Buying Voters with Dirty Money: The Relationship between Clientelism and Corruption

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Abstract: Both political experts and ordinary citizens perceive clientelist countries to have difficulties in controlling corruption. One possible mechanism linking the two outcomes is the more general relationship between clientelism and weak governance structures (a politicized bureaucracy and policy making process and weak rule of law). A second possible mechanism is that clientelism thrives when politicians can use corrupt dealings to generate the funds that political machines distribute. I find evidence for both mechanisms. Clientelist countries tend to have bad governance outcomes across the board, including lower levels of government effectiveness and a weaker rule of law. Clientelism is also associated with illegal fundraising by political parties. Finally, clientelism is also associated with the level of corruption experienced by businesses in their interactions with government officials who set policy and distribute contracts. However, it is not associated with the frequency government officials and policemen target citizens for bribes or corrupt exchanges with low-level officials (e.g. utility workers and tax collectors). The association of clientelism with grand corruption and not petty bribery suggests the linkage between clientelism and corruption may be driven more strongly by their linkage with fundraising than with their relationship to the rule of law.

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Corruption, commonly defined as the "misuse of public office for private gain", can take many forms (Rose-Ackerman 1999). "Petty" acts of corruption target individual citizens. Common examples include policemen soliciting bribes at a traffic stop, public officials asking for extra payments to issue a birth certificate or marriage license in a timely fashion, and government inspectors extorting funds in exchange for necessary permits or utility access. Corruption can also function on a grand scale as political elites misappropriate budgeted funds for personal enrichment or auction policy initiatives or procurement contracts in exchange for financial kickbacks (see Treisman 2007 for a recent review).

Many scholars have linked corruption with clientelism. Both involve political actors manipulating public resources for personal gain (be it financial or political). Clientelism and corruption are likely to thrive in the same kinds of countries - polities with high levels of poverty, weak democratic institutions, short democratic histories, and a large state economic presence (Treisman 2007, Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Thus countries that are heavily clientelistic like Argentina (e.g. Remmer 2007, Auyero 2001, Nazareno et al 2006, Stokes 2005, Calvo and Murrillo 2004, Brusco et al 2004) also tend to have corruption scandals (e.g. Saba and Manzetti 1996, Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2003) while countries like Sweden where political competition is primarily around competing programmatic policy proposals (Papakostas 2001, Muller 2007, c.f. Johansson 2001) tend to have fewer corruption scandals. Finally, measures of corruption have been proposed as proxies for the extent of clientelism in cross-national research (e.g. Persson et al 2003, Keefer 2007).

Yet corruption and clientelism are not necessary synonymous. Many forms of corruption, for example, have nothing to do with clientelism such as when a public official steals money or extracts bribes to fund their own consumption. Moreover, while vote buying and patronage hiring may be illegal and thus are ipso facto corrupt, other forms of clientelism are not necessarily corrupt. Clientelist actors who help individuals who do not qualify for welfare receive government handouts are engaging in corruption, but those who help qualified partisans or wing voters access social programs or provide them with information about upcoming benefits in the hope of gaining their loyalty are not necessarily engaging in corruption. As an early study concludes, “patron-client ties may or may not be corrupt” (Waterbury 1973, 537; quoted in Hutchroft 1997, 645).

Thus the goal of this chapter is to examine the relationship between clientelism and corruption. There is a strong relationship between the perceived level of clientelism in a country and the perceived level of corruption even after controlling for their underlying association with poverty. I propose three potential mechanisms that may explain this association. First, observers may be responding negatively to corrupt forms of clientelism. Second, clientelism may have an association with a weakened rule of law and politicized bureaucracy and regulatory process, both of which create opportunities for corruption. Finally, clientelism and corruption may be linked through the generation of funds to purchase the materialist goods that political machines distribute. Empirical evidence supports each of these mechanisms to some degree, although ultimately the data is most consistent with the third hypothesis.

Cross-National Patterns of Clientelism and Corruption

Previous cross-national studies interested in clientelism have frequently assumed that corruption indices are a good proxy for clientelism. One of the most commonly used corruption measures is a composite index generated by the World Bank, which combines data from political experts, surveys of businessmen, and public opinion surveys about the perceived extent of corrupt behaviors in a country as well as (to a more limited extent) their personal experiences with paying bribes (Kaufman et al 2006). In Figure 1, I plot the corruption control measure with our index of clientelist effort, which sums the total number of material goods that parties offer to voters in exchange for their support as described previously in this volume (indicator b15nwe).[1] The top figure includes all 88 countries in the expert survey. Within the entire sample, the correlation between these two variables is quite high (r=-0.863). However, this relationship is anchored by the general perceived lack of both clientelism and corruption with many developed countries; if we exclude 19 advanced industrial democracies as in the bottom figure, the correlation is still strong but more modest (r=-.5936).[2]

(Figure 1 about here)

At a measurement level, the imperfect relationship between the governance indicator and our clientelism indicator is reassuring. Clientelism and corruption do not overlap perfectly, and thus these variables should differ. Yet they are associated with each other. The question is whether this association is spurious and driven only by both happening within poor and weak democracies or reflects some more fundamental political dynamic.

I propose three potential ways in which clientelism and corruption may be politically reinforcing. While each of these potential linkages implies that clientelist politics will be associated with corrupt societies, they each have different empirical implications about the types of corruption that will abound in clientelist countries.

First, the association between perceived levels of corruption and clientelism in a country

[1] B15nwe in the dataset. In previous iterations of the paper I looked at the overall summary measure of clientelist exchange in a country (B6) but focus here on B15nwe for the reasons explained elsewhere in this volume. The results are consistent across indicators; if anything the association between the single question summary clientelism indicator and the governance indices is stronger than is the measure focusing on the specific goods that are distributed and initially disaggregates them by party.

[2] To put the difference in perspective, consider the difference in their squared correlation: the bivariate relationship between corruption control and clientelism has an R^2 of 0.74 within the tnire sample while among developing countries it is 0.35

may be superficially driven by the fact that clientelism and corruption partially overlap. Many forms of clientelism are in fact illegal. For example, providing money or other material considerations in direct exchange for a voter's support is illegal in every American state (Hasen 2000) and in many countries, though enforcement of these laws varies even in countries where vote buying is well-documented (Transparency International 2004). Direct vote buying is thus ipso facto corrupt. Another form of clientelism that is often considered corrupt is patronage-the distribution of jobs to political supporters. V.O. Key, for example, described "state-bribery": "the control of various public properties and the expenditure of public funds is abused-or perhaps more accurately misused-for the purpose of creating power or control relationships. … State-bribery includes the control of the political organization, its candidates and to some extent its policies, by *the control of patronage and contracts*" (1936, 389 emphasis added). Kawata (2006) includes both patronage and vote buying (as well as perhaps clientelism more generally) in his definition of corruption "Corruption takes many forms. It appears as fraud, oblique voting, *vote buying*, *patronage*, graft, payoffs and bribery in the distribution and regulatory process of diverging interests, as well as in *the electoral process itself*" (2006, xii emphasis added). Jain makes a similar linkage, "One can give examples that others will agree involve corruption. Those examples cover *patronage appointments*, bribery, misuse of authority and power, and favoritism in awarding contracts" (1999, 13 emphasis added). Even though patronage may not always be illegal, it may be widely perceived as corrupt by political observers and citizens themselves because it delivers benefits from the state to a small clique associated with a politician.

Thus as academics, NGOs, and citizens are asked to describe the amount of corruption in a country, what they might be in part describing is the level of clientelism in politics. This may include clearly corrupt practices such as vote buying as well as a general perception that politics in a clientelist country "seem corrupt". If this is the only relationship between clientelism and corruption, however, then there should be no relationship between the frequency of clientelist mobilization in a country and non-electoral forms of corruption (such as policemen soliciting bribes or politicians receiving kickbacks for procurement contracts) once political and economic variables have been controlled for.

A second and more direct reason why clientelism may potentially be associated with corruption is that clientelism may create a political structure in which corruption can flourish. Clientelism requires politicians and bureaucrats have discretion in the allocation of resources and programs and that these exchanges be made with minimal public oversight (Shefter 1977, Van de Walle 2001, Migdal 1988, Huber and Shipan 2002, Stokes 2005, Muller 2007). Clientelism, then, creates incentives for politicians to resist reforms that would increase transparency and accountability or strengthen the rule of law (Geddes 1994). Moreover, politicians can always undermine existing institutional restrictions that would curtail clientelist activity if they are sufficiently motivated (Stokes 2005, Levitsky 2003). In clientelist systems there may also be few government actors willing to act as "agents-of restraint" against rent-seeking officials because prosecuting them would be harmful to the larger political team (Collier and Pattillo 2000). Finally, as bureaucratic officials are selected based on their political connections instead of their other qualifications, efficiency may suffer and entrepreneurs (both inside of government and without) may see opportunities to grease the system through bribes and kickbacks. Clientelism may thus result in systems where mechanisms of horizontal and vertical accountability are weak, decisions are made with little transparency, and where bureaucratic discretion is high. These same conditions, however, are also expected to have high levels of corruption. Under these conditions, political actors have opportunities to rent seek as citizens attempt to navigate the bureaucracy and also freedom to do so due to a lack of punishment for all but the most egregious of offenses (Rose-Ackerman 1999, Djankov et al. 2002, Botero et al. 2004, Treisman 2007).

Clientelism thus potentially coexists with a regulatory system where corruption can flourish. Moreover, a weak and politicized state makes punishing both grand and petty forms of corruption difficult, and thus clientelism should be associated with a wide variety of corrupt acts.

A third potential association between clientelism and corruption stems from the difficulties in financing clientelism. Clientelism requires that parties have resources to distribute, which raises the costs of campaigns and of maintaining the party base compared to appeals based on issues or identity (Shefter 1994, Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, Samuels 2002). There are two ways in which politicians can pay for materialistic handouts. The first is by directly tapping the resources of the state such as by manipulating the distribution of state welfare programs and patronage assignments (e.g. Fox 1994, Schady 2000, Hawkins and Hansen 2006, Magaloni 2006) or by diverting funds from state programs into election coffers (Kitschelt 2007, Shefter 1994). Thus clientelism is generally associated with large states (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, Piattoni 2001). However, changes due to globalization and shifts in industrial organization[3] that have caused states to reduce their formal economic role and divest themselves of their industrial holdings have also reduced the resources many clientelistic states have at their disposal (Kitschelt 2007, Kaufmann and Siegelbaum 1997).[4] If politicians cannot directly use the

[3] The irony is that these same changes have weakened many of the organizations that underlie mass-parties generally and labor-based parties in particular and thus forced some of these parties to turn to clientelism to maintain their base (Levitsky 2003).

[4] Though the processes of privatization may reduce resources available for clientelism in the medium-term, the process of shrinking the state provides opportunities for politicians to cement relationships with patrons by giving them privileged access to newly divested firms (Arikan 2008, Saba and Manzetti 1996) and also provides windfall

resources of the state to fund clientelist organizations, then they instead may turn to rent seeking and other forms of corruption to raise the necessary funds.

Specifically, politicians can raise the funds that party operatives subsequently distribute to voters by auctioning off regulatory decisions and procurement contracts or using their controls of regulatory agencies to extort bribes.[5] Party officials may also demand kickbacks from government employees given patronage jobs that are used for campaign activities (Rose-Ackerman 1999, 137; Gingerich 2004).[6] Patronage can also reduce other forms of campaign costs by providing rewards to those that work on behalf of the party (Levitsky 2003, Kemahlioglu n.d.). As politicians turn to various forms of extortion and bribery to fund clientelism, they create a perverse form of redistribution:

> "Resource-rich but vote-poor constituencies provide politicians with money in exchange for material favors, dispensed by politicians when they are empowered with public office (public works contracts, regulatory decisions, subsidies, monopolies, etc.)… Second, vote-rich but resource-poor constituencies receive selective material incentives before and after elections in exchange for surrendering their vote" (Kitschelt 2000, 849).

If clientelism uses corruption as a source of funding, then it will be more likely to be associated with some forms of corruption than others. Specifically, it should only generate corruption that provides (1) relatively large returns that (2) can be controlled by party operatives and candidates. Grand corruption whereby politicians sell policy concessions, regulatory decisions, or procurement contracts by targeting wealthy economic actors are consistent with this

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resources that can be distributed via clientelist channels such as Fujimori's FONCODES program in Peru (Schady 2000).

[5] The linkage between corruption and the need for campaign finance more generally is explored by Chang and Golden (2006)

[6] While doing fieldwork in the Dominican Republic, one of the authors was told that government employees could even have their payment to the parties automatically withdrawn from their paychecks and deposited in the account of the current ruling party. No similar options were available should the civil servant wish to donate to an opposition party.

theoretical logic. Petty corruption by low levels officials are less likely to generate sufficiently large income to finance electoral machines and thus may not be associated with clientelism.

Of course, even in clientelist systems party finance may not be the dominant motivation for corruption; in Poland and Ukraine, out of a 5 percent kickback, about 0.5 percent goes to party coffers and 4.5 per cent ends up in private accounts (della Porta and Vannucci 1999, Quoted in Transparency International 2004). While some of the privately held funds may then be channeled into election management, much of the ill-gotten resources of corruption may simply be consumed. However, the need for resources in a clientelist system accentuates other existing incentives for politicians to be corrupt. "Corruption appears in many polities and in many forms, but in clientelist democracy, it works directly through the democratic exchange relations whereas under conditions of programmatic party competition, it may be more accidental than constructive." (Kitschelt 2000, 853).

In general, then, clientelist countries should be widely *perceived* as corrupt even after controlling for other factors. However, the relationship between clientelism and the specific form of corruption that citizens and businesses *experience* will depend upon the nature of the causal relationship. If the only factor linking clientelism and corruption is that vote buying and patronage hires are themselves corrupt, then my measure of clientelism will not be associated with the frequency of bribes after controlling for the level of development. If clientelism causes corruption by weakening the rule of law, clientelism will be associated with all forms of corruption, both petty and grand and targeting businesses and citizens. Finally, if clientelism motivates corruption aimed at generating funds, clientelism should only lead to grand corruption, have a greater effect on extortion of firms than on extortion of citizens.

Clientelism and Governance

To explore these mechanisms, I begin by testing whether clientelism is negatively associated with governance and the rule of law. As in figure 1, I focus on a country level indicator of clientelist effort that takes the weighted average (by party size) of the number of materialist benefits that our expert panel said parties offered to voters in exchange for their vote. High values represent parties providing material inducements at a greater scale. I model the association of this variable with the World Bank Governance Indicators developed by Kaufman et al (2006).[7] These indicators are generated by an unobserved components model that uses data from 31 sources to measure the quality of a country's political processes on six dimensions:

> *1. Voice and Accountability:* "the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media". Includes data on democratic protections and rights from Freedom House and other sources, public opinion on satisfaction with democracy and trust in democratic institutions, and measures of press freedom.
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> *2. Government Effectiveness*: "the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies." Includes data from expert panels and public opinion on the extent of red tape and bureaucratic quality and satisfaction with government infrastructure development.
>
> *3. Regulatory Quality:* "perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development." Includes measures of business regulation, tax collection, and labor regulations.
>
> *4. Rule of Law:* "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence." Includes crime rates (raw data and from victimization surveys), confidence in law enforcement agencies, and business confidence in property rights.
>
> *5. Control of Corruption:* "the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests." Includes business reports of bribery, public opinion data on the extent of corruption, and expert opinions. These data are graphed in Figure 1

[7] http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

6. Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: "perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism." Includes expert assessments and business opinions of the risk of coups/civil wars and data on human rights violations from the CIRI database.

Several of these indicators thus combine data on the processes that occur in policymaking as well as assessments of the quality of the outcomes that are produced.

Not surprisingly, these indicators are all correlated with each other (Table 1). Developed countries tend to have better governance than do poor countries and established democracies tend to have better governance than other regimes do (Keefer 2007). Each of these indicators is also correlated (negatively because high values on the bank governance indicators represent positive outcomes while our measure of clientelism tracks the greater levels of handouts provided to the electorate) with our indicator of clientelist effort, yet those correlations are generally weaker than the correlations within the governance indicators themselves (with the exception of the political stability and terrorism indicator). The correlations are also weaker across the board (and in particular with the clientelism measure and the governance indicators) if we exclude from the sample the subset of 19 countries classified in the dataset as "Advanced Industrial Democracies" that are widely believed to have good governance and little clientelism (with relatively little variance on either measure).[8] Again, these imperfect correlations are what we would expect if our expert survey is capturing a distinct political phenomenon.

Thus the initial scan of the data suggests that clientelism is associated with a wide range of governance failures that in turn might create opportunities for corruption. Yet given the general correlation other papers in this volume document between correlation and a lack of development, weak state capacity, a lack of democracy, etc. multivariate analysis is needed to

[8] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.

confirm the robustness of these findings. I thus control for the variables that Treisman (2007) argues are robust predictors of bad governance outcomes across different operationalizatioons of governance, samples of countries, and time periods. Specifically, control for several factors that should improve governance such as economic development (using log of GDP per capita), democratic history (including a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the country has been continuously democratic since 1950), press density (newspaper circulation per 1000 citizens), and trade openness (trade as a share of GDP).[9] I also control for several factors that may be negatively correlated with bad governance, such as oil and mineral wealth (oil and mineral's share of total exports), federalism (Fan et al (2009), and price volatility that makes monitoring contracts difficult (the log of monthly inflation 1998-2000-see Braun and Di-Tella (2004)). I do not include many of the institutional variables (e.g. presidentialism or the electoral system) that have received much attention in the literature (e.g. Persson et al 2003, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2005) because, like Treisman (2007), I do not find that their inclusion or exclusion yields either significant coefficients in this sample or changes the effect of other variables. In order to conserve space, I only present the estimated coefficients for the clientelism measure in Table 2-the full regression results are available in the web appendix to this chapter. Finally, I focus here on governance outcomes other than corruption, leaving it for separate analysis in the next section. Pairwise deletion of variables with missing data slightly reduces the sample.[10]

(Table 2 about here)

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[9] For the control variables and their sources, see http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/polisci/faculty/treisman/what_have_I_learned_data.xls. The most important change I made to the data was to add the standard deviation of monthly inflation from non-IMF sources where the data was missing, such as for much of Latin America using data from the IADB. Triesman has also compiled the data from the CPI, World Bank, Global Corruption Barometer, UNICRI, and WBES surveys; the data from Gallup, the World Economic Forum, and the size of bribes were compiled by the authors.

[10] Angola, Australia, Georgia, Lebanon, New Zealand, and Taiwan are missing data on at least one independent variable while there is no data on Namibia for the governance indicators on regulatory quality or government effectiveness.

Within the full set of democracies, high levels of clientelism are associated with negative governance outcomes. Specifically, clientelism is more likely to occur in countries that also have weak institutional protections of political rights and free speech (even after controlling for the democratic history and newspaper circulation), lower levels of governmental effectiveness and bureaucratic quality, higher levels of business regulation (even after controlling for trade levels), lower levels of trust in legal institutions and greater fear of crime, and greater worries about political stability. The relationship between civil freedoms/electoral democracy and clientelism is weaker and less consistent if we do not include the most developed democracies. The association between clientelism and political violence is also insignificant if we look only as cases where political violence is most likely to occur. Neither of these insignificant findings are surprising-clientelism does not require the overt suppression of political rights and can be a viable political strategy even in the face of vibrant electoral competition and a free press. Moreover, clientelism may jointly exacerbate and reinforce ethnic tensions and other political divides, making its ultimate relationship to state collapse or violence ambiguous (Chandra 2007, Van de Walle 2007).

Clientelism has amore robust association with the specific aspects of governance related to policymaking. Clientelist discretion in hiring and the political manipulation of policy decisions should lead to lower levels of trust in bureaucrats and democratic institutions within the business community and society at large. The politicization of political institutions designed to enforce the law on the streets or apply it in courts should have a similar effect. Finally, the creation of government regulation may give governments opportunities to intervene for their clients while political support may be exchanged for policy manipulations (Kurer 1993). Cross sectional data cannot distinguish whether it is clientelist actors that weaken institutions to allow them access to resources and discretion in distributing them, a byproduct of hiring individuals based on their political qualifications instead of the administrative ones, or if these weak institutions are what make clientelism possible in the first place. It is likely that all of these things are true.

Clientelism and Forms of Corruption

The data in Table 2 confirm that clientelist countries tend to have weak regulatory structures. These institutional weaknesses may create opportunities for politicians to extract rents while making their prosecution difficult. This is consistent with the second hypothesis laid out above. Yet this does not prove that clientelism is associated with actual experiences with corruption. Thus in this section I further disaggregate the relationship by modeling multiple measures[11] of corruption that are commonly used in the literature.[12] The data differ in two broad ways. First, I contrast data on the perceived level of corruption in a country with measures that count the number of individuals/firms that have had direct experiences with corruption. Treisman (2007) notes that analysts reach different conclusions about the causes of corruption when using data based on general perceptions of corruption (e.g. the CPI and Corruption Control described below) than when using data based on experiences with corruption at the firm or especially at the individual level. This may be, Treisman notes, because they measure different things:

"How frequently individuals in their daily life, or company executives in their business

[11] In choosing these variables, my goal is to maximize the variation in the type of corruption studied. In casting the net widely, a possible weakness of the data in that several of the measures of corruption are from before the time period when the clientelism data was collected. In combining these datasets, I thus make the assumption that both clientelism and corruption are phenomena that change relatively slowly (both because they are entrenched and because many of the variables that cause them are macro-s structural, cultural, and institutional that do not change quickly and are subsequently reinforced by political practices). The strong levels of correlation in corruption ratings over time suggest this may be true for corruption.

[12] This analysis draws heavily on the insights presented in Treisman (2007) and draws on much of the data used to generate that article. The data from the World Economic Forum and Gallup World Poll are not included in his review. All errors in how I use this data are my responsibility.

activities, have been targeted by venal bureaucrats may not capture what the expert analysts know about the extent of corruption at the state's highest levels" (2007, 241).

In other words, perceptions of corruption may reflect grand-corruption by elites while personal experiences with corruption (especially when measured at the level of individuals) may reflect petty activities by low level officials and law enforcement bodies that citizens interact with in their daily lives.[13]

Second, I look at corruption data measured at three levels. One set of measures combine the perspectives of businessmen and citizens (the other two units of analysis) with the opinions of NGOs and academics. Specifically, I focus on Transparency International's Corruptions Perceptions Index (*CPI*)[14] and the Kaufman et al/World Bank index of *Corruption Control*.[15] These two governance measures are the most commonly used measures of corruption in the literature. Given their similar focus, it is not surprising that the two of them are strongly correlated within this sample (r=0.98). Both the CPI and Corruption Control indices are coded so that high values are given to governments who are considered able to prevent corrupt behavior while low scores occur in countries where corruption is perceived to be rampant.

Next, I away from the aggregated measures and look at some of their components, starting with how individual citizens perceive and experience corruption. The 2008 Gallup World Poll[16] contains two publically available questions about the extent of corruption in a given country. One asks "is corruption widespread throughout the government of this country?" while the other asks "is corruption widespread within businesses located in this country?" Data on these questions are available for all countries in my sample; the first of the two questions is a

[13] The other possibility Treisman raises is less benign; corruption perceptions indices may instead reflect "experts'" best guesses about what causes corruption and the types of countries in which it thus should be frequent.
[14] See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
[15] See www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data or Kaufman et al (2006).
[16] See http://www.gallup.com/consulting/worldpoll/24046/About.aspx

component in the World Bank corruption control measure. With each question, I analyze the proportion of individuals who answered 'yes." High scores represent high levels of corruption.

I also measure the frequency that individuals report being asked for bribes. Transparency International's 2005 *Global Corruption Barometer*[17] asked citizens in 56 countries in our clientelism sample if they or anyone in their household had paid a bribe in the last 12 months. A similar question is on a survey by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (*UNICRI*) and then subsequently compiled by Mocan (2008) asking respondents whether during the previous year "any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector" had solicited a bribe from them.[18] This survey only covers 42 countries in the sample. Both variables take high values in countries where corruption is frequent.

The final set of measures looks at corruption (both perceived and experienced) from the perspective of businessmen and their firms using data from the World Economic Forum's Executive Opinion Survey (published in the *2006-2007 Global Competitiveness Report*), an annual survey of business executives in 125 countries, 84 of which are in the clientelism study.[19] This survey includes a large battery of questions on corruption, most of which are also included in the World Bank corruption control indicator. These questions include a direct question on corruption's costs:

- "Illegal payments to influence government policies, laws, or regulations impose costs or otherwise negatively affect your firm."

They also include a battery of questions with the perceived extent of corruption in industry that is believed to indirectly trace the firms' experiences:

[17] See http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb
[18] See Mocan (2008) and http://www.bus.lsu.edu/mocan/corruption%20data.xls
[19] see http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Global%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm The data excludes Ghana, Lebanon, Niger, and Senegal.

- "In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with:
    - influencing laws and policies, regulations, or decrees to favor selected business interests?"
    - getting favorable judicial decisions?"
    - the awarding of public contracts (investment projects)?"
    - import and export permits?"
    - annual tax payments?"
    - connection to public utilities (e.g. telephone or electricity)

These questions are ordered in the analysis to reflect a shift (in my opinion) from corruption done by elected officials to those done by officials with the most tenuous connections to the political process as well as a shift in their scope, with the last two measures reflecting lower stake transactions. Finally, to tap more directly the issue of clientelism and fundraising, I model managers' assessments of "how common illegal donations are in their country." In all cases, high values indicate relatively low levels of corruption.

These various measures of corruption are expected to capture slightly different phenomena, though given that most forms of corruption have at least a few similar causes (e.g. the level of development), it is not surprising that they are correlated with each other.[20] However, expectations for these variables diverge according to the theoretical logics proposed above. Because many forms of clientelism are perceived as corrupt, I expect that the corruption control indices (both by experts and citizens) will correlate with the extent of clientelism in a country even after controlling for their joint causes/correlates. However, clientelism's effect on the rule of law or needs for campaign finance may also cause it to be correlate with forms of

[20] The pairwise correlations between these various measures are in the appendix.

corruption that are not explicitly clietelistic but that directly affect citizens and firms. If clientelism is primarily associated corruption via the weak rule of law as documented in Table 2, then all forms of corruption will be likely associated with it, no matter the target or source. If clientelism is primarily associated with a demand for funds, then it should be more likely to be correlated with grand corruption by politicians targeting firms than by petty corruption targeting individuals generally or arising in interactions with low level officials.

In modeling the various corruption measures, I again focus on the variables that Treisman (2007) argues are robust to the specific indicator, sample of countries, and time period, previously listed in the analysis of other governance indicators. I present only the estimated coefficients for the clientelism measure in Table 3, with the full results in the web appendix. Most of the control variables have the expected association.[21]

(Table 3 about here)

Countries perceived by political experts to have corruption problems also are perceived to have parties that strongly rely on clientelist mobilization. This is true for both the CPI and World Bank Corruption Control indicators. This association holds both within the overall sample and if we only look at developing countries. The predicted effect of this variable is quite large; the effect of a standard deviation increase in clientelism corresponds with an increase in corruption that is larger than the change associated with than a standard deviation drop in the log

[21] The variable that is consistently associated with nearly all forms of corruption is a lack of economic development (the exception is citizen perceptions of corruption compiled by Gallup). It is unclear, of course, if economic development is primarily a cause of better governance or a consequence of it (or, more likely, both causal relations may exist simultaneously) (e.g. La Porta et al. 1999, Acemoglu et al. 2001, Glaeser et al 2004). However, poor countries tend to have corruption of all forms. Other variables, such as dependence on fuel exports, trade openness, and the number of bureaucratic hurdles and government actors that businesses have to deal with, also affect some forms of corruption. Most of the control variables, however, do not achieve statistical significance at conventional levels. For the models of corruption experience, this is not surprising because Treisman (2007) finds that very few variables that predict perceived levels of corruption also predict experiences with corruption. However, the null results are slightly more surprising for the two corruption perception measures In analysis not reported here, I have rerun the models in the first two columns without the clientelism measure to ensure that it was not absorbing the effects of variables like democratic history or bureaucratic quality; the results do not substantively change. Thus even the “robust’ results Treisman reports depend somewhat upon the specific sample of countries.

of per capita GDP.

Clientelism is also strongly correlated with the level of clientelism that citizens perceive in their governments and businesses, although this relationship is weaker and less consistent within developing countries. Thus there not only do political experts perceive corruption to be high in clientelist countries, citizens do as well.

(Table 2 about here)

An interesting finding from citizens' perspectives, however, is that there is no significant relationship between clientelism and the frequency that individuals are targeted for paying bribes. The global corruption barometer is a component of the World Bank Corruption Control index (as is the corruption in government question used by Gallup). Yet our measure clientelism is not significantly associated with forms of corruption that individuals may experience in their daily life once the country's level of development is controlled for. This is true for both data sources on individual-level corruption victimization. Thus while citizens in clientelist countries perceive a generally high amount of corruption overall, they do not personally experience most of that corruption.

The third set of analyses in Table 3 look at corruption experienced by businesses in different aspects of their business, using data compiled by the World Economic Forum. Businesses in heavily clientelist countries are more likely to report that corruption has a negative effect on their firm. Yet these executives report that clientelism is associated with corruption in some forms, but not all. There is a positive association between clientelism and the ability of bribes to shape the policymaking process, and the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in our clientelism measure is roughly double the effect of a similar change in Per Capita GDP. Clientelism's relationship with corruption in the judicial process, the awarding of public contracts, and trade regulations and permits is smaller (e.g. the estimated marginal effect of each one is smaller than the marginal effect of GDP) but generally significantly at conventional levels. Finally, the association of clientelism and corruption in tax collection and utilities industries is not significantly larger than 0 in either the full sample or within developing countries.

(Table 3 about here)

Taken together, the results in Tables 1-3 thus potentially clarify the reasons why clientelism and corruption covary. Observers may very well consider clientelist actions to be corrupt and clientelism may be incorporated into overall perceptions of corruption by both elites and common citizens.[22] However, the strong association between clientelism and corruption targeted at businesses suggests that the relationship goes beyond corrupt electoral practices and that clientelism is associated with politicians acting corruptly in their legislative and regulatory capacities. Moreover, the strongest associations between clientelism and corruption are in spheres where businesses are interacting directly with elected officials, in particular those responsible for making laws. Just as there is a weak association between clientelism and corrupt acts by policemen and government clerks that most citizens engage with, there is a weak association between clientelism and corrupt acts by utility workers and tax collectors. Government employees who are not elected themselves not very high in political hierarchies do still engage in corruption. Yet the lack of an association with our clientelism measures suggests that the greed motive is not being complemented by an electoral one to the degree that it is for other government officials. Finally, the association between clientelism and corruption is strongest in areas where the economic stakes are higher (public contracts and trade permits compared to utilities and specific tax collectors).

[22] However, data from the 2008 LAPOP survey suggests that citizens were less likely to consider patronage by a politician (using his power to arrange a job for his brother-in-law) to be corrupt, so clientelism may build up a tolerance for these kinds of actions.

Thus clientelism is associated with corruption that (1) is most likely to generate a large scale economic return and (2) is most directly controlled by elected officials. This is all consistent with clientelist politicians (point two) looking for sources of revenues form "resource-rich but vote poor" sectors of the economy (point one) that they can then distribute to their "vote-rich but resource-poor constituencies" mobilized in electoral campaigns.

Further evidence linking clientelism with corrupt fundraising is provided by the World Economic Forum survey analyzed in Table 3. In addition to asking about bribes, managers were asked about the frequency that campaign donations are made to parties and candidates that violate national finance laws. This indicator forms part of the World Bank governance index on the rule of law. Clean campaigns are not associated with higher levels of development; instead they are linked to higher levels of newspaper circulation and, in alternative specification, to citizen trust in law enforcement agencies and a lack of fear of crime (as one would expect given its position as an indicator of the larger rule of law-see the web appendix). More importantly for our purposes, clientelism is associated with a perceived increase in illegal party donations. The positive association between clientelism and illegal campaign finance remains significant at the $p<0.001$ level even if we control for public confidence in other elements of the legal process.

These results at the country level can be further corroborated at the party level using data from the expert survey. Country experts were asked whether parties violated campaign finance law in their managing of funds from public and private sources. This indicator (a1011s in the dataset) is strongly correlated at the country level with business' evaluations of illegal campaign finance.[23] Yet because it is measured at the party level, we can control for differences within party systems and evaluate whether clientelist parties are more likely to violate campaign finance laws. High values on this indicator correspond to parties obeying the law. In Table 4, we model

[23] R=0.53

campaign finance obedience as a function of clientelist effort, the average share of the legislature that the party received in the previous election, the level of development (per capita GDP), the level of democracy in the country (its Polity score), and the overall rule of law in the country as measured by the World Bank rule of law indicator to ensure that clientelism is not capturing its correlation with general weak regulatory agencies as noted in Table 2. Because variables are modeled at the party and country levels, we use a multi-level model, although a regression with clustered standard errors yields the same basic substantive conclusions. There is a positive association between clientelism and illegal party finance at the party level, even after controlling for party size, the country's level of development, and the overall quality of the rule of law in a country. Clientelist parties are more likely to seek after and use illegal funds.

(Table 4 about here)

Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that clientelism's only linkage to corruption is through its effect on parties' campaign finance needs. The analysis in Table 2 shows that clientelism was associated with a weakening of the bureaucracy, overall regulatory environment, and the rule of law. These provide additional channels for clientelism to affect corruption. To illustrate this, I have modeled a structural equation model of various linkages between clientelism levels and the World Bank's corruption control measure. One of these pathways is through illegal campaign finance, operationalized using the Global Competitiveness report's indicator of illegal campaign finance being rare. Because this indicator is part of the Bank's rule of law indicator, I cannot simply include the Bank's governance indicator to track the overall rule of law. I thus use a separate component of that indicator to track the strength of legal authority in a country-the Gallup World Poll's measures of confidence in police forces and the judiciary and reported crime victimization, combined into a single indicator by the World Bank.

In alternative specifications I have controlled instead for expert assessments of judicial independence and crime prevalence taken from the Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators. To test whether clientelism is associated with corruption via its association with a politicized bureaucracy and weak regulatory environment, I use Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators' assessments of (a) tax effectiveness and regulatory quality and (b) bureaucratic quality and policy consistency that form part of the World Bank's indicators on regulatory quality and government effectiveness respectively. I also control for the level of development and the country's polity score at the time of the survey, allowing each of these variables to have a direct effect on corruption, clientelism, and each of the intermediate pathways. Finally, I allow the various governance indicators to be correlated with each other since they represent a shared governance. The specific results are in the web appendix because we are primarily interested in the effect of clientelism, but can be quickly summarized. The level of development has a very large and positive effect on corruption control. The relationship between regulatory quality and corruption is relatively weak once the other factors are controlled for, but countries with high levels of bureaucratic quality, an effective legal system, and well functioning campaign finance system all are significantly better at reducing corruption.

Table 5 summarizes the standardized effect of clientelism on corruption. As Table 3 previously showed, high levels of clientelism are associated with low levels of corruption control. Most (66%) of that effect is indirect and occurs through clientelism's effect on various governance indicators, but there is a direct effect of clientelism that the model is not otherwise capturing. This may be the portion of clientelism that is corruption, either legally or as perceived by experts and citizens. The largest indirect association of clientelism with corruption is via the level of illegal fiancé used within a country. This association anticipated by the third mechanism described above is essentially as large as the estimated remaining direct effect. Yet the remaining portion of that effect through clientelism's association with a low quality bureaucracy and weak rule of law combine to explain as much of the association between clientelism and corruption as does the effect of clientelism through illegal campaign finance. Thus while the effect of clientelism on corruption through these other pathways are not as clearly delineated by the patterns in Table 3, they should not be completely dismissed.

(Table 5 about here)

Conclusion

Corruption and clientelism are commonly linked, but the exact nature of this linkage has widely escaped empirical scrutiny because of a lack of cross-national data on corruption. The data presented here confirm this linkage. Clientelist countries are widely perceived as corrupt. This exists even after controlling for GDP, democratic history, and culture. Moreover, clientelism is associated with high levels of corruption targeting businesses as they negotiate the policymaking process and with a perceived use of illegal campaign funds. This suggests that while clientelist practices may themselves often be considered corrupt (because, after all, many of them are corrupt), another factor that potentially links corruption with the politics of distributing handouts to supporters is the necesity of funding those handouts and the associated distribution networks. While parties likely draw on state resources for much of their clientelist networks, their abilities to create rents generates surpluses that can be channeled to potential political supporters. I also find evidence that clientelism may potentially create an atmosphere conducive to corruption via its affect on the rule of law or political accountability, but there is less evidence that this effect is trickling down to affect corrupt acts by low level government officials.

The challenge in cross-sectional data analysis, of course, is establishing causality. While the data suggest that the factor linking clientelism and corruption is a dynamic of fundraising, it is unclear which came first. Do politicians looking for ways to maintain clientelist machines begin engaging in corruption to maintain their authority, or do politicians engaging in corrupt behavior subsequently recognize the opportunity to establish clientelist linkages that are more predictable than those based on identity, program, or personality? Unfortunately, with cross-sectional data, we cannot use temporal sequences to isolate a causal structure. In addition, many of the factors commonly used as instruments for corruption (cultural traditions, the level of development at a previous point in time, etc) are also expected to be associated with a trajectory towards clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Further data collection is needed to establish trends in the two variables to better tease out the relationship between them.

However, while the causal relationship between these two factors is unclear, at the vary least the data suggest that grand corruption and clientelism are mutually reinforcing. This provides additional insight into why it is so hard to implement reforms aimed at improving governance. Politicians frequently attempt to undermine reforms that would impinge on their ability to profit from rent seeking (Van de Walle 2001, Ross 2001). Politicians are reluctant to enact electoral reforms that make clientelism more difficult and might undermine their electoral prospects except when anticipating an electoral challenge that might reduce their access to clientelist resources in the future (Geddes 1994, Brinegar et al 2006). Inasmuch as corruption is part of an electoral strategy, politicians may thus have even further disincentives to enact governance reforms. Thus reducing corruption requires not only strengthening the rule of law and mechanisms of accountability, it may also require strengthening the ability of parties to make credible policy promises and encouraging opportunities for electoral competitors to have access to the political process in a way that makes electoral reform possible.

Appendix: Correlations between Corruption Measures Used in the Analyses

	Transparency International CPI	World Bank Corruption Control	Gallup Corruption in Government	Gallup Corruption in Business	GCB Citizen paid bribe	UNICRI Citizen paid bribe	Corruption Does Not Hurt Your Firm	Bribes Do Not Affect Laws and Policies	Bribes Do Not Affect Judicial Process	Bribes Do Not Affect Public Contracts	Bribes Do Not Affect Trade Permits	Bribes Do Not Affect Tax Collection	Bribes Are Not Necessary to Access Utilities
World Bank Corruption Control	0.99												
Gallup Corruption in Government	-0.74	-0.73											
Gallup Corruption in Business	-0.75	-0.74	0.93										
GCB Citizen paid bribe	-0.62	-0.67	0.53	0.52									
UNICRI Citizen paid bribe	-0.80	-0.81	0.51	0.51	0.45								
Corruption Does Not Hurt Your Firm	0.90	0.91	-0.62	-0.63	-0.63	-0.66							
Bribes Do Not Affect Laws and Policies	0.90	0.90	-0.64	-0.66	-0.63	-0.72	0.81						
Bribes Do Not Affect Judicial Process	0.90	0.92	-0.58	-0.60	-0.66	-0.73	0.86	0.97					
Bribes Do Not Affect Public Contracts	0.92	0.91	-0.69	-0.70	-0.60	-0.73	0.80	0.98	0.95				
Bribes Do Not Affect Trade Permits	0.91	0.90	-0.62	-0.61	-0.52	-0.76	0.78	0.95	0.95	0.96			
Bribes Do Not Affect Tax Collection	0.89	0.89	-0.56	-0.57	-0.51	-0.71	0.78	0.94	0.94	0.92	0.97		
Bribes Are Not Necessary to Access Utilities	0.89	0.89	-0.63	-0.61	-0.60	-0.72	0.75	0.90	0.89	0.88	0.93	0.93	
Illegal Campaign Finance is Rare	0.93	0.93	-0.78	-0.75	-0.62	-0.75	0.87	0.86	0.84	0.86	0.83	0.81	0.81

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Table 1: Correlation of Governance Outcomes with Clientelist Effort

All Countries (N=87)[24]	Control of Corruption	Voice and Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Political Stability and the Absence of Violence
Voice and Accountability	0.8719					
Government Effectiveness	0.9355	0.8598				
Regulatory Quality	0.8945	0.8489	0.9531			
Rule of Law	0.9725	0.8796	0.9544	0.9135		
Political Stability and the Absence of Violence	0.7626	0.8153	0.7204	0.6958	0.7867	
Clientelist Effort	-0.8631	-0.7431	-0.8007	-0.7455	-0.8382	-0.6572

Developing Countries (N=67)	Control of Corruption	Voice and Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Political Stability and the Absence of Violence
Voice and Accountability	0.7443					
Government Effectiveness	0.8916	0.7404				
Regulatory Quality	0.8326	0.7279	0.9289			
Rule of Law	0.9419	0.7561	0.9216	0.8514		
Political Stability and the Absence of Violence	0.6731	0.725	0.5708	0.5406	0.694	
Clientelist Effort	-0.5936	-0.4367	-0.5516	-0.4999	-0.5832	-0.4579

[24] Namibia is missing data on 2 Bank governance indicators

Table 2: Association between Clientelism and Other World Bank Governance Indicators

	All Cases		Developing Countries	
	b15nwe	N	b15nwe	N
Voice and Accountability	-0.055* (0.021)	82	-0.023 (0.032)	64
Government Effectiveness	-0.060** (0.022)	81	-0.058* (0.027)	63
Regulatory Quality	-0.054* (0.024)	81	-0.068* (0.027)	63
Rule of Law	-0.109*** (0.023)	82	-0.072* (0.030)	64
Political Stability and the Absence of Violence	-0.096** (0.033)	82	-0.056 (0.046)	64

Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses
controls listed in the text
° $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 3: Estimated Effects of Clientelism on Various Corruption Measures

		All Cases		Developing Countries	
		b15nwe	N	b15nwe	N
Expert Surveys	Corruption Control (World Bank)	-0.131*** (0.023)	82	-0.080* (0.032)	64
	CPI (Transparency Interactional)	-0.277*** (0.052)	82	-0.151* (0.071)	64
Public Opinion Surveys	Corruption in Government (Gallup)	3.014*** (0.741)	81	1.241° (0.700)	63
	Corruption in Business (Gallup)	2.359*** (0.713)	81	0.772 (0.650)	63
	Individual Paid a Bribe Last Year (GCB)	0.527 (0.585)	56	0.520 (0.913)	41
	Individual Paid a Bribe Last Year (UNICRI)	0.134 (0.574)	42	-0.303 (0.780)	29
Surveys of Business Leaders (WEF)	Corruption Does Not Hurt Your Firm	-0.105** (0.034)	79	-0.087* (0.044)	61
	Bribes Do Not Affect Laws and Policies	-0.121*** (0.037)	79	-0.112* (0.049)	61
	Bribes Do Not Affect Judicial Process	-0.095* (0.039)	79	-0.099° (0.052)	61
	Bribes Do Not Affect Public Contracts	-0.086* (0.033)	79	-0.065 (0.044)	61
	Bribes Do Not Affect Trade Permits	-0.065° (0.036)	79	-0.063 (0.049)	61
	Bribes Do Not Affect Tax Collection	-0.021 (0.037)	79	-0.028 (0.048)	61
	Bribes Are Not Necessary to Access Utilities	-0.015 (0.037)	79	0.001 (0.052)	61
	Illegal Campaign Finance is Rare	-0.152*** (0.041)	79	-0.131** (0.046)	61
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses controls listed in the text, full results in the web appendix ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001					

Table 4: Party-Level Analysis of Parties' Propensity to Obey Campaign Finance Regulations

	All Cases	Developing Countries
Clientelist Effort	-0.039***	-0.040***
	(0.005)	(0.004)
Average Legislative Representation, Last 2 Elections	0.002***	0.002***
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Ln(Per capita GDP)	0.089	0.079
	(0.051)	(0.049)
Polity Score	0.001	0.004
	(0.013)	(0.012)
Protection of Rule of Law	0.179	0.106
	(0.072)	(0.077)
Constant	0.725	0.706
	(0.192)	(0.178)
Random Effects		
Country	0.338	0.305
Party	0.182	0.153
N Parties	489	354
N Countries	87	66
χ^2	177.59***	112***
Multilevel model, standard errors in parentheses ° p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001		

Table 5: Standardized Estimates of Clientelism's Effect on Control of Corruption from a Structural Equation Model

Direct Effect Clientelism	-0.179
(Total) Indirect Effect Clientelism	-0.355
- Via Regulatory Quality	-0.042 (11.8%)
- Via Rule of Law	-0.062 (17.4%)
- Via Government Effectiveness	-0.102 (28.8%)
- Via Campaign Finance Regime	-0.150 (42.2%)
Total Effect Clientelism	-0.535

Figure 1: The Cross-National Association between Clientelism and Corruption



Web Appendix 1: Predictors of Governance Indicators, All Cases (Table 2)

	Voice and Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Stability and Violence
Clientelist Effort	-0.055*	-0.060**	-0.054*	-0.109***	-0.096**
	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.033)
Ln(GDP)	0.265***	0.387***	0.454***	0.267***	0.161
	(0.063)	(0.063)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.098)
Democratic Since 1950	0.217°	0.169	0.111	0.192	-0.151
	(0.116)	(0.133)	(0.145)	(0.143)	(0.206)
Newspaper circulation	0.001	0.002**	0.001	0.001**	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Fuel Exports as a Share of GDP	-0.007*	-0.007**	-0.010***	-0.008**	-0.011**
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Trade as a % of GDP	0.001	0.003*	0.002	0.003°	0.004°
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Inflation Volatility	-0.007	-0.012	0.003	-0.015	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.014)
Federalism	-0.191	0.054	-0.121	-0.101	-0.303°
	(0.128)	(0.109)	(0.119)	(0.117)	(0.168)
(Constant)	-1.230°	-2.693***	-3.108***	-1.011	-0.290
	(0.673)	(0.687)	(0.749)	(0.738)	(1.061)
N	82	81	81	82	82
F	46.65***	54.05***	36.88***	48.91***	13.21***
R^2	0.745	0.857	0.804	0.843	0.592
Root MSE	0.374	0.367	0.401	0.395	0.568

Web Appendix 2: Predictors of Governance Indicators, Developing Countries (Table 2)

	Voice and Accountability	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Stability and Violence
Clientelist Effort	-0.023	-0.058*	-0.068*	-0.072*	-0.056
	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.046)
Ln(GDP)	0.182*	0.342***	0.324***	0.192*	0.160
	(0.088)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.130)
Democratic Since 1950	0.354	0.229	0.230	0.342	-0.218
	(0.213)	(0.182)	(0.184)	(0.206)	(0.314)
Newspaper circulation	0.001°	0.002*	0.001	0.002**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Fuel Exports as a Share of GDP	-0.006°	-0.005°	-0.006*	-0.006*	-0.012*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Trade as a % of GDP	0.001	0.004*	0.003*	0.004*	0.005°
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Inflation Volatility	-0.007	-0.012	0.002	-0.015	-0.004
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.015)
Federalism	-0.357*	-0.081	-0.339*	-0.298°	-0.375
	(0.165)	(0.141)	(0.143)	(0.159)	(0.243)
(Constant)	-1.144	-2.384**	-1.880*	-1.096	-0.972
	(0.939)	(0.801)	(0.810)	(0.905)	(1.383)
N	64	63	63	64	64
F	6.52***	20.75***	20.61***	13.6***	5.65***
R^2	0.521	0.779	0.778	0.694	0.485
Root MSE	0.422	0.360	0.364	0.407	0.622

Web Appendix 3a: Perceived Levels of Corruption, All Cases (Table 3)

	Corruption Control	Corruption Perceptions Index	Gallup: Government Corrupt	Gallup: Businesses Corrupt	Paid Bribe (GCB)	Paid Bribe (UNICRI)
Clientelist Effort	-0.131***	-0.277***	3.014***	2.359***	0.527	0.134
	(0.023)	(0.052)	(0.741)	(0.713)	(0.585)	(0.574)
Ln(GDP)	0.320***	0.638***	0.581	0.877	-5.138*	-6.815**
	(0.067)	(0.149)	(2.148)	(2.066)	(1.987)	(2.341)
Democratic Since 1950	0.218	0.527	-1.245	-7.670°	0.574	-1.488
	(0.156)	(0.401)	(4.482)	(4.312)	(3.206)	(2.668)
Newspaper circulation	0.001*	0.002	-0.026	-0.017	0.001	0.004
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.010)
Fuel Exports as a Share of GDP	-0.005**	-0.007	-0.058	0.027	0.024	0.251*
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.057)	(0.098)
Trade as a % of GDP	0.001	0.000	0.033	0.015	0.038	-0.031
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.028)
Inflation Volatility	-0.014	-0.027	0.450	0.192	-0.042	0.091
	(0.009)	(0.024)	(0.300)	(0.288)	(0.196)	(0.169)
Federalism	-0.090	-0.076	-1.794	-2.978	0.597	3.148
	(0.116)	(0.286)	(3.663)	(3.524)	(2.523)	(2.196)
(Constant)	-1.089°	2.328°	25.832	33.944	46.801*	70.113*
	(0.654)	(1.252)	(23.603)	(22.707)	(22.760)	(27.175)
N	82	82	81	81	56	42
F	92.34***	69.61***	11.14***	9.62***	4.67***	8.78***
R^2	0.8705	0.8017	0.5532	0.5167	0.4429	0.6804
Root MSE	0.38661	0.94253	12.346	11.878	7.8308	5.6087

Web Appendix 3b: Perceived Levels of Corruption, All Cases (Table 3)

	Cost of Corruption	Bribes Do Not Affect Laws and Policies	Bribes Do Not Affect Public Contracts	Bribes Do Not Affect Judicial Process	Bribes Do Not Affect Trade Permits	Bribes Do Not Affect Tax Collection	Bribes Are Not Necessary to Access Utilities	Illegal Campaign Finance is Rare
Clientelist Effort	-0.105**	-0.121***	-0.086*	-0.095*	-0.065°	-0.021	-0.015	-0.152***
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.041)
Ln(GDP)	0.371***	0.150	0.363***	0.452***	0.511***	0.663***	0.661***	-0.119
	(0.101)	(0.110)	(0.099)	(0.118)	(0.107)	(0.111)	(0.111)	(0.122)
Democratic	0.418*	0.357	0.463*	0.606*	0.205	0.228	-0.002	0.292
Since 1950	(0.207)	(0.224)	(0.203)	(0.241)	(0.219)	(0.227)	(0.226)	(0.248)
Newspaper	0.001	0.002*	0.001°	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002*
circulation	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Fuel Exports	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
Trade as a % of	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.001
GDP	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Inflation	-0.028*	0.000	0.002	-0.003	-0.005	0.010	-0.011	-0.033*
Volatility	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.017)
Federalism	-0.046	0.016	-0.115	-0.038	-0.115	-0.051	-0.037	-0.150
	(0.169)	(0.182)	(0.165)	(0.196)	(0.178)	(0.185)	(0.185)	(0.202)
(Constant)	2.467*	4.355***	1.978°	1.623	1.185	-0.909	-0.646	6.971***
	(1.101)	(1.189)	(1.078)	(1.282)	(1.164)	(1.206)	(1.204)	(1.319)
N	79	79	79	79	79	79	79	79
F	28.78***	18.94***	26.11***	24.64***	21.53***	22.51***	20.17***	12.75***
R^2	0.7668	0.684	0.749	0.738	0.7111	0.7201	0.697	0.593
Root MSE	0.56852	0.61382	0.5563	0.66186	0.60084	0.62246	0.622	0.68099

Web Appendix 4a: Perceived Levels of Corruption, Developing Countries (Table 3)

	Corruption Control	Corruption Perceptions Index	Gallup: Government Corrupt	Gallup: Businesses Corrupt	Paid Bribe (GCB)	Paid Bribe (UNICRI)
Clientelist Effort	-0.080*	-0.151*	1.241°	0.772	0.520	-0.303
	(0.032)	(0.071)	(0.700)	(0.650)	(0.913)	(0.780)
Ln(GDP)	0.296***	0.555**	-2.509	-1.771	-4.614	-4.757
	(0.077)	(0.175)	(1.961)	(1.820)	(2.836)	(3.349)
Democratic Since 1950	0.239°	0.252	11.663*	4.656	0.384	-0.888
	(0.139)	(0.348)	(4.785)	(4.443)	(4.982)	(4.498)
Newspaper circulation	0.001	0.003	0.006	0.005	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.016)
Fuel Exports as a Share of GDP	-0.003	-0.005	0.007	0.079	0.008	0.194
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.080)	(0.126)
Trade as a % of GDP	0.002	0.003	0.072°	0.064°	0.043	-0.041
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.040)
Inflation Volatility	-0.012	-0.033	0.303	0.103	-0.019	0.151
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.233)	(0.217)	(0.237)	(0.205)
Federalism	-0.346***	-0.668*	-3.743	-5.098	1.256	6.370°
	(0.100)	(0.278)	(3.696)	(3.431)	(4.044)	(3.516)
(Constant)	-1.692*	0.974	72.078***	73.656***	42.656	59.937
	(0.676)	(1.081)	(20.705)	(19.222)	(30.424)	(36.903)
N	64	64	63	63	41	29
F	26.84	15.49	1.99	1.18	1.4	3.06
R^2	0.698	0.642	0.228	0.149	0.259	0.551
Root MSE	0.374	0.891	9.472	8.793	9.292	6.492

Web Appendix 4b: Perceived Levels of Corruption, Developing Countries (Table 3)

	Cost of Corruption	Bribes Do Not Affect Laws and Policies	Bribes Do Not Affect Public Contracts	Bribes Do Not Affect Judicial Process	Bribes Do Not Affect Trade Permits	Bribes Do Not Affect Tax Collection	Bribes Are Not Necessary to Access Utilities	Illegal Campaign Finance is Rare
Clientelist Effort	-0.087*	-0.112*	-0.065	-0.099°	-0.063	-0.028	0.001	-0.131**
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.046)
Ln(GDP)	0.371**	0.109	0.390**	0.381*	0.498***	0.725***	0.654***	-0.043
	(0.125)	(0.140)	(0.128)	(0.150)	(0.142)	(0.137)	(0.148)	(0.169)
Democratic	0.837**	0.673*	0.586°	1.132**	0.468	0.515	0.149	0.257
Since 1950	(0.299)	(0.336)	(0.305)	(0.359)	(0.339)	(0.327)	(0.354)	(0.255)
Newspaper	0.001	0.002°	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.003**
circulation	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Fuel Exports	-0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.005	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Trade as a % of	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.001
GDP	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Inflation	-0.027°	0.001	0.004	-0.004	-0.005	0.009	-0.011	-0.032°
Volatility	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Federalism	-0.218	0.002	-0.150	-0.149	-0.152	-0.160	-0.098	-0.082
	(0.231)	(0.260)	(0.236)	(0.278)	(0.263)	(0.253)	(0.274)	(0.205)
(Constant)	2.101	4.455**	1.439	2.086	1.231	-1.303	-0.903	5.834**
	(1.292)	(1.452)	(1.319)	(1.550)	(1.466)	(1.413)	(1.530)	(1.888)
N	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
F	8.92***	4.78***	6.89***	8.2***	7.43***	11.61***	8.05***	12.88***
R^2	0.579	0.424	0.514	0.558	0.533	0.641	0.553	0.636
Root MSE	0.592	0.665	0.604	0.710	0.671	0.647	0.701	0.671

Web Appendix 4: Structural Equation Model, All Cases (Table 5)

DV	IV	Standardized Estimate	Ustandardized Estimate	(SE)
Clientelism	Ln(GDP)	-0.745	-2.265***	(0.264)
Clientelism	Polity	0.039	0.038	(0.085)
Trust in the Police/Courts/Fear of Crime	Clientelism	-0.485	-0.015***	(0.004)
Trust in the Police/Courts/Fear of Crime	Ln(GDP)	0.139	0.014	(0.014)
Trust in the Police/Courts/Fear of Crime	Polity	-0.332	-0.01	(0.003)
Illegal Donations are Rare	Clientelism	-0.681	-0.208***	(0.033)
Illegal Donations are Rare	Ln(GDP)	0.062	0.058	(0.112)
Illegal Donations are Rare	Polity	-0.018	-0.005	(0.026)
Government Effectiveness (WMO)	Clientelism	-0.465	-0.029***	(0.004)
Government Effectiveness (WMO)	Ln(GDP)	0.446	0.084***	(0.014)
Government Effectiveness (WMO)	Polity	0.096	0.006°	(0.003)
Regulatory Quality (WMO)	Clientelism	-0.381	-0.025***	(0.005)
Regulatory Quality (WMO)	Ln(GDP)	0.52	0.104***	(0.015)
Regulatory Quality (WMO)	Polity	0.113	0.007*	(0.004)
Corruption Control	Clientelism	-0.179	-0.055***	(0.014)
Corruption Control	Trust in the Police/Courts/Fear of Crime	0.127	1.223***	(0.325)
Corruption Control	Illegal Donations are Rare	0.22	0.223***	(0.042)
Corruption Control	Ln(GDP)	0.219	0.206***	(0.047)
Corruption Control	Polity	0.11	0.033***	(0.010)
Corruption Control	Government Effectiveness (WMO)	0.22	1.103***	(0.487)
Corruption Control	Regulatory Quality (WMO)	0.11	0.516*	(0.435)