

# **The Organizational Foundations of Democratic Accountability:**

Organizational Form and the Choice of Electoral Linkage Strategy

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## ABSTRACT

In democratic elections, political parties and/or individual candidates offer citizens some mix of policy promises, material benefits, and symbolic cues, in exchange for which they hope to secure votes, labor, campaign contributions, etc. Define such exchange relations as *democratic linkages*, and define a political party's chosen mix of exchange mechanisms as its *linkage strategy*. This paper's central theoretical claim is that a political party's organizational form will influence its ability to mitigate the distinct 'contracting' problems which accompany *clientelist* as opposed to *programmatic* linkage strategies. We operationalize and test our expectations as to the relationship between organizational form and linkage strategy with a newly emerging dataset on patterns of party organization and democratic accountability in 88 countries. On the whole, centralized organizations with 'non-formalized' local networks and financing practices are well-suited to the maintenance of clientelist contracts. In contrast, programmatic appeals tend to be best supported by decentralized organizations with extensive formal infrastructure, although the consequences of decentralization for programmatic effectiveness vary according to a party's size.

# **1. Citizen-Politician Linkage in Electoral Democracies**

The concept of *democratic linkage* refers, at its most general level, to an exchange and contracting mechanism by which voters are bound to elected officials, and vice versa. A political party's *linkage strategy* is defined as its relative allocation of organizational resources towards the cultivation of distinct, and oftentimes mutually undermining, patterns of electoral exchange. Some political parties emphasize the clientelistic targeting of benefits to individuals and small groups in exchange for electoral support. Others emphasize programmatic policy commitments by promising the delivery of collective or large-scale club goods, the benefits of which are not confined to the set of citizens who in fact support the party with votes, money, and energy. In some parties, politicians attempt to attract voters with both clientelistic and programmatic efforts.

By building such “linkages” to electoral constituencies and attempting to prove, in iterative rounds of electoral competition, the credibility of their contractual promises (whether they be clientelist and/or programmatic), politicians provide voters the information necessary to judge whether incumbents deserve reelection. Obviously, a focus on clientelist and programmatic linkage strategies conforms to an idealized, simplified sketch of the varieties of accountability which may characterize the process of political representation. It ignores, for example, the fact that most voters may not follow an instrumental-rational logic of choice among parties, and that the behavioral signals sent by party activities are noisy, and interpretable in different ways by a party's advocates, adversaries and the media. However, critical minorities of rational-instrumental citizens, whose choice to both turnout and support a particular party is contingent upon the successful cultivation of democratic linkage, often determine both electoral outcomes and a party's bargaining power in subsequent government formation processes.<sup>1</sup> Such groups thus gain extraordinary strategic importance for political parties, which must make determined efforts to garner such their electoral support.

This paper's central claim is that *a political party's organizational form will influence its ability to successfully cultivate one or another form of democratic linkage*. The paper's most basic theoretical question can be framed as follows: given an existing set of organizational features, what will be political party leaders' optimal allocation of effort to the relative pursuit of clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies? We expect some organizational forms to be more compatible with clientelist linkage strategies, and vice versa. In turn, parties with a greater relative emphasis on clientelism ought to display different organizational features than parties with a greater relative programmatic emphasis. In the paper's Conclusion, we address situations in which party leaders may simultaneously choose *both* a party's organizational features and its mix of electoral linkage strategies, such that organizational form itself becomes an object of endogenous choice.

The paper proceeds in the following steps. Section 2 first briefly introduces a typology of democratic linkage strategies, followed by a characterization of the most

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<sup>1</sup> Rational-instrumental voters may therefore not necessarily be “independents” who move between parties, but could also be party stalwarts who choose between support of a party and abstention.

basic dimensions of organization along which political parties' respective organizational endowments may vary. Section 3 then develops a set of hypotheses as to the relationship between linkage strategies and organizational forms. Section 4 operationalizes the theoretical argument(s) with data taken from an expert survey conducted in 88 countries in 2008 and 2009; Section 5 tests the arguments with a series of statistical analyses. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of theoretical and empirical extensions.

## **2. An Inventory of Linkage Strategies and Organizational Forms**

Theorists of representative democracy have generally concentrated on one form of political accountability, namely the programmatic accountability associated with parties' commitments and promises to promote and implement particular positions on fairly broad-based issues of public policy. After repeated iterations of electoral competition, candidates and parties accumulate a record of actions and commitments that inform voters' assessment of their current policy proposals and their inter-temporal credibility. In this view, citizen "principals" reward their elected "agents" when these agents' actions in office align with their policy preferences, and when they demonstrate professional competence in the implementation or programmatic promises. Principals punish agents who are either incompetent or diverge from the spirit of their constituencies' preferences.<sup>2</sup> Democratic politics forms an arc running from people's preference articulation through interest aggregation and decision-making by politicians all the way to the implementation of policy and the assessment of outcomes by citizens in view of (re)electing their agents (Powell 2004).

Political scientists always knew that this simple world of responsible partisan governance was an idealization of democratic politics rarely approximated in the practice of democratic governance. Yet general formal models of democratic politics, starting with Downs' *Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), or ambitious comparative-historical accounts of democratic partisan politics, such as Seymour Martin Lipset's and Stein Rokkan's (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments," invariably glossed over political practices of partisan politicians that diverged from the idealized model of programmatic politics.<sup>3</sup> With the global proliferation of democracy since the 1970s, however, it has become important to take a step back and systematically describe and theorize alternative accountability relations in competitive electoral democracies around the world. Indeed, the responsible partisan government may approximate realities of party competition primarily in established Western democracies, but in relatively few democratic polities elsewhere around the globe. This does not mean, however, that other democracies are devoid of accountability relations between citizens

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<sup>2</sup> For a masterful treatment of democratic accountability in the United States as both a "valence" relationship of competence in the pursuit of collective goods as well as an ideological-directional relationship of satisfying the preferences of some at the expense of those of others, see Erickson et al. (2003).

<sup>3</sup> Going back to Downs' (1957) original contribution, Freeze and Kitschelt (2010), however, do show that Downs was quite aware of the empirical relevance of other linkage strategies than those detailed in the programmatic responsible partisan model. A greater emphasis on non-programmatic politics can be found in case studies of Austria, Italy, or Japan, and students of the 19<sup>th</sup> century U.S. party system..

and politicians. What is the “stuff” of political representation, if not popular policy programs on which politicians act?

In the responsible partisan model, representation and accountability involve an instrumental exchange of office for policy which aims to provide club or collective goods to large groups of voters. These policy benefits are framed in *positional* and/or *valence* terms. If they are collective goods, parties engage in both positional and valence competition: everyone will want to supply the good, but in different amounts; and voters will recognize that some parties are more competent than others. If the good to be supplied is a club good, parties engage in primarily positional competition: chances are that in order to procure the good for one large group, costs will have to be imposed on some other group. In both positional and valence-based programmatic competition, the benefits and costs of public policy accrue to voters in an *unconditional way*. Regardless of whether or not individual voters support the winning party, authoritative policy choices will affect them as members of broad categories of citizens—wage earners or retirees, taxpayers or consumers, and so forth.

But there are other options available to organize an instrumental exchange between electoral principals and agents. Politicians may offer private benefits targeted to individual citizens or very small groups with face-to-face relations (families, neighborhoods) in exchange for their delivering the vote and participating in election campaigns. These benefits may come in the form of direct material gifts, or jobs (typically in the public sector), or preferential access to social programs and services (such as public housing, scholarships, disability benefits, medical treatment), or benefits for businesses (favorable regulatory decisions, procurement contracts, access to foreign currency). Not only does the *scale* of the target groups to which goods are provided in such “clientelistic” exchange differs from that of club/collective good recipients in programmatic politics; in addition, the exchange involves an implicit or explicit *contingency* such that benefits should accrue to citizens only as long as they comply with the terms of the exchange and contribute to the political fortunes of a political party, most importantly through their vote choice.

Under conditions of open, public ballots, a clientelistic quid-pro-quo is easily established, but secret ballots require more subtle approaches to redeem the contingency of clientelist relationships and avert opportunism by one or more of the contracting partners. Even where the secrecy of the vote is formally stipulated, there are, of course, numerous ways to make voters disclose their actual vote to political patrons. But also without such mechanisms, politicians have been highly inventive in maintaining the contingency of clientelistic exchanges in indirect ways, thus enabling them to monitor voters’ electoral conduct and punishing defectors.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> For example, the existence of party machines makes it possible to determine voters’ conduct based on social network information and to assess compliance in small voting precincts based on the difference between projected and achieved votes of known supporters. Voting may be secret, but turnout is public. As a simple first check, politicians may engage in turnout policing of projected party supporters (see Kitschelt/Wilkinson 2007 and especially Nichter 2008).

*Instrumental exchanges*—whether contingent and clientelistic or unconditional and programmatic in nature—do not exhaust the range of principal-agent linkages that may come into play in electoral democracies. There is also a range of *affective mechanisms* that may motivate citizens to enter a bond with candidates or parties. Voters might find it rewarding to be represented by agents with whom they share valued personal physical and cultural traits, such as gender, language, region, race or ethnic affiliation (*“descriptive” representation*). Voters may also be enchanted by the unique personal qualities of a politician to arouse affection, faith or loyalty in her leadership (*“charismatic” authority*), or by the sentimental significance of a party’s history, its symbols, its collective memories of past fights, and its lasting social networks of solidarity all of which politicians may invoke in electoral campaigns to strengthen party identification (affective linkage through *party identification*).<sup>5</sup>

In the global comparison of democracies, it would be instructive to know how profiles of linkage mechanisms in the game of partisan competition are distributed across parties and across polities, how they are chosen and what are their consequences. In this paper, we will focus on the main strands of instrumental democratic accountability mechanisms, clientelistic and programmatic citizen-politician linkages. The literature often presupposes without much theoretical justification that there is a sharp trade-off between clientelistic and programmatic linkage mechanisms that forces politicians to decide between alternative pathways. There are a variety of theoretical avenues in which a micro-logic for a trade-off pattern could be constructed:

- (1) *The resource argument*: Politicians operate under a budget constraint that in most circumstances makes it difficult to combine the delivery of policy benefits and clientelistic benefits simultaneously, even though some policies may also serve clientelistic linkage building in their implementation.
- (2) *The constituency argument*: Voters who support programmatic linkages are averse to clientelistic linkages, and vice versa, making it difficult to satisfy the two simultaneously.
- (3) *The ideational argument*: The logic of programmatic politics builds on a universalistic conception of citizenship and equality under the law that is undermined by clientelistic dealings and side-payments. Some clientelistic practices are indeed not much different from the outright vote buying that gives wealthy individuals and corporations tremendous leverage in the electoral process. Citizens concerned about universalistic standards will not accept politicians who operate based on particularistic loyalties.

As demonstrated shortly, there exists an undeniable (though imperfect) empirical tradeoff between parties’ relative deployment of clientelist and programmatic linkage

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<sup>5</sup> Of course, to a certain extent party identification, descriptive representation and even charismatic authority of politicians may reflect nothing but “running tallies” that track agents’ past policy achievements on behalf of their constituencies. Nevertheless, the resulting affective bonds to parties may also involve a kernel of irrational sentimentality that does not dissolve into instrumental calculation.

strategies. The interpretation of forthcoming statistical results depends, at the margins, on the extent to which we interpret this tradeoff as more or less absolute (conversely, more or less flexible).

Moving to a catalogue of basic organizational forms, we begin by distinguishing between two distinct dimensions of political party organization, each of which can be further analyzed in a variety of distinct organizational settings. We can look at parties from the *top-down*, i.e. examine who is involved in crucial decision-making processes; and we can also look at parties from the *bottom-up*, i.e. investigate how people become mobilized to participate in the party's electoral campaigns and internal processes.<sup>6</sup> From the top down, our interest is in the degree to which decision-making capacities are concentrated in the hands of a national leader (or a small group of leaders), rather than distributed more diffusely across multiple levels of organization with effective internal checks and balances.

In this paper, we study the relative centralization of two distinct organizational processes. First, what is the control of national leaders over the nomination of candidates for legislative office? The more local and regional subunits of the party govern the selection process autonomously, or at least operate as veto-powers in the nominations process, the less autonomy resides with the national party leadership. Second, who makes decisions about party strategy, such as the party's organizational structure itself, the content of policy programs or the targeting of constituencies, as well as the choice of coalition partners in pre-election electoral alliances or post-election government coalitions? Again, there is a scale of greater or lesser power concentration that comes up in concrete procedural questions, for example in the scheduling and governance of national party conventions. As theorized below, organizational centralization has complex and at times countervailing consequences for a party's optimal linkage portfolio; and the relationship between centralization and linkage choice may in fact be contingent on a series of additional organizational and contextual phenomena.

The second, bottom-up dimension of party organization — which we label the *extensiveness* of parties in a polity (defined as the ability of parties to effectively 'reach' voters with messages or promises) — also bears on political parties' functional flexibility. Again, we begin by distinguishing three distinct forms organizational extensiveness. First, there is the *formal*, geographical-administrative structure of parties across a polity. Formally extensive political parties are those which maintain effective and visible local offices, staffed with active party members and operatives, in most of a country's localities. Less formally extensive parties maintain an explicit and active local presence only in sub-nationally confined areas (or not at all). Second, some parties maintain *informal*, extra-organizational relationships with local notables of one stripe or another, which enhances a party's ability to 'reach' non-partisan voters. Third, some parties maintain explicit ties to particular *civil society organizations* (unions, religious institutions, etc), which facilitates their political access the social group's members. As

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<sup>6</sup> For the distinction between the two components of party organization, see Kitschelt (1994: chapter 5).

theorized below, a party's existing mix of formal, informal, and social extensiveness will exert a crucial influence upon party leaders' choice of linkage strategies.

Finally, we investigate a third dimension of party organization which is crucial in determining a parties' optimal mix of clientelist and programmatic appeals: the transparency and effective-governance of party financing behaviors. In parties where political leaders are constrained by either legal statutes and/or the dictates of transparency, the access to fungible resources essential for the cultivation of clientelist linkage strategies will become more challenging. Conversely, for reasons soon discussed, transparent and effectively governed financing practices will likely provide an element of credibility to programmatic campaign promises.

### **3. Interfacing Party Organizational Form and Linkage Strategies.**

Studies of political party organization have generally addressed the relationship between organizational forms and national-level systemic features (such as a party system's competitiveness and a country's level of economic development); or between a political party's organizational form and its allegiance to a particular 'ideological family' (Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, etc.; see Duverger 1954; King and Janda 1985; Panebianco 1988). Other literature has examined how formal institutional arrangements, as defined by a country's Executive regime type and its electoral system type, affects parties' investment in distinct organizational features (Harmel and Janda 1982; now also Samuels and Shugart 2010). To our knowledge, however, precious little has been achieved to theorize and empirically test the relationship between party organization and parties' profile of citizen-politician linkage mechanisms.

Successful *politicians* bring together *citizens* who contribute their vote and *activists* who make additional contributions (labor, funds) to the shared quest for political office, and often constitute a pool of overlapping generations of "candidates-in-training" and "candidates-in-waiting." Understanding the strategic and organizational relationships which bind these three categories of actors (voters, non-candidate activists, and partisan candidates) to one another is crucial to any theory of democratic accountability. We take voters as rational-instrumental actors who desire politicians to serve them through either: (1) targeted clientelistic benefits or (2) programmatic public policies. In developing our theoretical account of political party organizations we will take voter preferences as over these types of policy goods as *exogenous*. As demonstrated above, our data exhibits a strong trade-off between the utilization of these two linkage mechanisms in political parties, although the trade-off is not absolute.<sup>7</sup>

This paper is interested in exploring how politicians, both the elected/candidate kind and the activist kind, overcome the challenges of cooperation and coordination which threaten any effort to generate clientelistic or programmatic linkage. The challenge is to manage a principal-agent relationship—and in the case of clientelism a reciprocal principal-agent relationship—the viability of which can be enhanced or diminished by the

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<sup>7</sup> In particular, there is a class of parties which combine both clientelism and programmaticism.

details of a political party's organizational infra-structure. *In the programmatic case*, party leaders must begin by attempting to coordinate their manifold internal actors, whose programmatic preferences may be more or less homogenous, around a roughly shared set of programmatic stances. Having declared a set of programmatic proposals, accountability then becomes a one-way principal-agent problem: How do voters, as principals, have a clue before elections that politicians, as their agents, take policy stances credibly, i.e. with the intent and the organizational capacity to pursue such policies, if elected to office? How can the organization of the political party itself help in boosting the credibility of the agents' programmatic declarations?

In the clientelistic case, we are dealing with a two-way, reciprocal principal-agent relationship. On the one hand, voters want to know whether politicians will really deliver the targeted benefits to their supporters, once citizens have surrendered their vote or made other contributions to a party. On the other, if politicians try to solve the first problem by making up front "down-payments" on their clientelistic commitments, how can they count on voters to observe their end of the bargain, firstly by turning out and secondly by choosing the party in question. Similarly, how can parties identify which professed supporters do and do not deserve targeted benefits, without having directly observed the vote choice of individual citizens?

Both in the programmatic one-way principal-agent problem, as well as in the clientelistic two-way principal-agent problem, a political party's particular organizational form will influence whether or not affiliated politicians can successfully overcome the opportunistic temptations of politicians and/or voters. The problems party politicians and voters jointly address are similar to the problems of opportunism in complex contractual arrangements addressed by the new institutional economics of organization. Williamson (1975; 1985) distinguishes three sources of contractual complications that make it difficult for competitive spot markets to operate efficiently:

- *Opportunism*: Each actor tries to maximize his or her own benefit, and whenever possible will defect from contractual commitments in the pursuit of self-interest.
- *Small numbers*: The contractual situation is oligopolistic or monopolistic on the side of one or more actors involved in contracting. When dissatisfied with opportunism by the oligopolist/monopsonist, extracting herself from the relationship ("exit") is costly, if not impossible, for the other side(s). Also this is clearly the case in politics. Voters have few alternatives to choose from and the choices take place only periodically, with long intermittent intervals. Conversely, in a clientelistic relationship, politicians may have a hard time revoking and retrieving benefits provided to the "wrong" beneficiaries.
- *Uncertainty*: It is difficult to specify the rights and obligations of each participant to the web of contractual obligations exhaustively. This opens the door to opportunistic defection, as partners have to renegotiate their relationship in good faith continuously throughout the contractual term. Politics is obviously shot through with problems of fundamental uncertainty. Voters do not know the full range of issues on which elected politicians will act in a legislative term, nor do

they know with certainty the actual levels of effort expended to reward them with targeted benefits.

These three obstacles are combined in political transactions, and generate the particular complexity of political contracting that calls for—in Williamson’s terminology—“governance.” In the political transaction, party organization is a critical ingredient of governance. Consider the choice of organizational forms to address the vagaries of political “governance”—opportunism, small numbers and uncertainty—as an iterative and interactive process in which party leaders, faced with a particular organizational status quo, make efforts to home in on certain linkage strategies, and then in light of emerging results adjust both linkage strategies and organizational forms. While few parties ever may be in “equilibrium,” by any exalted definition (no improvement possible by unilateral change of strategy), a theory of party organization and linkage strategies should empirically predict at least whether and how, on average, certain organizational forms provide party leaders the incentive to emphasize one linkage mechanism or another.

### 3.1. Programmatic Party Organization

The title of a section in Downs’ (1957: chapter 7, p. 103) *Economic Theory of Democracy*: “Reliability, Integrity, and Responsibility” provides a useful starting point for examining the organizational forms that make programmatic appeals more credible, and thus more attractive to strategic politicians. Rational programmatic voting works only if people can take policy signals that parties send as inter-temporally stable across different electoral terms (Downs’ “responsibility”), from the campaign stage to the subsequent election term (Downs’ “reliability”), or from the beginning to the termination of a term (Downs’ “integrity”). Past responsibility builds a reputation giving voters a cue to assess parties’ future reliability and the likelihood that parties practice “strategic immobility” (Downs 1957: 110) as an essential ingredient of programmatic party competition.

Let us add to this an element of uncertainty that Downs also acknowledges. Since the slate of issues on the political agenda is always somewhat uncertain, and individual parties cannot single-handedly control the national political agenda, legislative or otherwise, voters would like to know not only a party’s position on this or that currently pertinent issue, but also on underlying principles and benchmarks parties employ in order to generate partisan positions on newly emerging issues (Hinich and Munger 1994).<sup>8</sup> In other words, voters take note of and value a party’s general ideological orientation that guides the production of issue positions. While new issues may initially be unrelated to existing issue clusters and underlying party principles, with programmatic electorates

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<sup>8</sup> This conceptualization of voter calculations implies a clear rejection of an “issue politics” and “issue ownership” theory of party competition (e.g. Budge and Farlie 1983). While new issues initially may not map on ideological dimensions and enable the entry of new parties, sooner rather than later in the iterated legislative and electoral game both established and new challenger parties have to assimilate new and old issues in the “ideology work” of assembling broad issue packages that give voters some certainty over the behavior of parties. On the issue assimilation process, see Stimson (2005).

parties are under pressure to assimilate issue positions and “map” them onto underlying ideological dimensions. Knowing such ideological principles and their implications for issue mapping helps voters reduce uncertainty over a party’s future positions on issues that have not yet come up. It also allows voters to stay rationally ignorant on parties’ positions where it is costly to gather information and expertise to assess a party’s platform accurately (Downs 1957). Whether the emerging dimensional space in which mappings take place is uni-dimensional (“left-right”) or multi-dimensional, may be historically contingent and is irrelevant here.

### **Programmaticism and Organizational Centralization**

What is it organizationally that promotes parties of high integrity and calculability from the vantage point of rational policy-seeking voters? The general analysis of the literature, building on some the early intuitions of Robert Michels (1911), but then cultivated in the post-World War II parties literature (e.g. McKenzie 1955; May 1973; Schlesinger 1984) is that the top leadership, driven by electoral incentives, is the guardian of rational voters’ concerns, whereas the rank-and-file activists are ideological preference outliers driven by policy enthusiasms. In turn, so as to provide voters the confidence that party policy-making will not be monopolized by ideological outliers, parties should be organizationally centralized: a small clique of leaders competing for public office should control the most important decisions a party makes regarding the nomination of candidates for electoral office, strategic choices over cabinet participation (where a party falls short of an outright legislative majority), and/or policy-making choices once in the executive.<sup>9</sup> Put simply, according to this view of fairly ubiquitous view of party organization, centralization is an important tool in the generation of *party discipline*, which both gives organizational leaders the means to coordinate unruly organizational cadre around particular policy issues, and to implement these policies once in office.

However, more nuanced consideration suggests that such arrangements are far from always beneficial. High centralization implies high personalization of party control in the hands of one or a handful of leaders, and this personalization may in fact compound the credibility problems that politicians face when soliciting votes with programmatic promises. Most basically, voters will be forced to acknowledge the possibility of ex post opportunism in the form of *goal displacement*. Without organizational checks and balances, myopic party leaders may simply shirk and line their pockets rather than deliver policy. Slightly less perniciously, re-election seeking leaders may, once in office, alter their policy proposals in ways inconsistent with past promises.

Recent game theoretic research provides a general strategic statement of the manner in which organizational decentralization might induce inter-temporal credibility. Loosely building on Caillaud and Tirole (2002), a party underlines its rational immobility by opening up organizational *opportunities* for challenges to its course from below, but

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<sup>9</sup> Critics have pursued the argument that only under specific institutional and competitive conditions (single-member district plurality electoral laws in the presence of effective two party competition) is it likely to expect an electoral irresponsibility of party activists, and even in such systems it empirically varies in time and space. For this, see one of the authors of this paper, Kitschelt (1989) and (1994: chapter 5).

*empirically* demonstrating consistency of its long-term trajectory. What better way to demonstrate the credible commitment of a party to a programmatic appeal than to let it operate under conditions of limited leadership control, yet showcase a trajectory of reliability and responsiveness in its programmatic efforts. There are organizational opportunities to create internal turmoil, but it does not happen!

Centralized leadership may also affect the pool of activists and legislative candidates in ways which undermines parties' ability to effectively *implement* public policy, and thus the credibility of their programmatic promises. Party organizations are, from a certain perspective, giant personnel departments that constantly churn and vet very large numbers of ambitious, potentially office-seeking young people, place them in offices of minor or moderate political importance, and select out high competence candidates to move up in the party ranks. Closing off competition for leadership positions, and draining away zones of autonomy and discretion from a party's mid-level personnel at the local or regional level, may sap the ambitions of political novices and drive the most competent, promising activists out of the party. The crisis of party organization is most often less a crisis of mass membership than of the breadth and depth of the intermediate cadres from which the next generation of leaders must be drawn.

Finally, while centralization may enhance party discipline, its consequences for organizational *cohesiveness* are less clear. Organizations are cohesive when their activists and legislative candidates demonstrate largely homogenous views on matters of programmatic policy. In decentralized parties, organizational promotions must generally be approved by an internal selectorate, which itself is often composed of motivated activists who most often join the party on the basis of shared programmatic commitments. In centralized parties, organizational promotions do not depend on the preferences of a more or less cohesive cadre. In turn, access to electoral candidacy will be less dependent on the expression of shared programmatic preferences, and more dependent on the willingness to signal loyalty to executive party leaders.

In cohesive parties, discipline as an organizational tool will be less relevant: when there is little difference of programmatic opinion among a party's cadre, the need to coerce legislators dissatisfied with party policy positions dissipates, since similar positions are acceptable to all. Of course, decentralization is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for organizational cohesion. But, to the extent that decentralization does create more unified organizations, it may obviate the very need for party discipline which in the past served as one of organizational centralization's core normative and theoretical justifications.

All of this suggests the need to rethink our traditional understanding of organizational centralization as a key element in the production of programmatic linkages. That said, in highlighting the mechanisms by which decentralization may enhance the effectiveness of programmatic appeals, we mean to complement rather than displace this more traditional understanding. Despite its potentially undermining impact on a party's professional competence and inter-temporal credibility, in highly unruly parties whose cadre is non-cohesive and subject to frequent internal schism, the

disciplining effect of organizational centralization may be the sole mechanism by which party leaders can cultivate even a modicum of programmatic accountability.

Put otherwise, the effect of organizational centralization on party leaders' incentives to cultivate programmatic accountability relationships may be *contingent* on a number of additional contextual and organizational phenomena. For example, in ideologically cohesive parties we would expect greater decentralization to be associated with increased programmatic effectiveness: since discipline is a more or less redundant tool in cohesive organizations, any marginal increase in legislative effectiveness associated with organizational centralization should be outweighed by the accompanying damage done to its inter-temporal credibility and professional competence. Similarly, even in non-cohesive parties, certain contextual and strategic factors (the configuration of formal political institutions, long-term incumbency, etc) may allow party leaders to maintain party discipline without having to suffer the credibility and competence costs associated with organizational centralization. When circumstances make organizational centralization redundant for the maintenance of discipline, we would once again expect the programmatic benefits of centralization to be outweighed by its programmatic costs.

On the other hand, in non-cohesive organizations whose strategic context provides no viable disciplinary substitute for centralization, the increased programmatic effectiveness associated with organizational centralization may actually outweigh its costs in terms of inter-temporal credibility and professional competence. As discussed at greater length below, this paper takes a first step towards examining these interactive hypotheses by using a party's *electoral size* and *formal extensiveness* as proxies for the extent to which centralization will enhance or dampen party leaders' incentives to cultivate programmatic accountability relationships.

### **Programmaticism and the Extensiveness of Party Organization**

Whether centralized or decentralized, a great source of instability and threat for the programmatic stability of a party is the absence of an extensive formal organizational base, in the form of active and effective local/regional offices and headquarters. From the perspective of programmatic voters, at least two reasons are important to prefer a large party organization. First, such organizations may have the capacity to train and homogenize new and young members before they reach important office. In other words, large parties have greater organizational capabilities to instill a programmatic cohesiveness of the decisive activists' outlook and thus boost their effectiveness and credibility when invoking programmatic policies.

Second, a large membership adds an element of "deadweight" or immobility to a party's programmatic strategic appeal. Small parties innovate fast, as the exit and entry of small bands of activists may overturn their hitherto dominant coalitions and replace them with new faces that pursue new policies, or as small cliques of leaders act spontaneously to alter a party's public appeal. Large parties, by contrast, are more like "tankers," as a German social democratic politician (Peter Glotz) characterized his own party in the 1980s. Tankers require plenty of space and time to change course. They are quite

impervious to the onslaught of small numbers of entrants or the exit of some scores of disgruntled leaders and activists.<sup>10</sup> In short, highly developed and extensive formal infrastructures are likely to enhance organizational cohesion and the credibility of policy platforms, which in turn will stimulate party leaders' incentives to cultivate programmatic accountability relationships.

Parties which lack a broad, formal network of active and effective local offices may utilize *informal* relationships with prominent local personalities (or 'notables') to mobilize voters at the local, municipal, or neighborhood level. Unlike the more cohesive, institutionalized, and organizationally 'indoctrinated' cadre which are more likely to emerge from formal organizational infrastructure, these local notables cooperate with party leaders so as to satisfy the demands of well-defined local constituencies, demand which almost always vary from locality to locality and region to region. Thus, informally extensive parties will tend to be less cohesive than formally extensive parties; this, in turn, obstructs the effective choice, implementation, and credibility of programmatic appeals. Leaders of organizations that depend heavily on such informal ties should thus have less incentive to compete programmatically than those with broad formal infrastructures.

Finally, recall from above that extensiveness need not be achieved on a purely geographic basis. Rather than reaching voters via a formal or informal geographic presence, some parties communicate with voters and mobilize electoral support via intermediary *civil society organizations* such as labor unions, professional associations, religious organizations, etc. If a party's affiliated civil society organizations share more or less homogeneous programmatic preferences, and are granted some formal veto power over party strategy, we would expect them to enhance the credibility of programmatic promises. On the other hand, ties to civil society organizations with heterogeneous programmatic preferences may undermine programmatic effectiveness and credibility; and voters may the ability of civil society ties to generate strategic immobility when affiliated organizations have no institutionalized voice in party affairs.

### **Programmatic Politics and Party Finance**

Returning to the importance of countervailing forces to check party leaders as an organizational device to improve programmatic credibility, let us consider the *management of party finances*. Party finance is one of the most difficult aspects of parties' operations to study and compare,<sup>11</sup> but understanding an organization's financing practices is crucial to understanding the incentives it provides for the cultivation of one or

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<sup>10</sup> This programmatic immobility may have its own downside: a lack of strategic adaptability. As such, when considering parties programmatic messages, rational voters may fear both extensiveness extremes. One of the paper authors (Kitschelt 1994: chapter 5) invokes the rapid shrinking and ultimately very small size of some European social democratic parties in the 1980s (in terms of member/voter ratios), such as the Dutch Labor Party, the French or the Spanish Socialists. While in the short run this increased their strategic innovativeness and adaptability, in the long run it may have precipitated a volatility of strategic purpose that antagonized critical voter constituencies.

<sup>11</sup> But see Scarrow (2007: 196) for a review of the rather respectable set of at least small and medium N comparative studies.

another linkage strategies. Unaccountable party leadership goes together with murky, non-transparent, and obscure party finances that allow for maximum discretion at the top level. In the same way that organizational decentralization provided voters some confidence in the inter-temporal credibility of programmatic promises, we argue that organizational financing practices which are both transparent and constrained by effective legal statutes should enhance the inter-temporal credibility of programmatic appeals.

Firstly, transparent and effectively-governed financing practices make rent-seeking more difficult. This reduced ability to divert scarce organizational resources, broadly conceived as time, energy, and money, to one's own personal financial enrichment provides voters greater confidence that a party's limited time and material endowment will be devoted to the development and implementation of programmatic policies. Similarly, transparent financing practices make it much more difficult for party leaders to exchange revenue for policy promises with groups or individuals whose policy preferences are inconsistent with the party's past programmatic promises: a.) donors themselves will be less willing to contribute if they transparently observe their ideological counterparts doing the same; and b.) such exchanges of revenue for policy will reduce the credibility of (or, alternatively, increase the uncertainty surrounding...) programmatic appeals in voters' eyes. The increased difficulty and electoral cost associated developing heterogeneous funding sources, faced by politicians in the 'governance subgame', allows voters in the 'electoral subgame' a greater confidence that opportunistic leaders will not engage in *ex post* policy shifts to satisfy new donors. To summarize, transparent and effectively-governed financing patterns are likely to enhance the credibility of programmatic appeals, and in turn party leaders' incentives to exert effort thereupon.

### **The Dilemma of Centralization and Programmaticism in Small Parties**

Recall from above that party size and a critical mass of activists constitute important components of the 'strategic immobility' so important for inter-temporal credibility. As such, electorally small yet aspiring programmatic parties face a major challenge. The parties' small electoral size typically also translates into lack of organizational extensiveness. Thus, from the bottom up, the party lacks a critical element of organizational stability. Absent the internal size and cohesion which characterizes larger and more extensive parties with greater formal infrastructure, decentralized small parties become vulnerable to substantial programmatic volatility, since small flows of activists may radically alter the party's short-term programmatic complexion.

Small parties also often lack a series of strategic substitutes to centralization available to larger and more extensive organizations. For example, in larger *governing* parties (or those with a high probability of incumbency), party leaders' ability to distribute the spoils of office may provide them an extra-organizational substitute with which to generate organizational discipline, absent centralized procedures for nominating candidates and adopting campaign/governance strategies. More generally speaking, large parties tend to be longer-lived and more 'institutionalized' than small parties, such that their internal actors have had repeated organizational interactions over which to calibrate

their respective behaviors. Given the importance of repeated interaction in solving problems of coordination and cooperation, larger more institutionalized parties should rely less completely on organizational centralization to consummate programmatic linkages than ‘newer’ parties with less shared experience (i.e. a shorter ‘history of play’).

Put simply, for a variety of reasons larger parties are likely to have more formal infrastructure, greater cohesiveness, and greater access to strategic or contextual substitutes than smaller parties. In these parties, where organizational centralization tends to be a more redundant tool, we would once expect the programmatic benefits of centralization to be outweighed by its programmatic costs, such that the incentives to cultivate programmatic linkages decreases with centralization. In small parties, the expected net effect of organizational centralization is less clear, and in fact depends on the relative impact of centralization’s counteractive consequences. This begs the both empirical and theoretical question: in small parties, will the coordinating benefits associated with increasing centralization outweigh its costs in terms of professional competence and credibility, or vice versa? We provide an empirical answer below, and provide some preliminary theoretical considerations in the paper’s Conclusion.

### **Summary of Hypotheses: Programmaticism and Party Organization**

Overall, we arrive at the following propositions regarding the impact of a party’s organizational structures on its leaders’ incentives to cultivate programmatic relationships of democratic accountability:

- Greater formal (informal) organizational extensiveness will enhance (reduce) party leaders’ incentive to cultivate relationships of programmatic democratic accountability.
- More transparent and effectively-governed party financing practices will enhance party leaders’ incentives to cultivate relationships of programmatic democratic accountability.
- Ties to civil society organizations may enhance the incentives for programmaticism, although this will depend on the relevant organizations ideological homogeneity and actual organizational veto power.
- In contrast to the accepted wisdom, centralization will often undermine the effectiveness and credibility of programmatic appeals. Since, in addition to providing inter-temporal credibility, decentralization often makes party discipline redundant by increasing organizational cohesiveness, on the whole we expect organizational centralization to reduce programmaticism.
- The negative relationship between centralization and programmaticism should be particularly pronounced in larger parties where, for reasons already presented, centralization is likely to be redundant for the maintenance of organizational discipline and coordination.
- On the other hand, in smaller, less cohesive parties which lack access to alternative coordinating mechanisms, the net effect of centralization on programmatic incentives will depend on the relative impact of its counteracting mechanisms.

### 3.2. Clientelistic Party Organization

Clientelistic voters focus on the tangible, material payoff politicians hand them in exchange for their vote or their labor contributions to the party (e.g. at rallies), and care less about the policy objectives politicians are pursuing than the delivery of targeted benefits. This makes them less concerned with the stability and credibility of parties' policy declarations. They may thus vote for a party despite doubting its capacity to credibly deliver club and collective goods.<sup>12</sup> Indeed, many clientelistic voters may entirely lack policy positions altogether. As long as they get their "stuff," they ignore all the other aspects of public policy, including the benefits allocated to and consumed by constituents elsewhere. In contrast, an instrumental clientelistic voter will mostly be concerned with the capacity of the party to mobilize resources and to disburse them with minimum "overhead," which comprises not only the costs incurred when organizing the extraction and disbursement of funds, but also the personal diversion of resources by party agents (brokers, mediators) put in charge of sustaining this supply chain. Minimum agency loss, then, is the voter objective.

On the side of the parties, the delivery of targeted benefits requires capacities to requisition fungible resources, either by extracting private or public funds and cycling them through party coffers, or by placing agents in civil service positions that obtain public resources at their disposal to be deployed for targeted benefits. Furthermore, clientelistic machines need substantial manpower to implement even a modicum of monitoring, if not sanctioning of the contingent exchange, either by direct supervision or indirect, tacit network information.

In order to achieve the acquisition and distribution of resources, parties may rely on their own members and paid officials. But they may also mobilize local elites external to the party, but with a comparative advantage in mobilizing voters and monitoring their activities. Candidates may be local employers, professionals (doctors, lawyers), journalists, religious leaders, as well as owners of pubs and retail outlets (a favorite source of party cadres). All of these occupations have in common that they interact with a wide range of local inhabitants and are therefore well-placed to insert themselves into politically relevant transactions.

The older anthropological and sociological literature conveys an image of clientelism as a diffuse, localized, unconditional and generalized exchange between clients and patrons in face-to-face relations, maintained over long periods of time. Such relations are monopolistic in the sense that clients cannot opt for a different supplier and characterized by great inequalities.<sup>13</sup> This may have been an empirically accurate description of clientelism in the past, but there is a general recognition that starting in the 1950s and 1960s the overlapping, but not identical processes of national and global market integration, state centralization, and formal political competition have changed the

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<sup>12</sup> Some formal models (e.g. Stokes 2005) assume that clients have policy preferences, in addition to desires to obtain targeted benefits, but this may be an unrealistic expectation.

<sup>13</sup> As a good starting point to appraise these characteristics of clientelism consider the case studies in Schmidt et al. 1977 and Eisenstadt and Lemarchand (1981).

game: Clientelism became more instrumental, specific, impersonal, contingent upon reciprocal contributions, inter-temporally unstable, and organized around a “pyramidal clustering of linked networks of clientelismo, which were related for formal organizations within the context of political competition,” as Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984: 68) characterize the transition in Southern Italy. These developments have been at least partially caught up in the reconfiguration of clientelism around political parties and the state, away from rich landowners and municipal gentries and their local political coteries. Against the backdrop of these changes, let us now consider the organization of clientelistic parties.

### **Clientelistic Party Centralization**

Clientelistic parties need agents that distribute the benefits and have some direct or indirect capacity to check on the conduct of the clients, but these agents also may succumb to the temptations of diverting resources they have been entrusted to their private use. To solve this “leaky-bucket” problem, voters and electoral party “bosses” have a strong interest in centralizing clientelistic party organization, as already postulated already by Weber (1919: 109) in characterizing the behavior of U.S. American clientelistic parties and their bosses in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Brokers and party operatives require direct and indirect supervision through performance monitoring, e.g. checking their capacity to turn out party supporters in rallies (cf. Stokes and Downing 2010). Centralization of party control is thus a benchmark of effective clientelism.

Compared to programmatic party competition that relies on media and canvassing, clientelistic inducements to voters are an expensive way to gain electoral support. Voters require costly side-payments to attract their endorsement, particularly in medium or higher income countries. If accurate figures were available, as a ratio of the per capita GDP/voter, clientelistic party campaigns would be much more expensive than programmatic campaigns. In addition to the direct side-payments, also the organizational transaction costs of getting the resources to the right constituents are high because of the professional brokers it typically involves. Even in mass parties, a great deal of the resources needed for clientelistic linkage building therefore cannot come from members, but are supplied by public coffers or by wealthy donors. These donors, in turn, dispense funds only to the bosses, not the brokers, as they figure in the leaky-bucket agency problem.<sup>14</sup> In order to service vote-rich, but asset-poor constituents, party leaders have to cater to vote-poor, but asset-rich donors. Clientelism thus involves two complementary exchanges with principals (Kitschelt 2000).

Finally, just as voters’ indifference to policy appeals dulls the programmatic consequences of organizational centralization, so does the lack of policy commitments on the part of the operatives in the clientelistic parties. Clientelist operatives’ primary concern is with gaining access to fungible resources for distribution to their social

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<sup>14</sup> Weber (1919: 109) put it best: “The boss is indispensable as the direct recipient of the money of great financial magnates, who would not entrust their money for election purposes to a paid party official, or to anyone else giving public account of his affairs. The boss, with his judicious discretion in financial matters, is the natural man for those capitalist circles who finance the election. (109)

networks, whose electoral support will in turn impact their opportunity for organizational advancement (and ultimately legislative candidacy).<sup>15</sup> It is fairly costless, therefore, to delegate whatever policy decisions need to be made in legislatures to individual representatives or to opportunistic party bosses. In turn, lacking the unifying force of a cohesive and non-indifferent programmatic cadre, the legislative caucuses of highly clientelistic parties should display substantial preference heterogeneity.

In summary, centralized organizational structures should both increase the credibility of clientelist promises (by mitigating the leaky-bucket problem) and facilitate the solicitation of fungible resources from private and/or public sources concerned with their financial contribution's effectiveness. Furthermore, in clientelist parties the potentially undermining effect of centralization on the credibility of programmatic appeals is dulled by voters' and activists' programmatic indifference, thus minimizing the 'costs' (in electoral terms) of reduced programmatic credibility. As such, higher levels of organizational centralization should be associated with higher levels of clientelist linkage.

### **Extensiveness of Party Organization**

From the perspective of the clientelist political entrepreneur, the challenge of party organization is primarily one of building a machine that acquires and distributes resources, rather than a structure that deliberates policies and crafts a collective policy utility function as envisioned by Aldrich (1995). In order to effectively distribute targeted benefits at the local level, clientelistic parties must be extensive organizations, either by virtue of expansive formal membership and active local/regional structure, by informal association with external networks of notables who seamlessly feed into the party, or by their affiliation with civil society organizations to whom they can delegate the task of distributing goods and monitoring voter behavior.

While extensive formal organizational machinery might facilitate the distribution of targeted benefits, it may also help to create an institutionalized and cohesive activist cadre likely to be dissatisfied with exclusively clientelist campaigns. In the case of informal extensiveness, its benefits more clearly outweigh its costs for the production of successful clientelist linkages. Such ties provide a broad network of social actors from which to solicit large fungible contributions. The need to adequately *monitor* (if not *sanction*...) clientelist exchanges with supporters also calls for a large network of informal societal contacts and connections to local notables. These external trustees can contribute to the surveillance of clients in unobtrusive ways, such as by registering rumors and reputations.<sup>16</sup> As such, informal extensiveness provides parties with

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<sup>15</sup> To quote Weber (1919: 109) about the preference schedule of the boss: "The typical boss is an absolutely sober man. He does not seek social honor; the 'professional' is despised in 'respectable society.' He seeks power alone, power as a source of money, but also power for power's sake." And on p. 110: "The boss has no firm political 'principles'; he is completely unprincipled in attitude and asks merely: What will capture votes?"

<sup>16</sup> The informality of surveillance through notables—whether they are the local employers, religious figures, teachers, owners of pubs and retail outlets, or professionals (lawyers, doctors)—may create the false impression that many clientelistic parties lack effective means for monitoring their clients. Such

numerous advantages in the production of clientelistic accountability relationships, and does so without creating an organizational cadre potentially inimical to clientelist politics.

Finally, the effect of explicit ties with civil society organizations on the effectiveness and credibility of clientelist strategies is, *a priori*, unclear. Like informal ties, these explicit civil society ties provide access to both resources and monitoring capabilities; but like formal organizations they may also provide a set of more programmatically inclined activists and candidates, who may in turn challenge clientelist linkage strategies.

### **The Fiscal Operation of Clientelistic Parties**

Because a great deal of money is involved in clientelistic politics, it is unlikely that the operation of clientelistic networks can be performed in a transparent fashion. Transparency would cause public deliberation about the sources and destinations of funds, something neither donors nor party bosses would welcome, even if the funding practices were legal. Fiscal transparency would bind the party bosses' hand in the pursuit of votes. This is likely to be a major reason why Weber (1919: 109) proclaims that "the American boss works in the dark." This also extends to the fact that political bosses often do not assume public electoral office. Those who control political parties by acquisition and disbursing money often will shy away from public office and its risks of transparency requirements. Like non-transparency, ineffective or non-existent campaign finance regulations maximize the range of public and private sources from which to acquire the discretionary resources necessary for clientelist exchange.

Fully transparent and effectively-regulated financing practices might also undermine clientelist linkages by generating an incentive problem among party operatives. These operatives are often motivated in no small part by their ability, at the margins, to 'skim resources' from their party's clientelistic war chest for personal gain. Indeed, while as general matter the 'leaky bucket' problem constitutes an obstacle to clientelist credibility, some minimal level of 'leakiness' (or 'slack') may be necessary to incentivize party operatives, who are key in the production and maintenance of credible clientelist linkages. Interestingly, qualitative accounts of clientelist competition often suggest that voters 'expect' patrons to accrue some private benefit from his or her work, and that these expectations may in fact increase voters confidence in the credibility of clientelist promises. In summary, non-transparency makes it both easier to quietly solicit private and public contributions, and provides the minimal organizational 'wiggle room' necessary to incentivize the various parties to the clientelist contract.

### **Summary of Hypotheses: Clientelism and Party Organization**

The following list, which to a certain extent represents a 'mirror image' of the above list of programmatic hypotheses, summarizes our expectations as to the relationship between organizational structures and clientelism:

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monitoring simply does not often require heavy handed direct surveillance of the act of voting, although we encounter even a fair amount of such practices in a number of countries.

- Centralized party organizations will enhance the credibility of clientelist exchanges by mitigating the ‘leaky bucket’ problem, which in turn will increase the incentives to cultivate clientelistic accountability relationships.
- Clientelistic linkage will be more effective in parties whose financing practices are non-transparent and poorly regulated.
- The presence of extensive informal ties to local brokers and notables should facilitate clientelist exchange more clearly and monotonically than the presence of extensive formal organizations or explicit ties with civil society organizations.
- Unlike with programmatic parties, we see no compelling theoretical reason to expect different party-organizational features in small versus large parties.

#### **4. Measuring Party Organization and Democratic Linkage**

To operationalize our theoretical arguments, we employ the data from an expert survey administered in 88 countries, (almost) each of which yielded a minimum of ten expert responses from political scientists and three from journalists covering national election campaigns for the country’s quality newspapers. Precise question wordings, correlation matrices, and summary statistics for all of the following linkage and organizational variables are contained in the Data Appendix, where one can also find details about the survey and its likely limitations. Here we briefly address the measurement of clientelism, programmaticism, and the organizational features of political parties.

To operationalize clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies, we employ both more ‘round-about’ measures in which experts indicate the *intensity of symbolic commitment* parties make to the linkage mechanism; and more precise measures of *operational effort* in which expert responses allow us to create a summary index that indicates the extent to which parties target resources to electoral constituencies (clientelism) or coordinate around successfully around cohesive policy objectives that are bundled in party programs (programmaticism).

Our measure of the symbolic or rhetorical commitment parties make to a political linkage mechanism, short of its operational realization, comes from a battery of questions at the end of the expert survey, where respondents simply score to what extent parties seek to mobilize voters “by emphasizing the capacity of the party to deliver targeted material benefits to its electoral supporters” (E3: the clientelism linkage) or “by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party’s positions on policy issues” (E2: the programmaticism linkage).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> In this final battery of questions, we also invite experts to score parties on three equivalent questions tapping other possible linkage mechanisms not in the center of the current study, but at least peripherally registered in this final module of questions:

- Parties’ efforts to feature the charisma of a leader’s personality (E1);

These ‘round-about’ members solicit expert judgments about party’s ‘rhetorical emphasis.’ Importantly, this rhetorical emphasis should not be confused with actual operational effort in the pursuit of various linkage strategies. For example, political parties and their various internal actors may place great emphasis on their programmatic policy preferences, and engage in vigorous and public programmatic debate, without in fact undertaking the organizational work necessary to generate cohesive, credible, and innovative policy proposals.

To move beyond symbolic commitments, we generate an additional set of variables which more closely approximate the actual operational effort exerted in the pursuit of linkage strategies. With regard to clientelism, the survey questions never actually employ the term itself, as especially among intellectuals, it often evokes negative connotations, opening the door to bias in expert scoring. Instead, experts are asked to assess the efforts parties make to provide or promise to provide certain goods and services to voters. Questions ask experts to assess these efforts for (1) consumer goods, (2) preferential access to social policy entitlements, (3) employment in public or regulated sectors, (4) preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities and finally (5) influence over regulatory procedures. The five classes of goods and services are not perfectly collinear (something that would make measuring each separately redundant), but sufficiently strongly related (at better than .70) to aggregate the experts’ scores on all five of them into a *single index of clientelistic effort (B1\_B5) for each party*.

The survey also asks experts to estimate how *successful* parties are in converting clientelistic effort into actual vote gain (**B11**). Figure 1 provides the distribution of our study’s 88 party systems across a field created by the dimensions of clientelistic effort and effectiveness. National summary indices are created by averaging all parties’ clientelistic effort scores, weighted by the proportion of votes each party received in the most recent national legislative election. The two indices are strongly, but not perfectly correlated ( $r = .628$ ;  $r\text{-square} = .395$ ). In general, clientelist effort and effectiveness are pretty low in most affluent (post-industrial) democracies, whereas both are quite intense in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Regions with widely dispersed national averages are the post-communist sphere of Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the—admittedly amorphous—residual category of Asia-Middle East. Note also the Latin American exceptionalism here. Experts score the clientelistic efforts of parties in the region as mostly high (except in Uruguay, Costa Rica, Chile and Peru where they are in the intermediate range), but the electoral effectiveness of clientelistic efforts often much lower (except in Jamaica, Dominican Republic, Argentina and Colombia). Below, we

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- Parties’ efforts to invoke partisan loyalty/affective bonds, a party’s historical accomplishments, and party identification (E4);
  - Parties’ efforts to feature a party’s claim to competence to govern (E5), something one might call “valence competition.”

In this paper, we are exclusively interested in the programmaticism/clientelism distinction, and bracket considerations of how organizational design of parties may be shaped by the choice of party identification and competence/valence competitive strategies.

provide we provide an explanation of this gap grounded in a particular organizational feature of Latin American parties.

**(Figure 1 about here)**

Our second more ‘operational’ measure of democratic linkage applies to the programmatic appeal of political parties. Rational, policy-motivated voters, who wish to support the party that is closest to their own programmatic positions, need to know that a party: a.) has a unified position on a policy (“cohesion”); b.) cares about that policy (“salience”), and (3) has a position on that policy distinctive from that of other parties (“polarization”). When all three elements come together, rational voters will have a reason to choose among parties based on programmatic appeals. Based on the expert’s scores of parties on a range of policy issues, a whole paper is devoted to the construction and exploration of a composite index of programmatic policy coordination in political parties, which includes all three above elements (cf. Freeze and Kitschelt 2010).

Suffice it here to underline that the index constitutes *a measure of the actual policy coordination accomplished within political parties*, as seen through the lens of experts’ judgments of parties’ policy positions. It is not simply a measure of the “enthusiasm” that parties show for the discussion of policies compared to their declarations of support for other linkage mechanisms, but more precisely captures the *realization of programmatic coordination*. We label this index COPOSAL, which is a summary measure of programmatic effort at the level of individual parties but can also be aggregated to the national level with the same procedure applied to other indices (weighted national average of parties).

Figure 2 shows the relationship between the weighted national averages of parties’ operational efforts to provide clientelistic linkages (B1\_B5) and programmatic linkages (COPOSAL) in the 88 countries of our study. What emerges is a robust trade-off between parties’ deployment of clientelistic effort and programmatic effort, when measured at the national level ( $r = -.65$ ;  $N=88$ ). Even when taking the “noise” of individual party variance into account, the negative correlation between the deployment of the two linkage strategies is still robust ( $r = -.51$ ;  $N=506$ ).<sup>18</sup>

**(Figure 2 about here)**

The organizational variables in the expert survey are much more easily described than the constructs of operational linkage strategies. The *centralization of party organization* is tapped by a question on the control of legislative candidate nominations

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<sup>18</sup> Note that the clientelism/programmaticism trade-off at the country level would be even stronger were it not for a small group of outliers: affluent Western democracies, where parties’ clientelistic effort is very low, but also their realized programmatic appeal is at best moderate (especially the Scandinavian countries Norway and Sweden, and the UK, as well as to a lesser extent Finland, New Zealand, and Ireland). Despite this aggregate level tradeoff, disaggregation also shows that there are some parties that can combine clientelistic and programmatic linkage strategies, and it will be interesting to explore what sort of organizational production function they are deploying.

(survey item a5), an issue clearly of very high strategic relevance for all political parties, and a question on the locus of a party's control over national party electoral strategy (a6). In both instances, low values indicate high centralization; as such, we label these indices Decent\_Nom and Decent\_Pol.<sup>19</sup>

There is a great deal more variance across parties on the (de)centralization of candidate nomination than that of party strategy, resulting in a rather low correlation (.46) between these measures. While experts attribute a rather high centralization of strategic choices to just about all parties, their judgments result in more inter-party variance on effective leverage over candidate nomination. We would argue that candidate nominations are possibly a more important measure of effective party centralization than that of strategic decisions. After all, the nominations process decides who in a party makes it into the illustrious circles at the summit of parties that make most of the important strategic decisions.

We have also two measures of the *formal extensiveness of a party's party organization*. The first concerns the estimated share of a country's municipalities in which a party has a physical presence through a district office (survey item a1). Note that low scores indicate greater levels formal local extensiveness. The second measure is a simple dummy where respondents could indicate whether a party has ancillary functional group organizations, such as youth or women's groups, retail cooperatives or athletic clubs (survey item a2). The organizational field extensiveness and the presence of ancillary organizations are rather strongly correlated ( $r = .67$ ). We label these indices Local\_Office and Local\_Anc1 respectively.

We also have two measures designed to capture rather different forms of extensiveness engendered by the *interaction of a party with its environment in socio-political networks*. One is a measure of a party's reliance on informal ties such as local intermediaries (notables, religious or neighborhood leaders). It taps the capacity of parties' informal networks to reach voters (survey item a3). This variable, which like the extensiveness variables is scored inversely (low values = high extensiveness), is labeled Local-Infml. The second measure asks experts to indicate whether parties have "strong linkages to one or more of a set of "civil society organizations," with a list on which for each party one or several of the following could be checked off by respondents: labor unions, business associations/professional associations; religious organizations; ethnic/linguistic organizations; urban neighborhood or rural associations/movements, and women's organizations (a8). Label this variable CS\_Links. While future work will concern the precise profile of parties' ties among these organizations, we create here a straight-forward index of the number of types of associations to which experts tick, on

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<sup>19</sup> The original response options in the questionnaire are not unambiguously ordinal, let alone metric, however. One of the options was to indicate that all levels of the party organization have say over important decisions (personnel, strategy). Does this indicate intermediate centralization or low centralization, if one interprets the need for cooperation across levels as conferring veto-powers on the local rank-and-file level? Empirically it fortunately appears not to matter how the mixed control option is scored in an ordinal recasting of the response options.

average, the presence of a linkage to a party. This index of associational ties thus ranges from 0 to 6.

We now present a series of descriptive plots of the relationship between party organization, economic development, and party size. Figures 3a-3c begin with the organization-development relationship.

**(Figure 3 about here)**

Each point represents one of the data set's 506 organizational observations. As seen in the plots themselves, there is very little correlation between a party's socio-economic context and the extensiveness of its party organization. Neither formal nor informal extensiveness varies systematically with GDP; both extensive and non-extensive parties can be found at any level of development. On the other hand, and consistent with the modest correlations presented in the Appendix, there is weak positive relationship between economic development and organizational decentralization.

We turn now to Figures 4a-4c, which present the descriptive relationship between a party's size and its organizational features.

**(Figure 4 about here)**

Not surprisingly, there is a fairly positive strong relationship between a party's electoral size and its extensiveness. In fact, in both plots there appears to be a curvilinear effect by which increases in party-size have a greater marginal impact on extensiveness among smaller parties (L-shaped relationship). The relationship between party size and centralization is less clear, and spotted with outliers, but overall smaller parties tend to be more centralized than larger parties.

It turned out to be particularly difficult to frame questions about *parties' financial dealings* that are answerable by experts across a wide range of diverse national institutional contexts. We finally settled on a pair of questions in which experts are invited to assess the share of private or public party finance the acquisition and disbursement of which proceeds in compliance with government regulation. Experts who give low scores to parties indicate that their regulatory compliance is high and *party finance thus highly transparent in the public sphere*. Experts with high scores, by contrast, indicate that parties *either* do not process private or public contributions in accordance with regulations *or* that there are no such regulations. Either way, high scores on these questions indicate *a lack of public transparency of a party's financial political economy*. The below analyses employ a composite index of non-compliance (Non\_Comply) generated by summing the individual measures and dividing by two.

## **5. What the Data Say: Organizational Structures and Linkage Strategies**

We now assess whether parties' empirical profiles of organizational attributes are statistically associated with their linkage efforts in ways that confirm or disconfirm the

hypotheses developed above. To do so we use OLS regression analysis with organizational features on the right-hand side and linkage strategies as dependent variables. We've also confirmed the robustness of all important regression results to Weighted-Least-Squares analyses in which observations are weighted by the standard deviation of expert judgments on our dependent variables. Given the multi-level nature of the data, i.e. the fact that individual parties are nested in larger national-level contexts, it may ultimately be important to verify the robustness of statistical results to a hierarchical linear model. We reserve this more ambitious robustness check for future research.

Similarly, in this iteration we employ only socio-economic development and party size as control variables, and reserve a more exhaustively controlled analysis for future research. Note, this choice is not merely one of convenience. For example, it is often suggested that formal institutional configurations are likely to influence the party leaders' ability to generate party discipline. In turn, these formal institutions are a prime candidate for the type of interactive hypothesis testing discussed above: where formal institutions are likely to induce party discipline even in the absence of organizational centralization, we should expect the net effect of centralization on the incentives to cultivate programmatic relationships to be negative, and vice versa.

On the other hand, a subset of the research cited above argues that formal institutional configurations are also likely to influence the organizational features of a country's political parties themselves. In turn, deciphering the complex and interlocking theoretical and empirical relationships which tie institutions to both party discipline and party organization will be essential for ultimately understanding the way in which extant levels of party discipline condition the relationship between organization and linkage. Put more bluntly, sorting out the relationship between formal institutions, parties' organizational features, and their democratic linkage strategies will be a complex task; and inserting formal institutions as a 'control' without having thought this complex relationship may lead to misleading results/interpretations. We reserve such controlled regressions and theoretical considerations for future research.

Begin with a set of four regressions investigating the impact of a party's organizational features on its propensity to adopt clientelist linkage strategies.

**(Table 1 here)**

Recalling the distinctions made in the data and measurement section above, the first three regressions employ the variable B1\_B5 on the left-hand side (composite clientelist effort), with a stepwise introduction of core organizational measures, secondary organizational measures, and core controls on the right-hand side. The final regression repeats the controlled analysis using B11 (clientelist 'effectiveness') as a left-hand side variable. On the whole, the results are strongly consistent with the expectations developed above, even when controlling for levels of economic development and party-size. Regardless of context, parties tend to be more clientelist (and more effectively clientelist) as they become more centralized. Similarly, it is the presence of informal rather than formal organizational extensiveness which most robustly generates effective

clientelist effort. As well, clientelism is much more present among parties whose organizational financing operates largely outside of the realm of the law (or equivalently were there is no legal regulation of campaign finance per se).

The substantive size of these effects is meaningful. Referring to the summary statistics presented in Appendix A, we see that parties who employ local ‘notables’ in ‘most’ electoral districts (Local\_Infrml = 1) register nearly a standard deviation higher on the variable (B1\_B5) than parties who do so in only ‘some’ electoral districts (Local\_Infrml = 2). The substantive impact is significant but smaller when B11 is employed on the left-hand side. Centralized nomination procedures generate similarly meaningful increases of both B1\_B5 and B11. Finally, although reduced compared to the effects of informal extensiveness and organizational centralization, loose financing practices increase a party’s clientelist effort and effectiveness in non-negligible ways.

As for the additional organizational indices, our alternative measure of ‘ancillary’ formal organization has a consistently negative impact on clientelist effort which, when taken in combination with the negative coefficients on Local\_Office, suggests that on the whole formal extensiveness provides a disincentive to clientelist effort. Decent\_Pol emerges as significant only in the final regression (where B11 is on the left-hand side). As a final set of interesting contrasts, note that ties to civil society organizations (CS\_Links) tend to have a positive effect on both B1\_B5 and B11, but that this effect is only significant in the ‘effectiveness’ regression. Civil society ties thus have an unclear impact on a party’s overall allocation of clientelist effort; but among parties which do expend substantial effort on clientelist appeals, they enhance these appeals’ effectiveness. It is interesting to note that ties to civil society organizations are particularly weak in Latin America (Kitschelt and Kselman 2010 **— This refers to a memo we collaborated on...**). In turn, this absence of group ties, which are important predictors of clientelist effectiveness, likely explains the particularly Latin America phenomenon of ineffectively clientelist parties (see Figure 1).

Finally, note that larger parties tend to be more clientelist than smaller parties, while parties in less developed countries tend to be more clientelist than parties in higher GDP environments. Interestingly, the latter effect is only significant when B1\_B5 is the dependent variable. Put otherwise, among clientelist parties the effect of GDP on clientelistic effectiveness is positive but not statistically significant.<sup>20</sup>

Consider now the variable COPOSAL, our composite index of a party’s programmatic cohesiveness, programmatic salience, and programmatic distinctiveness. Table 2 contains the results of five distinct regression analyses which employ COPOSAL as a dependent variable.

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<sup>20</sup> Unlike the programmatic case, we have no *a priori* theoretical reasons to expect the relationship between organizational centralization and clientelism to be interactive. So as to be consistent with the subsequent analyses, we reran regressions 3 and 4 while including interaction terms between centralization and party size and centralization and formal extensiveness. The results, omitted for reasons of space and time, were either insignificant and/or substantively meaningless.

**(Table 2 here)**

The first three regressions replicate the stepwise sequence employed above, beginning with core organizational variables and then sequentially introducing secondary organizational measures and control variables. The last two analyses introduce interactive terms so as to investigate the potentially contingent relationship of organizational centralization to programmaticism.

Across nearly all model specifications, both *Local\_Office* and *Non\_Comply* are statistically significant and in the expected direction: programmaticism increases in parties with extensive formal organizations, and in parties whose behavior is constrained by campaign finance regulation. The same is true of parties in more developed countries (positive and significant coefficient on *ln\_GDP*). As expected, the relationship between centralization and programmaticism is more complicated. The variable *Decent\_Nom* has a negative coefficient in regressions 1, 2, and 3, although the statistical effect is only significant and meaningful when external controls are included on the right-hand side. On the whole, this suggests that centralization has a positive impact on programmaticism. Put otherwise, on average the coordination benefits associated with centralized organizations seem to outweigh their costs in terms of programmatic credibility.

Column 4 presents the results of a regression which includes the interaction term *Vote\_Share \* Decent\_Nom*, i.e. the interaction of party size and party centralization. As elaborated upon above, we expect that small parties will be more dependent on centralized organizations for programmaticism than large parties. Small parties often lack the formal organizational infrastructure to generate a cohesive cadre, and their leaders often lack the access to incumbency benefits which makes centralization redundant for party discipline. Finally, small parties are often more ephemeral than larger established parties, implying that their cadre will not have had multiple iterations of intra-organizational competition over which to calibrate their respective behaviors.

For all these reasons, we take party size to be a reasonable proxy of an organization's dependence on centralization for programmatic coordination. The results are consistent with this expectation. A cut-point exists at roughly the vote-share 27%, beyond which the consequence of increasing organizational centralization shifts. For parties below this vote share, where we expect to see a greater dependence on centralization for programmatic coordination, centralization is positively associated with programmaticism. In larger parties with vote shares higher than 27%, the reverse is true: programmaticism is higher when parties are more decentralized, consistent with the expectation that where alternative coordinating mechanisms exist, the coordinative benefits of centralization should be outweighed by its costs in terms of credibility. Regression 5 repeats this exercise using the more specific measure *Local\_Office* as a proxy for parties' coordinating capacity, under the assumption that formal organization should be provide organizational infrastructure useful for programmatic coordination. The results of this second interactive specification are neither statistically significant nor substantively meaningful, so we avoid elaboration, though we discuss this non-finding in the paper's Conclusion.

Now move to the alternative, ‘round-about’ measure of programmaticism captured by survey item E2.

**(Table 3 here)**

As with the composite index COPOSAL, both formal organization and campaign finance constraints have the expected positive effect on programmaticism, as does GDP. In contrast to the regressions with COPOSAL as a dependent variable, civil society ties (informal extensiveness) emerge as significant positive (negative) predictors of the variable E2. Furthermore, the global relationship with centralization is reversed: more decentralized parties score systematically higher on the variable E2 than do more centralized parties. Note that we do not report the results of interactive model specifications as we did in Table 2 above. The interaction terms generated neither statistically significant nor substantively meaningful results with E2 as a dependent variable. In short, regardless of a party’s size or formal extensiveness, party scores on the variable increase as party’s become more centralized. This monotonicity suggests that the impact of centralization on E2 does not depend on a party’s coordinating capacity (as proxied by party size and formal extensiveness). In turn, this fact fuels the below discussion of the differences between our ‘composite’ and ‘roundabout’ measures of programmaticism, and how these distinctions might account for their varied relationship to organizational centralization.

Recall from Figure 2 above the strong empirical tradeoff between clientelist and programmatic linkage strategies. If we believe this tradeoff to be fairly absolute and binding, such that a unit of effort devoted to clientelism is taken directly from the same budget constraint containing programmatic resources, then it makes sense to study programmatic and clientelistic effort allocations simultaneously. Table 4 does just this, making use of the results generated by a factor analysis which includes all the current paper’s linkage measures (E2, E3, COPOSAL, B1\_B5, and B11). The details of this factor analysis can be found in the Data Appendix. The dependent variable, labeled Link\_Factor, captures parties’ factor scores on a factor which very clearly captures the strategic tradeoff between clientelism and programmaticism, where higher scores indicate a greater emphasis on clientelist as opposed to programmatic appeals.

The results are, once again, strongly consistent with theoretical expectations. Organizational centralization tilts a party’s linkage profile towards clientelism and away from programmaticism. As well, formal (informal) organizational extensiveness tends to tilt a party’s linkage portfolio away from (towards) clientelism and towards (away from) the cultivation of programmatic appeals. Finally, transparent and effectively-governed financing practices increase a party’s effort allocation to programmaticism, and vice versa for non-transparent and poorly governed situations. We tested interactive specifications of the type found in Table 2; the results were insignificant.

## 6. Concluding Discussion

This paper's central theoretical claim is that a political party's organizational form will influence its ability to mitigate the distinct 'contracting' problems which accompany *clientelist* as opposed to *programmatic* linkage strategies. We operationalize and test our expectations as to the relationship between organizational form and linkage strategy with a newly emerging dataset on patterns of party organization and democratic accountability in 88 countries. On the whole, centralized organizations with 'non-formalized' local networks and financing practices are well-suited to the maintenance of clientelist contracts. In contrast, programmatic appeals tend to be best supported by decentralized organizations with extensive formal infrastructure, although the consequences of decentralization for programmatic effectiveness vary according to a party's size.

As a first cut, this paper's material opens the door to a number of interesting research questions to be addressed in future iterations. We now address a subset of those future avenues. One obvious question raised by the empirical results in Section V relates to the distinction between our 'round-about' measure of programmatic competition (E2) and our more operational measure (COPOSAL). Not only is the correlation between these variables fairly weak; in addition, their relationship to party's organizational form is not perfectly overlapping. This is particularly the case with regards to organizational centralization, which has a categorically negative effect on the programmaticism as measured by E2, while its effect on programmaticism as measured by COPOSAL is only negative for parties large than 27%. A preliminary interpretation might be that decentralization has a universally stimulating effect on programmatic rhetoric as a result of the accompanying need of prospective candidates to 'signal' ideological competence to rank-and-file selectorates. On the other hand, we know from above that decentralization's effect on the actual operational implementation of programmatic linkages is complex and subject to countervailing mechanisms. For this reason, the relationship between centralization and COPOSAL will be more likely contingent on environmental features than will the relationship between centralization and E2. Interestingly, the second latent dimension which emerges in the factor analytic results from Appendix A seems at first glance to represent a 'rhetorical intensity' dimension, with programmatic emphasis, emphasis on party identification, and emphasis on competence-based appeals all loading positively and significantly. In future work, we look forward to comparing the organizational predictors of this second 'symbolic' dimension to those of the more 'operational' factor scores studied in Table 4 above.

We also look forward to more completely unpacking the countervailing mechanisms which define centralization's impact on programmaticism, and the potential contextual conditions which condition their relationship. Although the above data matched our expectations with regards to the interactive impact of centralization and party size on COPOSAL, we were surprised that the interaction between centralization and formal organizational extensiveness came up empty. Furthermore, we've also noted the ways in which formal political institutional arrangements (e.g. Presidentialism, Proportional Representation, etc) might qualify the relationship between centralization and programmaticism. Finally, it may be that a party's ideological 'family' (e.g. Green,

Radical Right, etc) has a conditioning effect on the relationship between centralization and programmaticism (Kitschelt 1989, 1995).

To note one final avenue, recall that this paper's basic theoretical object is the choice of a party's linkage strategies as a function of extant organizational features. However, a more general theoretical construct might allow parties to simultaneously adjust their organizational features and their linkage strategies, and then iteratively update both organizational and strategic investments given changes in electoral preferences, formal institutions, etc. Although looking forward to investigating this more general theoretical question, as a first cut this paper establishes with a fair degree of confidence that existing organizational features condition linkage strategies in systematic and meaningful ways.

**Table 1: Organization and Clientelism**

<b>N=489</b>	1	2	3	4
Local_Office	.074 (.062)	-.141 ** (.060)	-.088 (.058)	-.056 (.055)
Local_Ancil		1.069 *** (.114)	.718 *** (.121)	.035 (.115)
Local_Infrml	-.614 *** (.092)	-.752 *** (.088)	-.555 *** (.093)	-.226 ** (.088)
Decent_Nom	-.538 *** (.066)	-.458 *** (.074)	-.406 *** (.072)	-.322 *** (.068)
Decent_Policy		.158 (.124)	.194 (.122)	.440 *** (.116)
Faction		-.161 (.100)	-.157 (.098)	.182 ** (.092)
CS_Links	.011 (.027)	.061 ** (.027)	.039 (.027)	.165 *** (.025)
Non_Comply	.296 *** (.037)	.268 *** (.034)	.160 *** (.037)	.088 ** (.035)
Vote_Share			.004 ** (.002)	.009 *** (.002)
ln_GDP			-.140 *** (.022)	-.025 (.021)
CONS	3.547 *** (.231)	2.671 *** (.308)	3.936 *** (.308)	2.351 *** (.376)

\* Standard errors in parentheses; standard labels for p-values/statistical significance.

\* Regressions 1, 2, and 3 employ B1\_B5 as a Depvar

\* Regression 4 employs B11 as a Depvar

**Table 2: Organization and Programmaticism (COPOSAL)**

<b>N=489</b>	1	2	3	4	5
Local_Office	-.036 ** (.015)	-.016 (.016)	-.028 * (.015)	-.028 * (.015)	-.087 ** (.040)
Local_Ancil		-.103 *** (.031)	-.003 (.032)	-.009 (.031)	.002 (.032)
Local_Infrml	.032 (.023)	.051 ** (.024)	.021 (.024)	.017 (.024)	.025 (.024)
Decent_Nom	-.004 (.016)	-.020 (.020)	-.048 *** (.019)	-.108 *** (.024)	-.124 ** (.050)
Decent_Policy		-.004 (.033)	.015 (.032)	.034 (.032)	.011 (.032)
Faction		-.017 (.027)	.000 (.026)	.013 (.025)	-.010 (.026)
CS_Links	-.001 (.007)	-.008 (.007)	-.004 (.007)	-.004 (.007)	-.005 (.007)
Non_Comply	-.084 *** (.009)	-.083 *** (.009)	-.046 *** (.010)	-.046 *** (.010)	-.045 *** (.009)
Vote_Share			.001 (.000)	-.005 *** (.002)	.001 (.000)
In_GDP			.048 *** (.006)	.048 *** (.006)	.050 *** (.006)
Share * Decent				.004 *** .001	
Ext * Decent					.037 (.023)
CONS	.443 *** (.057)	.575 *** (.083)	.007 (.104)	.066 (.104)	.123 (.126)

\* Standard errors in parentheses; standard labels for p-values/statistical significance.

**Table 3: Organization and Programmaticism (E2)**

<b>N=489</b>	1	2	3
Local_Office	-.196 *** (.048)	-.090 * (.050)	-.105 ** (.049)
Local_Ancil		-.519 *** (.095)	-.349 *** (.102)
Local_Infrml	.131 * (.072)	.201 ** (.073)	.194 ** (.078)
Decent_Nom	.410 *** (.052)	.338 *** (.061)	.268 *** (.060)
Decent_Policy		.020 (.103)	.099 (.103)
Faction		.033 (.083)	.088 (.082)
CS_Links	.075 *** (.021)	.043 * (.022)	.046 ** (.022)
Non_Comply	-.112 *** (.029)	-.105 *** (.028)	-.032 (.031)
Vote_Share			.004 ** (.002)
ln_GDP			.097 *** (.019)
CONS	2.770 *** (.180)	3.214 *** (.256)	1.916 *** (.333)


\* Standard errors in parentheses; standard labels for p-values/statistical significance.

**Table 4: Organization and Linkage (Link\_Factor)**


<b>N=489</b>	1	2	3
Local_Office	.341 *** (.085)	.088 (.086)	.173 ** (.081)
Local_Ancil		1.292 *** (.163)	.676 *** (.169)
Local_Infrml	-.744 * (.128)	-.944 ** (.127)	-.662 *** (.130)
Decent_Nom	-.812 *** (.092)	-.626 *** (.105)	-.502 *** (.100)
Decent_Policy		-.034 (.178)	-.039 (.170)
Faction		-.018 (.144)	-.054 (.136)
CS_Links	-.028 (.038)	.050 (.039)	.016 (.037)
Non_Comply	.428 *** (.051)	.410 *** (.049)	.206 *** (.052)
Vote_Share			.003 (.003)
ln_GDP			-.266 *** (.031)
CONS	1.042 *** (.320)	-.166 (.442)	2.545 *** (.554)

\* Standard errors in parentheses; standard labels for p-values/statistical significance.

**Figure 1: Clientelist Effort and Clientelist Effectiveness**



**Figure 2: The Tradeoff Between Linkage Mechanisms**



### Figure 3: Organizational Structures and Development




Figure 3a: Formal Extensiveness and GDP




Figure 3b: Informal Extensiveness and GDP




Figure 3c: Decentralization and GDP

## Figure 4: Organizational Structures and Party Size




Figure 4a: Formal Extensiveness and Vote\_Share




Figure 4b: Informal Extensiveness and Vote\_Share




Figure 4c: Centralization and Vote\_Share

# Data Appendix

## I. The Democratic Accountability Expert Survey 2008-9

Cross-national information about democratic accountability mechanisms has been hitherto limited to directional policy or programmatic accountability in wealthy post-industrial countries, supplemented recently by investigations covering post-communist Europe and Latin America.<sup>1</sup> There is some cross-national evidence about aspects of valence/competence competition, albeit confined to economic voting in advanced industrial democracies (Duch and Stevenson 2009). We have virtually no comparative data on the distribution of clientelistic accountability mechanisms. There is ethnographic field research on localized clientelistic practices or macro-quantitative cross-national research using indirect indicators, such as corruption, although we have no clear evidence of how corruption and clientelism relate to each other. Similar fragmentary information is available about the use of charismatic personality appeals in electoral competition (including the personal “coattails” of executive office holders for their parties in legislative elections) or the effect of the parties’ deployment of collective symbols and organizational traditions in rallying support based on party identification. We have some descriptive studies of the variation among parties and countries to bring descriptive criteria (gender, ethnicity) to bear on its accountability mechanisms, but we have limited information about the causes and consequences of parties’ willingness to invoke descriptive representation in their electoral appeals.

The DAES study makes a step to filling this void by gathering detailed data primarily on two mechanisms of accountability, policy/program and clientelistic party appeals, supplemented by a cursory treatment with a single question each on the propensity of parties to appeal to voters based on policy competence, charismatic qualities of leaders, or party symbols and traditions that invoke affective party identification. We did not incorporate questions on descriptive representation because of the complexity of the phenomenon, requiring a whole battery of additional questions for which there was no space in the survey.<sup>2</sup>

The study financed by internal funds from Duke University, a grant from the Chilean National Research Agency for the Latin American component, and the World Bank, included more than 1,400 political scientists and political sociologists, as well as small panels of political journalists for national newspapers across 88 countries that had at least a modicum of party competition over the past five years and a minimum of two million inhabitants. In order to achieve at least a modicum of coverage of the Middle East and extensive coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa, these rules were bent a bit to include some hegemonic party systems with highly restrained multi-party competition. The study was administered by a team consisting of the Principal Investigator and 14 doctoral students at Duke University, as well as designated “country anchors” for each individual country with particularly intimate case-specific knowledge.<sup>3</sup>

In a total of more than 40 questions, experts were asked to characterize attributes of partisan activities in their countries in a total of four subject areas:

- *How parties are organized:* How extensive is the presence of parties across the country? How centralized are critical decisions on the nomination of electoral candidates and partisan strategy vis-à-vis competitors? How close are parties’ ties to external notables, elites, and interest associations? How legal or illegal are funding practices of political parties and where is the money coming from?
- *How politicians provide targeted benefits to voters:* To what extent do parties make an effort to provide clientelistic benefits to voters, whether in form of direct gifts, advantages to obtain social policy benefits (e.g. public housing, disability pensions), advantages of employment in the public sector, preferential access to government procurement contracts, and favorable treatment in government regulatory proceedings? What is the success rate of this effort turning into additional votes?

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<sup>1</sup> The most comprehensive study based on expert judgments of parties’ positions is Benoit and Laver (2006). A recent study covering the post-communist region is Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2009). Latin America has been included in Wiesehomeier and Benoit (2009).

<sup>2</sup> The gap may be filled at least partially by comparing the extent to which parties have incorporated ascriptive representation in their legislative delegations (women, gays, ethnic and religious minorities).

<sup>3</sup> In Latin America, the format was somewhat different, as a research group at the Catholic University of Santiago de Chile, led by Robert Altman and Juan Pablo Luna, led the effort for 18 Latin American countries.

- *How politicians can police the contingency of the clientelistic exchange*: Can parties monitor voters and, if so, can they punish defectors? Are clientelistic targeting efforts at all electorally effective for parties as a way of increasing their electorate?
- *How politicians appeal on programmatic issues*: Do parties take distinct stances on issues and, if so, on which ones? How are policies “bundled” and signaled through left-right placements?

Experts scored all political parties that received at least a minimum of 5% in the most recent legislative elections, plus all other parties that country anchors deemed sufficiently relevant according to Giovanni Sartori’s (1976) criteria that relevance is determined by a party’s capacity to be (1) a potential coalition partner or (2) a spoiler party that may undermine another party’s coalitional options. Depending on the number of parties in a country experts had to score, the survey involved between roughly 100 and roughly 500 scoring opportunities.

In all instances, experts were primed to score *politicians’ efforts* or the perceived effects of such efforts in their survey responses. They were not asked to gauge citizens’ demands for democratic accountability, or citizens’ perceptions of or responses to politicians’ actions. To explore citizens’ perspective on linkage relations, of course, one would need to conduct randomized population surveys. A complete study of politicians’ supply and voters’ demand for linkage relations would thus require the combination of measures of elite action (e.g. based on expert surveys) with mass surveys.

The congruence between elites’ efforts and voters’ acceptance of elites’ initiatives to establish clientelistic, programmatic, charismatic, valence/competence based or affective-party identification based accountability would fully confirm the presence of a citizen-politician linkage. The study is therefore mostly confined to politicians’ efforts and strategies to establish different kinds of linkages. Only with regard to clientelistic linkages, the DAES survey also asks experts to assess whether politicians’ efforts to provide targeted benefits is “effective” in generating votes. Answers to this question imply an assessment of the extent to which voters accept the politicians’ efforts.

In research on programmatic politics, there has been a long debate on the merits of different research methodologies, including expert surveys.<sup>4</sup> All methodologies generate large measurement errors, but there is no evidence that any particular methodology is unambiguously superior to expert surveys. Furthermore, the leading alternative methodology to expert surveys, the textual analysis of party artifacts such as party manifestos or newspaper articles about parties’ appeals, might work reasonably well to capture the programmatic dimension of linkage and accountability strategies, but not to probe into the semi-clandestine world of clientelistic exchange, the second major strategy in the crosshairs of my project. Surveys of country experts, focusing on those who conduct research, read the research literature, and instruct students about parties, campaigns, and elections in their respective places of residence.

It is important to be candid about possible challenges to the validity of data generated by expert surveys. The following list is not exhaustive, but indicates threats that loom large in expert survey methodology:

- *The expertise of the experts themselves may be limited, and differentially so*. Some experts may be more expert than others! In order to check and possibly control for this problem, each module of the democratic accountability survey asks all experts to indicate how certain they are of their judgments for each individual party they rate. We can thus check whether greater subjective uncertainty affects experts’ scoring practices.
- *Familiarity with parties in very specific, local settings provides experts with unique “anchors” to interpret the meaning of the scales on which they are rating parties*. Contingent upon the anchor, similar scores on the same scale mean different things for different experts, particularly when their anchor points vary across countries. The same practice that may appear as a “strong” case of partisan clientelism to a Norwegian expert may strike a Nigerian or Ecuadoran expert as a feeble effort at best to deliver clientelistic benefits and attract votes. Experts’ **anchor variability** is a significant threat to cross-national comparative research. It may be limited by anchoring vignettes that indicate to survey respondents how they should interpret scales or measure the respondent’s understanding of scales. For the critical part of the survey scoring parties’ efforts to provide targeted benefits to clients, an instructive vignette is included.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, we aspired to formulate questions as concretely as possible to limit anchor variability. Nevertheless, cross-national comparison remains beset by anchor problems that must be faced in specific uses of the data set.

<sup>4</sup> For a representative overview of the issues, read the special issue of *Electoral Studies*, Volume 26, 2007, Number 1.

<sup>5</sup> This, of course, is a far cry from the demand of methodologists to provide a vignette question with a hypothetical observation that all responds score for each and every item in a survey. But the economics of time and finances prevented us from engaging in elaborate vignette construction. For the principle, see King and Wand (2007).

- *Experts may have knowledge of a party politicians' behavior in localized settings, yet in the survey they are asked to manage a serious **challenge of data aggregation**, namely to score a party's or even a full system of parties' central tendency of conduct in an entire polity.* The exigency to pass summary judgment about political behavior at a highly aggregate level is likely to cause measurement error, even if well-informed experts know about the particulars of parties' practices in different sites. At the same time, cross-national data collection typically lacks the resources for in-depth sub-national data collection.
- *The selection process of experts is non-random and experts may be subject to **political bias** for or against a party and for this reason strategically distort their favored and their disliked parties' scores.* We have a partial control for this challenge by asking experts to indicate their personal sympathies/antipathies for parties in their country at the end of the survey. Exploratory checking of experts' scores of clientelistic targeting practices by regressing individual experts' party scores on their party (dis)likes revealed almost no bias across the more than 500 parties included in the data collection. With regard to experts' scoring of parties on a left-right policy scale, the scores of roughly 10% of parties may be subject to some expert political bias. Most often, however, this happens precisely in cases of parties where very great variability of judgment among experts signals "objective uncertainty" about a party's position caused by the erratic nature of its messages, if not the strategically calculated way of communicating ambiguity. The objective blurriness of parties' messages tends to enable experts to fill the resulting subjective gap of uncertainty with personal political bias. Strategic dissimulation of parties' conduct, experts' subjective uncertainty, and experts' political bias may be intertwined

The considerable "noisiness" and measurement error of a global cross-national data set of expert judgments thus commands certain precautions in the use of the data. For one thing, just as in psychological scale construction, it is wise to engage in *construct validation* such as to check whether the measures included in the survey covary with other measures of the same concept or of theoretically related phenomena with which one would predict an empirical association of the new measure. Not finding such covariance would cast doubt on the validity of the new measure.

Furthermore, the coarseness of the expert scores of party conduct probably makes it rather hazardous to attribute substantive significance to small, subtle differences between party scores, whether in the same or a small set of countries. Conversely, measurement error will produce inexplicable outliers that assume extraordinary importance in small N comparisons. This especially applies to the interpretation of small inter-party differences across polities that share basic parameters of economic, social, and political-institutional endowments. The data set may be employed with more confidence in large N comparisons among all parties and countries, or at least large subsets of the more than 500 parties and 88 countries included in this survey than in small samples of parties and countries. A detailed study of differences in the scores experts assign to parties within individual countries and within a single region of countries is tempting, but hazardous, given the measurement errors involved in expert surveys.

## II. Specific Survey Items: Party Organization and Linkage

\* This Section contains precise wordings and response categories for all of the organizational and linkage measures employed in the above analysis. As an arbitrary example we use the version of the survey implemented in Nigeria. As will become clear, the survey often presented short ‘vignettes’ to expert respondents prior to soliciting a ‘judgement’. We present first the organizational questions, which come from Module A of the Survey, and then the linkage questions, which come from Modules B and E.

### A.) Organizational Measures

Political parties differ greatly in the extensiveness of their local and municipal-level organizations. Some parties have very little organization below national level Executive Committees and Conferences, or maintain local offices and staff only intermittently during important election periods. Other parties have a permanent presence at the local and municipal level, with real estate, professional staff, and ongoing interaction between the community and local party members.

***A1 - Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the local or municipal level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?***

	Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in MOST districts	Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices, in SOME districts	Yes, the party maintains local offices, but only during national elections	No, the party does not maintain local offices	Don't know	
African Congress (AC)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A1_01
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A1_02
People's Democratic Party (PDP)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A1_03

**A2 - Do the following parties' local organizations maintain a permanent social and community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining ancillary social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives, or athletic clubs?**

	Yes	No	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A2_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A2_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A2_03

**A3 - Do the following parties have local intermediaries (e.g. neighborhood leaders, local notables, religious leaders) who operate in local constituencies on the parties' behalf, and perform a variety of important tasks such as maintaining contact with large groups of voters, organizing electoral support and voter turnout, and distributing party resources to voters and supporters?**

	Yes, they have local representatives in MOST constituencies	Yes, they have local representatives in SOME constituencies	No, they have almost no local representatives	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A3_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A3_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A3_03

**A5** - More generally, the power to select candidates in national legislative elections is always divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national party leaders. Often one particular level of party organization dominates the selection process, while in other places candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

1. National legislative candidates are chosen by national party leaders with little participation from local or state level organizations.
2. National Legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations.
3. National Legislative candidates are chosen by local or municipal level actors.
4. The power to choose candidates is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

*Which of the following four options best describes the following parties' balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections?*

	National Party Leaders Control the Process of Candidate Selections	Regional/state-level party organizations Control the Process of Candidate Selections	Local/municipal Actors Control the Process of Candidate Selections	Selection is the outcome of bargaining between different levels	Don't Know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A5_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A5_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A5_03

**A6** - Similarly, which of the following options best characterizes the process by which the following parties decide on electoral strategy, for example campaign platforms and slogans, coalition strategies, and campaign resource allocations?

1. Electoral Strategy is chosen by national party leaders with little participation from local or state level organizations.
2. Electoral strategy is chosen by regional or state-level organizations.
3. Electoral strategy is chosen by local or municipal level actors.
4. The choice of electoral strategy is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

	National Party Leaders Control Electoral Strategy	Regional/state-level party organizations Control Electoral Strategy	Local/municipal Actors Control Electoral Strategy	Electoral Strategy is the outcome of bargaining between different levels	Don't Know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A6_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A6_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A6_03

**A7** - Within a political party's National Convention and Parliamentary Caucus we often find relatively stable *factions*, intra-party subgroups of like-minded individuals that act as a unified body on matters of party politics. These factions may have independent access to financial and political resources, and their membership generally shows some stability over time.

*In your opinion, do the following parties have stable factional groups in their National Conventions or Parliamentary Caucuses?*

	Yes	No	Don't Know	
<b>AC</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A7_01
<b>ANPP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A7_02
<b>PDP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A7_03

**A8** - Political parties often have more or less routine and explicit linkages to civil society organizations such as unions, business or professional organizations, and cultural organizations based on religion, language, or ethnicity. The linkages might include leadership and membership overlap, mutual financial support, reserved positions for representatives of these organizations at National Conventions, etc.

*Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organizations? Please check ALL relevant categories for each party.*

	Unions	Business associations and professional associations	Religious Organizations	Ethnic/ linguistic organizations	Urban neighborhood or rural associations/ movements	Women's organizations	
<b>AC</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	A8_01
<b>ANPP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	A8_02
<b>PDP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	A8_03

**A10** – Most countries have campaign finance laws which regulate party fundraising and expenditure, and in particular specify both: a.) the legal sources of party finance, and b.) the legal amount of financial resources which particular private or public organizations may contribute. Political parties vary in the extent to which their fundraising behavior is in compliance with these campaign finance laws.

*Which of the following options best characterizes parties' compliance with campaign finance laws regulating donations from private sector actors?*

	<b>MOST</b> private revenue is gathered in compliance with regulations	About <b>HALF</b> of the party's private revenue is gathered in compliance with regulations	Almost <b>NONE</b> of the party's private revenue is gathered in compliance with regulations	Nigeria does not have laws regulating campaign finance and expenditure	Don't know	
<b>AC</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A10_01
<b>ANPP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A10_02
<b>PDP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A10_03

*A11 – Similarly, which of the following options best characterizes parties' compliance with campaign finance laws regulating donations from the public sector?*

	<b>MOST</b> public revenue is gathered in compliance with regulations	About <b>HALF</b> of the party's public revenue is gathered in compliance with regulations	Almost <b>NONE</b> of the party's public revenue is gathered in compliance with regulations	Nigeria does not have laws regulating campaign finance and expenditure	Don't know	
<b>AC</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A11_01
<b>ANPP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A11_02
<b>PDP</b>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	A11_03

B.) Linkage Measures

**B1** - Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens *consumer goods* (e.g., food or liquor, clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building materials etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes.

*How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods?*

	A negligible effort or none at all	A minor effort	A moderate effort	A major effort	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B1_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B1_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B1_03

**B2** - Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens *preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes* (e.g., preferential access to subsidized prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes.

*How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?*

	A negligible effort or none at all	A minor effort	A moderate effort	A major effort	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B2_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B2_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B2_03

**B3** - Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens *preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector* (e.g., post office, janitorial services, maintenance work, jobs at various skill levels in state owned enterprises or in large private enterprises with government contracts and subsidies, etc.) as inducement to obtain their vote.

*How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities?*

	A negligible effort or none at all	A minor effort	A moderate effort	A major effort	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B3_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B3_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B3_03

**B4** - Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens and businesses *preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities* (e.g., public works/construction projects, military procurement projects without competitive bidding to companies whose employees support the awarding party) as inducement to gain their and their employees' votes.

*How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities?*

	A negligible effort or none at all	A minor effort	A moderate effort	A major effort	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B4_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B4_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B4_03

**B5.** Consider whether candidates or parties influence or promise to influence the *application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies* (e.g., more lenient tax assessments and audits, more favorable interpretation of import and export regulation, less strict interpretation of fire and escape facilities in buildings, etc.) in order to favor individual citizens or specific businesses as inducement to gain their and their employees' vote.

*How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favor?*

	A negligible effort or none at all	A minor effort	A moderate effort	A major effort	Don't know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B5_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B5_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B5_03

**B11** - Please assess how effective political parties are in their efforts to mobilize voters by targeted benefits.

	Not at all	To a small extent	To a moderate extent	To a great extent	Don't Know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B11_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B11_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	B11_03

**E2** - Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the attractiveness of the party's positions on policy issues.

	Not at all	To a small extent	To a moderate extent	To a great extent	Don't Know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	E2_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	E2_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	E2_03

**E3** - Please indicate the extent to which parties seek to mobilize electoral support by emphasizing the capacity of the party to deliver targeted material benefits to its electoral supporters.

	Not at all	To a small extent	To a moderate extent	To a great extent	Don't Know	
AC	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	E3_01
ANPP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	E3_02
PDP	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	E3_03

### III. Descriptive Statistics

#### A.) Summary Statistics: Organization and Linkage

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
a1	506	1.923152	.6595583	1	4
a2	505	1.346816	.3157939	1	2
a3	506	1.790425	.4542997	1	3
a5_a	506	1.567447	.4206411	1	3
a6_a	506	1.233026	.2248071	1	2
a7	506	1.53406	.283303	1	2
a8_cnt	506	1.699781	1.103438	0	5.3
Non_Comply	489	2.154042	.7848519	1	3.85
b1_b5	506	2.428807	.7361521	1.06	3.93
b11	506	2.622857	.6209569	1	4
e3	506	2.790639	.6379866	1.19	4
e2	506	3.149578	.5081677	1.56	4
COPOSAL	506	.2370255	.1570552	0	.88

#### B.) Correlation Matrix: Organization and Linkage

	a1	a2	a3	a5_a	a6_a	a7	a8_cnt1
a1	1.0000						
a2	0.6762	1.0000					
a3	0.7355	0.6349	1.0000				
a5_a	-0.0590	-0.2130	-0.1086	1.0000			
a6_a	0.0207	0.0151	-0.0892	0.4610	1.0000		
a7	0.3118	0.2982	0.4455	-0.2132	-0.2143	1.0000	
a8_cnt	-0.4183	-0.4496	-0.4520	-0.1533	0.0003	-0.3781	1.0000
Non_Comply	0.0722	0.0489	-0.1550	-0.2834	-0.0011	-0.1428	0.1618
b1_b5	-0.1743	0.0955	-0.3520	-0.3686	-0.0154	-0.1976	0.2591
b11	-0.3503	-0.2422	-0.4468	-0.2331	0.0353	-0.2072	0.4971
e3	-0.1654	-0.0370	-0.3637	-0.2626	-0.0576	-0.1711	0.2830
e2	-0.2657	-0.3929	-0.1531	0.3708	0.1118	-0.1098	0.1281
COPOSAL	-0.1140	-0.1532	0.0458	0.1098	-0.0408	0.0439	-0.0513
ln_GDP	-0.0217	-0.2643	0.1270	0.3595	0.0243	0.0328	-0.1240
p11	-0.4648	-0.3290	-0.5861	0.0595	-0.0693	-0.3749	0.3522



Orthogonal varimax rotated factor loadings (weighted by party vote shares)

	Factor 1	Factor 2
E3	<b>0.88</b>	0.1772
B15	<b>0.9234</b>	0.0046
E2	-0.4798	<b>0.6475</b>
CoPoSal_4	<b>-0.6145</b>	0.2854
E1	<b>0.5379</b>	0.2186
E4	0.4246	<b>0.5783</b>
E5	0.186	<b>0.7857</b>
Eigenvalue	2.73916	1.53178
Proportion of total variance explained	0.3913	0.2188

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