

# **DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER FOR PARTIES' ELECTORAL LINKAGE STRATEGIES?**

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## **ABSTRACT:**

Do specific electoral systems and executive-legislative arrangements make it more likely that parties compete for votes by offering citizens the contingent provision of targeted, private and particularistic goods or the non-contingent production of large-scale club or collective goods? Based on an original dataset scoring parties' efforts to engage in clientelistic and/or programmatic linkage with citizens, the paper assesses a variety of institutional hypotheses. It finds that presidentialism and district magnitude moderately affect clientelistic partisan effort, as long as no regional geographical controls are deployed. The influence of institutions on parties' efforts to mobilize programmatic appeals is more elusive. Overall, the impact of democratic institutions cannot be discounted, but it is overwhelmed by socio-economic forces and the cumulative experience of citizens and politicians with democracy. A variety of research trajectories is identified to push the research agenda beyond this preliminary paper.

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The highly tentative explorations documented in this paper are prompted by a wager I made initially in a paper written almost 15 years ago (Kitschelt 2000) and reiterated more recently (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007): Political institutions have less capacity to shape strategies of democratic partisan competition, and especially the choice between more clientelistic efforts or programmatic appeals to mobilize voters than some influential and prominent single-country case study contributions have suggested, when focusing on the ballot structure and district size of electoral systems (see Katz 1980; Ames 1995a; 1995b; 2001; as well as to some extent Mainwaring 1999). Whether other democratic institutions may have an impact on partisan strategies of competition and citizen-political linkage building has been less well specified and explored. Among the features of formal democratic institutions worth considering are executive-legislative relations or principles of jurisdictional delegation to a subnational level with elected representative bodies (“federalism”). I will confine myself in this paper to the design of the government executive and its relation to legislatures.

Major research on the institutional foundations of citizen-politician linkages in democracies has been based on evidence from individual countries or small sets of qualitative cross-national comparison, whether it involves narratives discussing exemplary features or episodes of politics in a country or a systematic sub-national analysis of linkage patterns across constituencies and/or across time. None of the existing research has been able to draw on a more comprehensive set of parties and countries covering a wide range of democracies, nor has it been able to pit institutional against rival explanations. Having assembled a global dataset on citizen-politician linkage strategies with a group of Duke doctoral students recently, I can explore just that. There is, however, a trade-off here. My measures of political linkage as well as of institutional arrangements are pretty blunt. Moreover, the dataset is exclusively cross-sectional and does not allow for intertemporal comparison. As a consequence, problems of causality and endogeneity cannot be tackled successfully: It is, of course, plausible that politicians shape institutions to accommodate citizen-politician linkage mechanisms that have worked for the victorious parties. In whichever direction the causality of institutions and citizen-politician linkage mechanisms may be running, however, is only the second question. It is predicated on an affirmative answer to the first question of whether institutions and citizen-politician linkage practices are, in fact, matched. If it turns out that the empirical correlation between the two is quite elusive and limited, as I suggest in this paper, it is idle to search for causal mechanisms.

Another potential handicap of my analysis is that the strength of the dataset is in mapping differences in linkage strategies among individual parties within and across countries (N=506), not just between countries (N=88). But since as a first cut we may surmise that institutions affect all parties in a given polity in roughly similar ways, the effective level of analysis is that of party systems and country units. Given the more limited number of countries included in the survey, this constrains the power of comparative analysis substantially, especially once missing values on some of the variables are taken into account.

The general message of this early draft paper is that with a rather simple methodology and rough measures of the critical concepts it appears that there is a non-random relationship between (some) democratic institutional rules and the citizen-politician linkage mechanisms that become prominent in a polity. But this relationship is a weak and fragile one and often associated with specific geographical regions where other factors—such as economic and political class formations—may furnish more plausible explanations for linkage profiles than the formal democratic institutions as such.

I will first sketch modes of linkage, quickly moving over familiar ground, and then lay out the theoretical arguments that may associate democratic institutions with the political practice of democratic

linkage mechanisms. I subsequently provide some exploratory empirical tests of the theoretical assertions that flow from the institutionalist research program, but primarily lay out the tough challenges that lie ahead to go beyond the semblance of plausibility generated by the findings reported here.

## **1. Citizen-Politician Linkage Mechanisms**

Democracy is the only regime form that stipulates formal rules of accountability for those who wield power. In the thinnest, “realistic” definition of democracy, it is a regime in which the citizenry can vote the power incumbents out of office. Presumably, citizens will opt for throwing the rascals out, when they do not “perform,” i.e. deliver what citizens expected them to deliver. Politicians make more or less credible commitments to certain actions *ex ante* before elections and once in office have to make a choice whether to stick to their commitments or defect. Citizens can evaluate their performance *ex post*, after their term in office, at the following election.

The content and the quality of politicians’ accountability to citizens, however are in dispute, as are the causal forces that shape what kind of accountability empirically manifests itself in a polity, at a particular time, in specific parties, or even through a unique politician. For purposes of this paper, an aspect of the nature of the accountability relationship is the dependent variable. What effort, if any, do politicians make to deliver benefits to citizens in exchange for their vote? Presumably, politicians make an effort only because they anticipate that what they offer will resonate favorably with (parts of) the electorate. If politicians are serious in their effort and succeed in making good on their promises, they might get a chance to be reelected. And what is it that voters find worth approving and give them reason to support a politician or a party, particularly if an *ex post* evaluation of past performance enters the consideration? I refer to the accountability relationship between voters and politicians as “linkage.” If voters choose among candidates and parties anticipating a particular performance and politicians make commitments to deliver that kind of performance, sometimes made credible based on their past record in the offices for which they compete or in other elected offices, it reveals a *citizen-politician linkage*. The conditions under which particular profiles of accountability appear are the independent variables, although it is well possible that the causality runs in the reverse direction. What interests me here is the “stuff” of the linkage and accountability relationship, i.e. the content of what politicians make an effort to supply in anticipation of voters’ demand for it.

In previous work, I have offered two different, but not contradictory ways to differentiate the “stuff” of accountability relations, i.e. the political performance considerations that may enter a political linkage (Kitschelt 2010; 2011a). What is it that voters demand from democratic politicians and/or politicians deliver? In the “simpler” taxonomy (figure 1), I distinguish six types. The big divide is between “expressive” and “instrumental” performances politicians may offer and voters assess. On the expressive side, politicians and voters may establish a bond of social identity. This common identification can be configured around (1) the political party itself and its collective history, (2) descriptive traits voters and party politicians share (ethnicity, religion, language, gender, etc.), or (3) the politicians’ unique personal qualities leader (“charisma”) that may be highly praised by electoral constituencies.. On the instrumental side, where voters expect a tangible and usually material advantage from the politicians’ performance, politicians first have to decide whether to deliver such advantages in a contingent or non-contingent exchange. In the former, the politician performs *only if* the individual voter or small group of voters actually deliver support for her candidacy (the vote and sometimes participation in the campaign). This requires some kind of direct or indirect monitoring and sanctioning capacity on the part of politicians, particularly if they deliver benefits before an election. Contingent instrumental citizen-politician linkage in most political science figures under the label of “clientelism.” On the side of non-contingent exchange, where politicians promise (and sometimes deliver) benefits to

large mass audiences, a further distinction needs to be made between political performances that involve valence issues or positional issues in the distinction first put forth by Stokes (1963). Valence issues are those where every voter wants the same kind of performance so that politicians can compete only on their differential competence to deliver it. Positional issues are those where voters want and politicians credibly promise to deliver different kinds of performances, benefiting different constituencies. I reserve the notion of *programmatic linkage effort* for politicians' investment in staking out positional policy claims and promising to act on them, if elected to office.

Figure 1 about here

In the second more complicated division (table 1), I have tried to strengthen the analytical foundations of the accountability/linkage typology at the cost of ending up with 10 rather than 6 possibilities for linkage. I distinguish now not only expressive and instrumental linkages, and conditional and unconditional linkages within the instrumental branch, but also four types of goods politicians may deliver, starting out from, but going beyond the familiar public goods/private goods distinction. This typology brings in explicitly *considerations of scale of the target audience to which a politician addresses her performance*. The upshot is that clientelistic, contingent exchange logically excludes the delivery of public goods and generates an empty cell there, as a good that everyone cannot be barred from enjoying, without taking away anything from anyone else (non-excludability and non-rivalry of consumption), obviously cannot be delivered on a contingency base. Empirically, also large-scale club goods that benefit social classes or sectors are difficult, if not impossible, to deliver in a clientelistic set-up. The domain of clientelistic politics is local club goods and private goods, but not all of such goods re clientelistically delivered. Politicians in fact deliver much "pork" and individual constituency service in a non-contingent framework without a quid-pro-quo understanding. Not all localized small club and individual provisions are clientelistic.

Table 1 about here

To make life a bit easier for the empirical analysis, I will not consider all 6 (or 10) forms of linkage, or the complex profiles in which they may occur. As a matter of inductive analysis, using empirical indicators of the six mechanisms as the empirical input, the dataset on which I am about to report yields three orthogonally separable dimensions of linkage (Kitschelt 2011b). The first dimension combines clientelistic and programmatic, positional linkages at opposite extremes of instrumental linkage alternatives. This "trade-off" between clientelism and programmatic competition is well within the intuition underlying both most formal modeling efforts in this area (Kselman 2011c) and existing empirical case study analysis, yet it is incomplete. There are, in fact, a respectable number of parties, and particularly large parties, that are able to combine both clientelistic and programmatic appeals. They will play a minor role in the story conveyed in this current paper later on. The instrumental clientelism-to-programmatic partisan appeals dimension has one expressive element, namely parties' featuring of charismatic leadership qualities. Such efforts are mildly associated with clientelistic politics. Where parties feature on this first dimension of linkage effort varies not only across parties, but also across countries. It is therefore the natural starting point to study the interface between democratic institutions and citizen-politician linkage strategies.

The second dimension of parties' linkage strategies is mostly an expressive dimension, but also involves valence appeals. It captures how energetically parties promote three activities, rallying supporters around party identification based on a party's history and symbols, projecting an image of competence as capable of governing (a valence appeal) and cultivating the personal appeal of a party's leadership ("charisma"). Across the board, parties that tend to score higher on this second dimension

tend to be larger and more likely in government or at least having past government experience. But there are few cross-national differences in parties' efforts on this second dimension, thus rendering it an unlikely candidate to feature in a story about the impact of democratic institutions on linkage mechanisms.

The final dimension of linkage assembles social group identification and descriptive representation in gender, ethnic, regional or religious respects. It turns out to be orthogonal to the two other dimensions. While I would not entirely rule out that systemic conditions may affect the extent to which parties choose to place themselves on identity politics, I set this subject aside for another occasion.

By bracketing the second and third dimensions of linkage formation, I also ignore complex interaction effects and configurations in the profiles of individual parties or the central tendency of all parties in politics, compared cross-nationally, on all three dimensions. For example, one could explore whether among politics where parties are more programmatic (dimension 1) those that tend to put more emphasis on valence competition (competence, party ID, dimension 2) and/or identity politics (dimension 3) occur in different institutional constellations than programmatic parties that deemphasize valence and identity politics.

## **2. Democratic Institutions, Clientelistic and/or Programmatic Linkage Mechanisms**

I subscribe here to a simpleton's definition of political institutions as formal, codified rules of the game that prescribe or prohibit certain types of actions on the part of designated role players (citizens or voters, politicians as candidates for office, and incumbents of elected or appointed political offices). These formal institutions come with negative sanctions applied to anyone's behavior that violates these prescriptions. The intent of the paper is to explore whether formal institutions of democracy have any "bite" in shaping parties' linkage strategies to electoral constituencies. This is not only a theoretically interesting question, but one with practical implications for agencies that strive to convey operational advice to political actors, particularly in fledgling democracies. For example, if we found that certain democratic institutions make parties more or less inclined to compete in a programmatic-positional fashion, political actors who welcome this practice might want to engineer institutions that improve the probability of this to happen in their own countries.

In this paper, I entirely focus on two types of electoral systems, rather crudely operationalized: features of the electoral systems (districts, ballots, vote choices) and the relationship between executive and the legislature in the sense of simple regime alternatives (presidential, semi-presidential, and parliamentary systems). Depending on the findings of this initial exploration, one might want to dig deeper and refine these measures. One might also look elsewhere in the institutional design of democratic politics to find determinants of partisan linkage strategies, such as the delegation of jurisdictions to subnational elected bodies ("federalism") or the institutional rules governing legislatures.

### **2.1. Electoral Systems and Citizen-Politician Linkage Mechanisms**

For the most part, the literature on the effects of electoral systems on public policy makes an analytical distinction between the provision of collective goods and pork. As indicated in table 1, this is not cutting it fine enough to single out clientelism. The provision of local club goods does not necessarily involve clientelism, when they are delivered on a non-contingent basis ("pork"). Many programmatic party commitments are to supply collective goods, but club goods that redistribute

benefits from some constituencies to others, or at least advantage some constituencies more so than others. With many club goods, what is considered a good by some citizens, is a bad for others who have to finance the provision of the good.

The local disbursement of benefits with public funds is not clientelistic, but indicates “pork” or “constituency service,” whenever the delivery of such targeted benefits is not part of a quid-pro-quo exchange with the understanding that the recipient is to promote the party’s electoral fortunes. Clientelism, therefore, is a special case of local goods provision. Theorems postulating that certain institutional rules promote the delivery of local targeted goods, therefore, are not specifically aimed at clientelism, but also include pork and constituency service. We can only speculate that, on average, institutional rules concerning the organization of the democratic electoral contest that promote local goods provision among other things will also make clientelistic citizen-politician linkages more likely.

The literature on the consequences of electoral laws in contemporary mass democracies—based on universal suffrage with secret ballots—is not, for example, specifically geared to the phenomenon of clientelism. It makes no direct predictions about when the delivery of local goods should take the form of pork or constituency service or clientelism.

Of course, in the run-up to contemporary mass democracies, there were institutional innovations that had a direct bearing on the form via which politicians were seeking the delivery of local goods to voters, namely (1) the enlargement of the electorate through enfranchisement and (2) the introduction of the Australian ballot. As enfranchisement boosted the size of electorates, the costs of identifying a critical mass of voters who could be incentivized by clientelistic targeted goods provision also escalated, usually beyond the organizational and resource capabilities of the parties at the time. Thus, in England, politicians competing in larger districts switched from the “judicious distribution of patronage” to the “politics of opinion” (Cox 1987: 56). The Australian ballot, stipulating the secrecy of the vote and the provision of ballots by a neutral state agency, rather than the contestants themselves, was the second institutional innovation inimical to clientelism. It made it harder, yet not impossible, to generate the sort of personalized monitoring and sanctioning of individual voters that would allow politicians to target resources, yet limit the opportunism of voters to defect from the deal after they had received their prize (see Rozenas and Kitschelt 2011).

The critical element emphasized in the contemporary literature concerning the scale of benefits office-seeking politicians seek to provide to their electorates concerns *the degree of personalization of the political process*. The underlying theorem then states: The more electoral rules personalize the competition among candidates, rather than make it a sport between partisan teams, the more likely it is that candidates will want to provide local “particularistic” goods to their prospective voters. This critical mechanism is captured in unadorned fashion in Cox and McCubbins (2001: 48-9) and shall therefore be cited here:

“The basic logic is quite simple. If more than one member of a given party runs for office in a given constituency, and voters have the option of supporting some but not all of these candidates, then candidates of the same party will need some way of differentiating themselves from one another. They cannot do so by emphasizing the party label, because they all share this label. Thus, they need to form factions or emphasize their personal qualities. Note that the effectiveness of particularistic benefits in winning elections also depends on the nature of campaign finance.”

Cox and McCubbins use the notion of “personal qualities” as a summary term for a variety of candidate-centered activities politicians may undertake. I take it that one of them could be the clientelistic targeting of particularistic benefits. Personalized elections make clientelism more likely, but do not necessitate it. Going beyond Cox and McCubbins (2001), let me supply one more possible reason

for an association between clientelism and personalized voting. A decentralized transaction between individual candidates and their electoral supporters may facilitate the monitoring and sanctioning processes that are vital to contain ever-present voter opportunism in contingent clientelistic exchange. At least in single-shot transactions where voters receive targeted benefits before elections and then are expected to vote for their benefactor (“vote buying”), many voters will find the temptation to shirk overwhelming and end up voting for a different candidate. Various monitoring techniques are designed to counteract opportunism (Rozenas and Kitschelt 2011), but they may be more easily instituted when campaigns are candidate-centered.

If personalization makes clientelistic exchanges more likely, one needs to step back to consider what institutional rules promote personalization. Carey and Shugart (1995) provide a sophisticated argument. It is the interaction between district size and ballot format that matters. Where lists are closed so that voters cannot choose among candidates, it is single member districts that offer the greatest personalization. In large lists, candidates become anonymous from the perspective of voters, and from the perspective of candidates themselves a personal effort to target specific voters has little personal electoral payoff, except for the select marginal list candidate whose effort in fact may yield to margin that makes her obtain a seat. For most candidates, however, active engagement of the electorate is like providing a collective good without personal selective incentive so, following the logic of collective action, it is unlikely to be provided.

Yet personalization may be much greater in open ballot multi-member districts, where voters can choose individual candidates from party lists. The fierceness of personal competition among candidates on the same list may further intensify, if the electoral system does not provide for vote pooling among all candidates on the same list, i.e. candidates with fewer preference votes than the necessary quota to obtain a seat will not benefit from a reallocation of excess preference votes that accrued to other candidates on the same list who have more preference votes than the quota. The importance of preference votes and open lists without pooling for the personalization of electoral contests resonates with a number of empirical case studies (Katz 1980; Ames 1996a and b; Mainwaring 1999).

Carey and Shugart (1995) convincingly argue that a complex interaction may take place between district size and the personalization of the ballot structure through open list and absence of pooling. If ballot structures are personalized, then personalization will intensify as a positive function of district size: Candidates need to carve out smaller and smaller pockets of voters to meet an election quota and are more likely to differentiate themselves from their fellow party candidates. By contrast, where ballot structures are closed and impersonal, the personalization of the electoral contest will be greater the smaller is district size: At district size  $M = 1$ , party “lists” are “closed” by definition, as voters cannot make personal choices among multiple candidates on the same list, but the election focuses on a single candidate. At a large district size and closed ballot structures, voters face a large mass of anonymous candidates whom they need not differentiate in the act of voting, instead committing their support to a party list based on the reputation of the label. ***If clientelism is one feasible result of the incentives politicians obtain from a personalized electoral contest, then candidates and their parties in large districts with open lists and no pooling of candidate preference votes on the ballot should display the greatest effort to supply targeted benefits to their target electorates.***

## **2.2. Executive-Legislative Arrangements and Citizen-Politician Linkage Mechanisms**

Presidential systems are democracies where the chief executive is (1) directly elected, (2) serves a fixed term and (3) wields some assortment of considerable executive and/or legislative powers (cf.

Shugart and Carey 1992). In a semi-presidential system, presidents share meaningful executive and legislative powers with a prime minister who also depends on legislative (majority) support.<sup>1</sup> In a parliamentary system, the prime minister and the cabinet are fully accountable to the legislature and the head of state is ceremonial only.

Interestingly, while presidentialism and clientelism have been empirically associated in the literature, particularly on Sub-Saharan Africa,<sup>2</sup> clientelism typically figures as a correlate or a cause of presidentialism, but not as a consequence of this institutional arrangement. Much of the literature on the vulnerability of presidential democracy to regime breakdown—whether in support or opposition to the thesis—does not even mention clientelism.<sup>3</sup> It is therefore pretty much left to my own discretion, aided by a few guiding pieces (especially Cox and McCubbins 2001 and Shugart and Haggard 2001) and my previous speculations about the subject (Kitschelt 2000: 860-1) how to craft the theoretical mechanisms that conjoin executive-legislative form with partisan linkage patterns. Unfortunately, I can think of both arguments that lay out mechanisms why presidentialism translates into more clientelism as well as mechanisms that associate presidentialism with more programmatic politics, while parliamentary regimes are postulated as more clientelistic. I sketch these arguments in turn.

### ***2.2.1. Presidentialism clientelistic, parliamentary democracy programmatic?***

Just as in the case of electoral systems, the underlying mechanism to promote clientelism is the personalization of politics in the sense of whether the acquisition of office relies on teams of politicians or promotes the contest among individuals. Personalization makes face-to-face relations more relevant. Such direct interactions were held critical for clientelism, but I would argue that this applies only to older versions of clientelism and is no longer critical. Another aspect is likely to be more important: By elevating the prize of one office so far beyond all other offices, presidentialism greatly individualizes political competition, something that undercuts an emphasis on policy and the debates about the provision of goods to political constituencies. Ambitious politicians who want to induce a loyal personal following therefore better rely not just (or primarily) on ideas, but induce allegiance with other incentives. These may be affective and emotional (charismatic leadership) or instrumental (clientelistic targeted benefits by discretion of the leader).

In the fight for the presidential office, there are at least four strategic contexts in which politicians may want to deploy clientelistic inducements.<sup>4</sup> Two of these contexts present themselves at the pre-election stage. First, ambitious politicians compete inside political parties for the presidential nomination. If such parties are held together by programmatic commonalities at all, if candidates diverge too much on programmatic grounds, they are likely to tear their party apart. A less hazardous strategy for candidacy, therefore, may be to cultivate a personal appeal with affective and valence appeals, but

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1 While this definition of semi-presidentialism is slippery because reasonable minds may differ on what “meaningful powers” of the president are (cf. Elgin 1999; Siaroff 2003), I see little way around a classification that takes effective presidential powers into account. I prefer a restrictive definition that excludes overwhelmingly ceremonial presidents. Thus, in contrast to some, I would not code Austria or Ireland as semi-presidential regimes and even have second thoughts in the instances of Finland and Portugal, more unambiguously scored as semi-presidential. Very few, however, would challenge that classification for France, Lithuania, Poland, or Taiwan.

2 See especially Van de Walle (2003) and more broadly Randall & Svåsand (2002).

3 As prominent examples, consider Linz and Valenzuela (1994) and Cheibub (2007). In a similar vein, in Mainwaring and Shugart’s (1997) comprehensive treatment of presidentialism and party systems in Latin America, clientelism rarely figures in, and only once (p. 419) at all in the systematic comparative conclusion by the co-editors. Also in Samuels and Shugart’s (2010) book on presidentialism and political parties clientelism plays no role. They are overwhelmingly concerned with the cohesiveness of parties.

<sup>4</sup> I am drawing here on my previous treatments of this subject (Kitschelt 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007).



also with the provision of targeted clientelistic goods. Second, after the nomination stage, presidential candidates compete for the median voter in a programmatic space. Where the competition narrows to two effective contenders, either because of high thresholds of entry or a multi-round electoral contest in which only two candidates can compete in the second round, Downs (1957) envisions candidates to move to the center of the political left-right space. But he also mentions two rather different solutions for office-seeking candidates. They may make their programmatic appeals strategically fuzzy (Downs 1957: 135-6) or they may leave the framework of competition over programs and policies altogether (Downs 1957: 127). One of several options to achieve this is to engage in a vigorous clientelistic campaign, an operational course of action Downs does not mention.

The other two situations that promote clientelistic politics occur at the post-election stage, when presidential incumbents allocate resources. Unless a president controls a disciplined programmatic majority party, she finds herself in the situation of having to constitute a coalition government consisting of numerous parties and/or ad-hoc coalitions of members of parliament in order to pass legislation and budgets. In that process, the path of least resistance might be to “bribe” small groups of legislators or even individuals by offering them targeted funds—or even offices in the civil service—they can distribute and fill to their constituents at their discretion. Presidential systems may escape stalemate, the dreaded condition that is supposed to explain the early demise of presidential democracies, even when there is no presidential majority party and a great deal of hostility to the president in the legislature, when presidents use their clientelistic prowess to shore up support.

Fourth, in the presence of a potential stalemate situation, the initiative to solicit clientelistic resources, of course, may also come from the parties in the legislature themselves. They signal to the president that their compliance with her wishes must be bought by surrendering pork and clientelistic inducements.<sup>5</sup> The probability of this situation to occur that legislators threaten the chief executive to defect unless they receive side payments is much greater in a presidential than a parliamentary system because of the fundamental separation of purpose in the latter. Because of the president’s fixed term in office, legislators do not carry the responsibility of sustaining the government and being held responsible for the government’s collapse, if its chief executive officer falls. This may make them bolder in their efforts to extort special benefits for themselves, for their supporters (clientelism) or their districts (pork).<sup>6</sup>

### ***2.2.2. Presidentialism programmatic, parliamentary democracy clientelistic?***

Presidential systems, however, do provide a countervailing force to personalization, individualistic politics, and the defection of politicians from the provision of large-scale club and collective goods. And that is the fact that presidents are elected in a national constituency and must compete for the median voter (Shugart and Haggard 2001; Shugart 1999). Presidents and legislatures

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<sup>5</sup> In a recent article on the travails of Brazil’s new president Dilma Rousseff trying to hold together a “ramshackle coalition” while fighting corruption scandals, we read in the *Economist* (August 20, 2011: 36): “This [coalition] consists of over a dozen parties, ranging from communist to right-wing populist, that between them give her the nominal support of around three-quarters of Congress. The main interest of some of the coalition’s smaller members is not ideology but the extraction of jobs and money—for personal gain or party financing—from government.”

<sup>6</sup> Shugart and Haggard (2001: 84) conclude: “Although presidential systems give an official with a nationwide constituency a veto or other law-making powers, the very structure of presidentialism itself tends to reduce legislators’ interest in providing public goods at the national level. Paradoxically, presidential systems may therefore be less attuned to broad national interests than parliamentary systems, other things being equal.”

divide up political attention and correlated tasks dealing with different types of audiences. In her quest to win the highest office in the country, presidential candidates must attend to a national audience and commit to broad collective or club goods to sway that large audience. Moreover, the median voter is likely to be unaffiliated with any political party and therefore hard to identify and target with selective, conditional, clientelistic benefits. To win that national majority, candidates may find clientelistic strategies too costly and cumbersome and therefore may do better by making sweeping policy commitments and invoking programmatic stances. Attending to the task of particularistic goods provision to individual citizens and small groups, by contrast, is the preserve of the individual legislators.

In parliamentary government, legislators may be bound to parties, particularly if such parties support the government executive, more so than in presidential systems characterized by a separation of purpose between president and legislators. Yet a clientelistic penchant may sneak into parliamentary systems as well, if they exhibit a great party system fragmentation. A proliferation of small, sectional parties representing narrow electoral constituencies could lead to minority and coalition governments in which small parties can lobby for a disproportionate allocation of funds to small scale club or private goods, whether disbursed on a contingent partisan base (clientelism) or not (pork).<sup>7</sup> It then all depends on the configuration of government coalitions and the relative clout of the largest parties in the coalition that are most likely to be motivated by the provision of large scale club and collective goods. The literature on fiscal restraint therefore emphasizes the importance of centralized government control over budgets through a powerful finance ministry or a set of exogenous untouchable rules, particularly under conditions of high legislative fragmentation and polarization (Hallerberg et al. 2009).

### *2.2.3. Contradictory Incentives of the Same Institution?*

Overall, at the purely theoretical level, and without being able to make quantitative calibrations of the relative weight of the countervailing incentives executive-legislative arrangements may exert on personalism of the political contest and ultimately on the provision of clientelistic targeted goods, the predictions about the effects of executive design on partisan linkage strategies are in the balance. Both presidential government as well as parliamentary government may or may not promote the provision of small-scale targeted conditional clientelistic political exchange. Maybe the different forces just cancel each other out, revealing a net zero effect of different executive-legislative designs for linkage strategies. Maybe what tips the balance is the interface between presidentialism and electoral systems: If both point in the direction of personalization of party competition, overall party systems will more dramatically tilt toward the contingent provision of targeted goods to partisan constituencies.<sup>8</sup>

As a further feasible outcome pattern, consider that presidential systems may deliver **both** more (less) clientelistic linkage effort **as well as** more (less) programmatic partisan appeals. Defying simple patterns of trade-off between programmatic and clientelistic linkage efforts, given institutions incentivize (or diminish) parties' efforts to construct programmatic as well as clientelistic constituency linkages.

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<sup>7</sup> On older literature on budget deficits, for example,

<sup>8</sup> This is also what Shugart and Haggard (2001: 85) surmise: "Separation of survival may inherently reduce legislators' interest in representing voters' preferences on national policy issues, but the extent to which this is the case hinges crucially on the design of electoral systems, which in turn shapes parties and party systems."

A more fine-grained analysis of the role of presidential institutions for politicians' clientelistic and programmatic efforts would try to track the mechanisms that make the delivery of targeted clientelistic benefits more likely in a way similar to Cheibub's (2007) test (and refutation) of the impact of presidentialism on democratic breakdown. Most obviously, if presidentialism matters, (1) the president's own party should benefit most and make a particularly vigorous effort to target selective benefits to the electorate, particularly those that can be paid out of government coffers (social benefits and patronage jobs to voters, procurement contracts and favorable regulatory decisions for sympathetic businesses that also provide campaign funds and nudge their employees to turn out in favor of the ruling party). Presidents should use clientelism more actively where (2) they have little control over the presidential party, even if it has a majority in the legislature, where (3) the presidential party is in the minority and has to rely on complex coalitions, or where (4) presidential and legislative elections are non-concurrent, such that the separation of purpose between legislators and president is even more evident than in concurrent elections. Furthermore, one might explore (5) whether the reliance on clientelism as linkage strategy varies with the specific powers of the presidency. Proactive legislative and executive powers, such as decree powers, budget powers, and executive appointment powers, should contribute more to triggering clientelistic efforts by parties than strong reactive presidential powers (e.g. legislative veto powers).

### **3. Variables and Testing Strategy**

The dependent variables in this project result from an original dataset I collected with a group of Duke graduate students between 2007 and 2009 (see <http://www.duke.edu/web/democracy/index.html>). The study involves an expert survey among political scientists in 88 countries who indicated, among other things, how much and what kind of effort political parties make in providing voters with clientelistic goods and what kinds of party positions, if any, parties stake out in their countries. The construction of the relevant measures is extensively documented in previous papers. As independent variables, I rely on off-the-shelf datasets some of which were modified by several of my graduate students for purposes of their own research.

#### ***3.1. Dependent Variables***

The critical dependent variables are the national averages of the parties' clientelistic effort to target goods on electoral constituents and their efforts to make programmatic appeals. The unit of observation (expert judgment) in the survey is the effort of each individual party on each of a variety of targeted goods and services parties may provide to voters. On scales running from 1 to 5, experts rated the effort parties made to provide consumer goods (gifts) to voters (B1), social policy benefits (B2), and patronage jobs (B3). They also assessed how much effort parties made to increase their electorate through indirect targeted goods, namely the provision of government procurement contracts (B4) and the granting of favorable regulatory decisions to businesses (B5) who then presumably turn around and reward parties by campaign funds and/or incentivizing their employees to support the political benefactor.

For the purposes of this cross-national comparison with the objective to evaluate the role of institutions in affecting parties' linkage strategies, the observations have to be aggregated across different types of efforts and all parties. While there are differences in the provision of the five categories of goods across parties and countries that may be exploited for a detailed analysis of clientelistic voter-politician exchanges (Kitschelt 2011a; Rozenas and Kitschelt 2011), there is a

sufficiently strong correlation among the various effort categories (.65 - .84) to consider them cumulatively as contributing to a single dimension of clientelistic targeting for the purposes of the current analysis.<sup>9</sup> The index of clientelistic effort B15, then simply adds up the average score of all experts on each of the five clientelistic effort types, yielding a scale running from 5 (minimum clientelistic effort at all) to 20 (maximum clientelistic effort). To provide a single national summary term B15n, the individual party clientelism scores were weighted by the electoral support level of the parties in the national legislative election most recently preceding the expert survey (B15nwe).

The crudest, but empirically most robustly corroborated theory of clientelistic effort is that poor countries evidence a great deal of clientelistic linkage in electoral politics, whereas rich countries do not. Rather than taking this assertion as object of theoretical analysis, I treat the relationship here as a form of construct validation of the scale: If no positive correlation can be established between a country's per capita GDP, corrected to yield purchasing power parity estimates, then there is something wrong with the indicator, not the theory. Figure 2 shows the relationship between B15 and the log transformed 2007 per capita GDP at PPP figures for the 88 countries, with different colors indicating different geographical regions of the world for ease of interpretation. There is a clear relationship between the two variables and, incidentally, it is not linear: As we move from the poorest to middle income countries, clientelistic partisan efforts initially seem to intensify (or at least wane little), but then they drops off dramatically among countries with a rather high income level, say beyond  $\log = 10$  (~ \$ 22,000). This non-linearity in the relationship between linkage strategies and development may be well worth further theoretical and empirical examination, but not here.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 2 about here

The construction of an index of programmatic partisan appeals in political parties is empirically much more complicated than the assembly of an index of clientelistic effort, and different approaches yield somewhat different results.<sup>11</sup> Based on a detailed analysis and comparison of different indicators, I conclude that the superior measure combines information about a party's coherence on policy issues ("Co"), the salience of those issues for the party ("Sal"), and the polarization among parties ("Po") on that issue (together "CoSalPo"). These three elements provide the minimum information a voter needs to employ a party's issue signal as a rational decision criterion for vote choice. The party cannot be all over the place on the issue (cohesion), or the voter gets noise, but no information. The party must attribute a modicum of importance to the issues on which it is cohesive (salience), or the voter cannot expect it to act on issues on which it has cohesive positions. And the party must take a position on the issue that differentiates it from other parties ("polarization"), or the voter cannot distinguish which of the alternatives is best relative to her own policy ideal point. If any one of these signals is missing, a voter lacks grounds to opt for or against a party based on its programmatic signals. If it does not differentiate its position from other parties, the voter may as well opt for one of those.<sup>12</sup> If it is incoherent, it has no

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<sup>9</sup> An exploratory factor analysis indeed yields a single factor solution with a very high Eigenvalue.

<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, the linear relationship between  $\ln\text{GDPpc}$  at PPP in 2007 and clientelistic partisan effort averaged at the national level (B15.nwe) is a robust  $r = .69$ .

<sup>11</sup> For a detailed discussion, see Kitschelt and Freeze (2010).

<sup>12</sup> For this reason, it is insufficient, for example, to measure the cohesiveness of parties only, measured by the standard deviation of experts' judgments of a party's position on a specific issue. Parties could all converge in the middle of the scale. Besides, being in the middle may also mean that parties have no clear position on an issue, and experts simply assigned that middle of the scale for want of a better solution. Of course, we can check whether this is the case, because many experts leave judgment opportunities blank, where they do not see a position, and they were explicitly encouraged to do so in the survey. Thus, middle positions and percentage non-responses correlate in those cases.

position. And if it does not attribute salience to the issue, it probably will not act on its issue position, when elected into office.

The dataset makes possible to measure party cohesion by calculating the standard deviation of experts' scores of a party on each issue. The salience of an issue for a party is revealed by the percentage of experts who decline to assign a score for the party on that issue (they were instructed to leave a blank, if they were failing to see a clear party position). The polarization of issue positions can be measured by the average absolute distances of the issue score experts award a party on an issue from the scores they award each of the other parties on that same issue.

Of course, parties need not take coherent, salient, and differentiated positions on all issues under the sun to have a sharp programmatic profile, but only a subset of the issues. So for the purposes of the index construction, different sets of issues with high CoSalPo products were selected to gauge a party's overall programmatic appeal. Since these indices all intercorrelate pretty highly, I am taking here the CoSalPo\_4 index which averages the CoSalPo scores of a party on the four issues that generate the highest CoSalPo scores for that party. They typically include some economic-distributive and some socio-cultural issues. Details can be found in Kitschelt and Freeze (2010). For each party, a national average CoSalPo\_4 scores across all parties can be calculated, weighted by the electoral size of each party (CoSalPo\_4nwe).

Figure 3 engages in a test of construct validity akin to the previous one for clientelistic linkage effort. Now, however, the construct would be invalidated, if we could not detect a positive correlation between a country's wealth and the programmatic effort its parties are making. Once again, construct validation is successful.<sup>13</sup> And also again, the relationship between the linkage strategy and per capita GDP is not linear. Programmatic appeals, on average, do not increase that much until about \$ 16,000 are reached (log 9.7). Then they take off for most countries with higher incomes. There is a group of countries left behind, however, among which the Scandinavians (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) as well as Ireland, with a probably inflated GDPpc just ahead of the big financial crisis.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 3 about here

Examining both figures 2 and 3 together, we see that there is a fairly strong trade-off between politicians' investments in clientelistic and in programmatic effort. This holds not only at the aggregate national level, but also at the party level: In most instances, if a party invests more in clientelistic linkage building, it invests less in programmatic linkages. Of course, this trade-off does not always apply, and there is a theoretically and empirically interesting set of outlier parties that are "high everything," investing in both clientelistic and programmatic linkages (Kitschelt and Singer 2011).

## **3.2. Independent Variables**

### 3.2.1. Electoral Systems

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<sup>13</sup> The simple linear correlation between log GDPpc at PPP in 2007 and CoSalPo\_4.nwe is  $r = .62$ , albeit a bit weaker than that between clientelistic effort (B15) and economic affluence.

<sup>14</sup> I have been unable to find an explanation for the Scandinavian outlier status here, and even my Scandinavian expert informants found the result troubling and inexplicable. There may be an anchor effect here: Scandinavians understate sharp disagreements and therefore attribute to parties somewhat more overlapping positions than experts in other countries? In any case, for systematic comparative analysis of programmatic appeals it might be advisable to add a Scandinavian country dummy as control variable.

In terms of *electoral systems*, I include a variable measuring the *effective district size*, conventionally computed as the weighted magnitude of a system, where the weighting is by tier. In a single-tiered electoral system, the number is simply the average magnitude of seats per district, whereas in a multi-tier systems the weights (proportion of seats/tier) come into play. For this variable, as well as all the other institutional variables, country scores can be found in the appendix table below.

To reflect the *strategic configuration of the ballot structure*, Carey and Shugart (1995) employed three concepts, namely the extent to which voters can disturb candidate lists on the ballot, the extent to which votes are pooled among candidates on the same list, and the extent to which parties control access to the ballot. They develop a fused index of liability of a system to personalism that is, however, quite unsatisfactory. Johnston and Wallack (2007) have labored hard to improve on that index by disaggregating its components, but the results of their work may also still be quite contentious. I cannot go here into a detailed discussion of their solutions to fiendishly tricky questions of index construction, particularly in the presence of multiple voting tiers, and the problems they may involve.<sup>15</sup> Their dataset is invaluable because it makes their choices very transparent and allows researchers to reassemble different indices, if they so desire. I am drawing here on a recasting of the alternatives by Daniel Kselman, creating one new variable from the Johnston and Wallack dataset, but adopting the pooling variable as proposed.

The new variable, ballot structure, measures whether the voters can select among a party's candidates ("open lists") or not ("closed lists"). The variable 'open' thus simply conveys the percentage of all lower house seats elected using an effective intra-party voting choice. Closed lists can be fielded in any size of district. Single member districts with one candidate per party, however, are by definition closed list; multi-member districts, by contrast, may or may not be closed list, depending on whether they allow voters to discriminate among candidates with personal preference votes.

I do not include here a variable for control over ballot access, i.e. whether candidates or parties control the alternatives from which voters can choose as party nominations. The reason is that the candidate nominations process is typically not a matter of institutional design at the level of binding national electoral laws, but quasi-private party choice of how to organize it. Preciously few electoral laws proscribe whether parties have to use primaries, delegate conferences, or decisions by the party leadership to nominate candidates. The nominations process is therefore likely to be endogenous to other

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<sup>15</sup> Johnston and Wallack's first variable is "BALLOT" and it tries to capture whether parties control access to the ballot or not. But it seems their coding muddles (1) questions of access to the ballot, as a matter of who is involved in the nominations process (Party leaders? Activists? Voter primaries, and with what constituencies?), with (2) questions of voter choices among the nominated candidate(s), once the candidate(s) are on the ballot. Their option score 1 is sneaking in a scoring of "open list" ballots: Parties control the ballot, but voters can disturb the order of candidates. But this attribute is scored also in their second variable (see below).

Besides all this, should a study of electoral institutions code access to the ballot, as candidate recruitment is a "private" matter, within the discretion of the political parties and unregulated by legal stipulations, in most political systems. See even in the United States cross-party and cross-state differences in presidential and Congressional nominations. I therefore set aside a coding of candidate access to the ballot.

Johnston and Wallack's second variable, VOTE, then once again measures the extent to which voters can choose candidates that have already made it onto the ballot (by party selection or candidate initiative). This is supposed to measure the degree of discretion that voters have to choose among candidates for the same party (list). Score 0 is clear enough: no choice/closed list (voters have one vote for a party). But are scores 1 and 2 in an ascending rank order of increasing individual choice among candidates? Is there "more" choice, and therefore more personalization of competition among candidates, when voters have one vote for an individual candidate on a list that may have several options (score 2) than when they distribute multiple votes among multiple candidates (e.g. STV)? And how can it be justified to voting in SMD districts where voters have no choice among a party's candidates into this middle category?

political forces and strategic considerations that may push parties into more or less personalized inter-candidate contests, not a constitutive element following from the institutional set-up of party competition through electoral laws.

The second variable, directly taken from Johnston and Wallack (2007), measures whether the vote(s) a citizen casts for a party list accrue(s) only to an individual candidate, or also to other candidates (pooling). The latter may be the case in multi-member districts, if the candidate favored by a voter has already more preference votes than necessary to meet the quota to obtain a seat. In a “pooling” situation, the additional residual votes would then be redistributed to another candidate on the same list until she has enough preference votes to meet the quota and so on until no residual votes are left to be distributed. In a non-pooling situation, excess preference votes cast for one candidate simply go to waste and cannot help other candidate on the same list, like in Japan’s single non-transferable vote system until the early 1990s. Empirically following Johnston and Wallack (2007), we can score full pooling (=2) and non-pooling (=0) situations and in between partial pooling situations (=1 or some fraction, contingent upon the relative share of pooling and non-pooling candidates). Both the new codings for the ballot structure variable and the Johnston and Wallack pooling variable are itemized by country in the appendix table.

Following Carey and Shugart (1995), and as further exemplified by Cox and McCubbins (2001), the theory is now that “open” ballot structures and “no pooling” intensify the personal contest among candidates on the same list. Adding the contingent effect of district magnitude, we can say that the larger the districts, the presence of open ballot structures and/or the absence of pooling should make personalistic party competition more likely. Personalism in the electoral contest, in turn, should translate into particularism of goods distribution by the candidates of which clientelism (contingent targeted goods distribution) is one essential sub-type.

### 3.2.2. Executive-Legislative Relations

While there is a great deal of material to come up with quite complex, multi-dimensional scorings of electoral systems, but therefore little agreement on which empirical indices capture the theoretical intuition to measure incentives for personalism and particularistic goods provision best, the situation with regard to executive-legislative relations is that of a dearth of broadly comparative data, but an easier time to agree on principles of index construction and to come up with approximately similar index scores. Ideally, we would draw on a comprehensive dataset that would not only distinguish between presidentialism, various types of semi-presidential systems (see Shugart and Carey 1992), and parliamentarism, but also score relevant executive and legislative powers of the presidency in each of the countries in my comparison set. I am unaware of the existence of a comprehensive presidential powers dataset and unable to construct one myself. Instead, as a first-cut exploration, I will rely on a simple categorization of the different systems following Golder’s (2005) coding.

Systems are categorized as either presidential or semi-presidential (see appendix) or neither, the reference category that includes overwhelmingly parliamentary democracies or, at the margin, hard-to-classify hybrids (Switzerland’s “council democracy”). The difficulty is where to draw the line between presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and parliamentarism. Beyond the formal criteria of independent origin and fixed term of election for presidents, as well as the presence/absence of a prime minister (cabinet) relying on continued support in the legislature, what comes into play here are the powers of the presidency vis-à-vis the legislature and its representative in the executive arena, a prime minister and her cabinet. In general, only where the presidency shares substantial legislative or executive powers with a prime minister and cabinet that relies on the support of the legislature does the presidential office qualify

the entire political regime as semi-presidential. Thus, at the threshold between parliamentarism and semi-presidentialism, Austria and Ireland are coded as parliamentary, because directly elected presidents lack even a semblance of meaningful political power, whereas Finland, France, and Portugal score as semi-presidential. I could be convinced, however, to reclassify as parliamentary such borderline cases as Finland and Portugal with rather tepid presidential powers.

At the threshold between semi-presidentialism and presidentialism, it also is the relative authority of the office relative to that of the prime minister that determines how a regime will be classified. In the case of Russian and Ukrainian “super-presidentialisms,” this tips the balance in favor of coding them as presidential, although some data sets have scored these polities as semi-presidential because of the existence of prime ministers who also rely on parliamentary support. A case notoriously difficult to score is Switzerland with a president that in some regards looks more like a prime minister, selected from a quasi- cabinet, the Swiss Federal Council, for a short fixed term in office. While some datasets classify this unique arrangement as presidential, the system of rules and political leverage enjoyed by the members of parliament and the cabinet, however, makes it just as plausible to consider it a parliamentary democracy.

### 3.2.3. Controls

As figures 2 and 3 suggestion, *country wealth* is an obvious control to isolate whether there is indeed a relationship between institutions and partisan linkage strategies. There is substantial theory behind that regularity, but I will not dwell on it here (see Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). A second control is the *cumulative democratic experience of a country*, as scored by Gerring et al. (2005).<sup>16</sup> The logic here is that parties and voters need lots of experience with democratic competition and signaling between voters and politicians to enable parties to build up programmatic reputations as a consequence of multiple rounds of party competition. In “young” democracies, for want of credibility politicians resort to clientelistic exchange mechanisms with skeptical voters (Keefer 2007; Keefer and Vlaicu 2008). Clientelistic linkages, by contrast, are more likely to be consummated, as politicians often have to show their commitments before elections.

A further variable that may or may not be correlated with linkage strategies is the *freedom and fairness of elections* and the openness of the competitive contest more generally. Sometimes it has been surmised that clientelism is an asymmetrical relationship between citizens and politicians likely to become a dominant practice in hegemonic party regimes, where parties do not compete on a level field. Maybe fundamental deficiencies of the democratic process, not democratic institutional rules, are intertwined with linkage practices as cause and/or effect of the latter. I use here the familiar Polity IV dataset to code the quality of the democratic process at the time of the assessment of parties’ linkage strategies.

Finally, clientelistic linkages have been associated with the presence of *ethnic divisions and ethnic political parties that mobilize ethnic identities*. The presence of social networks with co-ethnics may facilitate the monitoring and sanctioning of contingent targeted clientelistic exchange. Yi-ting Wang and Kiril Kolev found in a detailed study of this relationship that ethnic divisions with one particularly important attribute, namely constituting economic disparities between wealthier and poorer groups, does correlate with clientelistic linkage practices in substantively important ways. Kolev and Wang (2010) drew on the work of Baker and Huber (2010) to extend their indicator of between-group inequality (BGI) to a larger number of countries. It is this extension on which I rely.

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<sup>16</sup> Data are available from Gerring’s website at [http://people.bu.edu/jgerring/Comparative\\_Politics.html](http://people.bu.edu/jgerring/Comparative_Politics.html).



While I cannot test a strictly causal argument, it is theoretically plausible that variables such as wealth, cumulative democratic experience and inter-ethnic group inequalities are causally prior to democratic institutions. The latter, but also a polity's openness to fair political contestation, appear to be more amenable to strategic bargaining and change than the former.

### ***3.3. Model specifications***

The dependent variables are both interval-scaled variables, and inspection of relations with independent variables do not indicate any obvious problems of heteroscedasticity. All the measures I employ are at the national level and no interactions with party level variables that would necessitate a hierarchical linear model will be considered here.<sup>17</sup> I do not consider problems of endogeneity at this stage, as I want to explore in the first place whether there is at all a sufficiently robust correlation between institutions and politicians' linkage strategies to make a probing into the causal direction of the relationship promising. As a first cut, I therefore employ a simple OLS estimation with parties' linkage efforts as dependent variables

In addition to the theoretical variables and controls, I will also selectively introduce regional dummies for Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia/Middle East, leaving the advanced post-industrial democracies as reference category. Like some of the literature, I am of two minds about the addition of atheoretical dummy variable controls. On the one hand, they help to check the impact of unspecified variables associated with linkage strategies. An obvious one is regional contagion according to which parties in countries situated in physical proximity to each other adopt similar operational techniques to attract voters from each other, probably against the background of a common history and dense networks of communication. On the other hand, however, the introduction of proper-name dummy variables undercuts the theoretical focus of the test and create a bias of over-control, undercutting the discovery of theoretical mechanisms simply because their presence happens to be concentrated in certain geographical entities.

Because complex multivariate regressions often hide as much as they reveal and because an APSA paper does not limit me to the standard length of a journal article, let me start out with a few crude tables showing the bivariate relations (or weakness thereof) between institutional features and predominant linkage strategies in each country. I will only then turn to multivariate analysis the substantive specification of which is debatable. A great deal more work will have to be done to isolate the presence or absence of an association between democratic institutions and partisan linkage strategies.

## **4. Exploratory Results**

Let us begin our eyeballing of bivariate relations with regime and linkage. Table 2 shows the average clientelistic effort parties make in different regimes. There appears to be a fair association between presidentialism and clientelism, but , beware, the clientelistic and presidentialist countries in the lower left hand corner tend to be poorer and more prominently concentrated in Latin America, whereas parties in the upper right-hand corner tend to be rich OECD countries. Cross-tabling programmatic appeals with democratic regime form would generate a similar picture, with presidential systems

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<sup>17</sup> One could, for example, hypothesize that the linkage strategies of large parties are affected differently by an institutional arrangement (say, presidentialism) than those of small parties.

featuring less programmatic parties than parliamentary systems, but the relationship would be somewhat less sharply contoured.

Table 2 about here

The relationship between district size and either clientelistic or programmatic partisan effort does not yield a sharp pattern of linear relations. We will have to explore in the multivariate analysis, whether this is due to the contingent relationship between district size and ballot format Carey and Shugart (1995) had hypothesized: In closed lists, personalization should go up in smaller districts, while in open districts personalization should be high and go up with district size.<sup>18</sup>

Also the relationship between average parties' clientelistic or programmatic linkage efforts in each polity and the division between open and closed lists evidences no direct linear relationship, again in line with the imperative to explore conditional interactive effects. There is a slight tendency that on average parties operating in closed list ballot formats show *less* programmatic effort than in open-list systems, contrary to the theoretical hypothesis, but the even the bivariate institutional difference is too small to be worth the display. At the same time, open systems tend to be slightly more likely to coincide with greater programmatic partisan appeals, but again the pattern is too marginal to deserve a display.

Finally, there is the relationship between citizen-politician linkage efforts (clientelism, programmatic appeals) and vote pooling for partisan lists of candidates or the absence of pooling with votes accruing to single candidates of a party. Once again, the observable direct linear bivariate relationships are excessively weak and may be displayed here for the interface of clientelistic effort and pooling only. There is a feeble relationship that clientelistic efforts are weaker in electoral systems providing more pooling.

The bivariate examination of the association between formal institutional rules of democratic governance and actual partisan linkage mechanisms does not look promising. Institutional theory must rest all its hope on a judicious calibration of multivariate statistical analysis that might carve out a distinct association between institutional rules and linkage strategies. This could be achieved through appropriate controls and/or introduction of interaction effects among institutional rules. What I present now is just the beginning of a quest to find an institutional logic in linkage strategies. I hope it generates further suggestions to come up with stronger models to shore up the power of institutional analysis.

Table 4 sets up the estimations for clientelistic linkage efforts (as dependent variable) in four blocs of independent variables: first the direct linear effects of institutional variables, followed by the controls, as explained above; next, there are various specifications of interaction effects among institutional variables in the spirit of the Carey-Shugart hypothesis. I have tried many more than presented here, all with similar (negative) results, and present here only a full version of interactions among the electoral systems components, as well as an interaction between an additive variable for ballot format (BS+VP: open lists + absence of pooling as highest score) and district size *M*. Finally there is the bloc of regional geographical dummies as controls to check for unspecified causal relations and/or spatial contiguity and dissemination in at least a primitive fashion.

In the basic model and throughout all the other models, in the control variables we see a large effect of development in the approximately curvilinear fashion suggested by the scatterplot in figure 2,

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<sup>18</sup> Kselman's (2011a) formal set-up in fact suggests that the conditional relationship applies to closed lists only. In open lists, candidates will always make a personalized effort to attract the vote, no matter how large the district.

as well as a negative effect of democratic stock: As citizens and politicians become more experienced in democratic competition, they begin to withdraw from clientelistic efforts. This is in line with the Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) hypothesis. The ethnic inter-group inequality variable BGI is substantively quite respectable, but has statistical significance only if no squared term is added for GDP per capita (not shown here). Its substantive size is obliterated, once regional dummies are added, identifying specific sites in which the ethnic inequality relationship with clientelistic partisan effort pertains.<sup>19</sup>

Table 4 about here

Turning to our critical theoretical variables, in the basic model the presidentialism dummy as well as the electoral district size (M) variable display moderately substantial associations with clientelistic effort in the expected direction. Compared to parliamentary regimes, presidentialism adds almost 1.4 effort units to clientelistic effort (on a 5-20 scale). Moving from single member districts to the logged maximal district size (6.1 for a district of 450) reduces clientelism by almost 1.6 units. Finally, going from fully vote pooling ballots to no pooling of votes on lists increases clientelism by 0.80 units, but the coefficient barely fails conventional statistical significance.

So at the outer bound, going from the extreme of a parliamentary democracy with very large districts and closed party lists (say, the Netherlands) to a presidential democracy with small, but not single-member districts, and no pooling at all in small multi-member districts (say SNTV systems) increases clientelistic effort by about 3.0 units.<sup>20</sup> This compares with a maximal effect of economic development of -2.80, when the poorest and the richest country are compared, and of -3.60, for a contrast between polities having the least and the most cumulative experience with democracy.

In other words, the combined effect of political institutions is quite respectable, but it pales when compared to combined effect of basic socio-economic and regime variables. But consider the addition of regional dummies to our basic model (column 2). As one might have already suspected from ocular inspection of table 2, the Latin American region looms large in the assessment of institutional effects on clientelistic linkage strategies. It is the region of the world where democracies have most uniformly adopted presidentialist constitutions, even though also Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and post-communist Eurasia each boast a substantial share of presidentialist democracies. Once we add the dummies for geographical regions, Latin America shows a substantively rather substantial and marginally significant statistical effect boosting clientelistic effort. Latin American countries feature parties that are on average 1.7 units more vested in clientelistic efforts than equivalently endowed countries in the reference category, the advanced postindustrial OECD West. But the addition of the a-theoretical regional dummies to our model of clientelistic partisan effort has the unfortunately consequence to wipe out much of the political regime effect and the district size effect, making them statistically insignificant, although still with correct signs. Instead, controlling for regions marginally enhances the size (and statistical significance) of the coefficient for the (non-vote) pooling variable, suggesting that politicians running in districts where electoral laws rule out the pooling of votes across multiple candidates across a party's list will be slightly more disposed toward clientelistic strategies than elsewhere.

How these results are to be interpreted may depend on one's philosophy about the use of proper name dummy variables. If we consider them an atheoretical assault on a test of a theoretically specified

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<sup>19</sup> I think the ethnic effect is worth while exploring, even if ethnicity has a time-space specific component.

<sup>20</sup> Keep in mind that the maximal clientelistic combination that would include both single-member districts and no pooling is logically impossible: By definition, in a single member district voters cannot disturb the list, so the pooling variable score is full pooling. This reduces the range of the feasible substantive impact of institutional arrangements somewhat.

statistical model, we actually may not be bothered by learning that the postulated mechanism works primarily in a single geographically bounded region. But if we consider the displacement of a significant effect of a theoretically relevant variable by a regional dummy variable as an alarm bell that unspecified causal processes might drive the relationship between institutions and clientelistic effort, then the result would reinvigorate our search for alternative explanations of the dependent variable. As long as no plausible alternatives are being advanced that would account for the pattern that only Latin American presidentialist polities appear to boost the efforts of politicians to engage in clientelistic linkage strategies, I would not entirely dismiss the claim that, at the margin, institutions—such as basic executive –executive relations—constitute an important correlate, if not cause, of clientelistic linkage effort.

So far, I have considered only the simple linear additive direct relations between institutions and citizen-politician linkage structures. But the dominant text in the literature (Carey and Shugart 1995) clearly emphasizes complex configurative and interactive effects. I have therefore run a rather large number of combinations of interaction effects among pooling, ballot structure, and district size stipulations in electoral system set-ups, either jointly or one by one, *but I have never come across a substantively large and statistically robust interactive relationship that would corroborate Carey and Shugart's argument*. For the sake of completeness, I present here only one model, both without and with regional dummies, that also includes two-way and three-way interactions among all the electoral system variables (columns 3-4), and a further model that uses an additive ballot structure variable, interacted with electoral district size (column 5). The interactions make electoral system effects vanish, but only slightly degrade the political regime effect (presidentialism), and they really do not affect the socio-economic and political control variables.

I do not present here interaction effects of electoral system properties with presidentialism, or interaction effects between institutional variables and various controls in order to explore whether institutions make more or less difference in certain socio-economic contexts or against the backdrop of particular regime or democratic experiences. But the explorations I made came up empty-handed. While my search certainly has not been exhaustive, I have seen a sufficient amount of results to put the burden of proof now on those who claim that institutional interactions really make the difference for democratic linkage strategies.

Let us turn next to the findings for programmatic structuring (CoSalPo\_4). Consistent with the fairly strong trade-off relationship between clientelistic effort and programmatic partisan appeals,<sup>21</sup> do the correlates that come with vigorous programmatic partisan appeals mirror the associations detected for clientelistic effort? Table 5 evidences that this is only the case to a rather limited extent. In the base model, a weakened version of the curvilinear relationship between development and linkage strategy is preserved and substantively large, but none of the institutional variables are significant.<sup>22</sup> This is predicated on adding a Scandinavia dummy to exclude the inexplicably middling scores for these countries, possibly based on measurement error or country anchor bias (Kitschelt and Freeze 2010). The control variable with a large effect on clientelism—cumulative democratic experience—does not make a difference for parties' programmatic appeals. It is apparently not the case that the inverse of the Keefer-Vlaicu (2008) hypothesis pertains, namely that party systems become more programmatic with growing experience.

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<sup>21</sup> The simple bivariate correlation between CoSalPo\_4.nwe and B15.nwe is -.55.

<sup>22</sup> Going from the poorest to the richest country, increases the programmatic appeal by .39 units. Keep in mind that the mean for all countries is .236, with a standard deviation of .156.

Table 5 about here

Adding the regional dummies generates substantially rather large, but not quite conventionally significant negative coefficients for Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia/Middle East, as well as a positive, yet insignificant coefficient for post-communist Eurasia. But these effects depress the impact of development on programmatic partisan efforts below the threshold of statistical significance, although it remains substantial. But now the institutional variable of presidentialism emerges as significantly positive: Contrary to the theory, presidential democracies appear to instill greater rather than lesser programmatic partisan efforts. But before we embrace this interpretation, let us consider the statistical meaning of the term. With regional dummies in place, the presidentialism coefficient represents the institutional effect net of the other regions, i.e. in the OECD-West reference region. That region, however, has only a single presidential democracy (see table 3) which has a stratospherically high score of programmatic partisan appeal (figure 3). This, I believe, is not a measurement error, but reflects the extreme programmatic polarization of American politics at this time when compared to just about any other OECD democracy. Yet statistically it creates an influential outlier that tips the effect of executive-legislative relations toward statistical significance.

Once again, the search for interactive relations is a frustrating, unrewarding chase for the proverbial golden pot of institutional efficacy at the end of the rainbow. For the record only, I include here estimation models with interaction effects paralleling those shown in table 4 for clientelistic effort. Let it be observed that by contriving the configuration of controls with interactions of the institutional variables makes it possible to generate a statistically significant negative coefficient for the Sub-Saharan Africa regional dummy.

## **5. Discussion: Probing into the Mechanisms that Link Institutions to Linkage Strategies**

Overall, then, the impact of democratic institutional design on partisan linkage strategies between citizens and politicians is modest at best, insubstantial and marginal at worst. It is more clearly articulated with regard to clientelism than programmatic party appeals, but even there it is mostly mediated through regional site-specific mechanisms. And the institutional argument is more plausible for executive-legislative relations (see table 2) than for electoral system variables. To make this plausible one last time, consider table 6 in which columns list configurations of ballot arrangements, ranging from those in theory most favorable to clientelism to those in theory most favorable to programmatic politics. At the clientelistic extreme are open-list systems without vote pooling, at the programmatic extreme closed-list systems with pooling. At that programmatic extreme, let me add the interaction effect with district size and distinguish countries with small electoral districts (effective size smaller than 3.0) and larger districts.

Table 6 about here

If the institutional electoral system hypotheses are correct, we should find few, if any countries where parties make a strong effort in building clientelistic linkages in the closed list/pooled votes column, and especially not when they have large districts. Yet we find just the opposite: There are plenty of countries in that column, indicated by bold faced cursive letters for countries, where parties make rather strong to very strong efforts to provide clientelistic linkages to their electorates (B15.nwe: 12.0 to 18.48). Think even of rather wealthy countries with large electoral districts and closed-list ballot structures (Israel, Korea).

One implication of the generated findings is that if the correlations between institutions and political linkage mechanisms are so feeble and fragile, there is little reason to worry about and explore endogeneity relations. If we find little statistical associations between electoral rules and parties' linkage strategies, why should we worry about whether institutions cause linkage strategies or linkage strategies cause institutions? The endogeneity challenge poses itself only if a strong relationship between phenomena has been established in the first place.

If these findings prove robust, even when challenged with more sophisticated methods of analysis and empirical operationalizations of institutional theory, they may give us pause to reconsider the relative weight given to the analysis of formal institutions in the study of clientelism, or more generally particularistic politics, and most generally democratic processes of accountability writ large. On the one hand, it might be more rewarding to turn to the social and political-economic conditions buttressing political exchange relations. On the other, it might make it imperative to shorten the causal chains we consider in theories of party competition and focus on phenomena within the purview of politicians' actions. One major component entirely ignored in this paper, but possibly rather consequential for linkage mechanisms, is the *construction of party organizations*. Internal party processes determine the nomination of candidates for electoral lists, or the extent to which parties are willing to expose that process to outside influence (e.g. in primaries). A theory of party organization may help to shed light on the efforts politicians make in building linkage relations to citizens.

But let us for a moment assume that in fact the data pick up a robust relationship at least for democratic regime design, i.e. the difference between presidential and other systems, albeit qualified by only regional contingency in the efficacy of the relationship. It would mean that presidential democracies, on the one hand, promote clientelistic targeted exchange between voters and politicians (positive coefficient, table 4), but, on the other, also promote programmatic partisan appeals (positive coefficient, table 5). As discussed earlier, there are good theoretical arguments to attribute to presidents both a penchant for clientelism and elaboration of programmatic politics. Moreover, we know while there is a trade-off between clientelistic and programmatic partisan appeals, detectable both at the level of individual parties as well as country aggregates, it is not absolute. There are, in fact, parties and countries that engage in "high everything" linkage strategies, with competitors investing in both direct targeted goods provision and credible programmatic appeals (Kitschelt and Singer 2011). Could presidentialism be one of the catalysts that makes parties seek to differentiate their portfolio of voter-linkage strategies?

"High everything" parties for the most part tend to be resourceful, large parties that can mobilize a variety of avenues to reach out to voters. Maybe holding presidential office makes parties affiliated with the office incumbent more resourceful ... and/or leaders of resourceful parties often manage to institute presidential democracies? Let me try here a simpleton's face validity test without getting into the statistical mess of more complex interaction effects in small-to-medium N estimations: Are presidential systems over-represented among countries that have undertaken a rather substantial clientelistic effort ( $B15.nwe > 12.0$ ), as well as an at least moderate programmatic appeal ( $CoSalPo\_4.nwe > .20$ )? Table 7 lists countries that meet both qualifications ( $N= 22$ ) by region and also compares their distribution of political regime forms with that among the residual set of countries in which parties on average make strong efforts only in regards to clientelism or programmatic appeals, or none of the above ( $N=66$ ).

Table 7 about here

Presidential systems are, indeed, somewhat over-represented among countries with “high everything” partisan linkage efforts. But it is regionally highly specific. Two regions dominate the “high everything” cohort, and these are postcommunist Eurasia and Latin America. One of the regions clearly invests in presidential “do everything” regimes, the other tilts more toward parliamentary systems. In a third region-Asia, four countries qualify, and they split evenly between presidential and parliamentary arrangements. There may be other more powerful things that unite all “high everything” countries (and their most important, often hegemonic parties) that has not been scrutinized here. All of these countries are medium-income countries, broadly conceived (say, \$ 3,000 - \$ 20,000 per capita GDP at PPP). They also may share political-economic challenges: Most of them either come out of a grueling era of import substituting industrialization, often led by hegemonic parties (communist, populist, and otherwise), and suffering economic decline since the 1970s. The rise of “high everything” parties appears to be predicated on deep and protracted economic crises, followed by the rise of a new party that begins to establish a successful novel political-economic formula and development strategy, politically enshrined in both a program to provide collective and large-scale club goods, as well as often clientelistic side-payments to compensate the losers and make them acquiesce to the “new deal” of the dawning era. The choice of political regime form may be possibly endogenous to the process and the resources such novel parties assemble as they ascent to predominance. It is obviously for a different paper to probe into the empirical and theoretical soundness of this story, but I bet that the political-economic account, endogenizing institutions into configurations of social and electoral coalitions, is a formidable contender challenging any institutional-centered theoretical argument.

## **6. Conclusion**

The paper provides only a semblance of an initial exploration of institutional arguments in the study of democratic citizen-politician relations. Its findings fuel skepticism about a predominantly institutionalist story about democratic politics. With appropriate controls, the seeming associations between institutional design and partisan linkage patterns substantively weaken or vanish altogether. Let me close by itemizing a few routes that may need to be explored to test the robustness of this argument and give institutional arguments a fair chance to prove themselves.

First of all, measures of key theoretical independent and dependent variables may require revision. The index of programmatic party appeals is a clear candidate, but also the scoring of ballot structures may be worth another look. In a similar vein, one might want to score presidential powers to develop a more sophisticated institutional differentiation. The incentives of presidentialism, for example, may play out only if there is sufficient scope and depth of office powers. In a similar vein, examining the programmatic appeal of parties may require a close study of parliamentary organization and incentives for politicians to coordinate around common policy appeals that set different labels apart.

Second, this paper has not even begun to exploit the leverage that cross-level analysis might yield. My data set makes information about individual parties’ linkage strategies available. Institutional effects may work only on specific parties, situated in a theoretically identifiable strategic configuration, not on party systems as a whole. For example, the incentives of presidentialism are likely to affect large parties who can put up credible presidential contenders more likely than small parties. In a similar vein, electoral system incentives may work differently on small and large parties.

Third, a pure cross-sectional analysis assumes an “instant match” between institutions and political behavior. But there are likely to be shorter or longer lags in which politicians adjust to

institutional incentives. Perhaps we should not explore whether the current district size in Italian elections affects the parties' profile of linkage strategies, but the institutions that prevailed in years t-20 to t-10. More generally, some temporal depth needs to be integrated into the examination of institutional effects on political behavior.

Fourth, as indicated above, if institutional effects do show up, then they must be linked to proximate mechanisms. For example, if presidentialism matters for clientelism, then some conditions under which presidents operate should be more likely to activate the leverage of the office for the production of targeted goods. Following the logic laid out above, presidents should be likely to resort to clientelistic inducements particularly if (1) they have little power over their own party, even when it is in the legislative majority, (2) there is no firm support coalition in a non-majoritarian situation and presidents have to assemble legislative coalitions on an ad-hoc basis, (4) specific powers of the presidency (such as decree powers, budget powers, executive appointments to agencies and government owned companies or to local and regional administrative jobs) make it expedient to mobilize clientelism or (5) because of non-concurrent legislative and executive elections, the separation of purpose between executive and legislature is particularly deep.

More generally, the voices that issue guarded messages about the promise of institutional design for shaping political behavior have gotten louder over the past ten years. It is no longer the case that graduate students think of "institutions" as the default explanation for just about any object of explanation that is presented to them. Maybe the study of citizen-politician linkages contributes to this skepticism and corrects the movement of a pendulum of theoretical fashions that has swung too far in the direction of institutionalism.




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


**FIGURE 1: MODES OF POLITICAL LINKAGE IN DEMOCRACIES**

**Table 1. Goods Provision and Democratic Linkage Mechanisms**

	<b>CONTRACTUAL FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONS</b>		
	<b>intangible, expressive “affective” linkages</b>	<b>Tangible, instrumental “programmatic” linkages</b>  Non-contingency of exchange	<b>Tangible, instrumental “clientelistic” linkages</b>  Contingent exchange with some targeting, monitoring, sanctions
<b>Collective goods (“public goods”)</b>	<b>-some identity (“nation”) -leadership charisma</b>	<b>“valence” competition</b> “competence” “governability”	<b>none</b>
<b>Large-scale club goods</b>	<b>-large group identity (ethnic group) -party identification - leadership charisma</b>	<b>positional issue competition</b>  (responsible partisan model of accountability)	<b>none</b>
<b>Small-scale (“local”) club goods</b>	<b>-small group identity (clans) -leadership charisma</b>	<b>competition with pork provision</b>  (special interest group politics)	<b>clientelistic group competition</b>  (Pork with contingency)
<b>Private goods</b>	<b>-nepotism</b>	<b>Constituency service</b>  (personalized assistance)	<b>clientelistic personal (family) competition</b>





**Figure 3: Relationship between Wealth (per capita GDP at PPP in 2007) and Clientelistic Partisan Effort (B15nwe)**

**Table 2: Executive-Legislative Relations and Clientelistic Effort**

	<b>Presidentialism</b>	<b>Semi- Presidentialism</b>	<b>Parliamentarism</b>
<b>Weak clientelistic effort: 5-11</b>	<b>1</b> (USA)	<b>2</b> (FIN; FRA)	<b>14</b> (AUS, AUT, BEL, CHE, CND, CZ, DNBK, GER, IRL, LVA, NLD, NOR, NZL, SWE, UK)
<b>Intermediate clientelistic effort: 11-14</b>	<b>6</b> (CHL, CRI, KOR, PER, RUS, URY)	<b>5</b> (HRV, MOZ, POL, PRT, TWN)	<b>14</b> (BWA, EST, GRC, ISR, ITA, JPN, MYS, MDA, SRB, SVK, SVN, ZAF, ESP, THA)
<b>Strong clientelistic effort</b>	<b>27</b> (AGO, ARG, BEN, BOL, BRA, COL, DOM, ECU, EGY, SLV, GEO, GHA, GTM, HND, IDN, KEN, LEB, MEX, NIC, NGA, PAN, PRY, PHL, TZA, UKR, VEN, ZMB)	<b>7</b> (ALB, LTH, MLI, MNG, NER, ROM, SEN)	<b>11</b> (BGD, BGR, HUN, IND, JAM, MKA, MUS, MAR, NAM, PAK, TUR)

**Table 3: Vote Pooling and Clientelistic Effort**

	<b>No pooling (0 - .49)</b>	<b>Partial pooling (.50-1.49)</b>	<b>Full pooling (1.50 -2.0)</b>
<b>Weak clientelistic effort: 5-11</b>	<b>4</b> (CND, FRA, UK, USA)	<b>4</b> (AUS, GER, IRL, NZL)	<b>10</b> (AUT, BEL, CHE, CZ, DENK, FIN, LVA, NLD, NOR, SWE)
<b>Intermediate clientelistic effort: 11-14</b>	<b>5</b> (BWA, ITA, JPN, MYS, THA)	<b>3</b> (CHL, RUS, ESP)	<b>15</b> (CRI, EST, GRC, HRV, ISR, KOR, MDA, MOZ, PER, POL, PRT, SLK, SVN, URY, ZAF)
<b>Strong clientelistic effort</b>	<b>12</b> (GHA, IND, JAM, KEN, MNG, MUS, NGA, PAK, PHL, TWN, TZA, ZMB)	<b>10</b> (ALB, BOL, COL, GEO, HUN, LTH, MEX, PAN, UKR, VEN)	<b>18</b> (ARG, BGD, BEN, BRA, BGR, DOM, ECU, SLV, EGY, GTM, HND, IDN, MAR, NAM, NIC, NER, ROM)



**Table 4: Determinants of Parties' Average Clientelistic Effort  
(Country Level Analysis: B15.nwe)**

	<b>1</b> Basic model	<b>2</b> Basic model + region dummies	<b>3</b> Basic model and interactions	<b>4</b> Basic model, interactions, regions	<b>5</b> Basic model, additive index, interactions
<b>Presidentialism</b>	1.377*** [0.478]	0.691 [0.578]	1.098** [0.513]	0.449 [0.613]	1.368*** [0.505]
<b>Semi-Presidentialism</b>	0.258 [0.597]	0.236 [0.581]	0.260 [0.607]	0.208 [0.596]	0.432 [0.609]
<b>District Magnitude M (log)</b>	-.259* [0.152]	-0.144 [0.160]	-3.840 [4.793]	-4.093 [4.777]	-.554 [0.665]
<b>Ballot Structure (BS) (closed=1; open=2)</b>	-0.590 [0.505]	-.517 [0.502]	-4.316 [6.427]	-4.129 [6.376]	
<b>Vote pooling (VP) (all=1; none=3)</b>	0.406 [0.267]	0.516* [0.286]	-4.415 [6.093]	-4.281 [6.050]	
<b>GDPpcPPP (log)</b>	14.05*** [3.225]	9.206** [4.090]	12.83*** [3.332]	8.373* [4.188]	13.63*** [3.358]
<b>GDPpcPPP (log)<sup>2</sup></b>	-.850*** [0.185]	-0.571** [0.235]	-.790*** [0.190]	-.529** [0.240]	-.838*** [0.192]
<b>Democratic stock</b>	-0.00361*** [0.0000928]	-.00451*** [0.00119]	-0.00327*** [0.000987]	-0.00423*** [0.00131]	-0.00301*** [0.000996]
<b>Polity IV: democratic contestation</b>	0.0649 [0.0644]	0.0685 [0.0703]	0.0630 [0.0673]	0.0775 [0.0738]	0.0622 [0.0668]
<b>Between-groups inequality (BGI)</b>	9.507 [8.787]	2.179 [9.020]	11.02 [9.063]	2.810 [9.489]	11.48 [9.238]
<b>M * BS</b>			3.18 [4.726]	3.690 [4.693]	
<b>M * VP</b>			3.729 [4.671]	4.228 [4.635]	
<b>BS * VP</b>			4.433 [6.027]	4.559 [5.958]	
<b>M * BS * VP</b>			-3.463 [4.639]	-4.048 [4.600]	
<b>BS + VP</b>					0.129 [0.455]
<b>(BS + VP) * M</b>					0.102 [0.228]
<b>Post-Communist Eurasia</b>		-.270 [0.985]		-0.107 [1.045]	
<b>Latin America</b>		1.743* [1.040]		1.832* [1.059]	
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>		0.237 [0.969]		0.532 [1.030]	
<b>Asia-Middle East</b>		1.097 [0.839]		1.268 [0.856]	
<b>_cons</b>	-.43.73*** [13.95]	-23.72 [17.44]	-33.12* [17.00]	-15.77 [19.56]	-41.33*** [14.89]
<b>N</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>.776</b>	<b>.789</b>	<b>.774</b>	<b>.784</b>	<b>.763</b>
<b>ll</b>	<b>-135.3</b>	<b>-130.8</b>	<b>-133.3</b>	<b>-129.0</b>	<b>-137.6</b>

**Table 5: Determinants of Parties' Average Programmatic Effort  
(Country Level Analysis: CoSalPo\_4.nwe)**

	<b>1</b> Basic model	<b>2</b> Basic model + region dummies	<b>3</b> Basic model and interactions	<b>4</b> Basic model, interactions, regions	<b>5</b> Basic model, additive index, interactions
<b>Presidentialism</b>	0.0364 [0.0369]	0.0975** [0.0440]	0.0505 [0.0385]	0.107** [0.0452]	0.0441 [0.0376]
<b>Semi-Presidentialism</b>	0.0578 [0.0468]	0.0589 [0.0440]	0.0467 [0.0463]	0.0487 [0.0446]	0.0526 [0.0458]
<b>District Magnitude M (log)</b>	-0.00303 [0.0118]	-0.0100 [0.0122]	0.229 [0.361]	0.292 [0.353]	0.0426 [0.0497]
<b>Ballot Structure (BS) (closed=1; open=2)</b>	-0.0227 [0.0389]	-0.0357 [0.0382]	1.369 [0.485]	0.384 [0.472]	
<b>Vote pooling (VP) (all=1; none=3)</b>	-0.0282 [0.0210]	-0.0355 [0.0222]	0.407 [0.460]	0.432 [0.448]	
<b>GDPpcPPP (log)</b>	-.430* [0.253]	-.382 [0.315]	-0.301 [0.256]	-0.276 [0.312]	-0.388 [0.255]
<b>GDPpcPPP (log)<sup>2</sup></b>	0.0301** [0.0146]	0.0258 [0.0180]	0.0235 [0.0146]	0.0204 [0.0178]	0.0282* [0.0146]
<b>Democratic stock</b>	0.0000351 [0.0000728]	0.000152 [0.0000917]	-0.00000451 [0.0000757]	0.0000571 [0.0000979]	0.00000646 [0.0000754]
<b>Polity IV: democratic contestation</b>	-0.00425 [0.00498]	-0.00573 [0.00537]	-0.00251 [0.00508]	-0.00355 [0.00546]	-0.00363 [0.00499]
<b>Between-groups inequality (BGI)</b>	-.354 [0.678]	0.0439 [0.687]	-0.537 [0.681]	-0.312 [0.699]	-0.496 [0.687]
<b>M * BS</b>			-0.197 [0.356]	-.243 [0.347]	
<b>M * VP</b>			-0.227 [0.352]	-0.276 [0.342]	
<b>BS * VP</b>			-0.392 [0.454]	-0.405 [0.440]	
<b>M * BS * VP</b>			0.204 [0.340]	0.242 [0.340]	
<b>BS + VP</b>					-0.00126 [0.0345]
<b>(BS + VP) * M</b>					-0.0161 [0.0171]
<b>Post-Communist Eurasia</b>		0.0726 [0.0750]		0.0236 [0.0769]	
<b>Latin America</b>		-0.102 [0.0792]		-0.108 [0.0780]	
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>		-0.121 [0.0792]		-0.173** [0.0759]	
<b>Asia-Middle East</b>		-0.0503 [0.0640]		-0.0673 [0.0631]	
<b>Scandinavia</b>	-0.261*** [0.0790]	-0.271*** [0.0760]	-0.249*** [0.0779]	-0.258*** [0.0748]	-0.253*** [0.0785]
<b>_cons</b>	1.722 [1.097]	1.692 [1.343]	0.672 [1.308]	0.656 [1.463]	1.420 [1.132]
<b>N</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>76</b>
<b>Adj. R<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>0.416</b>	<b>0.462</b>	<b>0.441</b>	<b>0.486</b>	<b>0.424</b>
<b>ll</b>	<b>59.97</b>	<b>65.57</b>	<b>64.07</b>	<b>69.89</b>	<b>60.49</b>

**Table 6: Ballot Structures, Vote Pooling, and Clientelistic Effort**

	Open BS No VP	Open BS Partial VP	Open BS Full VP	Closed BS No VP	Closed BS Partial VP	Closed BS, Full VP	
						Small districts (log <2)	Large districts (log >2)
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	MUS			BWA, GHA, KEN, NGA, TZA, ZMB			<i>MOZ, NAM, NER, ZAF</i>
<b>Asia-Middle East</b>	THA, TWN		EGY, IDN	IND, JPN, MSY, PAK, PHL	BGD		<i>MAR, ROK</i>
<b>Latin America</b>		PAN	BRA, CHL, ECU	JAM	BOL, COL, MEX, VEN		<i>ARG, CRI, DOM, GTM, HND, SLV, NIC, PER, PRY</i>
<b>Post-Communist Region</b>			CZ, EST, HRV, LVA, POL, SVK, SVN	MNG	ALB, GEO, HUN, LTH, RUS, UKR	<i>ROM</i>	<i>BGR, MDA</i>
<b>OECD West</b>		IRE	DNK, FIN, GRC, CHE	CND, FRA, ITA, UK, US	AUS, GER, NZL, ESP		AUT, BEL, <i>ISR</i> , NLD, NOR, <i>PRT</i> , SWE
	<p><b>Most favoring Clientelistic linkage Effort</b> ←————→ <b>least favoring clientelistic linkage effort</b></p>						

**Table 7: “High Everything” Clientelistic and Programmatic Linkage Efforts and Democratic Regime Structures**  
 (CoSalPo\_4.nwe > .20; B15.nwe > 12.0)

	<b>Presidentialism</b>	<b>Semi-presidentialism</b>	<b>Parliamentarism</b>
<b>Post-communist region (7)</b>	<b>RUS</b>	<b>ALB, CROA, ROM</b>	<b>BGR, MKD, SRB</b>
<b>Latin America (9)</b>	<b>BOL, CHL, COL, CRI, ECU, GTM, MEX, PRY, SLV</b>		
<b>Asia-Middle East (4)</b>	<b>EGY, KOR</b>		<b>MYS, TUR</b>
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa (1)</b>			<b>ZAF</b>
<b>OECD-West (1)</b>		<b>PRT</b>	
<b>Total, “high everything” linkage countries (22)</b>	<b>12 (55%)</b>	<b>4 (18%)</b>	<b>6 (27%)</b>
<b>All other countries without “high everything” linkages (66)</b>	<b>23 (35%)</b>	<b>10 (15%)</b>	<b>33 (50%)</b>

## Appendix: Scores for Institutional Variables and Controls

Country	Presidential	Semi-presidential	District magnitude	Ballot structure	Pooling	logGDPppp	Democracy stock	Polity	BGI	Scandinavia dummy
Albania	0	1	12.14	1	0.571429	8.81087	-348.767	5	0.000111	0
Angola	1	0	78.86	1	.	8.534117	-114.2957	-3	.	0
Argentina	1	0	10.11	1	2	9.433614	-23.93981	8	0.0467395	0
Australia	0	0	1	1	1	10.3962	633.9676	10	0	0
Austria	0	0	20.33	1	2	10.47832	430.683	10	0.0020398	0
Bangladesh	1	0	1	1	0	7.066241	2.855319	6	0.00232	0
Belgium	0	0	13.64	1	2	10.41628	582.2742	10	0.0115823	0
Benin	1	0	3.46	1	2	7.122027	-73.86301	6	0.0184706	0
Bolivia	1	0	3.62	1	0.953846	8.287111	37.58434	9	0.0653986	0
Botswana	0	0	1	1	0	9.460902	222.4992	9	0.0054072	0
Brazil	1	0	19	2	2	9.108797	-10.05199	8	0.0481982	0
Bulgaria	0	0	6	1	2	9.261878	-270.8675	8	0.0313744	0
Canada	0	0	1	1	0	10.49847	629.1129	10	0.0190194	0
Chile	1	0	2	2	2	9.480991	121.0611	9	0.0261728	0
Colombia	1	0	5.03	1	1	9.000733	236.2545	7	0.0108321	0
Costa Rica	1	0	8.14	1	2	9.233965	637.6279	10	0.0120957	0
Croatia	0	1	14	1	2	9.597579	-316.1763	7	0.0109153	0
Czech Rep.	0	0	14.29	2	2	10.04121	-57.00011	10	0	0
Denmark	0	0	19.54	2	2	10.46038	589.5113	10	0	0
Dom. Rep.	1	0	6.31	1	2	8.75358	-91.50744	8	0.0273139	0
Ecuador	1	0	2.78	1	2	8.858612	120.2365	6	0.0025468	0
Egypt	1	0	2	2	2	8.527463	-243.2351	-6	0	0
El Salvador	1	0	8.24	1	2	8.609101	-115.9387	7	0.0264046	0
Estonia	0	0	8.42	2	2	9.869267	-197.0089	6	0.0324025	0
Finland	0	1	13.33	2	2	10.41404	476.6909	10	0.0039914	1
France	0	1	1	1	0	10.3617	485.2277	9	0.0051191	0
Georgia	1	0	38	1	1.276596	8.389954	-344.4438	5	.	0
Germany	0	0	9.84	1	1.008292	10.40972	380.218	10	0.0033899	0
Ghana	1	0	1	1	0	7.139037	-131.7418	6	0.018568	0
Greece	0	0	5.27	2	2	10.20093	325.4668	10	0	0
Guatemala	1	0	10.72	1	2	8.368329	-114.634	8	0.1463327	0
Honduras	1	0	7.11	1	2	8.184494	111.5083	7	0.0293394	0
Hungary	0	0	13,81	1	1.088083	9.792242	-151.8334	10	0.0143631	0
India	0	0	1	1	0	7.863317	342.7573	9	0.0600632	0
Indonesia	1	0	18.67	2	2	8.16217	-199.2194	7	0.0186287	0
Ireland	0	0	3.86	2	1	10.62221	525.6672	10	0	0
Israel	0	0	120	1	2	10.11957	350.3274	10	0.0794697	0
Italy	0	0	24.24	1	0.492064	10.26402	328.2842	10	0	0
Jamaica	0	0	1	1	0	8.655412	336.6153	9	0.0136195	0
Japan	0	0	6.76	1	0	10.36373	434.1239	10	0	0
Kenya	1	0	1	1	0	7.283759	-154.9366	-2	0.0318956	0
Latvia	0	0	20	2	2	9.699984	-224.3887	8	0.0088446	0
Lebanon	1	0	4.92	2	.	9.163907	70.69515	7	.	0
Lithuania	0	1	35.5	1	0.992908	9.7207	-257.3486	10	.	0
Macedonia	0	0	20	1	.	9.030037	-191.6437	9	0.0206746	0
Malaysia	0	1	1	1	0	9.454556	182.1086	3	0.0180268	0
Mali	0	1	1.18	1	.	6.930415	-112.8725	6	0.0301189	0
Mauritius	0	0	2.95	2	0	9.274991	271.4257	10	.	0
Mexico	1	0	80.6	1	0.8	9.496066	-217.8286	8	0.0354009	0
Moldova	0	0	101	1	2	7.787041	-274.3442	7	0.0173915	0
Mongolia	0	1	2.92	1	0	8.02489	-287.7435	10	0	0
Morocco	0	0	5.59	1	2	8.263514	-296.4804	-6	0.0029936	0

Mozambique	0	1	22.73	1	1.984	6.630394	-78.88794	6	0.0023119	0
Namibia	1	0	72	1	2	8.490463	43.2606	6	0.0087133	0
Netherlands	0	0	150	1	2	10.51749	528.6914	10	0	0
New Zealand	0	0	21.36	1	0.983333	10.13782	637.6279	10	0.0036553	0
Nicaragua	1	0	5.29	1	2	7.794249	-225.6471	8	0.0160225	0
Niger	0	1	13.13	1	1.858407	6.384348	-148.0842	4	.	0
Nigeria	1	0	1	1	0	7.528038	-74.68044	4	0.0209985	0
Norway	0	0	8.89	1	2	10.80687	613.7269	10	0	1
Pakistan	0	0	1	1	0.409357	7.765256	9.757338	-6	0.0355582	0
Panama	1	0	1.82	1.65	1.307692	9.283298	-47.3194	9	0.0458038	0
Paraguay	1	0	4.44	1	2	8.339616	-260.0572	7	0.0220726	0
Peru	1	0	5.2	1	2	8.90919	60.45719	9	0.017123	0
Philippines	1	0	15.84	1	0.20339	8.076081	104.9035	8	0.003777	0
Poland	0	1	11.22	2	2	9.657202	-122.403	9	0	0
Portugal	0	1	10.45	1	2	9.960289	9.18345	10	0	0
ROK	1	0	10.57	1	1.625418	10.06046	-14.91795	8	0	0
Romania	0	1	1	1	2	9.282704	-267.7146	8	0.0068948	0
Russia	1	0	450	1	1	9.537682	-340.9565	7	0.0074026	0
S. Africa	0	0	111.11	1	2	9.128541	281.0852	9	0.0275968	0
Senegal	0	1	25.54	1	.	7.360677	-92.75738	8	0.0175638	0
Serbia	0	0	250	1	.	9.223087	-314.4908	6	0.0063471	0
Slovakia	0	0	150	2	2	9.87001	-74.2365	9	0.0151571	0
Slovenia	0	0	11.25	2	2	10.17709	-198.109	10	0.0013256	0
Spain	0	0	7	1	1	10.25894	107.0509	10	0.0019727	0
Sweden	0	0	13.86	1	2	10.43677	572.3362	10	0.001229	1
Switzerland	1	0	7.69	1	2	10.53426	637.6279	10	0.0118066	0
Taiwan	0	1	11.61	1.05	0.3200001	10.35471	-145.8511	9	0.0256317	0
Tanzania	1	0	1	1	0	7.039621	-190.8116	-1	0.0131961	0
Thailand	0	0	3.51	1.83	0.4	8.946639	-153.4894	9	0	0
Turkey	0	0	6.71	1	.	9.377965	149.64	7	0.1070324	0
UK	0	0	1	1	0	10.42575	619.3276	10	.	0
USA	1	0	1	1	0	10.67023	637.6279	10	0.002703	0
Ukraine	1	0	450	1	1	8.783991	-319.0996	7	0.0437557	0
Uruguay	1	0	5.21	2	2	9.267816	200.8246	10	0.0316114	0
Venezuela	1	0	1.69	1.26	0.909091	9.348359	131.9771	7	0.0444805	0
Zambia	1	0	1	1	0	7.156847	-102.9669	1	0.0083514	0
<b>Average</b>	0.4090909	0.1704545	30.122727	1.213863	1.273875	9.116718	70.62839	7.363636	0.0186132	0.0340909

## Appendix: Variable sources and descriptive statistics

Variable	Ob	Mea	Std.	Min	Max	Source/coding
	s	n	Dev.			
<b>Presidential system</b>	88	0.41	0.49	0	1	<a href="#">Golder's</a> (2005) "institution" variable
<b>Semi-presidential District</b>	88	0.17	0.38	0	1	<a href="#">Golder's</a> (2005) "institution" variable
<b>magnitude</b>	85	14.31	30	1	150	<a href="#">Johnson and Wallack</a> (2007)
<b>Ballot structure</b>	80	1.35	.4702	1	2	(a modified variable based on <a href="#">Johnson and Wallack</a> ): 1= closed list (including SMD); 2= open list (weighted average of all electoral tiers for mixed systems)
<b>Pooling</b>	81	1.27	.832900 7	0	2	<a href="#">Johnson and Wallack</a> : 0= no pooling of votes across candidates in a party (including SMD); 1= pooling of votes across some, but not all, candidates in a party in a district, or, where there is vote pooling across all candidates in a party in a district, but where the average district accounts for 5% or less of a legislature's membership; 2= pooling of votes across all candidates in a party in a district (weighted average of all electoral tiers for mixed systems)
<b>log GDP pc (ppp)</b>	88	9.12	1.12	6.38	10.81	World bank and IMF: 2007 GDP per capita in 2005 International Dollars
<b>Democracy stock</b>	88	70.63	306.02	-348.77	637.63	<a href="#">Gerring</a> (2005)
<b>Polity</b>	88	7.36	3.65	-6	10	lagged two-year average
<b>BGI</b>	81	0.019	0.02	0	0.15	<a href="#">Kolev and Wang</a> (2010), extended from <a href="#">Baldwin and Huber</a> (2010)