

# **Clientelistic Linkage Strategies. A Descriptive Exploration**

**Herbert Kitschelt**  
**Department of Political Science**  
**Duke University**  
**Durham, NC 2708-0204**  
[h3738@duke.edu](mailto:h3738@duke.edu)

Paper Prepared for the Workshop on Democratic Accountability Strategies. Duke University. May 18-19, 2011.

This paper is based on a dataset collected under the auspices of the project “Political Accountability in Democratic Party Competition and Economic Governance,” implemented by a political science research group at Duke University (Principal Investigator: Herbert Kitschelt). Funding for the data collection was provided by the World Bank, Duke University, and the Chilean Science Foundation (research grant directed by Juan Pablo Luna and David Altman, Catholic University of Chile). Data analysis and conclusions of this paper are the sole responsibility of its author.

The purpose of this paper sketch is to provide an empirical perspective on clientelistic partisan strategies in competitive electoral democracies around the globe. I assume here a general background understanding of the conceptual considerations that yield a typology of distinct democratic accountability strategies. Elected politicians are agents who seek a validation of their mandate from their principals in democratic elections. One way to obtain that mandate is through clientelistic exchange. Clientelistic linkages involve politicians supplying targeted private and small-scale club goods to individuals and groups of citizens who, in a generalized exchange that may extend over iterated rounds of electoral competition, lend their political support to their agent's candidacy for electoral office.

The transaction may be single-shot, but let me emphasize that it often enough endures over longer time periods, including several elections. Politicians may offer targeted goods before or after any individual electoral contest or throughout the political term between elections. As a consequence, it is often difficult to say whether the clientelistic principal-agent relationship is principally based on outright vote buying in the narrow sense of the word, characterized by a specific timing of the agent's benefit targeted on the client making a payment just before the vote, and the discrete, single-shot nature of that transaction. Clientelistic relationships may encompass a diffuse and unpredictable process of mutual giving and taking between clients and their patrons, often assisted and mediated by a layer of "brokers" who organize and manage clientelistic relations. It is such brokers who engineer the movement of goods and services that are the material "stuff" of clientelistic politics. While monitoring and sanctioning may be going on in this process, in many instances it is probably not essential that it takes place at each election.

I also assume in this paper a general sense of the theoretical problematics that research on democratic accountability mechanisms may address. It can be put to work to explain politicians' choice of public resource allocation with implications ultimately for citizen's quality of life and economic performance. Both the procedural practices of the clientelistic linkage process of accountability, as well as the tangible social and economic outcomes of such dealings, in turn, may ultimately shape popular allegiance to the democratic regime. If such "downstream" consequences of political accountability mechanisms can be empirically confirmed, it would highlight the importance of investigating the "upstream" conditions that make politicians and voters coordinate around specific accountability mechanisms in the democratic electoral process.

For an adequate treatment of "upstream" and "downstream" questions of democratic accountability, I assume that the right framework is not to focus on a single mode of accountability—such as clientelism—but on the profile of accountability strategies that politicians may produce and voters accept, if and when they build lasting relationships. For empirical purposes of concept construction and empirical data collection, I therefore isolate in this paper a phenomenon—clientelism—that cannot be treated in isolation, when set in a theoretical and explanatory context.

Finally, I will also bracket questions of data construction and empirical research methodology. The expert survey methodology employed in the Democratic Accountability project has strengths and weaknesses. It allows us to generate data on phenomena that are difficult to tackle with traditional survey technology or with content analysis or parties' statements of political intent ("manifestos"). At the same time, it raises troubling problems of measurement error due to bias, ignorance, aggregation and anchor point problems that obstruct cross-national comparability of the data. This approach to the data therefore constitutes only one avenue to learn about an important

empirical phenomenon situated at the interface between political economy and the comparative politics of elections and parties. Whatever results this approach generates will require cross-validation by other studies and other modes of data collection and analysis.

The first objective in this paper sketch, then, is to illustrate how the survey operationally measures clientelistic partisan efforts and inspect how such efforts vary across parties and across countries. I will then add a few details about the relationship between parties' choice of clientelistic efforts, associational networks, and political targets. The remainder of this sketch will then probe into the relationship between politicians' efforts to provide conditional targeted benefits and the effectiveness in the electoral contest experts attribute to such measures, as well as the change of the clientelistic effort over time at the highly aggregate level of cross-national comparison.

## **1, Operationalizing Democratic Accountability Strategies**

Because the concept of "clientelism" is a politically charged notion into which politicians and intellectuals have projected all sorts of meaning, the Democratic Accountability survey diligently avoids the concept entirely. The survey frames questions about clientelistic practices in a highly concrete fashion. It asks experts to assess actions and not to speculate about actors' motivations. Just consider the question about preferential access to social policy schemes:

**"B2** – Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens *preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes* (e.g. preferential access to subsidized prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes.

How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?

- a negligible effort or none at all;
- a minor effort;
- a moderate effort;
- a major effort;
  
- don't know."

Answers to this scale are, of course, subject to serious anchor point problems. What may appear as a "major effort" to mobilize targeted voters to a Norwegian probably is nothing to a Greek respondent (pardon the current news context of my example). While there was no space in the survey to include full anchor vignettes for the various scoring scales, the section in which experts rate politicians' efforts to win voters with targeted inducements fleshes out a common baseline interpretation of the scale in a one-page preface. It essentially introduces the four grading steps as the difference between supplying material advantages to no one, to just the small inner activist core of a party (only a mild effort: "small core of party activists and party supporters"...), core supporters, but with some less strongly affiliated voters added on ("a moderate effort"), and finally an extension of targeted benefits to "even some of those who are only mild sympathizers ("a major effort").

Critical for the highest score, however, is putting clientelistic efforts into perspective, as they have a multiplier and demonstration effect. If someone in an extended family obtains a public sector job or some other major benefit through clientelistic connections, it benefits and resonates with the extended family. Thus, in many settings providing 3-10% of a local labor market with public patronage jobs may touch the economic fortunes of 20-50% of all extended families in some fashion. These numbers are not excessively high, given that civil service administrative and social service jobs alone, not counting state owned or regulated enterprises and de-facto state financed non-profit institutions, account for anywhere between 10% and 30% of all employment (formal and informal) even in low to medium income countries.<sup>1</sup> The anchor reference point in the survey thus reads: “Please note that ***even targeting a rather small share of a party’s voters may signal a “major” effort by politicians. It may demonstrate to other voters that those who don’t pledge their support to the “right” party receive nothing.***”

### *What Are Clientelistic Practices?*

The nature of the targeted transactions explored in the Democratic Accountability expert survey is quite different from the clientelism questions included in some population surveys. Let us therefore briefly review the field of political practices that may be subsumed under the analytical notion of targeted conditional exchange.

As an indirect tracer of clientelism, surveys sometimes ask whether voters have contacted elected officials with a request for help (e.g. finding a job, health care, etc.) (cf. Carkoglu and Kemahlioglu 2007 on a Turkish survey; Stokes 2005 drawing on Argentinean survey). Or they ask whether voters received a gift from politicians (Stokes 2005). In another study of Argentina and Chile, voters were asked whether they had receive a handout, a patronage appointment, or the distribution of pork (local club goods) (Calvo and Murillo 2009). Also in the Afrobarometer surveys, the main indicator to trace clientelism is whether voters accepted a gift from political candidates.<sup>2</sup>

Questions probing into voters contacting politicians may involve constituency service, not necessarily clientelistic exchange. In a similar vein, questions about local goods provision are not necessarily about contingent exchange, but about local pork that may involve no contingency at all: Politicians simply want to take credit for benefits delivered to the community. Gift giving is an important form of individually targeted clientelistic exchange, particularly in poor countries, but not so prominent in the bulk of middle-income countries where clientelism is widespread or in the few affluent democracies where clientelism is common.

A great deal of clientelistic politics hence is not covered in available surveys at all. The demand side analysis of what *political practices*—that is what which voters report to receive when and how—is thus a woefully understudied subject. The same can be said about investigations covering voters’ *preferences for clientelism*. A few surveys ask respondents whether they would like politicians to bring home jobs and services, rather than make general policy, but this question is sufficiently unspecific to cover all sorts of pork and constituency service as well. I am aware of no

---

<sup>1</sup> For data on Latin American public employment, see Panizza (2000), table A1.

<sup>2</sup> For an analysis of the response pattern, see, for example, Young (2009).

studies that would probe into the acceptability (“legitimacy”) of clientelistic exchange in the eyes of voters.

On the supply side, I am not aware of any systematic comparative research that would have made possible the creation of an encompassing inventory of clientelistic efforts across parties and countries. Most research is based on individual country field research with often intriguing, if not entertaining evidence that is hard to generalize. For want of better alternatives, especially comparative political economy inspired research therefore resorts to rather indirect tracers of clientelism in cross-national research, such as the share of civil service jobs and the change rate of civil service employment in a polity (or region), or the investment in local infrastructure. While it is plausible that discretionary choices concerning construction projects or the appointment of civil servants may be shot through with political calculations, some of which may be clientelistic, particularly in cross-national comparison it may be quite risky to interpret variance in such resource allocations as an unambiguous indicator of different levels of clientelism.

The first objective of the Democratic Accountability survey, therefore, is to deliver a somewhat more comprehensive coverage of *types of clientelistic effort* across the global field of political parties. Based on a thorough review of the anthropological, sociological and political science case study evidence, the survey includes five “currencies” of clientelistic exchange:

- **Outright gifts:** Politicians may give food, liquor, clothes, appliances, building materials, and many other scarce and valuable items to voters. These goods may change hands before elections, after elections, in part before and in part after elections, or even during the regular term at some other point in time.
- **Preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes:** Major social programs leave rather little wiggle room for clientelistic manipulation, as they are based on general and precisely operationalized rules of contribution and eligibility. This applies in most countries to the biggest social programs, such as old age pensions, health care insurance, basic unemployment income replacement, and some family benefits. But there is a host of social programs, where administrators enjoy a great deal of discretion, as complicated means-tests and tests of deservingness have to be applied to determine eligibility of applicants. This concerns benefits as varied as disability pensions, and more broadly means-tested income replacement (“welfare”), entitlement to nutritional supplements, access to public health facilities and subsidized courses of treatments, public scholarships, public housing, or access to active labor market policies. Housing and health care benefits, as well as means-tested income replacement, are probably fiscally the most important categories among these discretionary benefits.
- **Preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector:** A focus on civil service hires is clearly not enough. The reach of political parties touches a variety of other employment situations that are not formally in the public economy. First of all, this applies to non-profit social and cultural services that are run in an arrangement of “subsidiarity” by formally non-state civic organizations set up by churches or political parties, running from kindergartens through hospitals and counseling centers to nursing homes. The Low Country system of “pillarization” of social service organizations around political parties that in some measure has survived in Belgium to this day is the

archetype of such arrangements. Second, there are state-owned enterprises that may have private legal status, but the corporate governance of which is shot through with party representation, particularly in the personnel departments that make appointments based on political patronage. Third, even where companies are formally private, governments may embed them in a cocoon of regulatory protection from competition that relaxes their hard budget constraints, allows them to carry excess employment, and makes them receptive to partisan demands for patronage appointments.

As a consequence, the size of a country's civil service employment, or even more so the size of its formally private sector, is often a misleading indicator of the share of work organizations that are amenable to political patronage appointments. In countries such as Japan, Taiwan, South Korea or many of the postcommunist countries, these simple measures may dramatically understate the percentage of all wage earners whose jobs may be liable to political patronage appointments.

- **Preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities:** The award of government procurement contracts to employers who then function as enforcers of their employees' voting support (or campaign assistance) for their partisan benefactors is a common clientelistic practice that has never been studied in a comparative setting. It may be common practice in state-owned or regulated enterprises, but it extends the reach of party patronage deep into the heartland of private capitalist business. It is particularly common in economic sectors with monopsonistic or oligopsonistic market structures, with the state being the main customer, such as civil engineering/construction or defense goods and services. Not by chance Japanese public construction contracts run upwards of twice the share of GDP as in any other affluent OECD democracy.

In procurement contracts, the clientelistic process is not necessarily organized through market producers, but could also be handled by a self-organization of consumers. This applies, for example, when parties contract with neighborhood organizers for the construction of local infrastructure (running water, road pavement, utilities) in exchange for the delivery of local voting blocs.

If the party's target for clientelistic exchange is indeed a producer organization, politicians may be faced with yet another choice. Will they be working with the company's senior management, its labor unions (if any are present), or both? Most likely the pursuit of procurement contracts will be an objective that unites labor and management, provided there is not an ideologically politicized labor movement.

- **Application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies.** The logic here is similar to that of government procurement contracts. Politicians and their administrative appointees in regulatory agencies interpret and apply regulatory code in favorable or unfavorable ways contingent upon the company's willingness to make its employees a rank-and-file army in the electoral battle on behalf of the benefactor. Areas in which regulatory discretion may be particularly important for clientelistic quid-pro-quo include zoning laws, construction and environmental codes, product safety laws, certification of companies and professions, a host of rules in finance and banking regulation, including loan guarantees, export and import licenses, or regulated access to foreign currency.

A review of this list of opportunities for clientelistic exchange drives home many points of which I wish to highlight only two. *First of all, equating clientelism with “vote buying” is analytically misleading, at least if vote buying is interpreted as a “spot market” single-shot contract between a buyer and a seller for the fully operationalized transaction of a single vote in a single election, with payment delivered before the vote is cast.*<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt that vote buying occurs in spot markets and needs to be understood in its own right. But more often than not clientelism involves an extended “relational” exchange in which patrons keep delivering benefits in exchange for a stream of votes in a variety of electoral contests. In these instances, it is difficult to say whether patrons deliver benefits to clients as first movers, before elections, or as second movers, after elections. Just consider a client’s tenure in public or state-regulated employment or her residence in publicly subsidized housing, or even her early retirement on a government disability plan. The same applies to procurement contracts where payments, deliveries, and subsequent ancillary services extend over long periods of time.

*Second, the relational, extended generalized exchange involved in many clientelistic dealings allow parties to subcontract the enforcement structure to a client organization.* This is a highly cost-effective way for political parties to operate, as they save the investment in an explicit enforcement structure. It may partially explain why clientelism appears to coincide with only a modest amount of direct monitoring and sanctioning of voters. The client sets up a brokerage external to the partisan patron to ensure that individual voters do the party’s bidding. This is most clear-cut in the case of procurement contracts and regulatory favors, but also applies to many patronage-based employment situations as well as some disbursement of social benefits (if subsidiary civic associations are involved). Parties strike “wholesale” contracts with intermediaries (companies, civic associations) who pattern the behavior of their employees—the individual voters—in the spirit of the political compact. Parties gear up for messy, high-transaction cost “retail” exchange relations with individual citizens essentially only in the areas of gift-giving that is closest to the practice of spot-market vote buying and the granting of social services.

### *Relationship among Fields of Clientelistic Practice*

How do clientelistic exchange practices empirically hang together? This question has a substantive side of intrinsic intellectual interest for the investigation of democratic accountability relations, but also a purely pragmatic technical implication for statistical analysis: Can we somehow simplify the field of practices and develop a single or very small set of parsimonious measures that captures the empirical range of relations in the real world?

In examining the more than 1,400 experts’ scores of 506 parties in 88 countries, it turns out that the five categories of clientelistic practices are, indeed, highly correlated among each other, as is confirmed by any cluster or factor analysis of the data I have inspected. The simple bivariate correlations among experts’ scores of parties’ practices are in the range of .70 to .85. In factor analysis, this yields one hugely overwhelming factor with an Eigenvalue of well over 3.0, capturing more than 60% of the total variance.

---

<sup>3</sup> For an analysis of the varieties of vote buying, see Schaffer (2007).

In part, this is an artifact of the situation that prevails among advanced industrial democracies where, with few exceptions, none of the clientelistic partisan practices occur and experts' average scores for parties are near the minimum value on the four-point scales. It is therefore worth setting these countries aside and examining more closely the structure of relations among modes of clientelistic exchange among poor and middle income countries with per capita GDP below \$ 10,000 (2008). Figure 1 depicts the bivariate correlations among the modes of clientelism for these countries.

Figure 1 about here

The three modes of clientelism that show the highest correlation are those related to the production sphere—procurement contracts, regulatory decisions, and patronage jobs—with good chances that votes are captured “wholesale” through relations with firms rather than “retail” through relations with individual voters. Patronage job creation is also quite intimately related to social policy benefits and slightly less so to regulation. The one form of clientelistic outreach that is not quite as strongly related to anything else but social policy is gift provision (B1), the most archetypical “retail” form of clientelism. It shares barely over a third of its variance with any of the three production/business- related modes of clientelism. Partially anticipating a later topic for analysis, let me also show a relationship between gift giving and the constituencies on which experts see political parties target their clientelistic efforts: In the case of gift giving, parties make an exceptional effort to target the rural poor. This is much less so the case with the other forms of clientelistic effort.

In spite of these differentiations in the use of clientelistic modes of targeting, the overriding story is one of *cumulative* or at least *complementary* and sometimes at the margin *substitutive* deployment of clientelistic targeting techniques by political parties around the globe. This legitimizes the creation of a simple additive index of clientelism (B15) that combines parties' scores on all five targeting techniques in a single number. The workhorse of the empirical analysis will be this indicator B15, aggregated to the level of experts' average judgments for each party. Based on party mean scores for B15, an even more aggregate index can be computed that provides a country average, based on party averages weighted by the electoral support of a party in the most recent election (B15nwe, with n standing for “national” and we for “weighted”). Before I work with this index, however, let me provide a sense of the distribution of clientelistic practices by inspecting the profiles of clientelistic effort in select countries across geographical regions of the world.

### *Varieties of Clientelism: A Global Tour*

On our global tour of clientelism is based on select countries and select parties. No effort was made to be representative to each region, nor am I depicting all parties for each country, typically leaving out some of the smaller parties. I chose the cases in order to demonstrate specific features and to highlight empirical details with respect to countries that are intrinsically important. For each country group, let us consider four features of the clientelism profiles:

- The ***overall mean intensity of clientelism***, as revealed by the averages 1-4 scores on each of the modes of clientelistic practice, varies across parties, countries and regions.
- Parties pursue ***the different modes of clientelistic effort with differential intensity***. Some parties prefer some mechanisms, while others focus on different mechanisms.

- At the level of party system, the *distribution of parties' capacity to make clientelistic efforts* varies substantially. In some countries, clientelistic effort is a *unilateral, monopolistic* affair concentrated in the hands of a single party. In other countries, clientelistic effort proceeds within a *bilateral or multilateral* competitive framework.
- I have added parties' scores on experts' assessment of *the effectiveness with which each party deploys clientelistic effort as a means to mobilize voters and produce votes* (B11). Effort and effectiveness are likely to be related, but we shall see that they are not the same thing. And the match or gap between clientelistic effort and effectiveness may vary by party and country.

To begin with the affluent *postindustrial democracies*, I present scores for the major parties in the three countries that have had the relative highest propensity to clientelism in that group after World War II. All three experienced major political-economic crises in the 1990s that led to an erosion of clientelism. This erosion was probably most pronounced in Austria and least pronounced in Japan.<sup>4</sup> Except in the realm of social policy clientelism (primarily housing) and marginally patronage clientelism (jobs), Austria therefore has the lowest level of clientelism. In Italy clientelism is still more elevated and practiced across a range of political parties from center left (PD) through center right (AN) to the far right (LN and FI). The party with the single highest scores among advanced industrial democracies resides, however, in Japan, where the old ruling party receives high marks for its clientelistic effort through business contracts, but also social policy benefits.

Table 1 about here

In terms of competitive set-up, Austria approximates a bilateral clientelism where at least two major parties make similar efforts to provide targeted benefits, Italy shows a multi-lateral clientelistic effort with a slight edge for the ruling party, *Forza Italia*, whereas Japan represents a unilateral clientelism that is concentrated on the long-term ruling party. This pattern is also reflected in the relative effectiveness of clientelistic efforts that experts attribute to the parties. In Austria and Italy, two or three parties share intermediate scores of clientelistic effectiveness. In Japan, the former ruling party is seen as most effective, but it is closely followed by a smaller, culturally specialized party (Komeito), whereas the main opposition party collects fairly low scores.

Also for the *postcommunist region*, I depict four countries where parties make rather more intense partisan efforts to produce targeted benefits, when compared to the rest of the region or all West European cases (table 2). The distributional pattern is quite diffuse, with both business and individually oriented social program and gift providing target efforts on the agenda. In terms of patterns of competition, however, there are huge differences between the countries. Bulgaria is a country with highly effective multilateral clientelism, Hungary features moderately effective bilateral clientelism, and Russia a lop-sided unilateral clientelism that is effective primarily for the ruling party. The Ukraine is situated somewhere between bilateral and multilateral clientelism.

Table 2 about here

---

<sup>4</sup> For a detailed discussion of the crisis of clientelism in these cases, see Kitschelt (2007).

The *Latin American cases* included in table 3 all feature bilateral to multilateral patterns of party competition. Overall, the intensity and effectiveness of clientelism is higher in Argentina than in any of the other countries among the Latin American cases here showcased or any of the postcommunist and postindustrial democracies introduced before. A unique feature among the four countries is the extremely low effectiveness that experts attribute to Mexican efforts to produce votes with clientelistic inducements. This *large gap between parties' clientelistic effort and actual vote-producing effectiveness* is actually a feature shared by a number of Latin American countries, as we shall see.

Table 3 about here

In table 4, moving on to six prominent cases across *Southern and Eastern Asia*, plus Turkey as one of the few Middle Eastern countries with competitive elections, we now see here a clear emphasis on “retail” clientelism in the fields of social policy benefits and gifts (except Turkey’s AKP). The competitive circumstances are again quite different. Indonesia offers a case of multilateral clientelism, while India and Taiwan are closer to bilateral clientelism. The other three cases—Malaysia, Thailand, and Turkey—produce variants of dominant clientelism, where one party is clearly making a greater effort and also is much more effective in producing votes with clientelistic techniques.

Table 4 about here

Table 5 finally depicts some *Sub-Saharan African countries*, with Senegal and Ghana being more representative for the rest of the lot than Nigeria and South Africa. Once again, most of the parties, except in South Africa, make intense efforts to provide clientelistic benefits in a widely differentiated menu of modes. One might detect a slight emphasis on gift giving as a preferred route for clientelistic outreach in at least three of the four countries, but business contracts are also a favorite avenue everywhere. Both in terms of effort and effectiveness, the competitive configurations of clientelism vary a great deal across these cases. While South Africa and to a lesser extent Senegal are instances of unilateral clientelism, Ghana would qualify more closely for bilateral clientelism, while Nigeria approximates multilateral clientelism. Interestingly, in Nigeria clientelistic efforts are considered to be quite modest, and so is the effectiveness in vote production that experts attribute to clientelistic mobilization.

Table 5 about here

Overall, expert judgments reveal tremendous variance in profiles of clientelism across parties and countries, but to a lesser extent across modes of clientelism. The differences in that regard occur at the margins and may involve a trade-off between wholesale business oriented and retail individual consumer/voter oriented clientelism.

### *Networks and Targets in Clientelistic Strategies*

Do parties deploy different kinds of linkage strategies contingent upon the groups in society with which they associate and the groups they target? The survey on Democratic Accountability permits us to explore this question in approximation. The experts were asked to indicate in simple yes/no questions whether a party deploys a specific civil associations or interest group in its process of targeting beneficiaries. Six types of civic associations could be ticked off (see table 6). We can

interpret the percentage of experts for a party that ticked off an interest group as part of the deployment network as an indirect measure of the *probability and strength of a party's reliance on a type of interest association*. Thus, if 50% of a party's experts affirmed that the party uses a group to funnel targeted benefits to voters, it would receive a score of 50.0.

The first column in table 6 lists the likely strength of ties between political parties and civic associations in poorer countries that rely on clientelistic targeting to a greater extent. We see here that business and professional associations and urban and rural associations are the most popular venues for parties through which parties channel their targeted benefits. Much less common are ties through labor unions and women's groups, possibly because these are the hallmarks of industrial and postindustrial societies in which clientelistic targeting is a progressively vanishing practice of the accountability process. Also much less frequent is the use of religious and ethno-linguistic associations for a party's targeted bidding for clientelistic support. But this is accurate almost by definition, as ethnocultural and religious mobilization presupposes that it targets only the section of a polity's population that meets the cultural qualification.

Table 6 about here

The subsequent column entries list the simple bivariate correlation between parties' emphasis on associational ties in clientelistic deployment and the prominence of specific accountability strategies in their menu of targeting practices. Positive correlations indicate that parties with stronger ties to a particular civic association are more likely to use a particular type of clientelistic effort.

Not much in the table stands out. Most generally, the presence of any type of associational ties ever so slightly facilitates the disbursement of clientelistic benefits. This applies somewhat more strongly to social benefits, followed by gift giving. This differentiation makes sense from an organizational transaction cost perspective, as the award of social benefits and of gifts is a "retail" activity that involves a great deal of labor within parties to identify the most suitable beneficiaries. It is therefore all the more important that at least some of this burden can be put on the shoulders of external support organizations and civic associations may fit the bill. A similar logic may also apply to the use of jobs, contracts, and regulation in conjunction with urban neighborhood or rural associations. These territorially based associations involve usually small entrepreneurs and employees both in formal and informal economic relations. These associations help parties to distribute business-related benefits.

A similar story can be told about the association between parties' choice of clientelistic benefits and the groups of voters who are being targeted (table 7). Although poor people and rural voters tend to be over-represented as recipients of all kinds of targeted clientelistic benefits, this applies with particular force to direct gift relationships and the parties' disbursement of social benefits. Conversely, not by chance it is rich voters who benefit mostly through procurement contracts and regulatory favors.

Table 7 about here

One of the most vibrant subjects of debate in the literature on clientelistic politics in political science has been the question of whether parties target their benefits to their core loyalists or to marginal voters (see, e.g., Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008; Dunning and Stokes 2010; 2010; Calvo and

Murillo 2009). Being focused on the conduct of partisan elites, the Democratic Accountability survey, of course, cannot directly contribute to this debate with new data. What is possible, however, is to ask the experts whether they believe that specific parties have a greater propensity to target loyalists who are bedrock supporters of their parties as recipients of their clientelistic services, or strategic voters who are ambivalent between alternative parties and decide strategically. Figure 2 reports some descriptive statistics for parties in both more affluent (per capita GDP > \$10,000/2008) and less affluent countries (GDPpc <\$10,000/2008).

Figure 2 about here

Everywhere the plurality of experts indicated that parties target *both* loyalists and strategic voters. This applies especially to the larger parties. Moreover, there is a greater share of non-responses to this question from experts scoring the wealthier post-industrial democracies, presumably because clientelistic efforts are so weak here in many instances that respondents often could not or did not bother to tell investigators whom such parties would target. The second largest group of respondents, and particularly respondents in the less affluent Latin American and East Asian polities, however, report that clientelistic parties primarily focus on loyalist voters with clientelistic targeted benefits. Only a small minority of experts rating either developing or highly developed countries support the hypothesis that parties focus their clientelistic benefits on the marginal strategic voters. Take this result as a global poll among political scientists on the validity of the competing hypotheses and it is the proponents of the core loyalist hypothesis who carry the day.

## **2. Patterns of Clientelistic Politics Across the Globe**

While a great deal of the relevant variance in the deployment of clientelistic linkage strategies occurs at the level of individual parties, it is nevertheless quite interesting to provide a bird's eye view from afar by aggregating clientelistic effort to a very high level of aggregation, namely a country score of parties' clientelistic efforts, additively combined across the entire set of five clientelistic linkage mechanisms and weighted by each party's electoral size (variable B15nwe). In the survey itself, after scoring parties on the five specific channels of clientelistic effort making, experts were asked to provide an overall judgment of all parties' disposition toward clientelistic politics in a country. The score on this roundabout variable (B6) can then be compared to the score for aggregate national level clientelism that results when we construct it from scratch—in ways already indicated above—by first calculating for each party's average B15 score over all channels of clientelistic targeting for all experts of a party. We then calculate the national average of these individual party averages, but weighted by electoral size of each party so as not to give undue influence to very small parties (B15nwe, i.e. national average of clientelism effort, weighted by parties' electoral size). The scatterplot in figure 3 reports the correlation between the two national summary indices of clientelistic partisan effort, B6 and B15. At  $r = .88$ , it is almost perfect.

Figure 3 about here

The color coding in figure 3 allows us also to see regional patterns of clientelistic effort. This is heuristically instructive, but the geographical regions have no theoretical significance, taken by themselves and are thus included here for illustrative purposes only. These geographical marker may, however, serve a heuristic role as catalysts to generate hypotheses about the relationship between political and economic processes and democratic accountability practices. I should also hasten to add that by aggregating the data for expositional purposes to the national level, I am hiding what may be the most valuable source of information for theorizing and empirical analysis, namely the variance in partisan strategies at the level of individual parties.

Nevertheless, a few features stand out that deserve a brief comment. *Affluent OECD countries* (red dots) are situated in the region close to the low extreme of clientelistic effort, but they are divided into two succinct subgroups, one consisting of Northern Europeans and Canadians with extremely low clientelism and a second group of continental Europeans with low-to-intermediate levels of clientelism. At the higher end of that group one encounters the United States, Spain and Portugal. Even higher on the scale are not surprisingly Italy and Greece, as well as Israel, Japan and Korea (in orange dots). Although the relative rankings are fully conforming with my own everyday (pre)judices about country practices, based on the case study literature, we should be careful not to overinterpret small differences among countries, given the very large measurement error involved in the scoring procedure.

*Post-communist countries* (blue color dots) are distribution over a very wide range of the clientelistic effort scales from low-to-intermediate effort in much of East Central Europe (except Hungary) to extremely high efforts in places like Bulgaria, Macedonia, or Mongolia. A similar very wide range of practices can be found among *Latin American countries* (green color dots) with Uruguay, Chile, and Costa Rica constituting the low end of the distribution near the mid-point of the scales and countries such as Argentina, Panama, Paraguay, Jamaica and the Dominican Republic at the high end. The wide distributions among post-communist and Latin American polities underlines that geographical contiguity probably has precious little theoretical purchase in accounting for patterns of clientelistic outreach by political elites.

Countries lumped under a single geographical heading that hides great territorial dispersion—*Middle Eastern and Asian countries*—also distribute over a wide range of the clientelism scales, but that is narrowed substantially, if we lump Korea, Israel, and Japan together with the Western high income OECD countries. Countries of *Sub-Saharan Africa*, finally, constitute a relatively compact cluster of polities near the high end of the clientelistic effort scales, with the exception of Botswana and South Africa more in the mid-range of the variables.

As a matter of concept validation, not theoretical analysis, let us inspect the relationship between countries' per capita GDPs in 2008 (at current exchange rates) and their clientelistic efforts (figure 4). Given the strength of the priors based on case studies and theorizing that poorer countries should exhibit parties that make more effort in clientelistic targeting of electoral constituencies, not finding a relationship between these two variables would not so much invalidate the development hypothesis, but cast doubt on the validity of the index generated in the Democratic Accountability project. Fortunately, the figure reveals a rather strong relationship, although it also indicates areas of indeterminacy that may open the door to other than developmentalist explanations. Among advanced industrial democracies with incomes in excess of \$ 10,000 per capita, there is considerable variance that cannot be captured in terms of variance in levels of affluence. The same applies to a within group comparison of countries with per capita GDPs below \$ 10,000. Also here

there is substantial variance that does not conform to a simple one-to-one correspondence between rising incomes and declining clientelism.

Figure 4 about here

How do patterns of clientelistic effort change over time? The Democratic Accountability survey has a purely cross-sectional character, except that it fields one question as follow-up to the overall summary judgment of all the parties' clientelistic efforts in a country that invite experts to compare clientelistic practices in their respective countries as of 2008 with what they recall to have been practices a decade earlier in 1998 (question B7). Figure 5 depicts experts' aggregate assessment of clientelistic efforts politicians make in each country at the time of the survey (2008-9) on the horizontal axis with the already familiar B6 scores (1-5 scale). On the vertical axis is experts' assessment of how clientelistic efforts have changed over time (1-5 scale) compared to ten years ago, with the absence of change indicated by the intermediate score (3.0 on the 1-5 scale). The figure shows that countries with clientelism scores below the global average now (2008-9: < 2.8) also had low scores ten years ago, or have seen clientelism weaken since the earlier time (Austria, Belgium, Japan). Most of the countries with low or falling clientelistic partisan efforts are postindustrial democracies, although a few still have intermediate, albeit also declining levels of clientelism (Italy, Japan, and especially Greece).

Figure 5 about here

To another much smaller group of countries situated in the Southeast of the figure experts attribute intermediate to fairly high levels of clientelistic effort in 2008, but against the backdrop of a decline over the preceding ten years. These countries tend to be located in Latin America. But most countries with above average scores of parties' clientelistic efforts now (>2.8) and especially those with very high scores now (>3.5) appear to have experienced a recent surge in clientelistic effort from lower intensities ten years ago. This applies especially to Middle Eastern, Asian, and Sub-Saharan African party systems that tend to display scorers in the Northeast region of the figure. A similar, but less pronounced pattern of stability at intermediate to relatively high levels of clientelistic partisan effort in some countries, but acceleration to higher levels in other countries, is displayed by the post-communist region.

What we witness, therefore, is a ***progressive global differentiation of clientelistic partisan targeting efforts, with the central tendencies in some countries and regions pointing toward more intense clientelism, while toward an atrophy of clientelism in other regions.*** If we statisticized this observation and entered the change rate of clientelism over the past decade as the dependent variable (B7), countries' per capita GDP in 1998 would not predict their level of clientelism in 2008, but their clientelistic effort in 2008 (B15) would show a positive significant relationship to the change in partisan effort over time, while the interaction between affluence (per capita GDP) and 2008 effort would signal a strongly negative relationship.

Why are rich countries showing a decline in clientelistic partisan effort while poor countries display an intensification? Whereas an answer to the first part of the question can rely on familiar developmentalist arguments, there is not really a convincing answer to the second part of the question. While the Democratic Accountability dataset allows us to sharpen the question, theoretical analysis must frame potential answers that can be addressed with this dataset or better alternatives in the future. One possibility is that the driving force of increasing clientelism is the

transition of many countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, to low-quality democracies, in which erstwhile authoritarian rent-seeking elites are now forced to compete for survival in office and do so by servicing an expanding array of rent-seeking constituencies with clientelistic targeting (cf. Bates 2008).

As a final descriptive question, let me address the relationship between clientelistic partisan effort and its effectiveness to produce electoral votes, as seen through the lens of the experts' judgments: Is it the case that greater efforts also translate into more votes? Figure 6 provides a tentative answer, displaying countries' expert scores on clientelistic effort (B15nwe) on the horizontal axis and a measure of electoral effectiveness of such efforts, also aggregated to the national level, weighted by the size of parties (B11nwe), on the vertical axis. Experts do see a rather tight association between politicians' clientelistic efforts and actual vote production across most regions of the world *except* in the case of many Latin American countries, where politicians evidently make energetic clientelistic efforts, but experts judge these efforts as rather futile in generating votes.

Figure 6 about here

Further research must reveal why Latin American politicians waste effort on clientelistic practices that do not generate results. One hypothesis has to do with social networks important for the effectiveness of contingent exchange. It turns out that experts score parties in most, but not all (Argentina!) Latin American countries as having very weak associational networks or ties to local notables that could reduce voter opportunism and enforce contingent exchanges through (indirect) monitoring and sanctioning of defectors. Wherever parties rely on functioning networks to notables and organizational machines, however, experts suggest that their clientelistic efforts appear to pay off at the ballot box.


### **3. Conclusion**

This paper has introduced operational measures of clientelistic partisan efforts in polities with electoral competition around the world. It has described some basic empirical features of the distribution of partisan efforts at the level of individual parties and whole polities. It has distinguished a wide range of empirical practices that may reasonably be subsumed under the umbrella of clientelism, while also insisting that clientelism should not be equated with vote buying. It then justified the construction of a single summary measure computed from the Democratic Accountability dataset's raw data to capture the efforts individual parties make to target voters in clientelistic exchange relations and the central tendencies of such efforts than can be observed for whole countries. Moreover, it has highlighted some additional features and correlates of clientelistic effort that may be important to appreciate in order to account for the origins and consequences of clientelistic practices. These include the role of civic networks in the mobilization of targeting efforts and the nature of the groups that are being targeted by different clientelistic practices. The paper finally examined some broad cross-national aggregate patterns that concerned the geographical distribution of clientelistic effort as well as its change over time and the differential effectiveness of clientelistic practices in translating into actual votes accruing to political parties in contested elections.

Let me close on what the paper has clearly not delivered. It has not ventured to supply any explanations for the rise or demise of clientelism in the world. It used some crude correlations with economic development only as yardstick for basic construct validation without examining in detail the correlation, let alone the presumed causation, involved in the relationship between affluence and political forms of democratic accountability. It also did not address any of the puzzles the data have uncovered, such as the patterns of change in clientelistic partisan effort over the first decade in the 21<sup>st</sup> century or the differential gaps between parties' clientelistic efforts and the electoral effectiveness of such commitments. The paper is thus only a teaser that does not constitute a stand-alone effort, but intimately ties into a whole array of further investigations some of which are documented in the initial set of studies featured at the May 2011 workshop.


## Bibliography

- Bates, Robert. 2008. *When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2009. Selecting Clients: Partisan Networks and the Electoral Benefits of Targeted Distribution. Paper prepared to be presented at the Conference on Vote-Maximizing Strategies of Political Parties, Washington University in St. Louis, November 5-7, 2009.
- Carkoglu, Ali, and Ozge Kemahlioglu. 2007. Patronage vs. Policy. Is This a Dichotomy for Turkish Voters? Paper prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. September 2007.
- Dunning, Thad, and Susan C. Stokes. 2010. How Does the Internal Structure of Political Parties Shape Their Distributive Strategies? Paper prepared for the workshop Political Parties in the Developing World. Princeton, NJ., April 30-May 1.
- Kitschelt, Herbert. 2007. "The Demise of Clientelism in Affluent Capitalist Democracies." In Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. Eds. *Patrons, Clients, and Policies. Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Competition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 298-321.
- Nichter, Simeon. 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot." *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 102, 1: 19-31.
- Panizza, Ugo. 2000. *The Public Sector Premium and the Gender Gap in Latin America: Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s*. Inter-American Development Bank Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (IDB). Research department Departamento de investigación Working Paper #431
- Schaffer, Frederic Charles, ed. 2007. *Elections for Sale. The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Schaffer, Frederic Charles, and Andreas Schedler. 2007. "What is Vote Buying?" in Frederic Charles Schaffer, ed. 2007. *Elections for Sale. The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner. Pp. 17-31.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2005. "Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence From Argentina." *American Political Science Review*. Vol. 99, 2: 315-26.
- Wang, Chin-Shou and Charles Kurzman. 2007. "Dilemmas of Electoral Clientelism: Taiwan, 1993." *International Political Science Review*. Vol. 28, No. 2: 225-45.
- Young, Daniel J. 2009. "Is Clientelism at Work in African Elections? A Study of Voting Behavior in Kenya and Zambia. Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 106, April 2009.  
[http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.php?option=com\\_docman&Itemid=39](http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=39)




**FIGURE 1: The Relationship Among Clientelistic Efforts in Less Affluent Countries**

(GDP per capita < \$10K/2008)




**Figure 2: Targeting of Benefits to Loyalist, Strategic, or Both Kinds of Voters**  
 (average % of experts/party who indicate that party uses the technique; N=506)




B15nwe =  $-.3772 + 4.6017 \cdot B6 + \text{error}$   
 R-squared: 0.88

**FIGURE 3: Relationship between Two Aggregate Indices of Clientelistic Effort**



**FIGURE 4: The Relationship Between GDPpc and Clientelistic Effort as Exercise in Concept Validation**



B7= 1.77126+ 0.500816\*B6+ error  
 R-squared: 0.2956

**Figure 5: Change of Clientelistic Effort over Time.  
 The last Decade (1998-2008)**



**TABLE 1: Clientelistic Practices in Wealthy Established Democracies**

COUNTRY	PARTY	MODES OF CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT (low = 1; high = 4)					CLIENTELISTIC EFFECTIVENESS? B11
		GIFTS	SOCIAL POLICY	JOBS	CONTRACTS	REGULATION	
Austria	OeVP	1.47	<b>2.53</b>	2.27	1.92	1.71	<b>2.92</b>
	SPOe	1.47	<b>2.60</b>	2.40	1.92	1.64	<b>3.00</b>
	FPOe	1.53	<b>2.38</b>	1.73	1.57	1.16	<b>2.50</b>
Italy	FI	2.04	<b>2.84</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>3.24</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>3.36</b>
	AN	2.04	<b>2.76</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>2.96</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>2.86</b>
	LN	1.71	2.48	<b>2.56</b>	<b>2.84</b>	<b>2.70</b>	<b>3.05</b>
	PD	1.52	2.48	2.48	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.76</b>	<b>2.36</b>
Japan	LDP	2.32	<b>3.33</b>	<b>2.47</b>	<b>3.56</b>	<b>3.17</b>	<b>3.26</b>
	Dem	2.11	2.33	2.16	2.17	2.17	<b>2.68</b>
	Komeito	2.06	<b>2.72</b>	<b>2.47</b>	<b>2.63</b>	<b>2.65</b>	<b>3.23</b>

**TABLE 2: Clientelism in the Post-Communist Region**

COUNTRY	PARTY	MODES OF CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT (low = 1; high = 4)					CLIENTELISTIC EFFECTIVENESS ?
		GIFTS	SOCIAL POLICY	JOBS	CONTRACTS	REGULATION	
Hungary	Fidesz	<b>2.62</b>	<b>3.14</b>	<b>2.93</b>	<b>3.07</b>	<b>2.54</b>	<b>2.92</b>
	MSzP	<b>3.00</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.29</b>	<b>2.92</b>	<b>3.31</b>
	KDU	1.67	2.00	2.08	2.15	1.91	2.17
Russia	United Russia	<b>3.50</b>	<b>3.46</b>	<b>2.68</b>	<b>3.21</b>	<b>3.38</b>	<b>3.36</b>
	CPDR	1.53	2.08	1.50	1.54	2.00	1.93
	Yabloko	1.43	1.62	1.08	1.31	1.57	1.33
Ukraine	Bloc Timoshenko	<b>2.14</b>	<b>3.00</b>	2.30	<b>3.43</b>	<b>3.36</b>	<b>3.62</b>
	Party of Regions	<b>2.68</b>	<b>3.05</b>	2.40	<b>3.57</b>	<b>3.36</b>	<b>3.32</b>
	Our Ukraine	1.90	<b>2.50</b>	2.26	<b>3.10</b>	<b>3.14</b>	<b>2.50</b>
Bulgaria	BSP	<b>3.15</b>	<b>3.31</b>	<b>3.62</b>	<b>3.69</b>	<b>3.23</b>	<b>3.54</b>
	NDSV	<b>3.33</b>	<b>3.08</b>	<b>3.42</b>	<b>3.42</b>	<b>3.52</b>	<b>3.09</b>
	DPS	<b>3.62</b>	<b>3.92</b>	<b>3.77</b>	<b>3.77</b>	<b>3.54</b>	<b>4.00</b>
	Ataka	<b>2.33</b>	<b>2.14</b>	<b>2.63</b>	<b>2.63</b>	<b>2.33</b>	<b>2.17</b>

**TABLE 3: Latin American Clientelism**

COUNTRY	PARTY	MODES OF CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT (low = 1; high = 4)					CLIENTELISTIC EFFECTIVENESS?
		GIFTS	SOCIAL POLICY	JOBS	CONTRACTS	REGULATION	
Argentina	PJ	3.55	3.82	3.90	3.91	4.00	3.73
	UCR	2.55	2.82	3.14	3.14	3.09	2.36
	AFV	3.33	3.62	3.57	3.65	3.52	3.67
Colombia	PLC	3.00	3.08	3.08	3.25	3.00	3.22
	PC	3.17	3.15	3.33	3.42	3.36	3.45
Brazil	PFL	3.54	3.35	3.33	3.41	3.64	3.0
	PMDB	3.33	3.47	3.60	3.41	3.64	3.14
	PSDB	2.14	2.50	2.47	2.76	3.00	2.54
	PT	2.27	2.76	2.87	2.81	3.00	3.07
Mexico	PRI	3.75	3.55	3.42	3.53	3.22	2.30
	PAN	2.70	2.80	2.79	3.11	3.39	1.70
	PRD	3.35	3.30	3.11	3.16	3.00	2.00

**TABLE 4: Clientelism in Asia**

COUNTRY	PARTY	MODES OF CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT (low = 1; high = 4)					CLIENTELISTIC EFFECTIVENESS?
		GIFTS	SOCIAL POLICY	JOBS	CONTRACTS	REGULATION	
Turkey	AKP	2.10	3.82	3.90	3.91	4.00	3.73
	CHP	1.29	3.00	3.50	3.18	2.86	2.36
	DP	1.14	2.17	3.20	2.60	2.60	1.89
Taiwan	KMT	3.12	3.56	2.63	2.69	3.67	3.56
	DP	2.75	3.17	2.56	2.50	3.44	3.11
Thailand	Palang Prachachon	3.13	3.11	2.17	3.14	3.14	4.00
	Prachatipat	2.75	2.67	2.00	2.57	2.86	3.43
Malaysia	UNMO	3.14	3.64	3.27	3.82	2.89	3.60
	Mal. Chinese Association	2.67	3.24	2.76	3.38	2.62	2.84
	PJP	1.43	1.68	1.36	1.18	1.74	1.94
India	INC	3.39	3.41	3.16	2.18	3.26	3.23
	BJP	3.19	3.30	2.96	3.00	3.18	3.51
	CPI	2.10	2.76	2.65	2.0	2.17	2.86
Indonesia	Golkar	3.62	3.57	2.58	2.85	3.00	2.92
	DP (pres)	3.38	3.57	2.58	2.77	2.92	3.18
	PDI (Megawati)	3.38	3.14	2.58	2.54	3.25	3.00

**TABLE 5: Clientelism in Sub-Saharan Africa**

COUNTRY	PARTY	MODES OF CLIENTELISTIC EFFORT (low = 1; high = 4)					CLIENTELISTIC EFFECTIVENESS?
		GIFTS	SOCIAL POLICY	JOBS	CONTRACTS	REGULATION	
Nigeria	AC	3.12	2.68	2.10	3.09	2.48	2.88
	ANPP	3.03	2.83	2.24	3.11	2.52	3.00
	PDP	3.17	2.94	2.44	3.53	3.03	3.06
Ghana	NPP	3.38	3.54	3.31	3.46	3.10	3.69
	NDC	3.31	3.38	3.08	3.15	2.70	3.23
Senegal	PDS	3.82	4.00	4.00	3.80	4.00	3.90
	SP	3.27	2.90	3.00	2.33	2.29	2.78
	AFP	3.45	2.70	2.73	1.89	2.14	1.83
South Africa	ANC	1.82	2.60	3.10	3.20	2.80	3.40
	DA	1.27	2.00	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.78
	Inkatha	1.70	2.44	2.67	2.0	1.63	2.57

**TABLE 6. Parties' Deployment of Civic Associations in Targeting Benefits**  
(parties in countries with GDPpc 2008 < \$10K; N=335)

		% of experts mentioning association (party mean)	Correlation between parties' use to civic associations and mode of clientelistic targeting (N=331)				
			gifts	Social benefits	jobs	Contracts	Regulation
Use of civic associations for targeting clientelistic benefits	Labor unions	23.5	.02	.17	.12	.04	.01
	Women's groups	26.2	.14	.10	.13	.04	-.03
	Business and professional associations	40.4	.19	.26	.10	.04	.05
	Urban neighborhood or rural association and movements	43.6	.21	.18	.16	.14	.12
	Religious organizations	23.2	.15	.26	.10	.04	.05
	Ethnic-linguistic associations	22.6	.01	.14	.07	-.01	-.08

**TABLE 7. Parties' Targeting Deployment of Civic Associations and Targeting Clientelistic Recipient Groups**  
(parties in countries with GDPpc 2008 < \$10K; N=335)

		% of experts mentioning targeted groups (weighted mean across parties)	Correlation between parties' use to civic associations and mode of clientelistic targeting (N=331)				
			gifts	Social benefits	jobs	Contracts	Regulation
Use of civic associations for targeting clientelistic benefits	Rural voters	45.7	.26	.26	.18	.20	.09
	Poor voters	55.8	.32	.35	.22	.16	.07
	Urban voters	53.7	.10	.09	.14	.13	.12
	Middle class voters	49.7	-.01	.08	.07	.03	-.01
	Rich voters	27.9	.17	.20	.19	.29	.23
	Ethnic voters	27.1	.02	.18	.12	.07	-.02