polarization of parties' issue positions—CoSal-econ and CoSal-4—they would have displayed patterns of trade-off with clientelism weaker than the symbolic scoring of programmaticism (E2). We take this as a signal that policy differentiation, if not polarization, is a distinctive attribute and ingredient of an operational programmatic linkage strategy that makes combination with clientelistic linkage building particularly difficult. As Weber's (1919) depiction of U.S. machine politics suggests, clientelism works best as a pragmatic, sober, non-ideological practice involving money, votes, and offices, but not programmatic commitments.

In table 8, it is instructive to examine also the relationship between programmaticism and the other linkage mechanisms that receive only marginal attention in the democratic accountability survey. There is a slight, but consistently negative relationship between the deployment of charismatic authority by political parties and their use of programmatic appeals, both when scored as a symbolic commitment and an operational practice. The reverse holds for clientelism and charismatic authority which tend to reinforce each other.

Programmatic partisan politics, whether scored in terms of its symbolic expression or its operational effort, shows little relationship to party identification and valence politics with claims to a party's competence to govern. The singular exception is the relationship between programmatic enthusiasm (E2) and claims to a party's competence to govern (E5) at the national level (0.51), but the lack of a corresponding relationship at the party level casts doubt on the robustness of this association. If anything, it is clientelism that shows a stronger relation to the mobilization of party identification and claims to the competence to govern than programmatic linkage strategies, at least at the level of parties as units of analysis.

We explored in a variety of factor analyses (not shown here) the relationship among the different linkage mechanisms. As one might expect based on the simple bivariate correlations, a rather strong trade-off between clientelism and programmaticism is also revealed in these computations. In almost all instances, indicators of the two linkage strategies load on the same factor, but in opposite directions. Furthermore, clientelism is typically also positively associated with use of charismatic authority and in a mildly positive manner to party identification as well as sometimes claims to government competence. For the most part, however, valence competition with claims to competent governance as well as the mobilization of affective party identification load on a distinctive factor that is orthogonal to clientelism or programmaticism.

All this is plausible to us, but awaits theorizing and detailed empirical analysis in future papers. We take this fabric of relationships among our indicators of linkage mechanisms, both in terms of symbolic commitments and representations as well as operational practices, as indications that the expert survey does not generate simply noise and measurement error, but

indeed provides a glimpse of political processes that are hard to capture and analyze with different tools.

6. The External Construct Validation of Measures of Programmaticism

As a final exercise in exploring the construct validity of our new measures of programmaticism, let us explore without much technical and theoretical sophistication what is probably the empirically most robust and widely shared, but also intellectually uninspiring hypothesis in the study of linkage mechanisms. According to this hypothesis, poverty goes with a predominance of clientelistic accountability strategies in competitive politics and high affluence goes with an emphasis on programmatic party competition (for a review, Kitschelt 2000). A variety of causal mechanisms have been specified to make sense of and refine this simple correlation, but they do not concern us here. Our only purpose is to establish that our measures of programmaticism and clientelism are able to reproduce the basic thrust of the development hypothesis. It is an exercise in construct validity, not in explanation. If our measures, aggregated to the level of party systems, show no relationship to per capita GDP, this would be unlikely to falsify the substantive development hypothesis. More likely it would be a damning judgment of the validity of our measures if they cannot even capture the most basic, pedestrian hypothesis in the field.

Table 9 shows the simple bivariate correlations between per capita GDP in 2007 or 2008 based on availability, corrected for purchasing power, in our full sample of countries, and the various indicators and indices of clientelism and programmaticism. They have been aggregated to the national level, with party level inputs weighted by the electoral size of the parties. The figures bear out the development hypothesis overwhelmingly. It should be emphasized that the correlations of linkage measures with economic development are strongest for the operational measures of both concepts where normative political bias and judgment of the experts are likely to play a lesser role than in their scoring of parties' principles and declaratory linkage commitments.

Table 9 about here

In some ways, the information conveyed in table 9 is mixed news for the overall project of analyzing the causes and consequences of democratic accountability strategies. It is good news in so far as it suggests that the measures employed to observe political processes that capture the theoretical concepts of citizen-politician linkages are probably valid. It is bad news, as the overwhelming power of the development variable to account for clientelism, albeit less so programmaticism, may leave little to be explained by more intricate, but more interesting political factors. One must hedge this pessimism, however, by recognizing that there is a great deal of variance among parties in the deployment of linkage mechanisms that cannot be explained in terms of national or even subnational economic development levels. It may not be true that everywhere poor voters are more likely to be serviced by clientelistic parties and more affluent voters by programmatic parties. Moreover, development explanations may reveal endogeneity problems that are worth probing into.

Finally, while the relationship between development and linkage mechanisms appears extremely robust over the entire range of countries in a global comparison, this may not apply when we try to account for variance within regions or theoretically more meaningful subgroups of parties and countries. Consider the scattergram in figure 4 that depicts the relationship between the operational measure of programmaticism, CoSalPo_4, and economic development. Overall, established affluent democracies display less programmaticism than the regression line would suggest, with the notable exception of the United States as the by far most programmatic partisan democracy around at this present time. But once again, there is a subset of Scandinavian countries, joined by Ireland, Britain and Spain, that is set off far from the regression line, with Norway as the most egregious outlier.

Figure 4 about here

The most simple reason for these anomalies may be that our operational measure of programmaticism somehow discriminates against detecting programmaticism in stable postindustrial democracies. Maybe they are not sufficiently polarized, although our CoSal measures, taking out the policy differentiation/polarization component of the index, does not make Scandinavian parties appear to be less in an outlier status than the full CoSalPo score. Alternatively, there may be something going on among affluent OECD countries that limits or even reduces operational programmatic competition. These are obviously questions for future research rather than the current paper.

7. Conclusion: Future Research

The purpose of the current paper is to measure a theoretical concept, to place that measurement strategy within a set of complementary and alternative strategies, and to engage in a variety of tests to explore the validity of the measurement. The paper has not the standard format to set out a theory and its rivals to account for a particular phenomenon and then test the alternatives with empirical evidence. By developing new measures, it prepares the ground to convert theoretical propositions into empirical tests. Our examples of probing into trade-offs among linkage strategies and examining the association between economic development and the prevalence of linkage mechanisms in party systems served as examples where theoretical and empirical work can intersect, once we feel comfortable about the measures.

In this conclusion, let us simply itemize some strategies where we suspect the envelope can be pushed on the descriptive side, sharpening the measures and relating them to each other.

- First of all, the inexplicable outlier status of many Scandinavian parties on the CoSalPo measure bothers us. Maybe CoSalPo needs to be revised, but without simply sacrificing policy discrimination/polarization.
- Different and more technically sophisticated techniques to distinguish programmatic effort at the party and/or the party system level should be explored. At the latter, factor and discriminant analysis presents itself as one way to go. One could examine the strength of factors or discriminant functions in structuring the partisan alternatives and the kinds of policies on which they load.
- As suggested earlier, one could also determine the programmaticism of parties and party systems by regressing parties' issue positions—or factors/discriminant functions capturing dimensions of issue positions—on experts' left-right placements of parties. The explanatory power of such regressions may serve as a benchmark of parties' programmatic effort.
- More work will have to be done on the impact of bias and differential expert competence on the expert judgments that feeds into the construction of linkage indices. Simple correlations between experts' clientelism scores or their policy scores of political parties have already been performed and reveal a surprisingly modest level of bias in almost all instances. Almost invariably, degrees of proximity between an expert's positions and sympathy with a party has precious little predictive power for her scoring of that party on our various indices. Nevertheless, as our exercise in trying to account for discrepancies between symbolic and operational scores of parties' programmaticism above demonstrates, exceptions may prove the rule. Sometimes, bias does explain a component of judgment. Our analysis reveals that the same applies to experts' varying subjectively reported levels of knowledge and competence about parties. Clearly more work needs to be done about this topic and could conveniently flow into the methodological debates about the uses and abuses of expert surveys.

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Table 1: The Expert Survey Instrument

| SURVEY SECTION | QUESTION CONTENT | LEVEL OF OBSERVATION | SCORING RANGE (Measurement level) |
|---|---|-----------------------------|--|
| PART A ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND POWER STRUCTURE | A.1. extensiveness of party organization: local district offices? (1 = extensive) | party | 1-4, ordinal |
| | A.2. party organized social/community presence, ancillary groups (youth groups, women, cooperatives, athletic clubs...) (1 = yes) | party | 0/1, ordinal |
| | A.3. party reliance on local intermediaries (notables, religious leaders, neighborhood leaders) (1 = extensive) | party | 1-3, ordinal |
| | A.4. reliance on party members in nomination of legislators: Centralization of control? (1 = members involved in most districts) | party | 1-3, ordinal |
| | A.5. legislative candidate nomination: power distribution? (1 = national party leaders) | party | 1-4; nominal* |
| | A.6. control over national party electoral strategy? (1 = national party leaders) | party | 1-4; nominal* |
| | A.7. existence of stable organized factions within party? (1 = yes) | party | 0/1 nominal |
| | A.8.1-6. party-group linkages: business/professional associations, etc. (1 = yes) | party | 0/1 nominal |
| | A.9. relevance of public subsidies for party funding? (1 = most revenue) | party | 1-3, ordinal |
| | A.10. private funding-- compliance with financial regulation? (1 = most in compliance) | party | 1-4; nominal* |
| | A.11. public funding --compliance with national regulation? (1 = most in compliance) | party | 1-4; nominal* |
| | A.12. self-assessment: How confident in one's own assessment of A1-11? (1 = low) | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| PART B BENEFITS TARGETED TO INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS AND SMALL GROUPS | B.1. effort to give/promise to give consumer goods (1 = negligible/not) | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | B.2. effort to give /promise voters preferential access to social policy entitlements | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | B.3. effort to give/promise voters employment in public or regulated sector | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | B.4. effort to give/promise voters preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities (1 = negligible/not) | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | B.5. effort to give/promise voters influence over regulatory proceedings (1 = negl.) | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | B.6. overall effort to induce voters with preferential benefits (1 = negligible/not) | country | 1-5 ordinal |
| | B.7. change in effort over last 10 years; (much less = 1; much more = 5) | Country | 1-5 ordinal |
| | B.8. group member targeting: rural, urban, ethnic | party | 1/0, 3 dummies |
| | B.9. group member targeting: poor-middle-wealthy (1 = poor) | party | 1-3 ordinal |
| | B.10. parties' transmission belts to deliver targeted goods: unions, business associations; religious groups; ethnic groups; urban or rural; women; | party | 0/1, 6 dummies |
| | B.11. effectiveness of targeted benefits for political parties 1=not at all | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | B.12. targeting party loyalists (=1), strategic voters (=2) or both (=3) | party | 1-3, nominal* |
| | B.13. self-assessment: How confident in one's own assessment of B1-12? | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| PART C MONITORING + ENFORCING | C.1. monitoring of voters ... successful? (all parties) | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | C.2. group allies in determining the candidate's vote? (multiple 0/1 dummies) | Party | 0/1, 6 dummies |
| | C.3. open-ended: describe practices of monitoring | party | n/a |
| | C.4. Sanctions for non-delivery of the vote | party | 0/1 dummy |
| | C.5. change in politicians' capacity to figure out voters (4 = very strong) | Country | 1-4 ordinal |
| | C.6. self-assessment – How confident in one's own assessment of C1-5? | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| PART D POLICY POSITIONS | D.1. parties' policy positions – spending on the disadvantaged (against = 10) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.2. parties' policy positions – state role in governing the economy (minimal= 10) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.3. parties' policy positions – social expenditure (against = 10) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.4. parties' policy positions – defense of national identity and culture (high = 10) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.5. parties' policy positions – compliance with traditional moral authorities and values (high = 10) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.7. – D.N. parties' policy positions – custom questions tailored to individual Countries | (party) | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.W. parties' policy positions – left-right scale placements of parties (10 = right) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| | D.X. self-assessment- How confident in one's own assessment of D-1 – D-W | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | D.Y. sympathy/closeness to a party (same views = 1; different views = 10) | party | 1-10 ordinal |
| PART E SUMMARY JUDGMENTS | E.1. parties' mobilizational effort ...featuring a leader's charismatic personality? | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | E.2. parties' mobilizational effort ...attractiveness of the party's policy positions? | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | E.3. parties' mobilizational effort...capacity to deliver targeted material benefits | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | E.4. parties' mobilizational effort...invoke loyalty, party history, party ID | party | 1-4 ordinal |
| | E.5. parties' mobilizational effort...parties' claim to competence to govern | party | 1-4 ordinal |

* some of the options are ordinally scaled, but at least one option cannot be placed in the ordinal scale;

Table 2: Hypothetical Expert Judgments

| | | EXPERTS | | |
|-------------------|---|---------|---|----|
| | | P | Q | R |
| PARTIES | A | 3 | 1 | 6 |
| | B | 5 | 5 | 8 |
| | C | 7 | 9 | 10 |
| Mean party values | | 5 | 5 | 8 |

Table 3: Components of Issue Programmaticness

| | Party-Level | National-Level |
|---------------------|---|--|
| Cohesion | Standard deviation of expert judgments for each party. | Mean of Party-level cohesion measure, weighted by party size. |
| Salience | Proportion of valid expert survey responses | Mean of party-level salience measure, weighted by party size. |
| Polarization | Mean absolute difference of the mean expert judgment between a party and the other parties in the system. Weighted by the relative size of each two parties | Standard deviation of the mean expert judgment for each party, weighted by party size. |
| CoSalPo | Multiplicative index of party-level cohesion, polarization and salience measures | Multiplicative index of country-level cohesion, polarization and salience measures |
| CoSal | Multiplicative index of party-level cohesion and salience measures | Multiplicative index of country-level cohesion and salience measures |

**Table 4: Attributes of the Linkage Process
And Operational Measures Derived from Expert Judgments**

| | Principle and Symbolic Commitment | Operational Efforts by Party Leaders | Organizational Efforts to Realize Linkage Appeal | OUTPUT: Effective Implementation of linkage | OUTCOME: Vote production through linkage |
|------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|
| Programmaticism | Survey E2: parties' programmatic appeal to voters ? | Survey, Part D, CoSalPo: coherence, salience, and distinctiveness of policy appeals | Survey, part A: * extensive formal organization * not quite fully centralized party control; * transparent party finances; * no monitoring of voters; | * party discipline in roll-call votes; * legislative policies; * budgetary allocations | * policy feedback to electoral performance in subsequent elections? |
| | Survey DWsd: cohesiveness of a party's left-right placement | | | | |
| Clientelism | Survey E3: Parties' clientelistic appeal to voters? | Survey B1 – B5, index B15: Procurement of different categories of targeted goods and services; | Survey, parts A and C: * extensive informal organization; * fully centralized party control; * obscure party finances; * monitoring and sanctioning of voters; | * resources mobilized to allocate to party followers before and after elections; (from party or government coffers) | * electoral return on clientelistic resource investment; * survey B11: experts' subjective assessment of the effectiveness of the parties' clientelistic targeting efforts; |

Table 5: Correlation Among Indices of Programmatic Linkage Efforts

| | | E2 | DWsd | CoSalPo Econ | CoSal Econ | CoSal 4 | CoSalPo 4 |
|--------------|---|---|--------------|-----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|
| | | Country-Level correlations above diagonal | | | | | |
| E2 | Party-level correlations below diagonal | 1 | -0.41 | 0.34 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.35 |
| DWsd | | -0.32 | 1 | -0.63 | -0.58 | -0.50 | -0.68 |
| CoSalPo Econ | | 0.37 | -0.52 | 1 | 0.62 | 0.59 | 0.90 |
| CoSal Econ | | 0.27 | -0.36 | 0.70 | 1 | 0.84 | 0.58 |
| CoSal 4 | | 0.27 | -0.36 | 0.61 | 0.82 | 1 | 0.62 |
| CoSalPo 4 | | 0.40 | -0.57 | 0.84 | 0.58 | 0.68 | 1 |

Table 6: The Discrepancy Between Experts' Symbolic and Operational Judgment of Programmatic Structuration. Aggregate National Level

| Overall Average=0.3 | -0.26 to 0 | 0.01 to 0.2 | 0.21 to 0.3 | 0.31 to 0.4 | 0.41 to 0.5 | 0.51 to 0.83 | Average |
|-------------------------|--------------------|--|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|--|---------|
| Eastern Europe | LTU, SVK, YUG | POL, BGR, EST, LVA, ALB, MDA, HRV, CZE | ROM | MNG | SVN, RUS, GEO, UKR | HUN, MKD | 0.23 |
| Asia-Middle East | KOR | PHL, EGY, MYS, PAK, JPN | TUR, LBN | MAR, IND, IDN, BGD, ISR, TWN | THA | | 0.23 |
| OECD West | USA, FRA, CAN, GRC | PRT, AUT, ITA | DEU, DNK | AUS, CHE, NLD, GBR, BEL | FIN, IRL | ESP, NZL, NOR, SWE | 0.28 |
| Latin America | ECU | CHL, CLV | PRY, GTM, BOL, PAN, PER, NIC, COL | MEX, BRA, VEN | JAM, HND, URY, ARG, CRI | DOM | 0.3 |
| SS-Africa | NER | NGA | MLI | NAM, MOZ | BWA, KEN | BEN, SEN, ZMB, ZAF, GHA, AGO, MUS, TZA | 0.45 |

Table 7: Discrepancies between Experts' Symbolic and Operational Scores of Parties' Programmatic Efforts

| | | Coefficient | Std. Err. | z | P> z |
|---|---|---------------|-----------|-------|-------|
| Party level attributes | Electoral size of parties (P31) (average voter support in the most recent two legislative elections) | -.738 | .229 | -3.21 | 0.001 |
| | Clientelistic effort to provide targeted goods (B15) | -.0132 | .005 | -2.83 | 0.005 |
| | P31 x B15 | .059 | .016 | 3.72 | 0.000 |
| Expert Bias and effects | DY: Sympathy with a party's policy positions (low value = high sympathy) | -.015 | .005 | -3.05 | 0.002 |
| | DX: Confidence in one's competence to judge a party | .092 | .032 | 2.85 | 0.004 |
| Systemic conditions | Left-right polarization of the party system (DWpolwe) | -.046 | .033 | -1.38 | 0.167 |
| | Party System Fractionalization | -.007 | .179 | -0.04 | 0.970 |
| | Ethnocultural between-group income inequality (BGI) | .994 | .825 | 1.21 | 0.228 |
| constant | | .308 | .151 | 2.05 | 0.041 |
| Number of Observations | | 457 | | | |
| Number of Groups | | 80 | | | |
| Wald chi2 (8) and (Prob > chi2) | | 47.47 (0.000) | | | |
| Log restricted-likelihood | | 108.99689 | | | |
| Mixed-effects REML regression | | | | | |

**Table 8: The Association of Programmatic Politics
With Other Linkage Modes**

| | | Clientelism | | Programmaticism | | E1 | E4 | E5 |
|---|--|---|-------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | | E3 sym- bolic | B15 Opera- tional | E2 Sym- bolic | CoSalPo _4 Opera- tional | Charis- matic lin- kage | Party identif- ication | Compe- tence to Govern |
| | | Country-Level correlations above diagonal | | | | | | |
| E3 Clientelism - symbolic | Party- level correla- tions below dia- gonal | 1 | 0.80 | -0.41 | -0.59 | 0.47 | 0.37 | -0.04 |
| B15 Clientelism - operational | | 0.77 | 1 | -0.54 | -0.65 | 0.58 | 0.33 | -0.14 |
| E2 Programmaticism - Symbolic | | -0.30 | -0.44 | 1 | +0.35 | -0.28 | 0.05 | 0.51 |
| CoSalPo_4 Programmaticism - Operational | | -.44 | -.51 | 0.40 | 1 | -0.27 | -0.24 | 0.16 |
| E1 Charismatic linkage | | 0.41 | 0.42 | -0.14 | -0.12 | 1 | 0.17 | 0.10 |
| E4 Party identification | | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.10 | -0.08 | 0.16 | 1 | 0.32 |
| E5 Competence to Govern | | 0.35 | 0.29 | 0.20 | 0.03 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 1 |

Table 9: Linkage Mechanisms and Economic Development
(national level aggregates, weighted by party size: .nwe)

| | Clientelistic Linkage Effort | | Programmatic Linkage Effort | | |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Symbolic E3nwe | Operational B15nwe | Symbolic E2nwe | Symbolic-Operational DWsdnwe | Operational CoSalPo_4 |
| Per capita GDP (at ppp 2007) | -0.68 | -0.85 | +0.53 | -0.65 | +0.69 |




Figure 3: “Symbolic” Expert Programmatic Evaluation (E2) and “Operational” Programmatic Appeal CoPoSal 4.




Figure 4: GDP per capita and CoSalPo 4.